feat: add bounded control plane rate limiting

This commit is contained in:
Josh Creek
2026-08-31 23:17:02 +01:00
parent 3533e8ae6c
commit 7f7516d9a0
4 changed files with 155 additions and 2 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ the local/CI/community transport, not a silent production fallback.
| 8.9 `[D:8.4,8.7]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Pure Go join policy binds SteamID/player/match/server/team/slot/protocol/expiry, rejects duplicate roster slots, permits same-identity reclaim through backend loss and fences prior server-owned generations | `server/domain/reconnect.go` covers SteamID/server/slot binding, expiry, repeated reclaim, grace boundary and old-generation fencing; signed token issuance/verification, persistent leases, Godot `hello` transport and production integration remain |
| 8.10 `[D:8.5,8.31]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Dependency-free workload credential policy validates an adapter-verified signature, issuer/audience/time bounds, namespace/service account, pod UID, GameServer UID, allocation ID, match ID and server ID before result submission | `server/domain/workload.go` and adversarial tests reject every binding mutation, missing/unverified signature and time boundary; `server/testkit/pipeline_test.go` carries allocation identity through the offline result path; projected-token/JWT adapter, trusted-cluster verification and live duplicate/conflict alerting remain |
| 8.11 `[D:8.1]` | **DONE.** Write the threat model: forged clients/replay/queues/results, floods/bots, pod/insider compromise, gameplay and API DDoS, SDR signing-key theft, dependencies and denial-of-wallet | [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md) records prevention, detection/response, owner and residual risk for every threat; it separates offline CA/online signer, client/game-server/PostgreSQL/Redis trust boundaries and recovery behavior |
| 8.12 `[D:8.11]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Provider-neutral Kubernetes baseline enforces restricted namespace admission, non-root/read-only/no-capability workloads, separate service accounts, allocator-only RBAC, default-deny networking and explicit edge/data/DNS/Agones flows; application manifests consume externally populated Secret objects | `deploy/k8s/base/` plus `server/security/test_kubernetes_policies.py` cover the static hardening and secret-reference invariants; private-store provisioning, edge DDoS/WAF/origin shielding, WebSocket limits, overload shedding, encrypted backups and live policy/load tests remain |
| 8.12 `[D:8.11]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Provider-neutral Kubernetes baseline enforces restricted namespace admission, non-root/read-only/no-capability workloads, separate service accounts, allocator-only RBAC, default-deny networking and explicit edge/data/DNS/Agones flows; application manifests consume externally populated Secret objects; the Go API now has an optional bounded per-replica rate-limit/429 boundary | `deploy/k8s/base/` plus `server/security/test_kubernetes_policies.py`, `server/api/rate_limit.go` and adversarial tests cover static hardening, secret-reference invariants, fixed-window limits and bounded key memory; private-store provisioning, distributed/global quotas, edge DDoS/WAF/origin shielding, WebSocket limits, overload shedding, encrypted backups and live policy/load tests remain |
| 8.13 `[D:8.12]` | **IN PROGRESS.** Docker/Kubernetes references are digest-pinned, a dependency-free checker rejects mutable tags/plaintext credentials and concrete release overlays can reject template digests; release documentation defines SBOM, dependency/image scanning, signing, admission verification and a 24-hour critical-fix SLA | `scripts/verify_supply_chain.py`, `server/security/test_supply_chain.py`, `docs/SUPPLY-CHAIN.md` and `.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml` cover repository policy and provenance requirements; registry SBOM/scan/sign/admission execution and a concrete production overlay remain |
#### 8C — Queueing, matchmaking, playlists and rating
+81
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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
package api
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// RateLimiter is an optional fixed-window limiter for the control-plane edge.
// It is intentionally process-local: a deployment must use a shared edge
// limiter for global quotas, while this boundary still protects each replica.
type RateLimiter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
limit int
window time.Duration
maxKeys int
entries map[string]rateWindow
}
type rateWindow struct {
started time.Time
count int
}
func NewRateLimiter(limit int, window time.Duration, maxKeys int) (*RateLimiter, error) {
if limit < 1 || window <= 0 || maxKeys < 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid rate limiter configuration")
}
return &RateLimiter{limit: limit, window: window, maxKeys: maxKeys, entries: make(map[string]rateWindow)}, nil
}
func (l *RateLimiter) Allow(key string, now time.Time) bool {
if l == nil || key == "" || now.IsZero() {
return false
}
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
for storedKey, entry := range l.entries {
if !now.Before(entry.started.Add(l.window)) {
delete(l.entries, storedKey)
}
}
entry, exists := l.entries[key]
if !exists {
if len(l.entries) >= l.maxKeys {
return false
}
l.entries[key] = rateWindow{started: now, count: 1}
return true
}
if !now.Before(entry.started.Add(l.window)) {
l.entries[key] = rateWindow{started: now, count: 1}
return true
}
if entry.count >= l.limit {
return false
}
entry.count++
l.entries[key] = entry
return true
}
func requestRateKey(r *http.Request) string {
if authorization := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")); authorization != "" {
digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(authorization))
return "auth:" + hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
}
host := r.RemoteAddr
if parsedHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
host = parsedHost
}
if host == "" {
return ""
}
return "ip:" + host
}
+62
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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package api
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestRateLimiterEnforcesWindowAndBoundsKeyMemory(t *testing.T) {
limiter, err := NewRateLimiter(2, time.Second, 1)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
start := time.Unix(1000, 0)
if !limiter.Allow("player-1", start) || !limiter.Allow("player-1", start.Add(100*time.Millisecond)) {
t.Fatal("allowed requests were rejected")
}
if limiter.Allow("player-1", start.Add(200*time.Millisecond)) {
t.Fatal("request over the window limit was accepted")
}
if limiter.Allow("player-2", start.Add(300*time.Millisecond)) {
t.Fatal("unbounded new key bypassed the memory bound")
}
if !limiter.Allow("player-1", start.Add(time.Second)) {
t.Fatal("window did not reset at the boundary")
}
}
func TestRateLimitedHTTPBoundaryReturnsGeneric429(t *testing.T) {
limiter, err := NewRateLimiter(1, time.Minute, 8)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
service := &Service{RateLimiter: limiter, Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1000, 0) }}
server := httptest.NewServer(service.Handler())
defer server.Close()
request, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, server.URL+"/healthz", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer secret-session:secret-token")
response, err := server.Client().Do(request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = response.Body.Close()
if response.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("first request status = %d", response.StatusCode)
}
request, _ = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, server.URL+"/healthz", strings.NewReader(""))
request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer secret-session:secret-token")
response, err = server.Client().Do(request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = response.Body.Close()
if response.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("limited request status = %d", response.StatusCode)
}
}
+11 -1
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@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ type Service struct {
Proposals map[string]*domain.Proposal
RankedProfiles map[string]domain.RankedProfile
TierPolicy domain.TierPolicy
RateLimiter *RateLimiter
proposalMu sync.Mutex
eventsMu sync.Mutex
events *eventHub
@@ -96,7 +97,16 @@ func (s *Service) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/proposals/", s.contractProposalMutation)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/assignments/", s.contractAssignment)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/events", s.controlPlaneEvent)
return mux
if s.RateLimiter == nil {
return mux
}
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.RateLimiter.Allow(requestRateKey(r), s.now()) {
writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "rate_limited")
return
}
mux.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
type steamSessionRequest struct {