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63 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Josh Creek
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3d6906b981 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 5 tasks 5.2-5.5 - clock, kickoff, goals, full time
Implements the rest of the §6.2 lifecycle on top of 5.1's state machine.
5.3 kickoff: the server resets every body and broadcasts the RESULTING
transforms, never a seed - §1's locked decision, because shared-seed
determinism needs both sides to consume the RNG stream in identical
order forever and the first randf() added to the reset path desyncs
silently. Countdown is derived from server_tick on both peers, and a
kickoff that lands after its own resume tick applies immediately and
skips the countdown rather than scheduling into the past.
5.4 goals: goal_scored(scoring_team, score, goal_tick, resume_tick).
Score is authoritative at sensor time, before any presentation. The
reset moved OUT of the sensor path and into the kickoff at resume_tick,
which is what stops the server resetting while clients are still
mid-celebration. Engine.time_scale is never touched.
5.2 clock: tick-derived, no Timer and no _process polling. The goal
pause shifts the absolute end_tick by (resume_tick - goal_tick) rather
than pausing anything, so no float drift accumulates across goals.
5.5 full time: clock expiry -> FULL_TIME -> sudden death on a draw or
RESULTS, golden goal in overtime, then LOBBY on both peers - clients
return to the lobby, not the main menu. get_tree().paused is never used.
Four bugs found and fixed while building this, each by a failing run
rather than by inspection:
- Tick order was load-bearing: _update_kickoff_countdown() clears the
same _kickoff_resume_tick that _update_match_state() reads to leave
WARMUP, so running the countdown first wiped the transition condition
and the match sat frozen in WARMUP forever.
- _apply_match_state resets _state_deadline_tick on every transition, so
a GOAL_PAUSE deadline assigned before _set_match_state was wiped and
the match never resumed. Deadlines are now owned by _apply_match_state.
- Freezing "all bodies" is wrong on a client. Remote ships and the ball
are permanently FREEZE_MODE_KINEMATIC and transform-driven; freezing
them all unfroze the remote ones on the way back out, so they fell
under gravity while the interpolator fought them - 210 hard snaps and
an infinite p99. A client now freezes only the one body it simulates.
- A frozen body never runs _integrate_forces, so the queued kickoff
teleport was stranded by an immediate set_deferred("freeze", true).
Freeze now happens on a strictly later tick, the same pattern Phase 2
used for _pending_reset_gen_bump_tick.
Prediction and reconciliation are suspended while the match is not live:
during a countdown or goal pause the local ship is frozen on both peers,
and running delta transport over those frozen states produced a p95
position error of 2.4e10 m. Input keeps flowing so the server's jitter
buffer does not starve into `stalled`.
Also fixed: a kickoff can arrive before match_config, and body order is
slot order - applying it early placed the BALL at positions[0], on top
of the first ship, which the ball-cam reported as "target vector can't
be zero" 95 times. It is now held until the roster exists.
Test changes: the ball-contact scenario steered by a hand-tuned fixed
heading, which 5.3 broke because kickoff applies KICKOFF_YAW_JITTER - it
flew past the ball in 3/3 runs. It now closes the loop on the actual
bearing using real input actions. Assertions that read a frozen ship
(freeze, thrust) are gated on the match being live, and the hooks now
survive the scene teardown at RESULTS instead of hanging on freed
objects for the full timeout.
Regression: 81 unit tests; free-flight LAN p99 0.143m and 80±20ms, both
0 hard snaps; transition gate 0.00%; ball contact 3/3; two-bot CI.
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Josh Creek
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9f28c02488 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 5 task 5.1 - match lifecycle state machine
Adds the §6.1 state machine, its broadcast, and the client side that follows it. Physics, freezing and input are deliberately NOT gated on state yet - 5.3 and 5.4 own freeze/unfreeze at kickoff and goal, and doing it here would change the conditions every Phase 4 prediction gate was measured under. scripts/match_state.gd holds the enum and transition table as pure data with no scene or RPC dependency, so the table is checked exhaustively rather than by example: every state reachable, every state has an exit, no self-transitions, abort-to-LOBBY from anywhere per §6.4, illegal shortcuts rejected, unknown values refused rather than coerced. The enum values are the wire format - match_state has been a u8 in the snapshot header since §2.4 - so a test pins them; only append, never renumber. The server validates every transition and push_errors an illegal one rather than following it. Clients deliberately do NOT enforce the table: authoritative state must be accepted, and a late joiner legitimately jumps straight to PLAYING. Two channels carry the state. state_change (reliable, channel 0) is prompt and carries an absolute at_tick, never a duration. The snapshot's match_state byte is the catch-up path for a client not yet sent a transition - a late joiner, or the window between scene load and the first RPC. The byte needs a tick guard, and this was found the hard way. Snapshots are unreliable_ordered on channel 2 and ordering holds only within a channel, so a state_change for tick N routinely arrives before an in-flight snapshot from tick N-2. Without the guard the client applies the new state then gets dragged back by the older byte, oscillating on every transition - observed directly as LOADING -> WARMUP -> LOBBY -> PLAYING -> LOBBY while running a deliberately-broken-byte control. Only a byte at least as new as match_state_since_tick is accepted. WARMUP_TICKS/GOAL_PAUSE_TICKS are honest placeholders so 5.1 drives real transitions to verify against; 5.3 and 5.4 replace them. The server also leaves LOADING immediately rather than waiting for scene_ready, which does not exist yet. New smoke flag --exercise-match-state, passed to both roles: the host forces a goal to drive a GOAL_PAUSE cycle, the client records the sequence and asserts every consecutive pair is legal, that ticks are monotonic, and that the wire byte agrees with its own state. Observed LOADING -> WARMUP -> PLAYING -> GOAL_PAUSE -> WARMUP with tick deltas matching the configured durations exactly. Verified against a control: hardcoding the snapshot byte back to 0 fails both the byte assertion and the transition-legality assertion. The byte is asserted separately from the RPC precisely because everything else in the check is RPC-driven and would pass with a dead byte - the same gap that hid the Phase 4 label bug (gotcha 47). Regression: 81 unit tests; 60s free-flight LAN (p99 0.148m, 0 hard snaps, marker 0/3364); transition gate 0.00%; ball contact; two-bot CI. |
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Josh Creek
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75f485667b |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 4 prediction correctness + two input-death fixes
Closes Phase 4's outstanding action-sequence-correctness invariant, then fixes two server-side bugs an adversarial review of that work uncovered. Server simulation, bot observations, collision resources and tick rate are unchanged: the server_physics_parity trace is byte-for-byte identical to HEAD across 360 ticks including both ships' full observation vectors. 4.11 - prediction history filed under the ISSUING sequence _send_local_input filed each post-step predicted state under the timeline's estimate of the sequence the server would consume this tick, trailing issuance by input_lead. The body had integrated the intent issued under _input_seq, so predicted[S] held "state after the intent from now" while the server's authority for S is "state after action(S)". They agree only while the stick is still. Filing under _input_seq costs nothing: which action the ship uses is decided in LocalNetShipController.get_action() and is untouched. Every prior Phase 4 gate held its input steady, and a steady input cannot falsify a sequence label - the 60s runs honestly reported marker=0/3784. New --exercise-input-transitions role toggles thrust every 6 ticks; it is the only gate that can catch a label regression. Verified non-vacuous: the old label fails it at 50%. 4.12 - issued-but-unsimulated sequences, and the release path An attack (delta > 1) issues and sends several sequences for one local physics step. Those gap sequences had no recorded prediction, so a server ack of one reported missing_not_recorded - indistinguishable from ring loss, costing a teleport and resync suppression several times a minute. They are now recorded stateless via record_unsimulated() and answered with a new "skip" decision mode. Free-flight hard snaps: 25/8/4 -> 0/0/0. A release (delta == 0) re-recorded at the unchanged _input_seq, filing the current intent under a sequence that went out carrying a different action; LocalInputTimeline deliberately refuses to mutate an issued sequence, so the ring contradicted the wire. Recording is now skipped on release ticks. 4.13 - two Phase 3 bugs silently killing player input (a) InputJitterBuffer.consume() advanced last_applied_seq on every tick including a starve. Since ingest() discards seq <= last_applied_seq, one starve on a sequence the client had not sent yet stranded the stream one ahead of arrivals permanently - both sides advancing in lockstep, every honest packet discarded on arrival. The client's own input_lead release is enough to trigger it, so input died for ~30 ticks roughly every 6.5s on a clean LAN. Now only gives up on a sequence once strictly newer data proves it lost. Silent-client stall and ring-overflow resync are unchanged. (b) The seq-range guard bounded incoming seq against highest_ingested_seq, which only advances inside ingest(), which that guard gates. After a ~2s host hitch every packet was rejected forever with no diagnostic (600+ consecutive rejections reproduced via SIGSTOP). Third iteration of this guard; each previous version bounded against a value only the accepted path could advance. Adds an escape after 10 consecutive rejections, which grants an attacker nothing the rate limiter does not already bound. (c) The transitions gate reported PASS at 3.76% while input was completely dead, because suppression stops _record_metrics - a worse outage yields fewer samples and a LOWER rate. Now scales the required sample count with run length and asserts the wire's server_stalled bit. Reverting both fixes makes it fail at samples 292/600, server_stalled=true, input_lead=12. Fixing (a) also explained a residual the review had already traced: 151 of 151 action-marker mismatches were the server repeating a stale action on a starve, not a prediction defect. Marker is now 0.00% in all three conditions (was 1.7-2.5%), and free-flight p99 improved to 0.141/0.168/0.154m from 0.170/0.176/0.184m. Two pre-existing test defects fixed alongside: the ball gate asserted RTT-masking on a link with no RTT (flaked 2 in 5; now asserted only at rtt >= 20ms, 5/5 under latency), and the two-bot CI compared scores across a 3-5s window (now polls the scores the server actually held; note score_changed is emitted only on the client path). QA: 72 unit tests; 60s free-flight at LAN/80+-20ms/5% loss; transition gate in all three; 2.0s and 3.5s host-freeze recovery; ball contact x5; two-bot CI x3; all three abuse roles; net/match_net/clock/lobby smokes. Phase 4 sign-off still pending a human playtest at ~100ms RTT - the milestone asks how it feels, which no gate here answers. |
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Josh Creek
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3d3024ae8a |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 4 tasks 4.1/4.2 - local prediction history ring
Adds LocalPredictionHistory, a client-owned seq-tagged ring recording predicted ship state per input sequence, plus wiring in NetworkedMatch to record predictions on send and compare them against authoritative snapshots on arrival. Ships stay frozen/interpolated until 4.3 lands actual correction logic; this round only builds the comparison machinery and its data. Includes fixes from two review rounds: resync_required now self-clears once acknowledgements catch back up (mirrors InputJitterBuffer's stalled flag), NetBodyState gained a copy() method to stop diagnostic accessors aliasing ring-owned state, and corrected comments that had described the local ship as being force-simulated pre-4.3 when it is still driven by interpolated transform writes. |
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Josh Creek
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cf73074e27 |
fix(multiplayer): resolve composition regression from second adversarial review
A second adversarial review of the previous fix commit found two of its nine fixes silently defeated each other: the seq-range guard (fix for a MEDIUM epoch-mismatch finding) capped the exact variable the ring-overflow resync (fix for the original CRITICAL finding) depends on, making the resync unreachable in production and recreating permanent input death at a lower failure threshold, reachable via ordinary server tick loss alone. - CRITICAL: rebind the seq-range guard to InputJitterBuffer's own highest_ingested_seq (now public) instead of the consumer-side last_applied_seq, so it tracks the client's send epoch rather than a value that can lag arbitrarily far behind during a stall. - HIGH: InputLeadController's release logic still ANDed the old `lead > LEAD_MIN` gate onto the new depth-driven condition, so a backlog the controller never caused still couldn't drain. Split into two independent decisions: the seq-duplicate action follows real depth alone; lead's own bookkeeping separately never drops below its floor. - MEDIUM: widen the CI driver's movement/stalled sampling margin (run_seconds - 2.0, was - 0.5) and assert the peer is still in multiplayer.get_peers() at sample time, since the old margin let the check pass on residual starvation grace after a bot had already disconnected. - LOW: measure horizontal-only displacement in the human smoke test's movement check — the old 3D-distance bar was beatable by pure gravity settling with fully dead input. - LOW: fix a real "clean stderr" violation (match_net.gd broadcasting a departure notice to a peer whose ENet channels are already torn down, including a second peer disconnecting in the same poll batch) by deferring the notification to the next idle frame. - Wire the server's per-slot stalled bit into the client debug overlay for real — a prior commit message claimed this already reached the overlay when only the CI gate actually read it. Re-verified end-to-end against the real production RPC path (not just unit tests in isolation, which is how the composition bug got past the first round): a 2-bot CI match with a 1.5s host SIGSTOP freeze injected mid-run, well past the 0.6s threshold the review reproduced the bug at, now recovers cleanly on repeated runs with zero stderr noise. |
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Josh Creek
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2325313ad2 |
fix(multiplayer): adversarial review fixes for Phase 3
An Opus subagent's adversarial review of Phase 3 found a critical, silent, permanent bug plus eight smaller real issues, all empirically verified with real two- and three-process runs: CRITICAL: InputJitterBuffer's 32-entry ring permanently bricked a player's input once the un-consumed backlog exceeded the ring's capacity - a fresh arrival would land in the exact slot consume() was still waiting on, and since both counters only ever advance, the gap never closed. Reproduced with a real SIGSTOP/SIGCONT host freeze: client movement dropped from ~26m to 0.00m at ~0.7s, worse under real loss (a lossy link lowered the fatal threshold to ~400ms), and reachable via ordinary clock drift with no external trigger at all. Fixed by tracking the highest seq ever ingested and having consume() jump directly to what the ring can still provide once the gap exceeds capacity, instead of starving through an unrecoverable span. Re-verified with a 3s freeze (well past the original threshold): full recovery. HIGH: InputLeadController's release logic was gated on its own past attacks (lead > LEAD_MIN) rather than the real server-reported depth, so a backlog it didn't itself cause was never drained. Fixed to gate on actual depth vs target. MEDIUM-HIGH: the rate limiter's "N consecutive over-budget seconds" streak hard-reset to 0 on any clean window, letting a duty-cycled flood (burst, one clean window, repeat) sustain ~33x budget indefinitely with zero warnings. Replaced with a leaky-bucket accumulator immune to the same evasion by construction. MEDIUM: the seq > server_tick + 20 guard compared two unrelated clock epochs (server process uptime vs. client's own from-zero seq numbering), so it never actually protected anything on a long-running server and could silently drop an honest client's input forever. Bound against the buffer's own last_applied_seq instead. MEDIUM: InputJitterBuffer.stalled was computed but never reached the wire - the one signal that would have made the ring-overflow bug visible anywhere. Now wired through _ship_to_net_body_state. MEDIUM: task 3.6's CI driver's assertions didn't depend on client input reaching the server at all, so it kept passing with the ring-overflow bug actively triggered. Added real ship-movement and non-stalled checks, sampled while bots are still connected (an initial attempt sampled after their own legitimate disconnect, which starves identically to the bug). LOW-MEDIUM: a lead change silently mislabelled _input_history's older entries, since the wire format has no per-entry seq field. Fixed by handling each delta case (ordinary/release/attack) on its own terms. LOW: bandwidth and snapshot-loss overlay metrics froze at their last value during a total outage instead of decaying - exactly when they matter most. Both now report honest post-outage values. LOW: a guard comment on NetworkManager._ping misdescribed the actual disconnect_peer() arguments in use. Corrected. New permanent regression tests: test_ring_overflow_resyncs_to_fresh_data _instead_of_starving_forever, test_release_drains_a_backlog_it_never_ caused_itself, and client-abuse-flood-dutycycle (reproduces the exact duty-cycle evasion). Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate, all abuse roles, and the CI driver, re-run clean after every fix. |
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Josh Creek
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caa9f44ab6 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 3 task 3.6 - --test-bot client mode + CI driver
networked_match.gd's client can now swap its input sampler for a real AIShipController (--test-bot, optionally --test-bot-model=<path>, defaulting to bots/promoted/medium.json) instead of PlayerShipController. Unlike the human sampler, AIShipController needs real scene context (get_parent() as Ship, plus ball/teammate/opponent discovery via groups), so it's parented onto the client's own ship via Ship.set_controller() rather than left floating - and the field's static type widened from PlayerShipController to the shared ShipController base to allow either. Known, documented limitation: this client's ships are all FREEZE_MODE_KINEMATIC and driven purely by transform writes, so nothing ever writes linear_velocity/angular_velocity onto them - the bot's observations always see every ship as stationary. It still produces well-formed, bounded actions from that degraded input (the policy network's output layer is bounded regardless of input quality), which is sufficient for this task's actual job: generating realistic sustained network traffic for CI, not winning matches. New CI driver (tests/networked_match_ci.gd/.tscn): a headless server plus two headless --test-bot clients playing a real match. task 3.6's original acceptance text also named "p95/p99 prediction error" and "snap count" - both Phase 4 concepts that don't exist until client-side prediction and its hard-snap threshold are built, so asserting on them now would be fabricated. What's checked instead: snapshot throughput (500+ received over an 8s run, comfortably above a 60Hz-scaled floor), and genuine cross-peer score agreement - forced via a deterministic server-side goal (bot-vs-bot scoring isn't reliable enough within a short run to gate on), with each client independently writing its own final score to a peer-id- keyed file for the host to compare against the other bot's, not just trusting the server's own view. "Clean stderr" is left as the external invocation's job, same as every other smoke test in this project. Verified with real 3-process runs (host + two bots): both clients independently confirmed identical scores after a forced goal, both saw 500+ snapshots, and all three processes exited 0 with clean stderr on a representative run (one run separately hit the same known, already- documented single-benign-error disconnect-timing race task 3.4's own abuse tests hit - not a new issue). Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate and the abuse-detection tests, re-run clean. |
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Josh Creek
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b290f49143 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 3 task 3.4 - input validation, rate limiting, disconnect policy
MatchSim._recv_input now validates before decoding (§3.1 steps 2-3): per-peer rolling-1s rate limiting (packet count AND byte budget, dropping over-budget packets and disconnecting after 3 consecutive over-budget seconds), and framing validation (redundancy count and payload size checked against NetCodec's own layout before unpack_input ever runs, disconnecting after 20 malformed packets). Framing has to be validated explicitly rather than relying on decode failure: StreamPeerBuffer silently zero-fills past EOF instead of erroring, a finding from Phase 2's adversarial review. networked_match.gd's _on_input_received now rejects any seq claiming to be more than 20 ticks ahead of the current server tick (§3.1 step 4) and counts (rather than silently ignoring) input from a peer with no slot, for observability. Verified with two new permanent regression tests (networked_match_smoke.gd --role=client-abuse-malformed / client-abuse-flood) that call MatchSim._recv_input directly with garbage bytes and a legitimate-but- too-frequent flood, respectively, bypassing the honest client encoder entirely - the same thing a hostile custom client sending raw ENet packets would look like. Both confirm real disconnection, not just that the server tolerates the abuse. Two bugs surfaced by getting these tests to actually pass cleanly: a GDScript lambda-capture-by-value mistake in the tests themselves (a plain `var disconnected := false` mutated inside a signal-handler lambda never became visible to the enclosing function - fixed by capturing a single-element Array instead, which is captured by reference); and a narrow real race where NetworkManager's own ping/pong reply could target a peer that a concurrent abuse-triggered disconnect had just removed from the same poll() batch, now guarded. (Passing disconnect_peer's `force` parameter as an attempted fix for a related one-off benign error was tried and reverted - it made Godot's own peer-list bookkeeping inconsistent, producing hundreds of errors instead of one; verified empirically rather than assumed.) Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate, re-run clean. |
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Josh Creek
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5bbb319161 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 3 task 3.3 - client-owned input_lead control loop
New InputLeadController (scripts/input_lead_controller.gd, standalone and unit-tested like input_jitter_buffer.gd): fast attack (+3 immediately, debounced to once per 30 ticks) on any server-reported starve, slow release (-1 per 60 ticks, gated behind a one-time 2s clean-surplus bar) otherwise, clamped [1, 12]. Deliberately the only thing that adapts buffer depth - the server (InputJitterBuffer) stays a pure reporter, per §3.3's explicit warning that multiple control loops acting on one plant (buffer occupancy) oscillate and present as unattributable sticky controls. Wired into the client's per-tick input send: a lead change is realized as extra distance between the client's outgoing sequence numbers and what the server has consumed - an attack skips extra sequence numbers, a release duplicates the current one (sent again, unincremented). The server's ring buffer needs no special handling for either: a skipped seq is an ordinary drop, a duplicated one is a same-seq resend already discarded by the existing "already consumed" check. Verified with real two-process runs: on a clean LAN, one early attack (a momentary hiccup during connection setup) recovers via two releases within the test's own ~4s window, settling back near minimum. Under sustained 30% simulated loss, lead climbs to 7 via repeated attacks and never releases while genuine loss continues - confirming the debounce, attack, and release gates all fire on real conditions, not just in isolated unit tests. Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate, re-run clean. |
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Josh Creek
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86a597f0f5 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 3 tasks 3.1/3.2/3.5 - input redundancy + server jitter buffer
Client now sends the last 4 ticks' actions per packet (newest-first, already-supported by net_codec's wire format from Phase 1) instead of a single action with no redundancy. Server gains a real per-slot ring buffer (new InputJitterBuffer class, scripts/input_jitter_buffer.gd) that consumes exactly one sequence number per physics tick: repeats the last action on a starve, zeroes only after a sustained 500ms stall, and reports real input_buffer_depth/last_input_seq/echo_client_send_ms in every snapshot instead of the hardcoded zeros Phase 2 shipped with. InputJitterBuffer is a standalone, scene-free RefCounted (same pattern as net_codec.gd/net_interpolator.gd) specifically so it's unit-testable against scripted arrival traces (tests/cases/test_input_jitter_buffer.gd): sequential consumption, redundancy surviving a 3-packet burst loss (3.1's own acceptance criterion), starvation repeat-then-zero timing, stale/ reordered packet handling, buffered-depth reporting, and ring-wraparound slot-tagging safety. One real bug found wiring this into a live match: the server's ring buffer started counting its own "expected sequence" from 0 the instant a player's slot was created - well before that player's first real packet could possibly have arrived (connection handshake, arena/ship spawn all take real time first). Since both sides only ever advance monotonically with no resync mechanism, that gap between the server's arbitrary local counter and the client's actual from-1 sequence numbers never closed, so the ship simply never received the client's input (0m movement in a two-process test). Fixed by seeding the buffer's expected-sequence counter from the client's own numbering on first real ingest, rather than assuming a shared from-zero baseline. Verified with real two-process runs: clean baseline movement restored, zero starvation observed under 25% random simulated input loss (well above what redundancy-4 needs to fully absorb), and correct starve-then- stall behaviour confirmed under 100% loss as a sanity check that the mechanism isn't a silent no-op. Full regression suite, including the net-sim-latency milestone gate, re-run clean. |
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Josh Creek
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7b150ef72e |
feat(multiplayer): task 2.8 net_sim.gd, close out Phase 2
New NetSim autoload: seeded, CLI-driven (--net-sim-latency/-jitter/-loss/-dup) latency/jitter/loss/duplicate decorator, a true no-op passthrough unless a flag is set. Wraps MatchSim.send_input/send_snapshot per the design doc's scope, plus NetworkManager's ping/pong so the already-tested RTT/clock measurement becomes the acceptance signal for "raises observed RTT" without waiting on Phase 3's per-peer snapshot echo. Two real bugs found while building and verifying this against Phase 2's own milestone gate (a real match under --net-sim-latency 80 --net-sim-jitter 20, not just LAN): a timestamp captured inside a delayed RPC closure silently ate that side's own added delay out of the round-trip measurement instead of adding to it; and a delayed send whose target disconnected (or whose own process had already shut down) during the hold threw RPC errors, since the existing get_peers() filtering only checked validity at schedule time. Fixed by capturing timestamps before handing off to NetSim, and by having NetSim re-validate the target at fire time. Phase 2's milestone gate now passes for real: a full 1v1 under simulated 80ms latency / 20ms jitter still shows clean server-authoritative movement and zero RPC errors. Full Phase 1 + Phase 2 regression suite re-verified clean with NetSim present but inactive. |
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Josh Creek
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39a41c016c |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 2 server-authoritative simulation, dumb client
Implements tasks 2.1-2.7: NetworkedMatch spawns a deterministic slot layout from the lobby roster, the server drives each connected peer's ship via RLShipController fed by decoded client input and broadcasts 60Hz snapshots, and the client renders everything (including its own ship) from a per-body NetInterpolator with no local prediction yet. Dual-time remote entities split collider updates (present-time, for correct contacts) from $Visual updates (interp-delayed, for smoothness). Camera/HUD wiring and remote engine-flame VFX fell out of the existing Ship API for free once snapshots were flowing. Three real bugs found and fixed while getting a two-process test green: an RPC method named _input collided with Node's built-in _input virtual and broke the whole MatchSim autoload from loading; networked_match.gd never called NetworkManager.poll(), so nothing sent via RPC in this scene reached the wire despite Phase 1's manual polling being wired up everywhere else; and a match_config request/response fallback (added to close a startup race) could double-deliver once polling was fixed, requiring an idempotency guard. Verified with tests/networked_match_smoke: a real headless two-process host+client run shows the client rendering 31m of server-authoritative movement from a held forward-thrust input, with thrust_z=1.0 confirmed on the interpolated snapshot mid-drive and camera/HUD both wired. Full Phase 1 regression suite re-run clean alongside it. Task 2.8 (net_sim.gd latency/jitter/loss decorator) is not yet done; Phase 2's own gate needs it before it's fully met. |
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Josh Creek
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4533da34e0 |
feat(multiplayer): Phase 1 transport, connection, and lobby
Lands tasks 1.0-1.8 of multiplayer-todo.md: the pure-function test runner, net_codec (wire format quantizers/pack-unpack), NetworkManager (ENet transport, manual polling, min-RTT clock sync), MatchNet (handshake, protocol/tick-rate gating, roster with team+ready state), lobby.tscn (team columns, switch team, ready toggle), server_boot.tscn (headless dedicated server with structured logging and an overrun watchdog), and main_menu.gd's Host/Join-by-IP UI (connecting overlay, cancel, bounded failure path). Followed by an adversarial review (Opus subagent) that found and fixed two real bugs - an unvalidated player_name broadcast that let one client's oversized name head-of-line-block the reliable channel for everyone, and a server-side roster leak across a host/re-host cycle - plus three gaps in the test suite itself where a claim of "verified" wasn't actually backed by what the test checked. All five two-process smoke tests plus the pure-function suite are green with the strengthened assertions in place. |