mirror of
https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash.git
synced 2026-09-10 16:04:04 +00:00
193 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
193 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// RateLimiter is an optional fixed-window limiter for the control-plane edge.
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// It is intentionally process-local: a deployment must use a shared edge
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// limiter for global quotas, while this boundary still protects each replica.
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type RateLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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limit int
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window time.Duration
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maxKeys int
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entries map[string]rateWindow
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}
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type rateWindow struct {
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started time.Time
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count int
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}
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// ClientIPResolver accepts X-Forwarded-For only from explicitly trusted
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// immediate peers. It walks the chain from the application backwards so an
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// untrusted client cannot select its own rate-limit identity by prepending a
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// forged address.
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type ClientIPResolver struct {
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trustedProxies []netip.Prefix
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}
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func NewClientIPResolver(cidrs string) (*ClientIPResolver, error) {
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resolver := &ClientIPResolver{}
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for _, raw := range strings.Split(cidrs, ",") {
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raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
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if raw == "" {
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continue
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}
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prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(raw)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid trusted proxy CIDR %q", raw)
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}
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resolver.trustedProxies = append(resolver.trustedProxies, prefix.Masked())
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}
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return resolver, nil
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}
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func NewRateLimiter(limit int, window time.Duration, maxKeys int) (*RateLimiter, error) {
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if limit < 1 || window <= 0 || maxKeys < 1 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid rate limiter configuration")
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}
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return &RateLimiter{limit: limit, window: window, maxKeys: maxKeys, entries: make(map[string]rateWindow)}, nil
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}
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func (l *RateLimiter) Allow(key string, now time.Time) bool {
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return l.AllowKeys([]string{key}, now)
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}
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// AllowKeys atomically charges every non-empty key for a request. This lets
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// the HTTP boundary enforce both the authenticated credential and source IP
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// limits without charging one dimension when the other dimension rejects.
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func (l *RateLimiter) AllowKeys(keys []string, now time.Time) bool {
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if l == nil || now.IsZero() {
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return false
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}
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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for storedKey, entry := range l.entries {
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if !now.Before(entry.started.Add(l.window)) {
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delete(l.entries, storedKey)
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}
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}
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unique := make([]string, 0, len(keys))
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seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(keys))
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for _, key := range keys {
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if key == "" {
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continue
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}
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if _, exists := seen[key]; exists {
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continue
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}
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seen[key] = struct{}{}
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unique = append(unique, key)
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}
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if len(unique) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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newKeys := 0
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for _, key := range unique {
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entry, exists := l.entries[key]
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if !exists {
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newKeys++
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continue
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}
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if now.Before(entry.started.Add(l.window)) && entry.count >= l.limit {
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return false
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}
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}
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if len(l.entries)+newKeys > l.maxKeys {
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return false
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}
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for _, key := range unique {
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entry, exists := l.entries[key]
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if !exists || !now.Before(entry.started.Add(l.window)) {
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l.entries[key] = rateWindow{started: now, count: 1}
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continue
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}
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entry.count++
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l.entries[key] = entry
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}
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return true
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}
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func requestRateKey(r *http.Request, resolver *ClientIPResolver) string {
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keys := requestRateKeys(r, resolver)
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if len(keys) == 0 {
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return ""
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}
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return keys[0]
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}
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func requestRateKeys(r *http.Request, resolver *ClientIPResolver) []string {
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keys := make([]string, 0, 2)
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if authorization := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")); authorization != "" {
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digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(authorization))
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keys = append(keys, "auth:"+hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]))
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}
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host := requestClientIP(r, resolver)
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if host == "" {
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return keys
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}
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return append(keys, "ip:"+host)
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}
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func requestClientIP(r *http.Request, resolver *ClientIPResolver) string {
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host := strings.TrimSpace(r.RemoteAddr)
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if parsedHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
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host = parsedHost
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}
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remote, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.Trim(host, "[]"))
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if err != nil {
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return host
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}
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remote = remote.Unmap()
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if resolver == nil || !resolver.trusts(remote) {
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return remote.String()
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}
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forwarded := strings.Join(r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), ",")
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if forwarded == "" || len(forwarded) > 2048 {
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return remote.String()
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}
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parts := strings.Split(forwarded, ",")
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if len(parts) > 16 {
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return remote.String()
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}
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chain := make([]netip.Addr, 0, len(parts))
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for _, part := range parts {
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address, parseErr := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(part))
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if parseErr != nil {
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return remote.String()
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}
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chain = append(chain, address.Unmap())
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}
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for index := len(chain) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
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if !resolver.trusts(chain[index]) {
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return chain[index].String()
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}
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}
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if len(chain) > 0 {
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return chain[0].String()
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}
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return remote.String()
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}
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func (r *ClientIPResolver) trusts(address netip.Addr) bool {
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if r == nil || !address.IsValid() {
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return false
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}
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for _, prefix := range r.trustedProxies {
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if prefix.Contains(address) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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