feat(multiplayer): implement WorkloadVerify without a Kubernetes trust boundary

WorkloadVerify (api.Service.WorkloadVerify) was permanently unwired: both
/v1/servers/{id}/register and /v1/servers/{id}/result always 503, because
the only design considered so far was verifying a Kubernetes-projected
service-account JWT (server/workload/jwt.go), which needs a live cluster's
TokenReview/JWKS endpoint to validate against safely -- something this
sandbox cannot do without guessing at a trust boundary.

The API layer doesn't actually require that specific mechanism. serverMutation
only compares WorkloadBinding.ServerID and .MatchID (server/api/service.go);
AdvanceServerRegistration only uses .MatchID/.ServerID/.AllocationID. Nothing
downstream needs Namespace/ServiceAcct/PodUID/GameServerUID populated.

This adds a self-contained alternative: a short-lived, HMAC-signed token the
control plane mints and verifies with a secret only it holds (server/workload/
signed_token.go), the same trust model domain.SessionStore already uses for
player sessions elsewhere in this codebase. It needs no cluster to verify --
signature + expiry is fully self-contained and unit-testable.

The design's soundness rests on the delivery channel, not the crypto: the
token is meant to reach the allocated GameServer via the same Agones
GameServerAllocation annotation channel allocation.go already uses for
match-id/allocation-id, readable only by that pod's own local SDK sidecar. A
caller presenting this token has already proven, via that channel, that it is
the pod Agones allocated. (Wiring the actual annotation delivery -- extending
agones.Client.Allocate and the supervisor's token source -- is a separate,
follow-up change; this commit lands the verification core it depends on.)

store.AllocationBindingStillValid adds defense-in-depth on top of signature
and expiry: it cross-checks the token's claims against the durable
allocations table (append-only, never leaves 'ALLOCATED'), so a validly-signed
token naming an allocation that was never recorded -- or a real allocation id
paired with a mismatched match/server -- is still rejected.

api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken wires the two together and is now plugged
into cmd/control-plane (new --workload-secret / COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET
flag; a startup warning is logged if it's left unset, since the route then
stays 503 exactly as before) and cmd/testkit-api (fixed test secret, since
that binary is test-only already).

Verified: new unit tests in server/workload (signature tamper, wrong secret,
expiry boundary, malformed input) and a new Postgres integration suite in
server/api (real allocation row, real signed token, acceptance / unknown-
allocation rejection / mismatched-triple rejection / the previously-503
Service.WorkloadVerify field itself) -- both run clean with -race across
multiple passes against a live postgres:17-alpine container. Full
`go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l . && go test ./... -race` and
`go test -tags integration ./... -race` both clean.
This commit is contained in:
Josh Creek
2026-09-01 14:51:21 +01:00
parent 330f99bb0e
commit 520613aab0
8 changed files with 497 additions and 14 deletions
+13 -12
View File
@@ -9,24 +9,25 @@ import (
func TestAPIHandlerExposesHealthWithoutDatabase(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
newAPIHandler(nil).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
newAPIHandler(nil, "").ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("health status = %d", rec.Code)
}
}
// TestServerRoutesRequireWorkloadVerifyToBeWired pins a real, known gap
// rather than leaving it silent: newAPIHandler wires ServerRegistrar and
// ResultSubmitter, but never a WorkloadVerify -- and Service.serverMutation
// treats a nil WorkloadVerify as fatal for BOTH the register and result
// routes, regardless of whether their own dependency is present. So today,
// in the actual running binary, POST /v1/servers/{id}/register and
// /v1/servers/{id}/result both always 503, independent of a real database or
// real request. This test should start failing (and be updated, not
// deleted) the day a real WorkloadVerify is wired -- that's the intended
// signal, not a bug in the test.
// TestServerRoutesRequireWorkloadVerifyToBeWired pins the deployment
// misconfiguration case: newAPIHandler wires ServerRegistrar and
// ResultSubmitter, but WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken deliberately returns
// nil whenever the secret or the database is missing (see
// api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken) rather than silently accepting every
// caller. Service.serverMutation treats a nil WorkloadVerify as fatal for
// BOTH the register and result routes. This test should start failing (and
// be updated, not deleted) the day this path stops 503ing with an empty
// secret and a nil database -- that's the intended signal, not a bug in the
// test. See TestWorkloadVerifierFromSignedTokenAcceptsARealAllocation in the
// api package's Postgres integration suite for the wired, working path.
func TestServerRoutesRequireWorkloadVerifyToBeWired(t *testing.T) {
handler := newAPIHandler(nil)
handler := newAPIHandler(nil, "")
for _, path := range []string{"/v1/servers/server-1/register", "/v1/servers/server-1/result"} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, path, nil)
req.Header.Set("Idempotency-Key", "regression-pin-key-123456")