Files
CosmicClash/server/cmd/control-plane/main.go
T
Josh Creek 520613aab0 feat(multiplayer): implement WorkloadVerify without a Kubernetes trust boundary
WorkloadVerify (api.Service.WorkloadVerify) was permanently unwired: both
/v1/servers/{id}/register and /v1/servers/{id}/result always 503, because
the only design considered so far was verifying a Kubernetes-projected
service-account JWT (server/workload/jwt.go), which needs a live cluster's
TokenReview/JWKS endpoint to validate against safely -- something this
sandbox cannot do without guessing at a trust boundary.

The API layer doesn't actually require that specific mechanism. serverMutation
only compares WorkloadBinding.ServerID and .MatchID (server/api/service.go);
AdvanceServerRegistration only uses .MatchID/.ServerID/.AllocationID. Nothing
downstream needs Namespace/ServiceAcct/PodUID/GameServerUID populated.

This adds a self-contained alternative: a short-lived, HMAC-signed token the
control plane mints and verifies with a secret only it holds (server/workload/
signed_token.go), the same trust model domain.SessionStore already uses for
player sessions elsewhere in this codebase. It needs no cluster to verify --
signature + expiry is fully self-contained and unit-testable.

The design's soundness rests on the delivery channel, not the crypto: the
token is meant to reach the allocated GameServer via the same Agones
GameServerAllocation annotation channel allocation.go already uses for
match-id/allocation-id, readable only by that pod's own local SDK sidecar. A
caller presenting this token has already proven, via that channel, that it is
the pod Agones allocated. (Wiring the actual annotation delivery -- extending
agones.Client.Allocate and the supervisor's token source -- is a separate,
follow-up change; this commit lands the verification core it depends on.)

store.AllocationBindingStillValid adds defense-in-depth on top of signature
and expiry: it cross-checks the token's claims against the durable
allocations table (append-only, never leaves 'ALLOCATED'), so a validly-signed
token naming an allocation that was never recorded -- or a real allocation id
paired with a mismatched match/server -- is still rejected.

api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken wires the two together and is now plugged
into cmd/control-plane (new --workload-secret / COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET
flag; a startup warning is logged if it's left unset, since the route then
stays 503 exactly as before) and cmd/testkit-api (fixed test secret, since
that binary is test-only already).

Verified: new unit tests in server/workload (signature tamper, wrong secret,
expiry boundary, malformed input) and a new Postgres integration suite in
server/api (real allocation row, real signed token, acceptance / unknown-
allocation rejection / mismatched-triple rejection / the previously-503
Service.WorkloadVerify field itself) -- both run clean with -race across
multiple passes against a live postgres:17-alpine container. Full
`go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l . && go test ./... -race` and
`go test -tags integration ./... -race` both clean.
2026-09-01 14:51:21 +01:00

128 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"flag"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/api"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/migrations"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/observability"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/store"
_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
)
func main() {
listen := flag.String("listen", ":8080", "HTTP listen address")
role := flag.String("role", "api", "control-plane role; currently api")
dsn := flag.String("dsn", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN"), "PostgreSQL connection string")
migrationDir := flag.String("migrations", "migrations", "directory containing numbered SQL migrations")
redisAddr := flag.String("redis-addr", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_REDIS_ADDR"), "optional Redis address for the candidate projection")
redisPrefix := flag.String("redis-prefix", envOrDefault("COSMIC_CLASH_REDIS_PREFIX", "cosmic-clash"), "Redis key prefix")
redisTTL := flag.Duration("redis-ttl", 60*time.Second, "TTL for transient candidate projection entries")
workloadSecret := flag.String("workload-secret", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET"), "HMAC secret for control-plane-issued workload tokens (see workload/signed_token.go); server registration/result submission return 503 until this is set")
flag.Parse()
if *role != "api" {
fatalf("unsupported role %q (only api is implemented)", *role)
}
if *dsn == "" {
fatalf("--dsn or COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN is required")
}
if *redisTTL <= 0 {
fatalf("--redis-ttl must be positive")
}
db, err := sql.Open("pgx", *dsn)
if err != nil {
fatalf("open PostgreSQL: %v", err)
}
defer db.Close()
startupCtx, startupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer startupCancel()
if err := db.PingContext(startupCtx); err != nil {
fatalf("ping PostgreSQL: %v", err)
}
if err := migrations.Apply(startupCtx, db, *migrationDir); err != nil {
fatalf("apply migrations: %v", err)
}
var candidateIndex api.CandidateIndex
var redisClient *redis.Client
if *redisAddr != "" {
redisClient = redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: *redisAddr})
defer redisClient.Close()
candidateIndex = store.RedisCandidateIndex{Client: redisClient, Prefix: *redisPrefix, TTL: *redisTTL}
}
if *workloadSecret == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control-plane: warning: --workload-secret / COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET is unset; server registration and result submission will return 503")
}
server := &http.Server{Addr: *listen, Handler: newAPIHandler(db, *workloadSecret, candidateIndex), ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second}
serveErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { serveErr <- server.ListenAndServe() }()
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer stop()
select {
case err := <-serveErr:
if err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
fatalf("serve API: %v", err)
}
case <-ctx.Done():
shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer shutdownCancel()
if err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
fatalf("shutdown API: %v", err)
}
}
}
func newAPIHandler(db *sql.DB, workloadSecret string, indexes ...api.CandidateIndex) http.Handler {
var candidateIndex api.CandidateIndex
if len(indexes) > 0 {
candidateIndex = indexes[0]
}
return (&api.Service{
SessionBackend: store.PostgresSessions{DB: db},
SessionIssuer: store.PostgresSessions{DB: db},
QueueBackend: store.PostgresQueue{DB: db},
ProposalBackend: api.ProposalProviderFromStore(db),
ProposalPromoter: api.ProposalPromoterFromStore(db),
ServerRegistrar: api.ServerRegistrarFromStore(db),
ResultSubmitter: store.PostgresResults{DB: db},
RankedProfileProvider: store.PostgresRankedProfiles{DB: db},
Assignment: api.AssignmentProviderFromStore(db),
CandidateIndex: candidateIndex,
ProbeRecorder: store.PostgresQueue{DB: db},
WorkloadVerify: api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken([]byte(workloadSecret), db),
Now: func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() },
Log: logEvent,
}).Handler()
}
// logEvent writes one credential-safe structured event per line to stderr.
// Best-effort: a logging failure must never fail or block the request it
// describes, so encode errors are swallowed rather than surfaced.
func logEvent(event observability.Event) {
payload, err := observability.Encode(event)
if err != nil {
return
}
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, string(payload))
}
func envOrDefault(name, fallback string) string {
if value := os.Getenv(name); value != "" {
return value
}
return fallback
}
func fatalf(format string, args ...any) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "control-plane: "+format+"\n", args...)
os.Exit(1)
}