newAPIService never supplied SteamLogin, so POST /v1/session/steam
always returned 503 auth_unavailable in production. The only
implementation was cmd/testkit-api's fake, which derives an identity
from the ticket string itself and accepts anything -- so the passing
integration path was neither deployable nor secure. On the client side
the game started with an empty token and a loopback base URL, and no
production code called configure() or login_steam(); the menu entered
matchmaking directly, so every request failed ERR_UNAUTHORIZED before
reaching the network.
Add a real ISteamUserAuth/AuthenticateUserTicket adapter behind an
interface, so the production login path is testable with only the Valve
call stubbed. It rejects family-shared copies (the account playing does
not own the app) and, by default, VAC- or publisher-banned accounts, and
refuses malformed tickets locally rather than forwarding them.
Crucially it separates our faults from the player's: a Valve outage or a
revoked publisher key returns 503, not 401. Answering 401 would tell a
legitimate player their login failed and send them to fix an account
that is fine while the real fault went unnoticed. A banned identity now
returns 403 rather than a misleading 503.
Sign-in is configuration-gated on the publisher key and App ID: without
them the endpoint keeps returning 503, since silently accepting an
unverified ticket would be worse than refusing to authenticate. A
returning player keeps the player ID they already had, so ratings,
penalties and bans follow the account rather than the session.
Client side: acquire a web-API ticket through GodotSteam's async
signal -- requesting one returns a handle, not a ticket -- using the
existing dynamic-call pattern so stock Godot still parses the project.
The endpoint is configurable for release builds, and matchmaking
completes sign-in before it will queue.
Verified against real PostgreSQL; 232 Godot tests pass.
banned_until and ban_reason have been in the schema since 0001, but no
production query ever read them -- grepping the tree found no reference
outside the migration itself. The only ban check was an in-memory map on
domain.TicketVerifier used by domain tests. Once real Steam login is
wired, a banned identity would keep full access through every existing
session until expiry and could obtain new ones.
Make the ban part of the durable authentication transaction rather than
a policy each login adapter must remember to re-implement:
- Session issuance inserts only when the identity exists and has no
active ban, so a banned player cannot mint a session.
- Authentication joins the identity and rejects an active ban on every
request, so a ban takes effect immediately on every replica rather
than at session expiry.
- ApplyIdentityBan sets the ban and revokes that identity's sessions in
one serializable transaction, closing the window where the ban is
durable but another replica still accepts an issued session.
Bans are time-bounded and clearing one does not resurrect sessions the
ban revoked.
Tests cover enforcement across two independently constructed stores
standing in for two replicas, expiry/unban semantics, and -- separately,
because revocation would otherwise mask it -- that a ban applied without
revoking anything still blocks the next request.
Josh Creek