fix(multiplayer): bind signed workload tokens to allocation_id only

The just-landed signed workload token embedded (allocation_id, match_id,
server_id) as claims. That doesn't actually work for its intended delivery
channel: the token is meant to be requested as a GameServerAllocation
annotation in the SAME request that asks Agones to pick a server, so at mint
time the allocator knows allocation_id (it generates it) but not yet which
server_id Agones will return -- server_id only exists in Agones's response,
after the annotation request has already been sent. Embedding it was simply
not possible for the real caller this was built for; only the (allocator ->
signed_token) unit tests and hand-constructed integration tests happened to
supply it directly, masking the gap.

Fixes it by having the token bind only allocation_id (the one identifier
actually known at mint time) plus expiry. match_id/server_id are resolved at
verify time from the durable allocations table via the new
store.AllocationBindingByAllocationID, keyed by allocation_id -- which the
allocator already records immediately after Agones responds. This is
strictly stronger, not just a workaround: a caller can no longer claim any
match/server pairing at all, even one that happens to be internally
consistent -- the binding returned is entirely durable-record-derived.

Verified: server/workload's unit tests updated for the new two-field claim
shape; server/api's Postgres integration suite gains
TestWorkloadVerifierFromSignedTokenNeverTrustsCallerSuppliedBinding (two
distinct real allocations each resolve to their own, and only their own,
match/server pairing) replacing the now-inapplicable mismatched-triple test.
Full `go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l . && go test ./... -race`
and `go test -tags integration ./... -race` both clean; the api integration
suite re-run 3x clean against a live postgres:17-alpine container.
This commit is contained in:
Josh Creek
2026-09-01 14:54:38 +01:00
parent 939b7a9584
commit d588898f5d
5 changed files with 118 additions and 86 deletions
+10 -14
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
secret := []byte("test-secret")
now := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0).UTC()
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(secret, "alloc-1", "match-1", "server-1", now, time.Minute)
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(secret, "alloc-1", now, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
}
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err)
}
if claims.AllocationID != "alloc-1" || claims.MatchID != "match-1" || claims.ServerID != "server-1" {
if claims.AllocationID != "alloc-1" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
}
}
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRejectsExpiry(t *testing.T) {
secret := []byte("test-secret")
now := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0).UTC()
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(secret, "alloc-1", "match-1", "server-1", now, time.Minute)
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(secret, "alloc-1", now, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
}
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRejectsExpiry(t *testing.T) {
func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRejectsTamperedPayload(t *testing.T) {
secret := []byte("test-secret")
now := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0).UTC()
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(secret, "alloc-1", "match-1", "server-1", now, time.Minute)
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(secret, "alloc-1", now, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
}
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRejectsTamperedPayload(t *testing.T) {
func TestSignedWorkloadTokenRejectsWrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0).UTC()
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken([]byte("secret-a"), "alloc-1", "match-1", "server-1", now, time.Minute)
token, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken([]byte("secret-a"), "alloc-1", now, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
}
@@ -80,20 +80,16 @@ func TestIssueSignedWorkloadTokenRejectsInvalidInput(t *testing.T) {
name string
secret []byte
allocationID string
matchID string
serverID string
now time.Time
ttl time.Duration
}{
{"empty secret", nil, "a", "m", "s", now, time.Minute},
{"empty allocation id", []byte("k"), "", "m", "s", now, time.Minute},
{"empty match id", []byte("k"), "a", "", "s", now, time.Minute},
{"empty server id", []byte("k"), "a", "m", "", now, time.Minute},
{"zero now", []byte("k"), "a", "m", "s", time.Time{}, time.Minute},
{"non-positive ttl", []byte("k"), "a", "m", "s", now, 0},
{"empty secret", nil, "a", now, time.Minute},
{"empty allocation id", []byte("k"), "", now, time.Minute},
{"zero now", []byte("k"), "a", time.Time{}, time.Minute},
{"non-positive ttl", []byte("k"), "a", now, 0},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if _, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(c.secret, c.allocationID, c.matchID, c.serverID, c.now, c.ttl); err == nil {
if _, err := IssueSignedWorkloadToken(c.secret, c.allocationID, c.now, c.ttl); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: expected an error, got nil", c.name)
}
}