5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Josh Creek	9f28c02488	feat(multiplayer): Phase 5 task 5.1 - match lifecycle state machine ... Adds the §6.1 state machine, its broadcast, and the client side that follows it. Physics, freezing and input are deliberately NOT gated on state yet - 5.3 and 5.4 own freeze/unfreeze at kickoff and goal, and doing it here would change the conditions every Phase 4 prediction gate was measured under. scripts/match_state.gd holds the enum and transition table as pure data with no scene or RPC dependency, so the table is checked exhaustively rather than by example: every state reachable, every state has an exit, no self-transitions, abort-to-LOBBY from anywhere per §6.4, illegal shortcuts rejected, unknown values refused rather than coerced. The enum values are the wire format - match_state has been a u8 in the snapshot header since §2.4 - so a test pins them; only append, never renumber. The server validates every transition and push_errors an illegal one rather than following it. Clients deliberately do NOT enforce the table: authoritative state must be accepted, and a late joiner legitimately jumps straight to PLAYING. Two channels carry the state. state_change (reliable, channel 0) is prompt and carries an absolute at_tick, never a duration. The snapshot's match_state byte is the catch-up path for a client not yet sent a transition - a late joiner, or the window between scene load and the first RPC. The byte needs a tick guard, and this was found the hard way. Snapshots are unreliable_ordered on channel 2 and ordering holds only within a channel, so a state_change for tick N routinely arrives before an in-flight snapshot from tick N-2. Without the guard the client applies the new state then gets dragged back by the older byte, oscillating on every transition - observed directly as LOADING -> WARMUP -> LOBBY -> PLAYING -> LOBBY while running a deliberately-broken-byte control. Only a byte at least as new as match_state_since_tick is accepted. WARMUP_TICKS/GOAL_PAUSE_TICKS are honest placeholders so 5.1 drives real transitions to verify against; 5.3 and 5.4 replace them. The server also leaves LOADING immediately rather than waiting for scene_ready, which does not exist yet. New smoke flag --exercise-match-state, passed to both roles: the host forces a goal to drive a GOAL_PAUSE cycle, the client records the sequence and asserts every consecutive pair is legal, that ticks are monotonic, and that the wire byte agrees with its own state. Observed LOADING -> WARMUP -> PLAYING -> GOAL_PAUSE -> WARMUP with tick deltas matching the configured durations exactly. Verified against a control: hardcoding the snapshot byte back to 0 fails both the byte assertion and the transition-legality assertion. The byte is asserted separately from the RPC precisely because everything else in the check is RPC-driven and would pass with a dead byte - the same gap that hid the Phase 4 label bug (gotcha 47). Regression: 81 unit tests; 60s free-flight LAN (p99 0.148m, 0 hard snaps, marker 0/3364); transition gate 0.00%; ball contact; two-bot CI.	2026-08-21 09:31:22 +01:00
Josh Creek	75f485667b	feat(multiplayer): Phase 4 prediction correctness + two input-death fixes ... Closes Phase 4's outstanding action-sequence-correctness invariant, then fixes two server-side bugs an adversarial review of that work uncovered. Server simulation, bot observations, collision resources and tick rate are unchanged: the server_physics_parity trace is byte-for-byte identical to HEAD across 360 ticks including both ships' full observation vectors. 4.11 - prediction history filed under the ISSUING sequence _send_local_input filed each post-step predicted state under the timeline's estimate of the sequence the server would consume this tick, trailing issuance by input_lead. The body had integrated the intent issued under _input_seq, so predicted[S] held "state after the intent from now" while the server's authority for S is "state after action(S)". They agree only while the stick is still. Filing under _input_seq costs nothing: which action the ship uses is decided in LocalNetShipController.get_action() and is untouched. Every prior Phase 4 gate held its input steady, and a steady input cannot falsify a sequence label - the 60s runs honestly reported marker=0/3784. New --exercise-input-transitions role toggles thrust every 6 ticks; it is the only gate that can catch a label regression. Verified non-vacuous: the old label fails it at 50%. 4.12 - issued-but-unsimulated sequences, and the release path An attack (delta > 1) issues and sends several sequences for one local physics step. Those gap sequences had no recorded prediction, so a server ack of one reported missing_not_recorded - indistinguishable from ring loss, costing a teleport and resync suppression several times a minute. They are now recorded stateless via record_unsimulated() and answered with a new "skip" decision mode. Free-flight hard snaps: 25/8/4 -> 0/0/0. A release (delta == 0) re-recorded at the unchanged _input_seq, filing the current intent under a sequence that went out carrying a different action; LocalInputTimeline deliberately refuses to mutate an issued sequence, so the ring contradicted the wire. Recording is now skipped on release ticks. 4.13 - two Phase 3 bugs silently killing player input (a) InputJitterBuffer.consume() advanced last_applied_seq on every tick including a starve. Since ingest() discards seq <= last_applied_seq, one starve on a sequence the client had not sent yet stranded the stream one ahead of arrivals permanently - both sides advancing in lockstep, every honest packet discarded on arrival. The client's own input_lead release is enough to trigger it, so input died for ~30 ticks roughly every 6.5s on a clean LAN. Now only gives up on a sequence once strictly newer data proves it lost. Silent-client stall and ring-overflow resync are unchanged. (b) The seq-range guard bounded incoming seq against highest_ingested_seq, which only advances inside ingest(), which that guard gates. After a ~2s host hitch every packet was rejected forever with no diagnostic (600+ consecutive rejections reproduced via SIGSTOP). Third iteration of this guard; each previous version bounded against a value only the accepted path could advance. Adds an escape after 10 consecutive rejections, which grants an attacker nothing the rate limiter does not already bound. (c) The transitions gate reported PASS at 3.76% while input was completely dead, because suppression stops _record_metrics - a worse outage yields fewer samples and a LOWER rate. Now scales the required sample count with run length and asserts the wire's server_stalled bit. Reverting both fixes makes it fail at samples 292/600, server_stalled=true, input_lead=12. Fixing (a) also explained a residual the review had already traced: 151 of 151 action-marker mismatches were the server repeating a stale action on a starve, not a prediction defect. Marker is now 0.00% in all three conditions (was 1.7-2.5%), and free-flight p99 improved to 0.141/0.168/0.154m from 0.170/0.176/0.184m. Two pre-existing test defects fixed alongside: the ball gate asserted RTT-masking on a link with no RTT (flaked 2 in 5; now asserted only at rtt >= 20ms, 5/5 under latency), and the two-bot CI compared scores across a 3-5s window (now polls the scores the server actually held; note score_changed is emitted only on the client path). QA: 72 unit tests; 60s free-flight at LAN/80+-20ms/5% loss; transition gate in all three; 2.0s and 3.5s host-freeze recovery; ball contact x5; two-bot CI x3; all three abuse roles; net/match_net/clock/lobby smokes. Phase 4 sign-off still pending a human playtest at ~100ms RTT - the milestone asks how it feels, which no gate here answers.	2026-08-21 09:17:19 +01:00
Josh Creek	2325313ad2	fix(multiplayer): adversarial review fixes for Phase 3 ... An Opus subagent's adversarial review of Phase 3 found a critical, silent, permanent bug plus eight smaller real issues, all empirically verified with real two- and three-process runs: CRITICAL: InputJitterBuffer's 32-entry ring permanently bricked a player's input once the un-consumed backlog exceeded the ring's capacity - a fresh arrival would land in the exact slot consume() was still waiting on, and since both counters only ever advance, the gap never closed. Reproduced with a real SIGSTOP/SIGCONT host freeze: client movement dropped from ~26m to 0.00m at ~0.7s, worse under real loss (a lossy link lowered the fatal threshold to ~400ms), and reachable via ordinary clock drift with no external trigger at all. Fixed by tracking the highest seq ever ingested and having consume() jump directly to what the ring can still provide once the gap exceeds capacity, instead of starving through an unrecoverable span. Re-verified with a 3s freeze (well past the original threshold): full recovery. HIGH: InputLeadController's release logic was gated on its own past attacks (lead > LEAD_MIN) rather than the real server-reported depth, so a backlog it didn't itself cause was never drained. Fixed to gate on actual depth vs target. MEDIUM-HIGH: the rate limiter's "N consecutive over-budget seconds" streak hard-reset to 0 on any clean window, letting a duty-cycled flood (burst, one clean window, repeat) sustain ~33x budget indefinitely with zero warnings. Replaced with a leaky-bucket accumulator immune to the same evasion by construction. MEDIUM: the seq > server_tick + 20 guard compared two unrelated clock epochs (server process uptime vs. client's own from-zero seq numbering), so it never actually protected anything on a long-running server and could silently drop an honest client's input forever. Bound against the buffer's own last_applied_seq instead. MEDIUM: InputJitterBuffer.stalled was computed but never reached the wire - the one signal that would have made the ring-overflow bug visible anywhere. Now wired through _ship_to_net_body_state. MEDIUM: task 3.6's CI driver's assertions didn't depend on client input reaching the server at all, so it kept passing with the ring-overflow bug actively triggered. Added real ship-movement and non-stalled checks, sampled while bots are still connected (an initial attempt sampled after their own legitimate disconnect, which starves identically to the bug). LOW-MEDIUM: a lead change silently mislabelled _input_history's older entries, since the wire format has no per-entry seq field. Fixed by handling each delta case (ordinary/release/attack) on its own terms. LOW: bandwidth and snapshot-loss overlay metrics froze at their last value during a total outage instead of decaying - exactly when they matter most. Both now report honest post-outage values. LOW: a guard comment on NetworkManager._ping misdescribed the actual disconnect_peer() arguments in use. Corrected. New permanent regression tests: test_ring_overflow_resyncs_to_fresh_data _instead_of_starving_forever, test_release_drains_a_backlog_it_never_ caused_itself, and client-abuse-flood-dutycycle (reproduces the exact duty-cycle evasion). Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate, all abuse roles, and the CI driver, re-run clean after every fix.	2026-08-20 15:28:44 +01:00
Josh Creek	b290f49143	feat(multiplayer): Phase 3 task 3.4 - input validation, rate limiting, disconnect policy ... MatchSim._recv_input now validates before decoding (§3.1 steps 2-3): per-peer rolling-1s rate limiting (packet count AND byte budget, dropping over-budget packets and disconnecting after 3 consecutive over-budget seconds), and framing validation (redundancy count and payload size checked against NetCodec's own layout before unpack_input ever runs, disconnecting after 20 malformed packets). Framing has to be validated explicitly rather than relying on decode failure: StreamPeerBuffer silently zero-fills past EOF instead of erroring, a finding from Phase 2's adversarial review. networked_match.gd's _on_input_received now rejects any seq claiming to be more than 20 ticks ahead of the current server tick (§3.1 step 4) and counts (rather than silently ignoring) input from a peer with no slot, for observability. Verified with two new permanent regression tests (networked_match_smoke.gd --role=client-abuse-malformed / client-abuse-flood) that call MatchSim._recv_input directly with garbage bytes and a legitimate-but- too-frequent flood, respectively, bypassing the honest client encoder entirely - the same thing a hostile custom client sending raw ENet packets would look like. Both confirm real disconnection, not just that the server tolerates the abuse. Two bugs surfaced by getting these tests to actually pass cleanly: a GDScript lambda-capture-by-value mistake in the tests themselves (a plain `var disconnected := false` mutated inside a signal-handler lambda never became visible to the enclosing function - fixed by capturing a single-element Array instead, which is captured by reference); and a narrow real race where NetworkManager's own ping/pong reply could target a peer that a concurrent abuse-triggered disconnect had just removed from the same poll() batch, now guarded. (Passing disconnect_peer's `force` parameter as an attempted fix for a related one-off benign error was tried and reverted - it made Godot's own peer-list bookkeeping inconsistent, producing hundreds of errors instead of one; verified empirically rather than assumed.) Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate, re-run clean.	2026-08-20 13:27:03 +01:00
Josh Creek	39a41c016c	feat(multiplayer): Phase 2 server-authoritative simulation, dumb client ... Implements tasks 2.1-2.7: NetworkedMatch spawns a deterministic slot layout from the lobby roster, the server drives each connected peer's ship via RLShipController fed by decoded client input and broadcasts 60Hz snapshots, and the client renders everything (including its own ship) from a per-body NetInterpolator with no local prediction yet. Dual-time remote entities split collider updates (present-time, for correct contacts) from $Visual updates (interp-delayed, for smoothness). Camera/HUD wiring and remote engine-flame VFX fell out of the existing Ship API for free once snapshots were flowing. Three real bugs found and fixed while getting a two-process test green: an RPC method named _input collided with Node's built-in _input virtual and broke the whole MatchSim autoload from loading; networked_match.gd never called NetworkManager.poll(), so nothing sent via RPC in this scene reached the wire despite Phase 1's manual polling being wired up everywhere else; and a match_config request/response fallback (added to close a startup race) could double-deliver once polling was fixed, requiring an idempotency guard. Verified with tests/networked_match_smoke: a real headless two-process host+client run shows the client rendering 31m of server-authoritative movement from a held forward-thrust input, with thrust_z=1.0 confirmed on the interpolated snapshot mid-drive and camera/HUD both wired. Full Phase 1 regression suite re-run clean alongside it. Task 2.8 (net_sim.gd latency/jitter/loss decorator) is not yet done; Phase 2's own gate needs it before it's fully met.	2026-08-20 08:42:13 +01:00