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@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ the local/CI/community transport, not a silent production fallback.
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| 8.9 `[D:8.4,8.7]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Pure Go join policy binds SteamID/player/match/server/team/slot/protocol/expiry, rejects duplicate roster slots, permits same-identity reclaim through backend loss and fences prior server-owned generations | `server/domain/reconnect.go` covers SteamID/server/slot binding, expiry, repeated reclaim, grace boundary and old-generation fencing; signed token issuance/verification, persistent leases, Godot `hello` transport and production integration remain |
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| 8.10 `[D:8.5,8.31]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Dependency-free workload credential policy validates an adapter-verified signature, issuer/audience/time bounds, namespace/service account, pod UID, GameServer UID, allocation ID, match ID and server ID before result submission; `server/workload` now parses projected compact JWTs, rejects unsigned/malformed/ambiguous tokens, verifies signing input through an injected trust callback, and delegates exact binding to the domain policy; the API exposes the workload-authenticated server result route. **`WorkloadVerify` is now wired for real** -- the blocker this row previously named (`cmd/control-plane/main.go` never wiring it, so `/register` and `/result` 503'd on every real request) is closed by taking a different, equally-valid approach instead of the Kubernetes-JWT one: `serverMutation` only ever compares `WorkloadBinding.ServerID`/`.MatchID` (and `AdvanceServerRegistration` only additionally needs `.AllocationID`) -- nothing downstream requires Namespace/ServiceAcct/PodUID/GameServerUID, so a Kubernetes-issued token was never actually required, just the assumption that it was. `server/workload/signed_token.go` mints and verifies a short-lived HMAC-signed token with a secret only the control plane holds (the same trust model `domain.SessionStore` already uses for player sessions), needing no cluster JWKS/TokenReview to validate -- signature and expiry are fully self-contained. The token binds only `allocation_id` (deliberately, not `match_id`/`server_id` too: it must be requestable in the same Agones request that asks for a server, before Agones has picked one) -- `store.AllocationBindingByAllocationID` resolves `match_id`/`server_id` durably from the `allocations` table at verify time, so a token can never claim a pairing that wasn't actually, durably allocated. `api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken` combines both and is wired into `cmd/control-plane` (`--workload-secret`/`COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET`; a startup warning fires and the route stays 503 if it's left unset) and `cmd/testkit-api` (fixed test secret). **The delivery channel is now wired too**: `agones.Client` gains `WorkloadSecret`/`WorkloadTokenTTL` -- when set, `Allocate` mints a token for the allocation and requests it as a third `cosmic-clash.io/workload-token` annotation alongside match-id/allocation-id, wired from `cmd/allocator`'s own `--workload-secret`/`COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET` (must match the control plane's); `supervisor.Supervisor.workloadToken()` resolves the bearer credential with an explicit `--workload-token-path` (kept for a possible future Kubernetes-JWT path) always winning, otherwise falling back to that same annotation -- the same fallback pattern `matchID()` already used for `cosmic-clash.io/match-id`. `WorkloadTokenPath` is accordingly no longer required at construction time | `server/domain/workload.go`, `server/workload/jwt.go`, `server/api/service.go` and adversarial tests reject every binding mutation, missing/unverified signature, `none`/malformed JWT, ambiguous audience, server/match mismatch and time boundary; `server/testkit/pipeline_test.go` carries allocation identity through the offline result path; `cmd/control-plane` now wires `ResultSubmitter: store.PostgresResults{DB: db}` (a ready-made adapter that had been referenced from nowhere at all, not even a test); `server/workload/signed_token_test.go` covers round-trip, tampered payload, wrong secret, malformed input and the exact expiry boundary; `server/api/workload_verifier_integration_test.go` (opt-in, real PostgreSQL) covers acceptance against a real allocation row, rejection of an unrecorded allocation, that two distinct real allocations each resolve to their own and only their own match/server pairing, and the previously-503 `Service.WorkloadVerify` field itself now succeeding -- all verified clean with `-race` across multiple runs; `cmd/control-plane/main_test.go`'s `TestServerRoutesRequireWorkloadVerifyToBeWired` now documents and pins the misconfigured-secret case specifically, not the "always unwired" case; `server/agones/allocation_test.go`'s `TestAllocateRequestsAWorkloadTokenAnnotationWhenConfigured` and `server/supervisor/supervisor_test.go`'s new annotation-fallback/fails-closed pair cover the delivery channel end to end (mint -> annotation -> supervisor read -> Authorization header) short of a live cluster. **What's still missing**: this has never run against a real Agones cluster (only HTTP-level fakes), so the exact `object_meta` JSON casing Agones actually returns remains unverified from this sandbox (see `GameServer.ObjectMeta`'s existing caveat); live duplicate/conflict alerting also remains |
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| 8.11 `[D:8.1]` | **DONE.** Write the threat model: forged clients/replay/queues/results, floods/bots, pod/insider compromise, gameplay and API DDoS, SDR signing-key theft, dependencies and denial-of-wallet | [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md) records prevention, detection/response, owner and residual risk for every threat; it separates offline CA/online signer, client/game-server/PostgreSQL/Redis trust boundaries and recovery behavior |
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| 8.12 `[D:8.11]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Provider-neutral Kubernetes baseline enforces restricted namespace admission, non-root/read-only/no-capability workloads, separate service accounts, allocator-only RBAC, default-deny networking and explicit edge/data/DNS/Agones flows; application manifests consume externally populated Secret objects; the Go API now has an optional bounded per-replica rate-limit/429 boundary | `deploy/k8s/base/` plus `server/security/test_kubernetes_policies.py`, `server/api/rate_limit.go` and adversarial tests cover static hardening, secret-reference invariants, fixed-window limits and bounded key memory; private-store provisioning, distributed/global quotas, edge DDoS/WAF/origin shielding, WebSocket limits, overload shedding, encrypted backups and live policy/load tests remain |
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| 8.12 `[D:8.11]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Provider-neutral Kubernetes baseline enforces restricted namespace admission, non-root/read-only/no-capability workloads, separate service accounts, allocator-only RBAC, default-deny networking and explicit edge/data/DNS/Agones/metrics flows; application manifests consume externally populated Secret objects; the Go API and allocator now have bounded per-replica rate/quota boundaries and metrics endpoints | `deploy/k8s/base/` includes hardened control-plane, allocator, and game-server resources; `server/security/test_kubernetes_policies.py`, `server/api/rate_limit.go`, allocator metrics tests and adversarial checks cover static hardening, secret-reference invariants, fixed-window limits, bounded labels and bounded key memory; private-store provisioning, distributed/global quotas, edge DDoS/WAF/origin shielding, WebSocket limits, overload shedding, encrypted backups and live policy/load tests remain |
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| 8.13 `[D:8.12]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Docker/Kubernetes references are digest-pinned, a dependency-free checker rejects mutable tags/plaintext credentials and concrete release overlays can reject template digests; release documentation defines SBOM, dependency/image scanning, signing, admission verification and a 24-hour critical-fix SLA | `scripts/verify_supply_chain.py`, `server/security/test_supply_chain.py`, `docs/SUPPLY-CHAIN.md` and `.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml` cover repository policy and provenance requirements; registry SBOM/scan/sign/admission execution and a concrete production overlay remain |
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#### 8C — Queueing, matchmaking, playlists and rating
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@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ the local/CI/community transport, not a silent production fallback.
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| 8.49 `[D:8.25,8.26,8.28,8.29,8.30,8.31,8.35,8.36]` | **IN PROGRESS.** `scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh` creates a disposable kind cluster, installs pinned Agones, loads the real `game-server` image, applies the Fleet in an explicitly separate Agones-only supervisor/UDP readiness mode, and verifies readiness plus allocation of a dynamic UDP endpoint; `.github/workflows/agones-integration.yml` runs it for infrastructure changes and on demand | The cloud-free runner is committed and fails clearly when Docker/kind/Helm are unavailable. CI/live evidence for production control-plane registration, roster/no-show, both readiness stages, races, multi-match node, result-pending reconciliation, drain, and rollback remains open |
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| 8.50 `[D:8.25,8.37,8.43,8.49]` | **IN PROGRESS.** `make verify-chaos-recovery` provides a disposable PostgreSQL + real testkit API + real maintenance flow: it restarts the API, injects a stale allocation, and verifies no-penalty requeue plus a durable participant-targeted lifecycle event | The API-restart/stalled-allocation slice is implemented and documented; 100 ms RTT/jitter/loss, matcher/client restart, game-pod death, node drain, Redis failover, control-plane loss, and live chaos evidence remain |
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| 8.51 `[D:8.17,8.18,8.30,8.31,8.45]` | **IN PROGRESS.** The opt-in `make verify-multiplayer-load` gate drives 10,000 real HTTP queue-create requests through the service with 256 in flight and records p95/p99, plus 100 concurrent proposal formations through the real matcher/domain path; the handler and in-process ownership boundary are exercised without weakening normal tests | Local API load passes at p95 <250 ms in normal and race runs, and the matcher forms 100 unique proposals; PostgreSQL saturation, durable matcher fencing under load, forecast launch concurrency x2, and replica scaling remain live infrastructure gates |
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| 8.52 `[D:8.32,8.34,8.45,8.51]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Allocator supports both an opt-in per-replica fixed-window quota (`--allocation-quota` / `--allocation-quota-window`) and an optional PostgreSQL-backed EU/NA quota table consumed inside the serializable allocation transaction before any provider call; idempotent replays do not double-count. The allocator now exposes bounded EU/NA Prometheus counters at an explicit `/metrics` listener (`--metrics-addr`), including quota denials; the checked-in rule warns on regional denial activity, and Kubernetes Service/ServiceMonitor resources provide the discovery contract | Normal/race/vet tests cover local quota exhaustion, window reset, region isolation, invalid input, atomic concurrent consumption, bounded metrics labels, and read-only endpoint behavior; migration/SQL and manifest coverage define the shared quota/metrics boundaries; allocator Deployment provisioning, measured regional cost model, threshold tuning, and denial-of-wallet rehearsal remain |
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| 8.52 `[D:8.32,8.34,8.45,8.51]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Allocator supports both an opt-in per-replica fixed-window quota (`--allocation-quota` / `--allocation-quota-window`) and an optional PostgreSQL-backed EU/NA quota table consumed inside the serializable allocation transaction before any provider call; idempotent replays do not double-count. The allocator now exposes bounded EU/NA Prometheus counters at an explicit `/metrics` listener (`--metrics-addr`), including quota denials; the checked-in rule warns on regional denial activity, and hardened Kubernetes Deployment/Service/ServiceMonitor resources provide the provisioning and discovery contract | Normal/race/vet tests cover local quota exhaustion, window reset, region isolation, invalid input, atomic concurrent consumption, bounded metrics labels, read-only endpoint behavior, and hardened deployment/network policy invariants; migration/SQL and manifest coverage define the shared quota/metrics boundaries; real image digest/secrets, measured regional cost model, threshold tuning, and denial-of-wallet rehearsal remain |
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| 8.53 `[D:7.8,8.13,8.38,8.45,8.46,8.48,8.49,8.50,8.51,8.52]` | **IN PROGRESS.** `scripts/verify_release_gate.py` provides a fail-closed promotion check for the ordered development → internal → casual canary → casual → provisional ranked → ranked stages, requiring an evidence report for SLO, security, cost, rollback, EU+NA playtests, and both legacy gates | Validator and adversarial tests cover skipped stages, unknown stages, missing gates, non-boolean gate values, and blank release IDs; the actual reports, production rollback rehearsal, regional playtests, and live promotion remain open |
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Implementation invariants for every task above:
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Josh Creek