Several independent causes, all of which had to be right before the
Fleet could reach Ready.
The supervisor pointed --sdk-base-url at 127.0.0.1:9357, which is the
Agones sidecar's gRPC port; its HTTP surface is 9358, and that is what
AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT carries and what agones_sdk.gd reads. An HTTP
client against the gRPC port could never have worked, in kind or in
production.
The supervisor also treated the sidecar's first incomplete /gameserver
response as fatal. The sidecar accepts requests before the controller
populates status.address and status.ports, so this produced a restart
loop precisely during normal Agones startup. It now polls until the
endpoint is assigned or ReadyTimeout elapses.
server_boot.gd started ServerControl and the Agones SDK only under
--allocated-mode, but the kind smoke deliberately strips that flag, so
nothing served the readiness probe and the GameServer could never become
Ready. Lifecycle now keys on AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT, which Agones injects
into every managed container, while allocation and roster semantics stay
tied to --allocated-mode. The SDK node is added to the tree
non-deferred, since start_health() creates a Timer immediately.
Fleet: Agones assigns its own SDK service account and masks that token
from the game container while keeping it for the injected sidecar, so
the manifest must not pin serviceAccountName or
automountServiceAccountToken. Godot stores user:// under HOME, so HOME
points at the writable runtime volume to keep the root filesystem
read-only, and fsGroup makes that volume writable for the non-root user.
Namespace: Agones' Dynamic port policy injects a hostPort, which both
the baseline and restricted Pod Security Standards forbid, so the
workload namespace enforces privileged while continuing to audit and
warn against restricted.
NetworkPolicy: the injected sidecar reaches the Kubernetes API over
HTTPS, and NetworkPolicy applies to the whole Pod rather than to the
container whose token was masked.
The kind runner creates the namespace before Helm so Agones can install
its per-namespace SDK RBAC, scopes gameservers.namespaces to it, forces
the allocator and ping Services to ClusterIP because LoadBalancer
ingress never becomes ready in plain kind, and labels the node so the
production Fleet's on-demand/zone constraints are exercised rather than
edited out of the rendered manifest.
The dump added in 9ab1bec8 never ran. A `kubectl cluster-info`
reachability guard suppressed it, so its first exercise produced exactly
the silence it was written to prevent. Every command inside is already
`|| true`, so the guard bought nothing and cost the whole dump; removed.
That run did establish something the CI logs cannot: after clearing
local Docker pressure, the Agones install completes cleanly (controller
and allocator both reach "condition met") and the gate instead fails
later, waiting for the Fleet's game-server pods to become Ready. CI
never reaches that point because the Agones install times out first.
So there are likely two failures stacked, and fixing the CI timeout will
probably expose the Fleet one. Recorded in AGONES-CI-INVESTIGATION.md
along with the reasons the Fleet failure warrants suspicion -- fleet.yaml
changed its join-signing key mount from raw bytes to a JSON map this
branch -- and the reasons it may be unrelated.
This gate fails with nothing but Helm's "context deadline exceeded" and
three Deployments reporting Available: 0/1, then the EXIT trap deletes
the cluster -- so there is no way to learn why the pods never became
ready. Both CI runs and a local run are equally uninformative.
Dump node capacity and conditions, pods and recent events for
agones-system and cosmic-clash, and describe plus current/previous logs
for every not-ready pod, on any failure and before deletion. Events
matter as much as pod status here: FailedScheduling, ImagePullBackOff
and probe failures are all invisible in a status column.
KIND_KEEP_ON_FAILURE=1 retains the cluster for interactive inspection.
Same approach that just found the allocated-Compose cause, where a
silent assertion had hidden a real 422-instead-of-409 API bug across
several CI runs.
The root blocker (issue #14). The worker bound the provider allocation
and stopped. Service.PublishRoster and store.SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster
both existed, fully tested, with zero non-test callers, and the
production allocator configured neither a roster store nor a signing
key. Nothing ever wrote the assignments table.
The allocated supervisor fetches a non-empty roster before it launches
the game child, so every real allocation failed at that fetch: no match
could reach ASSIGNMENT_READY or accept a player. Existing tests seeded
assignments directly, which is exactly why the missing hand-off went
unnoticed.
The worker now builds one join authorisation per durable participant,
signs each with the active key, and publishes them. Participants are
read through the same query SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster re-validates
against, so the allocator cannot construct a roster the persistence
boundary would reject. The manifest commits to a digest over the whole
roster, so a server cannot be handed a truncated roster whose surviving
entries are each individually valid.
Persist the provider endpoint on the allocation: it arrived on the
provider response and was never stored, so a worker crashing between
allocating and publishing had no endpoint to recover and would have
stranded the match permanently. Republishing is idempotent, so that
crash now simply retries.
cmd/allocator refuses to start without key material rather than running
an allocator that binds allocations and silently strands every match.
The k8s allocator Deployment mounts the same key set the Fleet does, and
both now take the JSON key map so a rotation can publish several.
New integration test drives the real worker through to the supervisor's
own roster read path without seeding the assignments table. Verified it
fails with "assignments = 0, want 2" when the publish step is removed.
Josh Creek