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Author SHA1 Message Date
Josh Creek aac00f148e fix(tests): stop the ENet residual gate failing on host scheduling noise 
The client-bot smoke asserted remote_residual_position_p99 < 0.3. Commit
52ee1810 both passed and failed on that assertion, in runs three seconds
apart on identical code: two clients in one run reported 0.324 and 0.187
with matching snapshot counts, scores and slot checks.

A p99 over a few hundred samples is its worst handful, so on a shared CI
host it measures how often the process was descheduled as much as how
well the interpolator tracks. Locally the same test reports p95 0.025m
and p99 0.081-0.149m; CI's p99 runs 2-4x higher on a healthy build,
which is the entire margin the 0.3 bar had.

Assert two bars instead of one. The tight numeric bar moves to p95,
which is stable run to run, and p99 is bounded by the product's own
REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_OFFSET/REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_ROTATION_DEGREES: past those
the visual smoother stops absorbing a correction in a single step, so
exceeding them is a real defect rather than a slow runner. Referencing
the constants also means the test follows the product if that tolerance
is ever retuned.

This is a genuine trade, not a free win: a regression that pushed p99
from 0.2 to 0.35 while leaving p95 healthy now passes where it once
failed. That band is exactly where the noise lives -- 0.324 was observed
on a healthy build -- so the old bar could not tell that regression from
a busy runner either, and paid for the ambiguity with false reds.

Both percentiles are printed with their bars so a future failure shows
which one moved.

Checked first whether goal-driven kickoff teleports were polluting the
metric; they are not. Both the ship and ball paths already skip
accumulation across a reset_gen change.
 2026-09-05 22:22:30 +01:00
Josh Creek 52ee181042 fix(kind): validate the allocation response Agones actually returns 
With the Fleet readiness wait corrected, the gate reached the allocation
check for the first time and failed with "allocation did not return a
GameServer" -- while the cluster dump shows the allocation plainly
succeeded: one GameServer Allocated, Fleet reporting ALLOCATED 1.

GameServerAllocationStatus is flat: state, gameServerName, address,
ports, nodeName. It does not embed the allocated GameServer. The
validator read status.gameServer.metadata.name and
status.gameServer.status.{address,ports}, a shape Agones never sends,
and its unit tests asserted that same invented shape -- so validator and
tests agreed with each other while both disagreed with Agones. Nothing
caught it because the gate had never once allocated anything.

Read the real fields, keeping every existing check: non-empty name,
address neither blank nor unspecified, exactly one named "game" port in
range.

Also print the response body when validation fails. work_dir is removed
by the EXIT trap, so a shape mismatch was otherwise invisible from CI --
which is how this survived. If the shape is still not what I expect, the
next run says so instead of costing another round trip.
 2026-09-05 22:03:41 +01:00
Josh Creek 4f48f0a6a8 fix(kind): wait on the Fleet field that exists 
The gate asserted `--for=jsonpath='{.status.ready}'=2`. An Agones Fleet's
status carries replicas, readyReplicas, reservedReplicas and
allocatedReplicas -- there is no `ready` -- so the wait could never match
however healthy the Fleet was.

It failed in the most misleading way available: as "the Fleet never
became ready", which sent three separate investigations after the game
server. Two of those found genuine bugs, but the gate would have stayed
red with both fixed.

The evidence is in the previous CI run's own dump, which the new
per-container diagnostics produced: both GameServers Ready and stable for
5m6s, and the Fleet reporting DESIRED 2 / CURRENT 2 / READY 2, while
kubectl wait timed out beside it. That same dump also confirms the health
fix in 0de97381 worked -- those GameServers had been churning every ~20s
before it.

Assert the corrected jsonpath in test_fleet_manifests.py and reject the
old one, alongside the build-by-default behaviour, so neither silently
regresses.
 2026-09-05 21:55:20 +01:00
Josh Creek 0de97381b7 fix(agones): stop a dead health loop from passing as a healthy server 
Every allocated GameServer reached Ready and was recycled by Agones ~20s
later. Health pings are the game process's job by design -- the
supervisor has no health implementation at all -- so a server that stops
pinging is exactly what Agones is built to reclaim.

start_health() armed a Timer on a node that might not be inside the
SceneTree. A Timer only ticks inside the tree, so the node reported
itself configured, sent nothing, and said nothing about it. It now
returns a bool, refuses loudly when unconfigured, and defers to _ready()
when called before parenting, so the SDK arms its own timer and no
caller has to get the ordering right. server_boot.gd defers the add like
every sibling does (§9 gotcha 27) and logs when AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT is
missing, which previously read identically to a healthy start.

Also bounded the in-flight latch: it is set across an await, so a request
that never completes would silence health permanently. Defence in depth
rather than an observed fault.

Tests target the contract rather than the mechanism: a test that parents
the SDK correctly and asserts pings passes with the bug present, because
the defect was in the wiring. The unit tests assert start_health()
cannot claim success out of tree, and were confirmed to fail against the
previous code. The smoke gains a counting sidecar and asserts a
*repeating* ping -- it reports "health pings in 3.0s = 1, want at least
2" when the loop is broken, which is the production symptom exactly. It
is also now actually run: nothing referenced it before.

Two diagnostic fixes, both of which changed conclusions during this work:

The kind gate only built the game-server image when the tag was absent,
so a local rerun silently verified whatever was built last. That is why
local runs and CI disagreed about the same commit. It now builds by
default, with KIND_REUSE_GAME_SERVER_IMAGE=1 as the opt-in fast path.

The failure dump logged only not-ready pods, and used --all-containers
with a shared tail. A GameServer recycled after reaching Ready leaves no
unready pod behind, and the Agones sidecar out-logs the game server, so
the relevant output was never captured. It now dumps every pod, per
container, current and previous, plus the GameServer and Fleet resources
-- Agones' own state machine is what rejects these.
 2026-09-05 21:35:50 +01:00
Josh Creek ca70568fad fix(agones): make the kind gate's Agones lifecycle actually work 
Several independent causes, all of which had to be right before the
Fleet could reach Ready.

The supervisor pointed --sdk-base-url at 127.0.0.1:9357, which is the
Agones sidecar's gRPC port; its HTTP surface is 9358, and that is what
AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT carries and what agones_sdk.gd reads. An HTTP
client against the gRPC port could never have worked, in kind or in
production.

The supervisor also treated the sidecar's first incomplete /gameserver
response as fatal. The sidecar accepts requests before the controller
populates status.address and status.ports, so this produced a restart
loop precisely during normal Agones startup. It now polls until the
endpoint is assigned or ReadyTimeout elapses.

server_boot.gd started ServerControl and the Agones SDK only under
--allocated-mode, but the kind smoke deliberately strips that flag, so
nothing served the readiness probe and the GameServer could never become
Ready. Lifecycle now keys on AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT, which Agones injects
into every managed container, while allocation and roster semantics stay
tied to --allocated-mode. The SDK node is added to the tree
non-deferred, since start_health() creates a Timer immediately.

Fleet: Agones assigns its own SDK service account and masks that token
from the game container while keeping it for the injected sidecar, so
the manifest must not pin serviceAccountName or
automountServiceAccountToken. Godot stores user:// under HOME, so HOME
points at the writable runtime volume to keep the root filesystem
read-only, and fsGroup makes that volume writable for the non-root user.

Namespace: Agones' Dynamic port policy injects a hostPort, which both
the baseline and restricted Pod Security Standards forbid, so the
workload namespace enforces privileged while continuing to audit and
warn against restricted.

NetworkPolicy: the injected sidecar reaches the Kubernetes API over
HTTPS, and NetworkPolicy applies to the whole Pod rather than to the
container whose token was masked.

The kind runner creates the namespace before Helm so Agones can install
its per-namespace SDK RBAC, scopes gameservers.namespaces to it, forces
the allocator and ping Services to ClusterIP because LoadBalancer
ingress never becomes ready in plain kind, and labels the node so the
production Fleet's on-demand/zone constraints are exercised rather than
edited out of the rendered manifest.
 2026-09-05 20:50:01 +01:00
Josh Creek 8aa4af3a3a test(kind): always dump on failure, and record the second Agones failure 
The dump added in 9ab1bec8 never ran. A `kubectl cluster-info`
reachability guard suppressed it, so its first exercise produced exactly
the silence it was written to prevent. Every command inside is already
`|| true`, so the guard bought nothing and cost the whole dump; removed.

That run did establish something the CI logs cannot: after clearing
local Docker pressure, the Agones install completes cleanly (controller
and allocator both reach "condition met") and the gate instead fails
later, waiting for the Fleet's game-server pods to become Ready. CI
never reaches that point because the Agones install times out first.

So there are likely two failures stacked, and fixing the CI timeout will
probably expose the Fleet one. Recorded in AGONES-CI-INVESTIGATION.md
along with the reasons the Fleet failure warrants suspicion -- fleet.yaml
changed its join-signing key mount from raw bytes to a JSON map this
branch -- and the reasons it may be unrelated.
 2026-09-05 20:03:16 +01:00
Josh Creek 9ab1bec89a test(kind): dump cluster state before the Agones gate deletes its cluster 
This gate fails with nothing but Helm's "context deadline exceeded" and
three Deployments reporting Available: 0/1, then the EXIT trap deletes
the cluster -- so there is no way to learn why the pods never became
ready. Both CI runs and a local run are equally uninformative.

Dump node capacity and conditions, pods and recent events for
agones-system and cosmic-clash, and describe plus current/previous logs
for every not-ready pod, on any failure and before deletion. Events
matter as much as pod status here: FailedScheduling, ImagePullBackOff
and probe failures are all invisible in a status column.

KIND_KEEP_ON_FAILURE=1 retains the cluster for interactive inspection.

Same approach that just found the allocated-Compose cause, where a
silent assertion had hidden a real 422-instead-of-409 API bug across
several CI runs.
 2026-09-05 19:57:05 +01:00
Josh Creek 14da286e11 fix(store): return 409 for idempotency key reuse, not 422 
Both idempotency paths returned a bare fmt.Errorf, and writeDomainError
maps anything it does not recognise to its 422 "invalid_request"
default. So reusing a key with a different payload answered 422 where
openapi.json declares 409 and state-transitions.json requires
"reject_conflict_without_state_change".

That is the difference between "your request was malformed" and "that
key is taken". A client acting on 422 would rewrite a request that was
never wrong, and the 409 branch of every generated client was
unreachable.

Wrap domain.ErrConflict on both the create and mutate paths, and add an
integration test covering identical replay and conflicting reuse.

Pre-existing: both bare errors are unchanged from 089c127c, which is why
verify-allocated-compose failed in CI before this branch's work as well.
Found only after adding the diagnostics in 432e5a11 and fc2f5c86 --
until then the assertion aborted silently and three CI runs reported
nothing but "make: *** Error 1".
 2026-09-05 19:30:41 +01:00
Josh Creek fc2f5c8669 test(compose): report the actual status when the idempotency conflict check fails 
The ERR trap added in 432e5a11 located the CI failure at the
`[[ "$conflict_status" == 409 ]]` assertion, but the request discarded
its body and the assertion printed nothing, so three failing runs never
revealed what the API actually returned.

Print the status and body on mismatch.
 2026-09-05 19:27:35 +01:00
Josh Creek 432e5a11e8 test(compose): make the allocated smoke explain its own CI failures 
This suite fails on GitHub Actions while passing locally, and it failed
the same way at 089c127c -- the branch head before any of this branch's
recent work -- so it is pre-existing rather than newly broken.

Diagnosing it is currently impossible from CI alone. The script is
mostly `curl -fsS` and bare [[ ]] assertions under `set -e`, all of
which abort with no output, so the run log contains nothing but
"make: *** Error 1". Both failing runs are equally silent.

Add an ERR trap that reports the script line and the failing command,
and dump `compose ps` plus the service logs on any non-zero exit rather
than only when COMPOSE_KEEP_ON_FAILURE is set. The next CI run should
therefore say what actually broke instead of needing another round trip
to find out.

No behaviour change on success; the target still passes locally.
 2026-09-05 19:19:45 +01:00
Josh Creek 707aea5898 docs: mark the 8.48 Compose fixture item done 
compose.allocated-smoke.yml and verify_allocated_compose.sh are already
independent of compose.phase6-smoke.yml -- the script says so explicitly
and reuses none of its ports -- so the allocated-mode flow no longer
inherits that fixture's hardcoded port, first-come slots or
--max-matches=2.

Fifteenth stale backlog entry found this session, and the first in
TODO.md rather than multiplayer-next.md §7. It was also the only
remaining item marked agent-actionable.
 2026-09-05 18:21:51 +01:00
Josh Creek 8ba045063d fix(compose): give the allocated smoke's allocator its signing key 
Making cmd/allocator refuse to start without join-signing material was
right -- an allocator that binds allocations it can never publish rosters
for strands every match silently -- but I updated the Kubernetes
manifests and the kind fixture without updating the Compose one. The
allocator container exited at startup, so no allocation was ever bound
and verify-allocated-compose failed with "allocator did not bind a
provider allocation".

Mount the same join-signing-keys.json fixture the game server already
uses and name the key it was written with. Caught by running the target
locally rather than by CI after a push.
 2026-09-05 18:19:56 +01:00
Josh Creek 654f20e28f docs: record the backfill roster-delivery decision and remaining work 
A backfilled player's join authorisation is issued after their server
started, but the supervisor fetches the roster once before launching the
game child and the game process has no reload path, so backfill cannot
work end to end regardless of how good the selection rule is.

Decided: the control plane marks the roster changed, the supervisor
re-fetches and rewrites the roster file, then signals the game process to
reload. Chosen because it reuses the authenticated channel and roster
endpoint that already exist -- no inbound path into the game pod, no new
trust boundary -- and keeps the roster an allowlist the server was told
to expect rather than admitting anyone holding a valid signature.
Signature verification is untouched and already binds match, server, slot
and generation.

Recorded in docs/MATCHMAKING.md, which the repo treats as the design
source of truth, so the decision is not re-litigated from a task row.
Remaining implementation is tracked in #32 and summarised in §7 8.19.
 2026-09-05 18:09:10 +01:00
Josh Creek 1becfb4f3f feat(domain): add casual backfill candidate selection 
First slice of task 8.19. docs/MATCHMAKING.md specifies the choice
precisely -- "the oldest ordinary casual ticket that meets the same
build, region <=100 ms and current anchor-tolerance rules for the
vacated human slot; ties use ticket ID" -- and that rule is needed
whatever is decided about delivering a late authorisation to a running
server, so it is worth landing on its own.

Kept a pure function over an already-fetched candidate set: the choice
is then reproducible and testable without a database, and claiming the
ticket stays a durable transaction as it is for ordinary proposals. Ties
break on ticket ID rather than scan order, so two replicas evaluating
the same queue cannot offer one slot to different players.

Region matching is stricter than ordinary formation: the server already
exists in one region, so a candidate must have RTT evidence for that
region specifically, not merely share some region with the others.

Eligibility is re-checked here as well as at the durable boundary, so an
ineligible mid-play or human-occupied slot never reaches selection at
all. Ranked is refused outright.

Corrected a comment I had written claiming the backfill window is
shorter than an ordinary proposal's; both are 10 seconds. What makes a
backfill offer separate is its payload and the absent decline penalty,
not its timing.

This does not yet make backfill work end to end -- see the roster
delivery question raised alongside this commit.
 2026-09-05 17:32:49 +01:00
Josh Creek 61a073099d fix(store): widen the serializable retry budget, stop leaking test volumes 
Two things that made the integration gate untrustworthy.

The retry budget was too small for expected contention.
TestPostgreSQLConcurrentIdenticalResultSubmission fires five identical
concurrent submissions and requires all five to succeed; it failed 4 runs
in 20. The error was retryable and retries did fire -- three attempts
simply was not enough. Contention here is normal rather than
exceptional: several game servers can submit results, and several
matchers can claim candidates, against the same rows at once. Raised to
five attempts, which is 0 failures in 40 runs.

Also jittered the backoff, but measured rather than assumed: my first
theory was a thundering herd, since the delay was exactly
RetryBackoff*(attempt+1) and every loser of a race woke at the same
instant. Isolating the two changes showed jitter alone moved 4/20 to
3/20, while the budget alone reached 0/20. The budget was the real
constraint. Jitter is kept because it costs nothing and its benefit
grows with the number of contending writers -- production is not capped
at five -- but the comment now says plainly that it is the smaller half,
so nobody inherits my wrong explanation.

Second, the integration scripts leaked one throwaway database volume per
run. --rm does reclaim anonymous volumes on a normal exit, but these
scripts force-remove the container from a trap, and `docker rm -f`
without -v keeps the volume. Sixty-four accumulated during this branch
until PostgreSQL stopped starting, surfacing only as the scripts' own
readiness timeout rather than as a disk error -- which is what the
"Docker storage exhausted locally" notes were really describing.
Measured at one volume per run before, zero after, across all five
scripts.
 2026-09-05 17:14:43 +01:00
Josh Creek a1f30f6af9 test(store): prove the audited claims instead of asserting them 
The audit established which rows understated what was built by locating
implementations and their call sites. That proves code exists, not that
it works, so each corrected claim is now tied to an executable test.

Seven of the nine were already covered and just needed naming: the
allocated ServerConfig fields, signed-authorisation admission, endpoint
wiring, casual lineup being reached through formation, three of the four
penalty kinds, signed roster metadata, the season countdown, and the
matcher deployments.

Two had no proof at all:

- INITIAL_CONNECT_NO_SHOW was the one penalty kind with no integration
  coverage, so "all four penalty kinds are written durably" rested
  entirely on reading the code.
- Cross-replica revocation is a behavioural property. An in-memory cache
  in front of the session read would break it while leaving every call
  site looking correct, so no amount of reading establishes it.

Writing the first one found my own error rather than a defect: casual
deliberately waits past InitialConnectWindow to CasualBotStartAfter
before deciding a no-show, giving a slow-loading player longer than the
ranked deadline. Reconciling at the earlier window only yields WAIT.

Both new tests were mutation-checked -- removing the penalty insert and
removing the revoked_at check each make them fail -- so they assert
something real rather than passing incidentally.
 2026-09-05 17:07:05 +01:00
Josh Creek 8033d52db3 docs: audit every Phase 7/8 task row against the code 
Three tasks in a row this branch turned out to be partly built already:
8.20's allocation wiring was complete end to end, 8.22's client UI was
built, and 7.4/8.7 listed durable ban storage and the Steam adapter as
outstanding after both had landed. That is a systematic problem, not
three coincidences, so this checks all 56 rows rather than fixing them
one at a time as they are picked up.

Nine more rows understated what exists:

- 8.6  every allocated-mode ServerConfig field is present, signed
       authorisation admission is in MatchNet, endpoint wiring is in
       AssignmentState
- 8.8  distributed revocation needs no cross-replica protocol: sessions
       are durable and read on every authenticated request
- 8.19 casual lineup formation is built and wired, and all four penalty
       kinds are written durably; only the backfill proposal path is
       genuinely missing
- 8.30 signed roster metadata landed with 8.31
- 8.42 the season countdown is implemented
- 8.16/8.43 the matcher is deployed; what remains is soak, not integration
- 8.13/8.52 cross-referenced to #31 rather than described loosely

The drift runs one way -- rows keep listing work that has since landed --
which inflates the apparent backlog and invites rebuilding what exists.
8.19 is the clearest case: it reads as four missing pieces and is one.

The §7 preamble claimed every row lists only what is still open. It
doesn't, so it now says so and points at the audit note, with the
standing instruction to verify a row against the code before planning
against it.
 2026-09-05 17:01:00 +01:00
Josh Creek 2702e53068 feat(ranked): make tier thresholds durable instead of compiled in 
Task 8.22. Tier bands lived in domain.DefaultTierPolicy(), compiled into
every API binary, so retuning one meant building and rolling a new image
-- least attractive exactly when it is most needed, as the rating
distribution settles after launch.

Bands now live in a tier_bands table, seeded by the migration with the
exact policy the binaries hardcode, so this changes durable state without
changing behaviour. Retuning is a rolling restart rather than a rebuild.

Three properties the loader deliberately holds:

- A malformed durable policy stops startup. Falling back on error would
  silently mis-tier every player, which is worse than not starting.
- An empty table is supported and falls back to the compiled default, so
  an operator can truncate back to known-good without a deploy, and a
  fresh database works before the seed is reviewed.
- PROVISIONAL is rejected as a band. It is derived from ranked game
  count, not rating, so a band claiming it would be unreachable at best
  and would shadow a real tier at worst.

Bands stay backend-owned; clients still receive only the resulting label,
per docs/MATCHMAKING.md. UNIQUE(min_rating) rejects two bands sharing a
threshold, catching an ambiguous policy before NewTierPolicy does.

testkit-api loads it too, so the control-plane integration scripts
exercise the durable path rather than the compiled default.

Integration tests cover the seeded policy matching the compiled one,
retuning taking effect from the database alone, truncation falling back,
and each invalid-policy shape being rejected. Verified they fail against
a loader that ignores durable bands.

The other two parts of 8.22 needed no work: the client UI already renders
tier, provisional status, ranked games and the season countdown, and
reconnect transport is 8.42's, dependent on live backend events.
 2026-09-05 15:38:24 +01:00
Josh Creek 8b9ae35b43 test(domain): guard the ranked arena list against Godot registry drift 
Task 8.20. `arena_registry.gd` is the documented single source of truth
for arenas, but `domain/ranked.go` keeps a hand-maintained mirror of its
floor-goal entries and nothing checked the two against each other --
ranked_test.go asserts the same three paths the production code
hardcodes, so both could drift together silently.

Drift is not hypothetical in either direction. The registry's own comment
anticipates flipping an elevated variant to random:true once a checkpoint
trained on that geometry is promoted, which ranked would then keep
excluding indefinitely. A rename or removal is worse: the allocator would
hand out a scene path that no longer exists, and the ranked server fails
to load its arena at match start -- after allocation, so it burns a real
match and a real server.

Keeping the two copies is deliberate rather than a wart: ranked arena
selection is server-authoritative and happens before any Godot process
exists. So this guards the relationship instead of removing it, the same
way the golden join-authorisation token guards the signing format. It
parses the registry and fails if the sets disagree either way, if
rotation order diverges from declaration order, or if a ranked path has
no scene behind it. The parser asserts it found both eligible and
ineligible entries, so a format change cannot make everything pass
vacuously. Verified against four drift scenarios.

The allocation-wiring half of 8.20 turned out to be already complete end
to end, with coverage at each hop; recorded in the task row rather than
rebuilt.

Add a Server Unit Tests workflow, because none of this would otherwise
run: the only Go tests CI executed were multiplayer-load's two load
tests, so ~24k lines of control plane gated nothing. Docker-free so it
can gate every push, and it vets the integration-tagged files too, since
those are excluded from the default build and could otherwise rot
uncompiled.

CLAUDE.md's CI section claimed two workflows and no unit-test job; there
were seven and now eight.
 2026-09-05 15:05:49 +01:00
Josh Creek a4b362cb01 fix(deploy): supply Steam credentials to the control plane, refresh stale status 
The Steam adapter took --steam-publisher-key/--steam-app-id and the
matching env vars, but no manifest supplied them, so a deployed control
plane would have kept sign-in returning 503 even once the App ID from
#15 arrived -- that issue would have unblocked nothing on landing.

Mount them from a new cosmic-clash-steam Secret, into the control-plane
Deployment alone: the publisher key is issued to us, never to a client,
and no other workload (least of all a game server) has any use for it. A
manifest test asserts both the wiring and that the Secret appears in no
other manifest; verified it fails in both directions.

Both keys are optional, so the Deployment still rolls out before the App
ID exists and sign-in simply stays 503.

Also correct task rows this branch made stale: 7.4 (durable ban storage
landed), 8.7 (adapter, bans and secret store landed), 8.39 (cross-replica
fan-out landed), and 8.5's migration range, which stopped at 0013.

Move the branch review into docs/ with a header marking it a point-in-time
artefact -- all thirteen findings are addressed, and its present tense
would otherwise read as current behaviour.

Record gotcha 52: the integration scripts use `docker run --rm`, which
reclaims the container but not its anonymous volume. Sixty-four of them,
~4 GB, accumulated during this session until PostgreSQL stopped starting
-- surfacing only as the script's own readiness timeout, not as a disk
error. That is the real cause behind the "Docker storage exhausted
locally" notes those rows carried.
 2026-09-05 12:38:15 +01:00
Josh Creek 0a8f3924d0 docs: cross-reference the new image-publishing issue in TODO.md 
Issue #31 covers the gap that no workflow builds or pushes the images
deploy/k8s/base references, and that every digest there is still an
all-zero placeholder which the supply-chain gate accepts because it runs
without --require-concrete. It blocks #17.
 2026-09-05 12:18:32 +01:00
Josh Creek ccf7d0fbfe docs: record the closed root blocker and the new probe/rotation contract 
docs/MATCHMAKING.md is the stated source of truth for this design, so it
changes first: the probe challenge endpoint and why probing gates
matching rather than merely improving it, and the key-ID rotation
procedure that makes overlapping-key rotation concrete.

multiplayer-next.md §0's root blocker is closed rather than deleted --
what it was, why it blocked everything, and how it was resolved, since
the reasoning is what a future reader needs. Tasks 7.6, 8.15 and 8.31
updated to what actually remains, which in every case is now external
rather than unbuilt.

TODO.md #14 asked for a join-signing design decision; that decision is
recorded with its rationale. CLAUDE.md no longer says a real deployment
cannot complete a match end to end.
 2026-09-05 11:00:50 +01:00
Josh Creek f628ccfd35 feat(auth): wire production Steam sign-in and the client login flow 
newAPIService never supplied SteamLogin, so POST /v1/session/steam
always returned 503 auth_unavailable in production. The only
implementation was cmd/testkit-api's fake, which derives an identity
from the ticket string itself and accepts anything -- so the passing
integration path was neither deployable nor secure. On the client side
the game started with an empty token and a loopback base URL, and no
production code called configure() or login_steam(); the menu entered
matchmaking directly, so every request failed ERR_UNAUTHORIZED before
reaching the network.

Add a real ISteamUserAuth/AuthenticateUserTicket adapter behind an
interface, so the production login path is testable with only the Valve
call stubbed. It rejects family-shared copies (the account playing does
not own the app) and, by default, VAC- or publisher-banned accounts, and
refuses malformed tickets locally rather than forwarding them.

Crucially it separates our faults from the player's: a Valve outage or a
revoked publisher key returns 503, not 401. Answering 401 would tell a
legitimate player their login failed and send them to fix an account
that is fine while the real fault went unnoticed. A banned identity now
returns 403 rather than a misleading 503.

Sign-in is configuration-gated on the publisher key and App ID: without
them the endpoint keeps returning 503, since silently accepting an
unverified ticket would be worse than refusing to authenticate. A
returning player keeps the player ID they already had, so ratings,
penalties and bans follow the account rather than the session.

Client side: acquire a web-API ticket through GodotSteam's async
signal -- requesting one returns a handle, not a ticket -- using the
existing dynamic-call pattern so stock Godot still parses the project.
The endpoint is configurable for release builds, and matchmaking
completes sign-in before it will queue.

Verified against real PostgreSQL; 232 Godot tests pass.
 2026-09-05 10:57:50 +01:00
Josh Creek d40344a2c0 fix(deploy): ship runnable control-plane and matcher workloads 
The Kubernetes base deployed a control-plane image the Dockerfile never
built -- cmd/control-plane was absent from the Go build stage and no
target existed -- while the Dockerfile built a matcher image no manifest
ever deployed. Applying the checked-in base therefore could not produce
the advertised topology: one required workload had no repository-defined
artifact, and nothing consumed queued tickets. Tickets could be created
but never became proposals.

Add the production control-plane build and image target, explicitly not
the testkit-api target, which injects a fake login accepting any ticket.
Add casual and ranked matcher Deployments as separate workloads: they
have different match sizes, and separating them keeps a ranked backlog
from delaying casual formation. One replica each -- CreateProposal's
SKIP LOCKED fences make more replicas safe, but they would halve the
candidate pool each worker sees per poll and worsen formation for no
throughput gain at this scale. Their PDB uses maxUnavailable, since
minAvailable against a single replica blocks node drains outright.

Also fix both blocked traffic directions. No ingress policy admitted
UDP/7777 to game-server pods, so an allocated server was unreachable
from the internet under the namespace-wide default deny. And
control-plane ingress admitted only edge-gateway pods, so roster fetch,
registration, connection receipts, shutdown and result submission from
game servers were dropped even inside the cluster, despite their egress
being permitted. The default deny stays.

Manifest tests now assert every required role is deployed, both
playlists are scheduled, every referenced image maps to a real
Dockerfile target, and both traffic directions are permitted. Each was
verified to fail against the defect it covers. The control-plane image
was built and run to confirm the target works.
 2026-09-05 10:52:52 +01:00
Josh Creek 801fca7cb0 fix(matchmaking): make regional RTT evidence obtainable end to end 
domain.validCandidate hard-requires a non-empty PredictedRTT map, but
CreateQueueTicket persisted an empty one and the only endpoint that
could fill it returned 503 in every real binary, because Service.Probe
was assigned nowhere outside api tests. No client-created ticket could
ever be selected by the matcher. The Godot client had no probe method at
all, so even a wired backend was unreachable from the game.

Four distinct defects had to be fixed for this path to work:

Nothing issued the nonce ProbeProvider was meant to compare against, so
the contract could not be satisfied even in principle. Add
POST /v1/probes/{region}/challenge, backed by a durable single-use
challenge -- durable because any replica may serve the answer for a
challenge another replica issued. RTT is the interval between issuing
and receiving, so no client-reported latency reaches placement.

CreateQueueTicket marshalled a nil map to JSON `null`, a JSONB scalar
rather than an object, and jsonb_set rejects that with "cannot set path
in scalar". RecordProbe would have failed at runtime even once wired.
Persist an object, and normalise non-object values in the update for
rows already written.

A nil ProbeRecorder made the handler report success while persisting
nothing, which silently leaves the ticket unmatchable. That is a
misconfiguration, not a successful probe; it now returns 503.

A successful probe updated PostgreSQL only. The candidate inserted at
enqueue time carries an empty RTT map, and the Redis keyspace has its
TTL continually refreshed, so the stale entry need never repair itself.
Refresh that player's projection after the probe commits.

Client side: add the challenge/answer round trip and have the
matchmaking screen collect evidence before creating a ticket, since
queueing first produces a search that can never match. Probing every
region fully is not required -- placement uses whichever regions
answered -- but queueing with none is refused rather than silently
stalling.

New integration test drives the real enqueue and probe paths and then
asks the actual matcher predicate, rather than hand-building a candidate
the way the unit tests do -- which is exactly why they missed this.

Also make the integration schema reset drop the whole public schema: the
enumerated table list silently broke with each new migration.
 2026-09-05 10:49:28 +01:00
Josh Creek 5765532409 fix(allocator): publish signed assignment rosters before servers start 
The root blocker (issue #14). The worker bound the provider allocation
and stopped. Service.PublishRoster and store.SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster
both existed, fully tested, with zero non-test callers, and the
production allocator configured neither a roster store nor a signing
key. Nothing ever wrote the assignments table.

The allocated supervisor fetches a non-empty roster before it launches
the game child, so every real allocation failed at that fetch: no match
could reach ASSIGNMENT_READY or accept a player. Existing tests seeded
assignments directly, which is exactly why the missing hand-off went
unnoticed.

The worker now builds one join authorisation per durable participant,
signs each with the active key, and publishes them. Participants are
read through the same query SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster re-validates
against, so the allocator cannot construct a roster the persistence
boundary would reject. The manifest commits to a digest over the whole
roster, so a server cannot be handed a truncated roster whose surviving
entries are each individually valid.

Persist the provider endpoint on the allocation: it arrived on the
provider response and was never stored, so a worker crashing between
allocating and publishing had no endpoint to recover and would have
stranded the match permanently. Republishing is idempotent, so that
crash now simply retries.

cmd/allocator refuses to start without key material rather than running
an allocator that binds allocations and silently strands every match.
The k8s allocator Deployment mounts the same key set the Fleet does, and
both now take the JSON key map so a rotation can publish several.

New integration test drives the real worker through to the supervisor's
own roster read path without seeding the assignments table. Verified it
fails with "assignments = 0, want 2" when the publish step is removed.
 2026-09-05 10:42:31 +01:00
Josh Creek b8bcc1f3c1 feat(join-auth): add key-ID rotation to signed join authorisations 
Prerequisite for wiring the allocator to publish rosters. The signing
key is a shared HMAC secret mounted into both the allocator and the
allocated game server; without a key ID, rotating it would invalidate
every authorisation already issued for an in-flight match, because a
server holding only the new key cannot verify a token signed with the
old one.

Add KeyID to JoinAuthorisation and append it to the canonical claim
bytes, so it is covered by the signature and cannot be repointed at a
different key than the one that actually signed. Allocated servers now
hold a set of currently-valid keys and select by ID: a rotation
publishes the new key alongside the old, and the old is dropped once no
live match can still reference it.

The key file becomes a JSON map of key ID to base64 key. A file of raw
key bytes is still accepted as a single key under the empty ID, which is
what an unrotated deployment and the kind fixture use.

Game/scripts/match_net.gd builds the canonical bytes independently, so
it changes in lockstep; the cross-language golden token in
test_match_net.gd is regenerated from the Go implementation and now
carries a key ID. Added tests cover accepting either key mid-rotation,
rejecting a retired key ID, and rejecting a token whose key ID was
swapped to name a key the server does hold.

Go suite and 223 Godot tests pass.
 2026-09-05 10:36:06 +01:00
Josh Creek 5453e19761 feat(server): add retention for idempotency, outbox and session records 
Each ten-second queue heartbeat mints a fresh idempotency key and
permanently inserts a row. Published outbox rows and expired/revoked
sessions were never purged either -- the maintenance role performed
lifecycle reconciliation only. At 10,000 queued players heartbeats alone
add roughly 60,000 durable rows per minute, so table and index growth,
vacuum pressure, backup size and recovery time were all unbounded on a
service intended to scale horizontally.

Add retention windows chosen to exceed every retry and recovery horizon
that could still consult the row -- deleting an idempotency key early
would turn a client replay into a second real mutation, so this is a
correctness bound, not just a housekeeping one. Dead-lettered outbox
rows are kept longest, being the record of events never delivered.

Deletes run in bounded SKIP LOCKED batches so a purge never blocks live
traffic, never holds a long transaction, and concurrent maintenance
replicas do not contend. Indexes back each predicate so a pass cannot
degrade into a sequential scan of the table it is bounding. The
maintenance role reports rows purged, the backlog past its window
(deletion lag), and any dead-lettered events.

Also make the migration-rollback test derive its step counts instead of
hardcoding them: adding a migration silently shifted the fixed counts so
the failure surfaced as an unrelated "0006 rollback did not drop
matches.allocation_id".
 2026-09-05 10:32:08 +01:00
Josh Creek 129b0c7ef0 fix(server): fan outbox events out to every control-plane replica 
The Deployment runs two replicas, but WebSocket subscribers live only in
each process's in-memory hub. Every replica races to read the same
global unpublished outbox rows, and publishing succeeded even when the
winning replica held no matching local subscriber -- that replica then
set the single global published_at. A client connected to the other
replica never received the event, and delivery degraded further with
each replica added. REST recovery eventually converged, but short-lived
proposal transitions could be observed late or not at all.

Publish committed events through PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY so the replica
that owns the subscriber's connection delivers it, regardless of which
replica drained the row. The listener holds its own pgx connection --
LISTEN is session state, so a pooled database/sql connection cannot
carry it -- and reconnects with backoff, since losing it would silently
downgrade that replica's subscribers to REST-only recovery.

The fan-out is optional: without EventFanout configured, behaviour is
unchanged local-hub publication, which stays correct for a single
replica and for tests. Only outbox-sourced events are routed through it;
the in-request-path publishes remain local, as those are a latency
optimisation for the caller's own connection.

Fan-out needs a wire shape of its own because ControlPlaneEvent hides
PlayerID from clients, and the recipient is exactly what a peer replica
needs to route on.
 2026-09-05 10:29:23 +01:00
Josh Creek 4248e51c60 fix(server): enforce durable identity bans on session issuance and auth 
banned_until and ban_reason have been in the schema since 0001, but no
production query ever read them -- grepping the tree found no reference
outside the migration itself. The only ban check was an in-memory map on
domain.TicketVerifier used by domain tests. Once real Steam login is
wired, a banned identity would keep full access through every existing
session until expiry and could obtain new ones.

Make the ban part of the durable authentication transaction rather than
a policy each login adapter must remember to re-implement:

- Session issuance inserts only when the identity exists and has no
  active ban, so a banned player cannot mint a session.
- Authentication joins the identity and rejects an active ban on every
  request, so a ban takes effect immediately on every replica rather
  than at session expiry.
- ApplyIdentityBan sets the ban and revokes that identity's sessions in
  one serializable transaction, closing the window where the ban is
  durable but another replica still accepts an issued session.

Bans are time-bounded and clearing one does not resurrect sessions the
ban revoked.

Tests cover enforcement across two independently constructed stores
standing in for two replicas, expiry/unban semantics, and -- separately,
because revocation would otherwise mask it -- that a ban applied without
revoking anything still blocks the next request.
 2026-09-05 10:26:25 +01:00
Josh Creek 320ec46ba2 fix(server): partition and bound the Redis candidate projection 
Both playlists shared one hash and sorted set, causing two independent
failures.

Starvation: Snapshot performed an unbounded ZRANGEBYSCORE and HMGET,
decoded the whole queue, and the matcher then truncated to its candidate
limit *before* filtering by playlist. A large casual prefix could
therefore leave the ranked worker with zero candidates indefinitely even
while ranked tickets were queued further down the set.

Mutual erasure: each matcher captured only its own playlist as the
durable source, but Rebuild replaced the shared keys, so a casual repair
wiped ranked projections and vice versa.

Namespace the keys per playlist, push the limit into Redis (LIMIT 0 N)
so reads no longer scale with total queue depth, and scope Rebuild to
one namespace. Rebuild now rejects a candidate whose playlist does not
match the namespace, which would reintroduce the starvation. Upsert
derives the namespace from the candidate; Remove takes the playlist,
since a ticket ID alone no longer identifies its namespace.

Add tests for a 300-deep casual backlog not starving ranked, for neither
playlist's rebuild erasing the other, and for the limit being applied
without losing enqueue ordering.
 2026-09-05 10:23:52 +01:00
Josh Creek f6a87463c5 fix(server): load authoritative ratings into ranked candidates 
The candidate projection selected only from queue_tickets and its scan
never set Candidate.Rating, so every PostgreSQL-sourced ranked candidate
arrived with Go's zero value. Rating tolerance, selection scoring and
team partitioning all read that field, so ranked matchmaking treated a
900-rated player as identical to a 2100-rated one. Unit tests missed it
because they construct candidates with ratings already populated.

Join the ratings table, defaulting to domain.GlickoInitialRating for a
player with no ratings row yet -- a genuinely new profile, matching the
column default.

Fix the same defect on the Redis path too, which is reached differently:
the projection is seeded from the candidate CreateQueueTicket builds,
not from the candidate query, and that candidate also left Rating unset.
Resolve the rating inside the enqueue transaction so both projections
agree on one authoritative value. The rating is never client-supplied.

Add a store-backed test with deliberately distant ratings (900 vs 2100)
plus an unrated player, asserting both projections and that the spread
survives. Verified it fails without the fix.
 2026-09-05 10:19:23 +01:00
Josh Creek 1dd05c75f1 fix(server): repair the initial-connect outbox envelope and unblock dispatch 
ApplyInitialConnectPlan wrote a payload of {match_id,state,action},
omitting event, revision, resource_id, occurred_at and player_ids --
every field deliverStateOutboxEvent requires. Delivery rejected the row,
dispatch returned on the first error so it was never acknowledged, and
because reads are ordered oldest-first it was retried ahead of every
later state_changed event on every 100ms poll. One initial-connect
transition therefore blocked lifecycle delivery for all matches, not
just its own.

Two independent fixes, since either alone leaves the system fragile:

Build envelopes through one validating helper (MarshalOutboxEnvelope)
and convert all five writers to it. A writer that omits a required
field now fails its own transaction instead of committing a row that
can only ever poison the queue. The helper takes revision as int64 so
the -1 "nothing matched" sentinel some CTEs return surfaces as an error
rather than wrapping to a huge uint64.

Make dispatch resilient regardless: a delivery failure is now counted
against that row and the batch continues, with the row dead-lettered
after MaxOutboxDeliveryAttempts so a poison event degrades to one lost
notification instead of a stalled queue. Ordering within an aggregate
is still honoured -- later events of a failed match are deferred, so no
client observes that match's newer state before its older state. An ack
failure still stops the batch, being a database rather than a payload
problem.

Initial-connect events now address every participant, not just the
connected ones: a no-show needs to learn their ticket was failed and a
penalty applied.
 2026-09-05 10:17:16 +01:00
Josh Creek 2c648514ba test(server): fix and wire up the two unrun Python suites 
test_contracts.py required operation ID `recordPlayerConnected`, but
openapi.json names that endpoint `claimPlayerConnection` — the accurate
name, since POST /servers/{id}/connect claims a connection lease and
returns a generation. Align the test on the document and assert the set
difference, so a future mismatch names the missing operation instead of
reporting "False is not true".

test_observability_manifests.py copied only two of the four files the
checker reads, so it died on a missing kustomization.yaml before ever
reaching the mutated namespace. Copy the full fixture, split the
namespace and scrape-path mutations into separate cases so either
defect produces its own diagnostic, and add an unmutated-copy case so a
broken fixture can't make the mutation cases pass vacuously.

Neither suite was invoked by any Make target or workflow, which is why
both could sit red. Add them, plus test_threat_model.py, to
verify_multiplayer_local.sh.
 2026-09-05 10:10:11 +01:00
108 changed files with 7040 additions and 392 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.github/workflows/server-unit-tests.yml
+47
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# The Go control plane is ~24k lines, and until this workflow existed the only
# Go tests CI ever ran were the two load tests in multiplayer-load.yml. Nothing
# else — domain policy, the wire/store boundaries, the allocator, the Steam
# adapter — gated a change. The Godot unit suite is covered (verify-phase6 runs
# test_runner.tscn as its first step); this closes the equivalent gap on the
# Go side.
#
# Deliberately Docker-free and cluster-free so it stays fast enough to gate
# every push. Tests that need a real PostgreSQL or Redis are behind the
# `integration` build tag and stay with their own scripts; `go vet` is still
# run over that tag so those files cannot rot uncompiled.
name: Server Unit Tests
on:
push:
pull_request:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
go-tests:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: server
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version-file: server/go.mod
cache-dependency-path: server/go.sum
- name: Build
run: go build ./...
- name: Vet
run: go vet ./...
# Integration-tagged files are excluded from the default build, so
# without this a signature change could leave them broken until someone
# ran the integration scripts by hand.
- name: Vet integration-tagged tests
run: go vet -tags integration ./...
- name: Test
run: go test ./...
# The control plane is concurrent by design: outbox dispatchers, the
# event hub, the matcher worker and the allocator all run in parallel.
- name: Test with race detector
run: go test -race ./...
AGONES-CI-INVESTIGATION.md
+141
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@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
# Investigate and fix the failing Agones Integration CI gate
## Task
`make verify-kind-agones` (workflow `.github/workflows/agones-integration.yml`,
script `scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh`) fails. Find the root cause and fix it so
the gate passes on CI. Repo: `jcreek/CosmicClash`, branch `feat/multiplayer`,
PR #30.
## What is already known — do not re-derive this
**The failure.** `helm upgrade --install agones ... --wait --timeout 5m` fails
with `Error: context deadline exceeded`. Immediately before, Helm reports:
```
resource Deployment/agones-system/agones-controller not ready. status: InProgress, message: Available: 0/1
resource Deployment/agones-system/agones-extensions not ready. status: InProgress, message: Available: 0/1
resource Deployment/agones-system/agones-allocator not ready. status: InProgress, message: Available: 0/1
```
So the cluster is created, the game-server image loads, and the Agones chart
installs — but none of its Deployments become Available inside 5 minutes. The
script never reaches the parts that exercise this repo's own manifests.
**It is pre-existing.** It fails identically at `089c127c`, the branch head
before recent work. It is not caused by the branch's changes. Do not assume a
recent commit broke it.
**It is not architecture-specific.** It fails the same way on GitHub's
`ubuntu-24.04` amd64 runners and on an arm64 macOS developer machine. Agones
1.49.0 publishes both amd64 and arm64 images.
**It is not a Helm kubeVersion rejection.** Agones charts 1.49.0, 1.50.0 and
1.51.0 declare no `kubeVersion` constraint, so Helm is not refusing the
Kubernetes version — the pods are being created and are not becoming ready.
**Ruled out as a red herring:** reproducing locally on a machine with heavy
Docker usage produced `FailedCreatePodSandBox: containerd connection reset`,
which is local resource pressure, not the CI cause. If you see that locally,
clear Docker state and retry rather than chasing it.
**There may be two distinct failures, not one.** After `docker system prune`,
a local run got *past* the Agones install cleanly (controller and allocator
both reached "condition met") and failed later, at:
```
scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh:146
kubectl wait --for=jsonpath='{.status.ready}'=2 fleet/cosmic-clash-game -n cosmic-clash --timeout=5m
error: timed out waiting for the condition on fleets/cosmic-clash-game
```
So locally the Agones install is fine and the **Fleet's game-server pods never
become Ready**; on CI the run never gets that far because the Agones install
itself times out. Treat these as potentially separate problems: fixing the CI
Agones timeout may simply expose the Fleet one underneath. Both need to pass.
The Fleet failure is the more suspicious of the two for recent work, because
`deploy/k8s/base/fleet.yaml` changed: the join-signing key material moved from
a single raw-bytes secret key (`join-signing-key`) to a JSON map
(`join-signing-keys.json`), and the mount's `items[].key` moved with it. The
script's `kubectl create secret` was updated to match and does succeed
(`secret/cosmic-clash-game-server created`), so the obvious mismatch is not
present -- but verify the pod actually mounts and starts rather than assuming.
Note the script's `sed` also strips `--allocated-mode` and the roster path and
blanks `--control-plane-url`, so the game server runs in a reduced mode here;
check whether it is failing for a reason unrelated to the key at all.
## Pinned versions (all in `scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh`)
| Thing | Value | Override |
|---|---|---|
| Agones chart | `1.49.0` | `AGONES_VERSION` |
| kind node image | `kindest/node:v1.33.1` (Kubernetes 1.33) | `KIND_NODE_IMAGE` |
| Cluster | single node, `--wait 120s` | `KIND_CLUSTER_NAME` |
| Runner | `ubuntu-latest` (ubuntu-24.04), 30 min timeout | — |
The chart is installed with `--set agones.controller.replicas=1`,
`agones.extensions.replicas=1`, `agones.allocator.replicas=1`, and
`agones.extensions.resources.{requests,limits}.ephemeral-storage` lowered to
128Mi/512Mi. That ephemeral-storage override already exists because Agones 1.49
otherwise requests 10,100 MiB and will not schedule on a default kind node —
there is a comment saying so. **A similar resource-fit problem for the other
Deployments is a strong hypothesis worth checking first.**
## Diagnostics are already in place
The script now dumps, on any failure and before the cluster is deleted: node
capacity and conditions, pods in `agones-system` and `cosmic-clash`, recent
events per namespace, and describe + current/previous logs for every not-ready
pod. Set `KIND_KEEP_ON_FAILURE=1` to retain the cluster for interactive
inspection instead of deleting it.
Its first run revealed a bug in the diagnostics themselves: a
`kubectl cluster-info` reachability guard suppressed the entire dump. That
guard has been removed, so the dump now always runs on failure.
**Start by reading that output**, either from a CI run or a local run. The most
likely candidates it will distinguish between:
1. **Resource pressure** — `FailedScheduling ... Insufficient cpu/memory/
ephemeral-storage`. Fix by lowering requests for the other Deployments the
way extensions already is, or by giving the kind cluster more capacity.
2. **Version incompatibility** — Agones 1.49 against Kubernetes 1.33. Check
Agones' release notes for its supported Kubernetes range; if 1.33 is outside
it, either raise `agones_version` or lower `kind_node_image`. Confirm the
pairing is one Agones actually tests.
3. **Probe/readiness failure** — pods Running but never Ready. The pod logs and
describe output will show the failing probe.
4. **Image pull** — `ImagePullBackOff` on an Agones image.
## Constraints
- **Do not weaken the gate to make it pass.** Removing `--wait`, extending the
timeout to hide a real failure, or `|| true` around the install are all wrong.
If the cause is genuinely a timeout on slow-but-working startup, raising it
is acceptable *only* with evidence that the pods do become Available, and the
new value should be justified in a comment.
- Keep it a disposable, isolated cluster: it must not touch an existing cluster,
and the EXIT trap must still remove the one it created.
- If you change a pinned version, pin the new one explicitly and say why in the
commit message. Do not float to `latest`.
- `CLAUDE.md` applies: never create co-authored commits, never mention Claude.
## Verification
- `make verify-kind-agones` passes locally (needs Docker, kind, kubectl, Helm).
- The `Agones Integration` workflow passes on PR #30. It is `pull_request`
triggered with path filters on `Dockerfile`, `Makefile`, `deploy/k8s/**`,
`scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh`, and its own workflow file — so a change to
the script will trigger it.
- Do not regress the other seven workflows. `Allocated Compose Smoke` was also
failing and has just been fixed; confirm it stays green.
## Useful context
- `multiplayer-next.md` §7 task 8.49 describes what this gate is meant to prove.
- `deploy/k8s/base/fleet.yaml` is the Fleet the script applies after Agones is
up, with a `sed` that swaps the release digest placeholder for the locally
built image and strips `--allocated-mode` and the roster path (there is no
control plane in this disposable cluster).
- The gate is a prerequisite for issue #17 (standing up a real cluster).
CLAUDE.md
+18 -3
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Important rule: never create co-authored commits. Never mention Claude in commit
## Project overview
Cosmic Clash is an open-source, physics-based "vehicle soccer" game (a spiritual successor to Rocket League) built in Godot 4.7, using space ships instead of cars. The game and the dedicated server are GDScript/Godot only — the "C# backend" an early README described was never started, and the dedicated server is an export of this same Godot project. There is one component outside the Godot project: a **Go matchmaking control plane** in `server/` for casual/ranked queues, ranked ratings and Agones-based server allocation. It is partially implemented and a 1.0 launch blocker — see `docs/MATCHMAKING.md` for the design, `multiplayer-next.md` §0 and §7 for what remains (a real deployment cannot complete a match end to end today), and `docs/TECH_STACK.md` for why the control plane is Go rather than C#, Rust or C++. README.md's "MVP is local-only against bots" section is historical: server-authoritative online multiplayer, a headless dedicated server, Docker/CI verification, and an optional Steam transport are all implemented (Phases 1–6). See `multiplayer-next.md` for what actually remains.
Cosmic Clash is an open-source, physics-based "vehicle soccer" game (a spiritual successor to Rocket League) built in Godot 4.7, using space ships instead of cars. The game and the dedicated server are GDScript/Godot only — the "C# backend" an early README described was never started, and the dedicated server is an export of this same Godot project. There is one component outside the Godot project: a **Go matchmaking control plane** in `server/` for casual/ranked queues, ranked ratings and Agones-based server allocation. It is a 1.0 launch blocker — see `docs/MATCHMAKING.md` for the design, `multiplayer-next.md` §0 and §7 for what remains (the allocation-to-connect pipeline is now wired end to end; what is left is external — a Steamworks App ID, custom GodotSteam builds, and a live Agones cluster), and `docs/TECH_STACK.md` for why the control plane is Go rather than C#, Rust or C++. README.md's "MVP is local-only against bots" section is historical: server-authoritative online multiplayer, a headless dedicated server, Docker/CI verification, and an optional Steam transport are all implemented (Phases 1–6). See `multiplayer-next.md` for what actually remains.
Because the gameplay concept (vehicle soccer) can't be copyrighted but specific expression can, all code/art/assets must be original — this is why the project uses Godot instead of Unreal/Unity and ships instead of cars. Keep this in mind when writing code or pulling in assets: don't port or closely mirror Rocket League's actual implementation.
@@ -132,7 +132,22 @@ To run one by hand, and for every config flag, see `SERVER.md`. `--smoke-force-g
### CI
`.github/workflows/` has exactly two jobs, both running the Make targets above: `dedicated-server-smoke.yml` (`make verify-phase6`) and `enet-integration.yml` (`make verify-enet-integration` inside the `enet-test` image). There is no unit-test-only workflow — `verify-phase6` runs `test_runner.tscn` as its first step.
`.github/workflows/` has eight jobs, all but one running a Make target:
| Workflow | Runs | Needs |
|---|---|---|
| `server-unit-tests.yml` | `go build`/`vet`/`vet -tags integration`/`test`/`test -race` in `server/` | nothing (no Docker) |
| `dedicated-server-smoke.yml` | `make verify-phase6` | Docker, several GB |
| `enet-integration.yml` | `make verify-enet-integration` inside the `enet-test` image | Docker |
| `allocated-compose.yml` | `make verify-allocated-compose` | Docker Compose |
| `agones-integration.yml` | `make verify-kind-agones` | kind + Helm |
| `multiplayer-chaos.yml` | `make verify-chaos-recovery` | Docker |
| `multiplayer-load.yml` | `make verify-multiplayer-load` (two `-tags load` Go tests) | — |
| `supply-chain.yml` | `make verify-supply-chain` | — |
**The Godot unit suite runs via `verify-phase6`**, which invokes `test_runner.tscn` as its first step — there is no separate Godot workflow. The Go unit suite has its own workflow because until it existed the only Go tests CI ran were `multiplayer-load`'s two load tests, so ~24k lines of control plane gated nothing.
Note what is *not* in CI: `make verify-multiplayer-local` (the combined local gate, which also runs the Python manifest/contract suites) and the `integration`-tagged Go tests, which need a real PostgreSQL/Redis and live in `scripts/run_*_integration.sh`. Run those by hand before landing server changes.
### Other
@@ -148,7 +163,7 @@ The structure was deliberately chosen so an RL-trained AI opponent and, later, m
- **Scene flow**: `scenes/main_menu.tscn` (`main_menu.gd`, one handler per mode) → `free_play.tscn` (practice: no timer, R resets ball), `match.tscn` (150s timer, per-team score, kickoff resets), `spectate.tscn` (bot vs bot exhibition), `settings.tscn`, or — for online — `lobby.tscn` → `networked_match.tscn`. Esc returns to the menu. Canonical paths live in `scripts/scene_paths.gd`; use those constants rather than string literals.
- **Controller seam (do not bypass)**: `Ship` (`scripts/ship.gd`, `RigidBody3D`) never reads `Input`. Each physics tick, `_integrate_forces` pulls one `ShipAction` (`scripts/ship_action.gd`: thrust `Vector3`, rotation `Vector3`, turbo `bool`, each axis -1..1) from its `ShipController` child (`scripts/ship_controller.gd`, base returns a zero action). `PlayerShipController` reads input actions; `AIShipController` runs an RL policy; `RLShipController` is driven by the training bridge; `LocalNetShipController` wraps another controller to record inputs into the network timeline. A ship with no controller is inert but simulated. The ShipAction shape *is* the RL action space and *is* what the wire format quantises — change it deliberately and everywhere at once.
- **Arena vs game mode**: an arena (`scripts/arena.gd`, group `"arena"`) is a stateless stadium — a setting, an enclosing `Boundary` (instance of `objects/arena_boundary.tscn`), two `Goal` instances, `BallSpawn` and `SpawnsTeam0/1` Marker3Ds — queried via `get_ball_spawn()`/`get_ship_spawns(team)`/`get_goals()`. All arenas are a standard size: they instance the shared `arena_boundary.tscn`, and `scripts/arena_boundary.gd` (`ArenaBoundary`) holds the canonical play-volume constants (`INNER_HALF_X` 18, `INNER_HALF_Z` 27, `INNER_HEIGHT` 18, `GOAL_LINE_Z` = `INNER_HALF_Z`) that field-size logic must derive from instead of restating numbers. Game modes extend `GameMode` (`scripts/game_mode.gd`, group `"game"`): the mode's scene contains an Arena + HUD, and the mode spawns ball/ships/controllers/camera **in code** (`spawn_ship(team, index, controller)` etc.) so ship counts and controller mixes stay flexible.
- **Arena registry**: `scripts/arena_registry.gd` is the single source of truth for the arena list — three settings × floor/elevated goal variants. `"random": true` gates which arenas Match/Spectate/the dedicated server may pick; **elevated-goal variants are Free-Play-only** until a checkpoint trained on `training_elevated.tscn` is promoted, because the current bots cannot score on an elevated goal. `path_for_match(match_index, mode)` is deliberately pure arithmetic so "the server cycles arenas" is unit-testable. `arena_base.tscn` is the scenery-free physical layout the dedicated server loads (clients still render the variant `MatchSim` names).
- **Arena registry**: `scripts/arena_registry.gd` is the single source of truth for the arena list — three settings × floor/elevated goal variants. `"random": true` gates which arenas Match/Spectate/the dedicated server may pick; **elevated-goal variants are Free-Play-only** until a checkpoint trained on `training_elevated.tscn` is promoted, because the current bots cannot score on an elevated goal. `path_for_match(match_index, mode)` is deliberately pure arithmetic so "the server cycles arenas" is unit-testable. **The Go control plane keeps its own copy of the ranked-eligible subset** (`server/domain/ranked.go`'s `rankedArenas`), because ranked arena selection is a server-authoritative decision made before any Godot process exists. That copy is not free to drift: `server/domain/arena_registry_sync_test.go` parses this file and fails if the two disagree in either direction, or if a ranked path has no scene behind it. Editing the arena list therefore means updating `ranked.go` too — the test says so when it fails. `arena_base.tscn` is the scenery-free physical layout the dedicated server loads (clients still render the variant `MatchSim` names).
- **Goals are dumb sensors**: `scripts/goal.gd` (`Area3D`, group `"goal"`, `@export team`) only emits `goal_scored(team)` when a body in group `"ball"` enters; `GameMode` debounces it (`_handle_goal_scored`) and modes decide consequences. Never put scoring/reset logic in the goal.
- **Ship physics**: all movement is force/torque-based (`_integrate_forces`), not kinematic — inputs become world-space forces/torques relative to ship orientation, with manual drag and speed clamps per tick. Physics properties (mass, inertia, friction material) live in `objects/ship.tscn`, not in `_ready` overrides — keep the scene truthful; RL tuning and the client/server parity trace depend on it.
- **Surface pull (wall/ceiling grav-plating)**: `ArenaBoundary.get_surface_pull()` is a wall+ceiling-only proximity force field (the floor stays plain default gravity) that `Ship` and `Ball` (`scripts/ball.gd`) each apply in their own `_integrate_forces` with independently-tuned strength/range, discovered via the `"arena_boundary"` group — enabling wall-rides and ceiling shots with no collision-shape changes.
Dockerfile
+17
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@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ COPY server/go.mod server/go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY server/ ./
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /opt/cosmic-clash/game-server-supervisor ./cmd/game-server-supervisor
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /opt/cosmic-clash/control-plane ./cmd/control-plane
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /opt/cosmic-clash/testkit-api ./cmd/testkit-api
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /opt/cosmic-clash/matcher ./cmd/matcher
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /opt/cosmic-clash/allocator ./cmd/allocator
@@ -76,6 +77,22 @@ COPY --from=supervisor-build /opt/cosmic-clash/game-server-supervisor /opt/cosmi
RUN chmod 0755 /opt/cosmic-clash/game-server-supervisor
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/cosmic-clash/game-server-supervisor"]
# The production control-plane API. deploy/k8s/base/control-plane-deployment.yaml
# has always referenced this image, but nothing built it: cmd/control-plane was
# absent from the Go build stage and no target existed, so the checked-in
# Kubernetes base could not produce its own advertised topology.
#
# This must never be substituted with the testkit-api target below, which
# injects a fake login provider that accepts any ticket string.
FROM server AS control-plane
COPY --from=supervisor-build /opt/cosmic-clash/control-plane /opt/cosmic-clash/control-plane
COPY server/migrations /opt/cosmic-clash/migrations
RUN chmod 0755 /opt/cosmic-clash/control-plane
EXPOSE 8080
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/cosmic-clash/control-plane"]
# TEST ONLY. Supplies a fake Steam login that accepts any ticket; never deploy
# this in place of the control-plane target above.
FROM server AS testkit-api
COPY --from=supervisor-build /opt/cosmic-clash/testkit-api /opt/cosmic-clash/testkit-api
COPY server/migrations /opt/cosmic-clash/migrations
Game/scripts/agones_sdk.gd
+54 -3
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@@ -12,6 +12,21 @@ const MAX_ANNOTATION_VALUE_LENGTH := 4096
var _base_url := ""
var _health_timer: Timer = null
var _health_in_flight := false
var _health_started_msec := 0
# Set when start_health() is called before this node is inside the tree, so
# _ready() can arm the timer at the first moment it is legal to do so.
var _health_pending := false
# Health is armed here rather than by the caller. A Timer only ticks while its
# owner is inside the SceneTree, so arming it from a caller that has not yet
# parented this node produces a node that looks configured and never pings —
# which is exactly how every allocated GameServer silently failed its Agones
# health check and was recycled.
func _ready() -> void:
if _health_pending:
_health_pending = false
_arm_health()
func configure_from_environment() -> bool:
@@ -33,8 +48,29 @@ func is_available() -> bool:
return not _base_url.is_empty()
func start_health() -> void:
if not is_available() or _health_timer != null:
# Returns whether health pings are running. It is a bool rather than void
# because every way this can fail used to be silent, and a game server that
# believes it is healthy while sending nothing is worse than one that refuses
# to start: Agones recycles the former every ~20 seconds forever.
func start_health() -> bool:
if not is_available():
push_error("AgonesSDK: start_health() before configuration; no health pings will be sent")
return false
if _health_timer != null:
return true
if not is_inside_tree():
# Deferred rather than fatal: the caller may legitimately configure
# before parenting. _ready() arms it. Still reported, because if the
# node is never parented this is the whole failure.
_health_pending = true
push_warning("AgonesSDK: start_health() called outside the tree; deferring until ready")
return false
_arm_health()
return true
func _arm_health() -> void:
if _health_timer != null:
return
_health_timer = Timer.new()
_health_timer.name = "AgonesHealth"
@@ -46,6 +82,10 @@ func start_health() -> void:
_send_health()
func health_is_running() -> bool:
return _health_timer != null and is_inside_tree()
func stop_health() -> void:
if _health_timer != null:
_health_timer.stop()
@@ -76,9 +116,20 @@ static func annotation_is_valid(key: String, value: String) -> bool:
func _send_health() -> void:
if _health_in_flight or not is_available():
if not is_available():
return
# The latch stops overlapping requests, but it must never become permanent.
# It is set across an await, and a request that never completes would
# otherwise silence health for the lifetime of the process. HTTPRequest's
# own timeout normally resolves this; the elapsed check is the backstop for
# the case where request_completed never fires at all.
if _health_in_flight:
var stuck_for := Time.get_ticks_msec() - _health_started_msec
if stuck_for < int(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS * 2.0 * 1000.0):
return
push_warning("Agones health ping did not complete in %dms; sending another" % stuck_for)
_health_in_flight = true
_health_started_msec = Time.get_ticks_msec()
var status := await health()
_health_in_flight = false
if status < 200 or status >= 300:
Game/scripts/control_plane_client.gd
+76
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@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ extends Node
signal request_succeeded(operation: String, payload: Dictionary)
signal request_failed(operation: String, http_code: int, detail: String)
signal session_expired()
signal probe_challenge_received(region: String, nonce_base64: String)
signal probe_recorded(region: String, server_rtt_ms: int)
signal session_changed(player_id: String)
signal websocket_event(event: Dictionary)
signal websocket_status_changed(status: String)
@@ -13,6 +15,10 @@ signal assignment_connection_started(assignment: AssignmentState)
signal assignment_connection_failed(detail: String)
const DEFAULT_BASE_URL := "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
# Release builds must point at the real control plane rather than a developer's
# loopback. The environment variable is read at startup so the same binary can
# be pointed at a staging or production endpoint without a rebuild.
const BASE_URL_ENV := "COSMIC_CLASH_CONTROL_PLANE_URL"
const PERSIST_PATH := "user://matchmaking_state.cfg"
const AUTHORITATIVE_RECOVERY_INTERVAL_SECONDS := 5.0
@@ -154,6 +160,21 @@ func _connect_when_assigned(match_id: String) -> void:
_pending_connect_match_id = match_id
# configured_base_url resolves the endpoint this build should use, preferring
# explicit configuration over the loopback development default.
static func configured_base_url() -> String:
var configured := OS.get_environment(BASE_URL_ENV).strip_edges()
if is_valid_base_url(configured):
return configured
return DEFAULT_BASE_URL
# has_session reports whether matchmaking requests can be made at all. Without
# it every request fails ERR_UNAUTHORIZED at the first guard in _start_request.
func has_session() -> bool:
return not access_token.is_empty() and not is_session_expired(session_expires_at)
func configure(url: String, token: String) -> bool:
var normalized := url.strip_edges().trim_suffix("/")
var normalized_token := token.strip_edges()
@@ -215,6 +236,50 @@ func queue_create(ticket_id: String, playlist: String, client_build: String, pro
return err
# Regional latency probing. The backend issues a single-use nonce, the client
# echoes it back with its opaque platform location, and the backend derives the
# round trip from its own timestamps -- no client-measured latency is accepted.
#
# Until a ticket has RTT evidence for at least one region the matcher will not
# consider it (server/domain.validCandidate requires a non-empty map), so this
# has to complete before searching is meaningful.
const PROBE_REGIONS := ["EU", "NA"]
func request_probe_challenge(region: String) -> Error:
if not is_valid_probe_region(region):
return ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER
return _start_request("probe_challenge_" + region, HTTPClient.METHOD_POST, "/v1/probes/%s/challenge" % region, {}, "")
func submit_probe_answer(region: String, nonce_base64: String, opaque_location_base64: String) -> Error:
if not is_valid_probe_region(region) or nonce_base64.is_empty() or opaque_location_base64.is_empty():
return ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER
return _start_request("probe_answer_" + region, HTTPClient.METHOD_POST, "/v1/probes/%s" % region, {
"nonce": nonce_base64,
"opaque_location": opaque_location_base64,
}, "")
static func is_valid_probe_region(region: String) -> bool:
return region == "EU" or region == "NA"
# The platform location is opaque to us by design: the backend treats it as a
# blob and never derives placement from anything the client measured. Without a
# Steam runtime there is nothing to report, so send a stable non-empty marker
# rather than failing the probe -- the RTT is what actually matters and that is
# measured by the backend either way.
static func opaque_location_payload() -> String:
if Engine.has_singleton("Steam"):
var steam := Engine.get_singleton("Steam")
if steam.has_method("getLocalPingLocation"):
var location = steam.call("getLocalPingLocation")
if location is String and not String(location).is_empty():
return Marshalls.utf8_to_base64(String(location))
return Marshalls.utf8_to_base64("no-platform-ping-location")
func login_steam(web_api_ticket: String) -> Error:
if not is_valid_web_api_ticket(web_api_ticket):
return ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER
@@ -592,6 +657,17 @@ func _on_request_completed(result: HTTPRequest.Result, response_code: int, _head
if not assignment.apply(payload, player_id):
request_failed.emit(operation, response_code, assignment.error_message)
return
elif operation.begins_with("probe_challenge_"):
# Answer immediately: the nonce is single-use and short-lived, and the
# interval to this answer is exactly what the backend measures.
var challenge_region := operation.trim_prefix("probe_challenge_")
var nonce := String(payload.get("nonce", ""))
if nonce.is_empty():
request_failed.emit(operation, response_code, "probe challenge did not include a nonce")
return
probe_challenge_received.emit(challenge_region, nonce)
elif operation.begins_with("probe_answer_"):
probe_recorded.emit(operation.trim_prefix("probe_answer_"), int(payload.get("server_rtt_ms", -1)))
request_succeeded.emit(operation, payload)
if not _pending_resync_resource_id.is_empty():
call_deferred("_run_pending_resync")
Game/scripts/match_net.gd
+31 -7
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@@ -67,7 +67,11 @@ var _allowed_join_authorisations: Dictionary = {}
var _active_join_peers: Dictionary = {} # opaque authorisation -> peer_id
var _join_history: Dictionary = {} # token -> {generation, lost_at}
var _join_authorisation_context: Dictionary = {}
var _join_signing_key := PackedByteArray()
# Key ID -> raw HMAC key. A set rather than a single key so a signing-key
# rotation does not invalidate authorisations already issued for in-flight
# matches: the allocator signs with the new key while servers still accept
# both, and the old key is dropped once no live match can reference it.
var _join_signing_keys := {}
var _connection_lease_claim := Callable()
var _connection_lease_disconnect := Callable()
var _result_submit := Callable()
@@ -109,7 +113,7 @@ func _on_shutting_down() -> void:
_active_join_peers.clear()
_join_history.clear()
_join_authorisation_context.clear()
_join_signing_key = PackedByteArray()
_join_signing_keys = {}
_connection_lease_claim = Callable()
_connection_lease_disconnect = Callable()
_result_submit = Callable()
@@ -117,7 +121,9 @@ func _on_shutting_down() -> void:
admissions_open = true
func configure_join_authorisations(tokens: Array, context: Dictionary, signing_key: PackedByteArray = PackedByteArray()) -> bool:
# signing_keys maps key ID to raw key bytes. An empty dictionary disables
# signature verification, which is only valid for local/direct-hosted play.
func configure_join_authorisations(tokens: Array, context: Dictionary, signing_keys: Dictionary = {}) -> bool:
var allowed := {}
for token in tokens:
if not token is String or String(token).is_empty():
@@ -127,7 +133,12 @@ func configure_join_authorisations(tokens: Array, context: Dictionary, signing_k
return false
_allowed_join_authorisations = allowed
_join_authorisation_context = context.duplicate(true)
_join_signing_key = signing_key.duplicate()
_join_signing_keys = {}
for key_id in signing_keys:
var raw = signing_keys[key_id]
if not raw is PackedByteArray or PackedByteArray(raw).is_empty():
return false
_join_signing_keys[str(key_id)] = PackedByteArray(raw).duplicate()
require_join_authorisation = true
return true
@@ -372,24 +383,37 @@ func _valid_join_authorisation(token: String) -> bool:
if not AssignmentState.is_valid_expiry_timestamp(expires_at):
return false
var expiry := Time.get_unix_time_from_datetime_string(expires_at)
if not _join_signing_key.is_empty():
if not _join_signing_keys.is_empty():
var signature_token := str(envelope["Signature"])
var signature := Marshalls.base64_to_raw(signature_token)
if signature.size() != 32:
return false
# The key ID selects which of the currently-valid keys signed this
# authorisation, so the allocator can rotate without invalidating
# authorisations already issued for in-flight matches. It is part of
# the signed bytes below, so pointing it at a different key simply
# fails verification rather than choosing a weaker key.
var key_id := str(claims.get("KeyID", ""))
if not _join_signing_keys.has(key_id):
return false
var signing_key: PackedByteArray = _join_signing_keys[key_id]
if signing_key.is_empty():
return false
var canonical := PackedByteArray()
# Must stay byte-identical to server/domain/join_auth.go's
# JoinAuthorisationBytes; the two change together or every join fails.
var fields := [
str(claims.get("MatchID", "")), str(claims.get("ServerID", "")),
str(claims.get("PlayerID", "")), str(claims.get("SteamID", "")),
str(int(claims.get("Slot", -1))), str(int(claims.get("Team", -1))), protocol,
str(int(claims.get("Generation", 0))), expires_at,
str(int(claims.get("Generation", 0))), expires_at, key_id,
]
for index in fields.size():
canonical.append_array(String(fields[index]).to_utf8_buffer())
if index < fields.size() - 1:
canonical.append(0)
var hmac := HMACContext.new()
hmac.start(HashingContext.HASH_SHA256, _join_signing_key)
hmac.start(HashingContext.HASH_SHA256, signing_key)
hmac.update(canonical)
if hmac.finish() != signature:
return false
Game/scripts/matchmaking.gd
+122
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@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ const RECOVERY_POLL_SECONDS := 2.0
var _elapsed_seconds := 0.0
var _heartbeat_seconds := 0.0
var _recovery_poll_seconds := 0.0
# Regions still awaiting RTT evidence, and the queue request deferred until at
# least one lands. The matcher ignores a ticket with no predicted RTT, so
# queueing before probing produces a search that can never match.
var _pending_probe_regions: Array[String] = []
var _probed_regions: Array[String] = []
var _deferred_queue := {}
var _web_api_ticket_handle := 0
func _ready() -> void:
@@ -31,10 +38,59 @@ func _ready() -> void:
ControlPlaneClient.request_failed.connect(_on_request_failed)
ControlPlaneClient.request_succeeded.connect(_on_request_succeeded)
ControlPlaneClient.session_expired.connect(_on_session_expired)
ControlPlaneClient.probe_challenge_received.connect(_on_probe_challenge_received)
ControlPlaneClient.probe_recorded.connect(_on_probe_recorded)
_ensure_signed_in()
_refresh_ranked_profile()
_render(ControlPlaneClient.state.snapshot())
# Matchmaking previously opened with an empty token against a loopback default,
# so every request failed ERR_UNAUTHORIZED before reaching the network. Point
# the client at its configured endpoint and complete Steam sign-in first.
func _ensure_signed_in() -> void:
if ControlPlaneClient.has_session():
return
if not ControlPlaneClient.configure(ControlPlaneClient.configured_base_url(), ""):
_on_local_error("Matchmaking endpoint is not configured")
return
if not SteamBootstrap.supports_web_api_ticket():
# Deliberately explicit rather than silently presenting a search that
# can never start: online matchmaking requires a verified identity.
_on_local_error("Sign-in requires the Steam build: %s" % SteamBootstrap.unavailable_reason())
return
var steam := Engine.get_singleton("Steam")
if not steam.get_auth_ticket_for_web_api.is_connected(_on_web_api_ticket):
steam.get_auth_ticket_for_web_api.connect(_on_web_api_ticket)
_web_api_ticket_handle = SteamBootstrap.request_web_api_ticket()
if _web_api_ticket_handle <= 0:
_on_local_error("Could not request a Steam authentication ticket")
return
ControlPlaneClient.state.set_notice("Signing in...")
func _on_web_api_ticket(_handle: int, result: int, ticket: PackedByteArray) -> void:
# Steam reports k_EResultOK as 1; anything else means no usable ticket.
if result != 1 or ticket.is_empty():
_on_local_error("Steam declined to issue an authentication ticket")
return
var encoded := SteamBootstrap.encode_web_api_ticket(ticket)
if encoded.is_empty():
_on_local_error("Steam returned an unusable authentication ticket")
return
var err := ControlPlaneClient.login_steam(encoded)
if err != OK:
_on_local_error("Could not sign in: %s" % error_string(err))
func _exit_tree() -> void:
# The ticket handle is a Steam resource; releasing it avoids leaking one
# per visit to this screen.
if _web_api_ticket_handle > 0:
SteamBootstrap.cancel_web_api_ticket(_web_api_ticket_handle)
_web_api_ticket_handle = 0
func _process(delta: float) -> void:
if ControlPlaneClient.state.phase in [MatchmakingState.QUEUED, MatchmakingState.PROPOSED, MatchmakingState.ACCEPTED, MatchmakingState.ALLOCATING]:
_elapsed_seconds += delta
@@ -54,6 +110,10 @@ func _process(delta: float) -> void:
func _on_queue_pressed() -> void:
if not ControlPlaneClient.has_session():
# Queueing without a session would fail at the first request guard.
_ensure_signed_in()
return
if ControlPlaneClient.can_retry_queue_create():
var retry_err := ControlPlaneClient.retry_queue_create()
if retry_err != OK:
@@ -71,11 +131,73 @@ func _on_queue_pressed() -> void:
_recovery_poll_seconds = 0.0
var playlist := String(playlist_dropdown.get_selected_metadata())
var ticket_id := "ticket-%s-%s" % [str(Time.get_ticks_usec()), str(randi())]
# A ticket with no regional RTT evidence is invisible to the matcher, so
# collect it first and queue once the first region reports.
if _probed_regions.is_empty():
_deferred_queue = {"ticket_id": ticket_id, "playlist": playlist}
_start_probe_collection()
return
var err := ControlPlaneClient.queue_create(ticket_id, playlist, CLIENT_BUILD, PROTOCOL_VERSION)
if err != OK:
_on_local_error("Could not start matchmaking: %s" % error_string(err))
func _start_probe_collection() -> void:
_pending_probe_regions = []
for region in ControlPlaneClient.PROBE_REGIONS:
_pending_probe_regions.append(String(region))
ControlPlaneClient.state.set_notice("Measuring connection quality...")
_request_next_probe()
# One request at a time: the client serialises HTTP through a single
# HTTPRequest, so a second call would return ERR_BUSY.
func _request_next_probe() -> void:
if _pending_probe_regions.is_empty():
_finish_probe_collection()
return
var region := _pending_probe_regions[0]
var err := ControlPlaneClient.request_probe_challenge(region)
if err != OK and err != ERR_BUSY:
# A region we cannot probe is not fatal; placement just uses the
# regions that did respond.
_pending_probe_regions.remove_at(0)
_request_next_probe()
func _on_probe_challenge_received(region: String, nonce_base64: String) -> void:
var err := ControlPlaneClient.submit_probe_answer(region, nonce_base64, ControlPlaneClient.opaque_location_payload())
if err != OK:
_drop_pending_probe(region)
func _on_probe_recorded(region: String, _server_rtt_ms: int) -> void:
if not _probed_regions.has(region):
_probed_regions.append(region)
_drop_pending_probe(region)
func _drop_pending_probe(region: String) -> void:
var index := _pending_probe_regions.find(region)
if index >= 0:
_pending_probe_regions.remove_at(index)
_request_next_probe()
func _finish_probe_collection() -> void:
if _deferred_queue.is_empty():
return
var queued := _deferred_queue
_deferred_queue = {}
if _probed_regions.is_empty():
# Queueing now would create a ticket the matcher can never select.
_on_local_error("Could not measure connection quality to any region; matchmaking is unavailable")
return
var err := ControlPlaneClient.queue_create(String(queued["ticket_id"]), String(queued["playlist"]), CLIENT_BUILD, PROTOCOL_VERSION)
if err != OK:
_on_local_error("Could not start matchmaking: %s" % error_string(err))
func _on_cancel_pressed() -> void:
if not ControlPlaneClient.state.can_cancel():
return
Game/scripts/networked_match.gd
+6
View File
@@ -2216,6 +2216,12 @@ func get_net_debug_stats() -> Dictionary:
"ball_proxy_moved_before_authority": _ball_proxy_moved_before_authority_count > 0,
"ball_proxy_moved_before_authority_count": _ball_proxy_moved_before_authority_count,
"ball_authority_changed_since_contact": _ball_authority_changed_since_contact,
# p95 alongside p99. A p99 over a few hundred samples is only its worst
# handful, so on a loaded host it reports scheduling jitter as much as
# interpolation quality. p95 is stable enough to carry a tight bar,
# leaving p99 to catch genuine tail blow-ups.
"remote_residual_position_p95": _remote_percentile(_remote_position_residuals, 0.95),
"remote_residual_rotation_p95": _remote_percentile(_remote_rotation_residuals, 0.95),
"remote_residual_position_p99": _remote_percentile(_remote_position_residuals, 0.99),
"remote_residual_rotation_p99": _remote_percentile(_remote_rotation_residuals, 0.99),
"latest_prediction_error": _last_local_prediction_comparison.get("position_error", Vector3.ZERO),
Game/scripts/server_boot.gd
+63 -20
View File
@@ -73,26 +73,12 @@ func _ready() -> void:
printerr("cosmic-clash-server: allocated transport '%s' is not supported by this build" % assigned_transport)
get_tree().quit(1)
return
if allocated_mode:
var roster_file := String(config.get_value("join-authorisations-file"))
var key_file := String(config.get_value("join-authorisations-key-file"))
var roster_json := FileAccess.get_file_as_string(roster_file)
var signing_key := FileAccess.get_file_as_bytes(key_file)
var roster_tokens = JSON.parse_string(roster_json)
if not roster_tokens is Array or roster_tokens.is_empty() or signing_key.is_empty() or not MatchNet.configure_join_authorisations(roster_tokens, {
"match_id": String(config.get_value("match-id")),
"server_id": String(config.get_value("server-id")),
"protocol": str(NetCodec.PROTOCOL_VERSION),
"protocol_version": NetCodec.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
}, signing_key) or MatchNet.assigned_player_slots().size() != roster_tokens.size():
printerr("cosmic-clash-server: refusing to start with invalid join-authorisations-file")
get_tree().quit(1)
return
# Agones injects its HTTP port into every managed game-server container.
# Keep lifecycle readiness and health active in the reduced kind smoke even
# though that environment intentionally omits allocation/roster semantics.
var agones_managed := not OS.get_environment("AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT").is_empty()
if allocated_mode or agones_managed:
_control = ServerControlScript.new()
# An allocated process owns exactly the roster issued for this match.
# Never let the general-purpose direct-server default (one player) start
# an allocated match with only a partial assignment admitted.
config.values["min-players"] = required_min_players(true, roster_tokens.size(), int(config.get_value("min-players")))
_control.name = "ServerControl"
_control.drain_requested.connect(_on_drain_requested)
_control.initial_connect_ready.connect(_on_initial_connect_ready)
@@ -102,11 +88,41 @@ func _ready() -> void:
printerr("cosmic-clash-server: refusing to start with invalid readiness control port")
get_tree().quit(1)
return
if agones_managed:
_agones = AgonesSDKScript.new()
_agones.name = "AgonesSDK"
get_tree().root.add_child.call_deferred(_agones)
# Configure before parenting, then request health and defer the add like
# every other node here (§9 gotcha 27: add_child() on get_tree().root
# from inside _ready() is refused because the tree is still attaching
# this very node, and the refusal is not catchable from GDScript). The
# SDK arms its own timer in _ready(), so nothing depends on the order
# these deferred calls happen to flush in.
if _agones.configure_from_environment():
_agones.start_health()
else:
# Never silent: without this the log looks identical to a healthy
# server right up until Agones recycles it.
printerr("cosmic-clash-server: AGONES_SDK_HTTP_PORT is missing or invalid; Agones health pings are disabled")
get_tree().root.add_child.call_deferred(_agones)
if allocated_mode:
var roster_file := String(config.get_value("join-authorisations-file"))
var key_file := String(config.get_value("join-authorisations-key-file"))
var roster_json := FileAccess.get_file_as_string(roster_file)
var signing_keys := _load_join_signing_keys(key_file)
var roster_tokens = JSON.parse_string(roster_json)
if not roster_tokens is Array or roster_tokens.is_empty() or signing_keys.is_empty() or not MatchNet.configure_join_authorisations(roster_tokens, {
"match_id": String(config.get_value("match-id")),
"server_id": String(config.get_value("server-id")),
"protocol": str(NetCodec.PROTOCOL_VERSION),
"protocol_version": NetCodec.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
}, signing_keys) or MatchNet.assigned_player_slots().size() != roster_tokens.size():
printerr("cosmic-clash-server: refusing to start with invalid join-authorisations-file")
get_tree().quit(1)
return
# An allocated process owns exactly the roster issued for this match.
# Never let the general-purpose direct-server default (one player) start
# an allocated match with only a partial assignment admitted.
config.values["min-players"] = required_min_players(true, roster_tokens.size(), int(config.get_value("min-players")))
_connection_leases = ConnectionLeaseClientScript.new()
_connection_leases.name = "ConnectionLeases"
var lease_url := OS.get_environment("COSMIC_CLASH_CONTROL_PLANE_URL")
@@ -253,3 +269,30 @@ static func required_min_players(allocated: bool, roster_size: int, configured:
if allocated and roster_size > 0:
return roster_size
return configured
# The join-signing key file maps key ID -> base64 raw key, so the allocator can
# rotate the signing key without invalidating authorisations already issued for
# in-flight matches: a rotation publishes the new key alongside the old, and the
# old one is dropped only once no live match can still reference it.
#
# A file containing raw key bytes (no JSON object) is accepted as a single key
# under the empty ID, which is what an unrotated deployment and the local smoke
# fixtures use.
static func _load_join_signing_keys(key_file: String) -> Dictionary:
var raw := FileAccess.get_file_as_bytes(key_file)
if raw.is_empty():
return {}
var parsed = JSON.parse_string(raw.get_string_from_utf8())
if not parsed is Dictionary or (parsed as Dictionary).is_empty():
return {"": raw}
var keys := {}
for key_id in parsed:
var encoded = parsed[key_id]
if not encoded is String or String(encoded).is_empty():
return {}
var decoded := Marshalls.base64_to_raw(String(encoded))
if decoded.is_empty():
return {}
keys[str(key_id)] = decoded
return keys
Game/scripts/server_control.gd
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
class_name ServerControl
extends Node
# Small loopback HTTP control surface for allocated servers. The Go supervisor
# uses GET /ready as the explicit process-ready probe and POST /drain during a
# controlled termination. Direct/community servers do not start this node.
# Small loopback HTTP control surface for lifecycle-managed servers. The Go
# supervisor uses GET /ready as the explicit process-ready probe and POST
# /drain during a controlled termination. Direct/community servers outside
# Agones do not start this node.
signal drain_requested
signal initial_connect_ready
Game/scripts/steam_bootstrap.gd
+50
View File
@@ -40,3 +40,53 @@ static func initialize() -> Dictionary:
if result is Dictionary and bool(result.get("status", false)):
return {"error": OK, "app_id": app_id()}
return {"error": ERR_CANT_CONNECT, "reason": "Steam initialization failed for App ID %d" % app_id()}
# Web-API auth ticket acquisition (task 7.6). The control plane exchanges this
# ticket with Valve's publisher API for a verified Steam identity; the client
# never chooses its own identity, which is what makes this the fix for slot
# reclaim being keyed on a display name.
#
# GodotSteam delivers the ticket asynchronously through the
# `get_auth_ticket_for_web_api` signal, because the ticket is not usable until
# Steam has confirmed it with its backend. Requesting one and reading the
# return value alone yields a handle, not a ticket.
#
# Everything here is called dynamically so stock Godot, which has no GodotSteam
# symbols, can still parse and run the project.
const WEB_API_IDENTITY := "cosmicclash"
static func supports_web_api_ticket() -> bool:
if not is_runtime_available():
return false
var steam := Engine.get_singleton("Steam")
return steam.has_signal("get_auth_ticket_for_web_api") and steam.has_method("getAuthTicketForWebApi")
# Returns the request handle, or 0 when unavailable. The caller must await the
# `get_auth_ticket_for_web_api` signal for the ticket itself.
static func request_web_api_ticket() -> int:
if not supports_web_api_ticket():
return 0
var steam := Engine.get_singleton("Steam")
var handle = steam.call("getAuthTicketForWebApi", WEB_API_IDENTITY)
return int(handle) if handle is int or handle is float else 0
static func cancel_web_api_ticket(handle: int) -> void:
if handle <= 0 or not is_runtime_available():
return
var steam := Engine.get_singleton("Steam")
if steam.has_method("cancelAuthTicket"):
steam.call("cancelAuthTicket", handle)
# GodotSteam hands back raw ticket bytes; the Web API expects them hex encoded.
static func encode_web_api_ticket(buffer: PackedByteArray) -> String:
if buffer.is_empty():
return ""
var encoded := ""
for byte in buffer:
encoded += "%02x" % int(byte)
return encoded
Game/tests/agones_sdk_smoke.gd
+106 -9
View File
@@ -1,33 +1,130 @@
extends SceneTree
# Headless smoke for the Agones SDK bridge. Run by
# scripts/verify_multiplayer_local.sh:
# godot --headless --path Game --script res://tests/agones_sdk_smoke.gd
#
# Phase 1 drives each REST call directly. Phase 2 covers what phase 1 cannot:
# that start_health() produces a *repeating* ping. That is the property Agones
# actually enforces -- one ping proves nothing, because the Fleet recycles any
# GameServer that stops pinging for periodSeconds * failureThreshold -- and its
# absence is what silently recycled every allocated server.
const ServerControlScript = preload("res://scripts/server_control.gd")
const AgonesSDKScript = preload("res://scripts/agones_sdk.gd")
const PORT := 18081
const HEALTH_PORT := 18082
# start_health() pings every 2s, so three seconds must contain at least two.
const HEALTH_OBSERVATION_SECONDS := 3.0
const MINIMUM_EXPECTED_PINGS := 2
# Counting stand-in for the Agones sidecar. ServerControl answers /health but
# cannot report how often it was called, and asserting repetition is the whole
# point here, so this counts rather than changing production code for a test.
class CountingSidecar extends Node:
var health_pings := 0
var _listener := TCPServer.new()
var _peers: Array = []
func start(port: int) -> Error:
return _listener.listen(port, "127.0.0.1")
func stop() -> void:
_listener.stop()
for peer in _peers:
if is_instance_valid(peer):
peer.disconnect_from_host()
_peers.clear()
func _process(_delta: float) -> void:
while _listener.is_connection_available():
_peers.append(_listener.take_connection())
for i in range(_peers.size() - 1, -1, -1):
var peer: StreamPeerTCP = _peers[i]
if peer.get_status() != StreamPeerTCP.STATUS_CONNECTED:
_peers.remove_at(i)
continue
var available := peer.get_available_bytes()
if available <= 0:
continue
var request := peer.get_utf8_string(available)
if "\r\n\r\n" not in request:
continue
if request.begins_with("POST /health"):
health_pings += 1
var body := "{}"
peer.put_data(("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n%s" % [body.length(), body]).to_utf8_buffer())
peer.disconnect_from_host()
_peers.remove_at(i)
func _init() -> void:
if not await _direct_calls_smoke():
quit(1)
return
if not await _repeating_health_smoke():
quit(1)
return
print("Agones SDK smoke passed")
quit(0)
func _direct_calls_smoke() -> bool:
var fake_sidecar = ServerControlScript.new()
root.add_child(fake_sidecar)
if fake_sidecar.start(PORT) != OK:
printerr("fake sidecar failed to bind")
quit(1)
return
return false
fake_sidecar.set_process_ready(true)
var sdk = AgonesSDKScript.new()
root.add_child(sdk)
if not sdk.configure_for_testing("http://127.0.0.1:%d" % PORT):
printerr("SDK test configuration failed")
quit(1)
return
return false
await process_frame
var health_status := await sdk.health()
var ready_status := await sdk.mark_ready()
var annotation_status := await sdk.set_annotation("match", "result")
var shutdown_status := await sdk.shutdown()
fake_sidecar.stop()
fake_sidecar.queue_free()
sdk.queue_free()
if health_status != 200 or ready_status != 200 or annotation_status < 400 or shutdown_status < 400:
printerr("Agones SDK smoke statuses health=%d ready=%d annotation=%d shutdown=%d" % [health_status, ready_status, annotation_status, shutdown_status])
quit(1)
return
print("Agones SDK smoke passed")
fake_sidecar.stop()
quit(0)
return false
return true
func _repeating_health_smoke() -> bool:
var sidecar := CountingSidecar.new()
root.add_child(sidecar)
if sidecar.start(HEALTH_PORT) != OK:
printerr("counting sidecar failed to bind")
return false
# Configure before parenting and let the node arm its own timer on _ready(),
# which is exactly how server_boot.gd wires it in an allocated pod.
var sdk = AgonesSDKScript.new()
if not sdk.configure_for_testing("http://127.0.0.1:%d" % HEALTH_PORT):
printerr("health SDK configuration failed")
return false
if sdk.start_health():
printerr("start_health() reported success while the node was outside the tree")
return false
root.add_child(sdk)
await process_frame
if not sdk.health_is_running():
printerr("health loop did not arm once the node entered the tree")
return false
await create_timer(HEALTH_OBSERVATION_SECONDS).timeout
var observed := sidecar.health_pings
sdk.stop_health()
sidecar.stop()
sdk.queue_free()
sidecar.queue_free()
if observed < MINIMUM_EXPECTED_PINGS:
printerr("Agones health pings in %.1fs = %d, want at least %d; the health loop is not repeating" % [HEALTH_OBSERVATION_SECONDS, observed, MINIMUM_EXPECTED_PINGS])
return false
return true
Game/tests/cases/test_agones_sdk.gd
+37
View File
@@ -17,3 +17,40 @@ func test_annotation_validation_rejects_header_injection_and_oversized_values()
assert_true(not AgonesSDKScript.annotation_is_valid("bad\nkey", "value"), "annotation key newline is rejected")
assert_true(not AgonesSDKScript.annotation_is_valid("key", "bad\rvalue"), "annotation value newline is rejected")
assert_true(not AgonesSDKScript.annotation_is_valid("key", "x".repeat(4097)), "oversized annotation is rejected")
# Regression: every allocated GameServer reached Ready and was then recycled by
# Agones ~20s later, because start_health() armed a Timer on a node that was
# never parented. A Timer only ticks inside the SceneTree, so the process
# reported healthy while sending no pings at all, and nothing said so.
#
# These are deliberately synchronous: test_runner.gd calls test methods without
# awaiting, so anything needing a live tree or an HTTP round trip belongs in
# tests/agones_sdk_smoke.gd instead. What is asserted here is the contract that
# makes the silent case impossible.
func test_start_health_refuses_when_not_configured() -> void:
var sdk = AgonesSDKScript.new()
assert_true(not sdk.start_health(), "health cannot start before a sidecar URL is known")
assert_true(not sdk.health_is_running(), "no timer is armed without configuration")
sdk.queue_free()
func test_start_health_reports_failure_when_outside_the_tree() -> void:
# The exact shape of the production bug: configured, so is_available() is
# true and the node looks ready to work, but unparented.
var sdk = AgonesSDKScript.new()
assert_true(sdk.configure_for_testing("http://127.0.0.1:9358"), "fixture configures")
assert_true(sdk.is_available(), "an unparented node still reports available")
assert_true(not sdk.start_health(), "start_health() must not claim success outside the tree")
assert_true(not sdk.health_is_running(), "no health loop is running outside the tree")
sdk.queue_free()
func test_health_is_not_running_until_a_timer_exists() -> void:
# health_is_running() is what a caller should trust, rather than
# is_available(), which only says a URL was parsed.
var sdk = AgonesSDKScript.new()
assert_true(not sdk.health_is_running(), "a fresh SDK is not pinging")
sdk.configure_for_testing("http://127.0.0.1:9358")
assert_true(not sdk.health_is_running(), "configuration alone does not start pinging")
sdk.queue_free()
Game/tests/cases/test_control_plane_client.gd
+72
View File
@@ -508,3 +508,75 @@ func test_ranked_profile_projects_and_bounds_season_countdown() -> void:
assert_true(not profile.apply({"rating": 1500.0, "rd": 200.0, "volatility": 0.06, "ranked_games": 10, "tier": "GOLD", "provisional": false, "season_ends_at": 123}), "non-string season expiry is rejected")
assert_true(not profile.apply({"rating": 1500.0, "rd": 200.0, "volatility": 0.06, "ranked_games": 10, "tier": "GOLD", "provisional": false, "season_id": "short"}), "short season identifier is rejected")
assert_true(not profile.apply({"rating": 1500.0, "rd": 200.0, "volatility": 0.06, "ranked_games": 10, "tier": "GOLD", "provisional": false, "season_id": 123}), "non-string season identifier is rejected")
# The client had no probe support at all, so even with the backend wired a real
# player could never acquire the RTT evidence the matcher requires.
func test_probe_region_validation_rejects_unknown_regions() -> void:
assert_true(ControlPlaneClient.is_valid_probe_region("EU"), "EU is a placement region")
assert_true(ControlPlaneClient.is_valid_probe_region("NA"), "NA is a placement region")
for region in ["", "eu", "APAC", "EU/NA", "../EU"]:
assert_true(not ControlPlaneClient.is_valid_probe_region(region), "rejects %s" % region)
func test_probe_requests_require_a_session() -> void:
var client = ControlPlaneClient.new()
client.base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
client.access_token = ""
assert_eq(client.request_probe_challenge("EU"), ERR_UNAUTHORIZED, "probing without a session is refused")
assert_eq(client.submit_probe_answer("EU", "bm9uY2U=", "bG9j"), ERR_UNAUTHORIZED, "answering without a session is refused")
client.free()
func test_probe_answer_rejects_empty_nonce_or_location() -> void:
var client = ControlPlaneClient.new()
client.base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
client.access_token = "session-1234567890:token-1234567890"
assert_eq(client.submit_probe_answer("EU", "", "bG9j"), ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, "an empty nonce is refused")
assert_eq(client.submit_probe_answer("EU", "bm9uY2U=", ""), ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, "an empty location is refused")
assert_eq(client.request_probe_challenge("APAC"), ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, "an unknown region is refused")
client.free()
func test_opaque_location_payload_is_never_empty() -> void:
# The backend rejects an empty opaque location, and without a Steam runtime
# there is nothing real to report -- but the RTT the backend measures is
# what actually drives placement, so the probe must still be answerable.
var payload := ControlPlaneClient.opaque_location_payload()
assert_true(not payload.is_empty(), "a probe answer always carries a location blob")
assert_true(not Marshalls.base64_to_raw(payload).is_empty(), "the location blob is valid base64")
func test_probe_challenge_response_without_a_nonce_is_a_failure() -> void:
var client = ControlPlaneClient.new()
client.base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
client.access_token = "session-1234567890:token-1234567890"
var failures: Array = []
client.request_failed.connect(func(operation: String, _code: int, detail: String): failures.append([operation, detail]))
client._operation = "probe_challenge_EU"
client._on_request_completed(HTTPRequest.RESULT_SUCCESS, 201, PackedStringArray(), JSON.stringify({"region": "EU"}).to_utf8_buffer())
assert_eq(failures.size(), 1, "a challenge with no nonce is reported as a failure")
client.free()
# The game started with an empty token against a loopback default and no
# production code ever called configure() or login_steam(), so every
# matchmaking request failed ERR_UNAUTHORIZED before reaching the network.
func test_has_session_reflects_token_and_expiry() -> void:
var client = ControlPlaneClient.new()
assert_true(not client.has_session(), "a fresh client has no session")
client.access_token = "session-1234567890:token-1234567890"
client.session_expires_at = "2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"
assert_true(client.has_session(), "a valid unexpired token is a session")
client.session_expires_at = "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"
assert_true(not client.has_session(), "an expired token is not a session")
client.free()
func test_configured_base_url_falls_back_to_the_development_default() -> void:
# Release builds set COSMIC_CLASH_CONTROL_PLANE_URL; without it the
# loopback default keeps local development working.
var resolved := ControlPlaneClient.configured_base_url()
assert_true(ControlPlaneClient.is_valid_base_url(resolved), "the resolved endpoint is always usable")
if OS.get_environment(ControlPlaneClient.BASE_URL_ENV).strip_edges().is_empty():
assert_eq(resolved, ControlPlaneClient.DEFAULT_BASE_URL, "falls back to the development default")
Game/tests/cases/test_match_net.gd
+52 -3
View File
@@ -168,13 +168,62 @@ func test_allocated_join_authorisation_verifies_canonical_hmac() -> void:
# This envelope is generated from server/domain.JoinAuthorisationBytes with
# HMAC-SHA256(test-key), proving the Godot verifier agrees with the Go
# canonical representation rather than merely checking token membership.
var token := "eyJBdXRob3Jpc2F0aW9uIjp7Ik1hdGNoSUQiOiJtYXRjaC0xIiwiU2VydmVySUQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMSIsIlBsYXllcklEIjoicGxheWVyLTEiLCJTdGVhbUlEIjoic3RlYW0tMSIsIlNsb3QiOjUsIlRlYW0iOjEsIlByb3RvY29sIjoiMSIsIkdlbmVyYXRpb24iOjEsIkV4cGlyZXNBdCI6IjIwOTktMDgtMzFUMTI6MDA6MDBaIn0sIlNpZ25hdHVyZSI6Ijk0QkFOWjJpMkJUWHNWOVdaSWQ1dnE1Q3FqUXF4eGFXNnB4c2U0SFRXSDg9In0="
# Regenerate it whenever JoinAuthorisationBytes changes; a stale token here
# is exactly how a silent cross-language format drift would be caught.
var token := "eyJBdXRob3Jpc2F0aW9uIjp7Ik1hdGNoSUQiOiJtYXRjaC0xIiwiU2VydmVySUQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMSIsIlBsYXllcklEIjoicGxheWVyLTEiLCJTdGVhbUlEIjoic3RlYW0tMSIsIlNsb3QiOjUsIlRlYW0iOjEsIlByb3RvY29sIjoiMSIsIkdlbmVyYXRpb24iOjEsIkV4cGlyZXNBdCI6IjIwOTktMDgtMzFUMTI6MDA6MDBaIiwiS2V5SUQiOiJrZXktMjAyNi0wOSJ9LCJTaWduYXR1cmUiOiJ4bWw1a09qdjltVURab256bHVFcitCM2wyQ0c4THBOUisxd0tpV1VkMjFrPSJ9"
var match_net := MatchNet.new()
assert_true(match_net.configure_join_authorisations([token], {"match_id": "match-1", "server_id": "server-1", "protocol": "1", "protocol_version": 1}, "test-key".to_utf8_buffer()), "HMAC roster configures")
assert_true(match_net.configure_join_authorisations([token], {"match_id": "match-1", "server_id": "server-1", "protocol": "1", "protocol_version": 1}, {"key-2026-09": "test-key".to_utf8_buffer()}), "HMAC roster configures")
assert_true(match_net._valid_join_authorisation(token), "Go-compatible canonical HMAC is accepted")
var tampered_payload: Dictionary = JSON.parse_string(Marshalls.base64_to_raw(token).get_string_from_utf8())
tampered_payload["Signature"] = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA="
var tampered_token := Marshalls.raw_to_base64(JSON.stringify(tampered_payload).to_utf8_buffer())
var tampered_match_net := MatchNet.new()
assert_true(tampered_match_net.configure_join_authorisations([tampered_token], {"match_id": "match-1", "server_id": "server-1", "protocol": "1", "protocol_version": 1}, "test-key".to_utf8_buffer()), "tampered roster fixture configures")
assert_true(tampered_match_net.configure_join_authorisations([tampered_token], {"match_id": "match-1", "server_id": "server-1", "protocol": "1", "protocol_version": 1}, {"key-2026-09": "test-key".to_utf8_buffer()}), "tampered roster fixture configures")
assert_true(not tampered_match_net._valid_join_authorisation(tampered_token), "allowlisted but forged signature is rejected")
# Rotation contract: the allocator signs with one key while allocated servers
# accept the set of currently-valid keys, so rotating does not invalidate
# authorisations already issued for in-flight matches. All three envelopes are
# generated from server/domain.JoinAuthorisationBytes.
const ROTATION_CONTEXT := {"match_id": "match-1", "server_id": "server-1", "protocol": "1", "protocol_version": 1}
const TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_OLD_KEY := "eyJBdXRob3Jpc2F0aW9uIjp7Ik1hdGNoSUQiOiJtYXRjaC0xIiwiU2VydmVySUQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMSIsIlBsYXllcklEIjoicGxheWVyLTEiLCJTdGVhbUlEIjoic3RlYW0tMSIsIlNsb3QiOjUsIlRlYW0iOjEsIlByb3RvY29sIjoiMSIsIkdlbmVyYXRpb24iOjEsIkV4cGlyZXNBdCI6IjIwOTktMDgtMzFUMTI6MDA6MDBaIiwiS2V5SUQiOiJrZXktMjAyNi0wOCJ9LCJTaWduYXR1cmUiOiI5TW42eldERGNwR1pmblY2NXdreXNCYTduUnk3OG1QQkZPT29JN2F1UkdJPSJ9"
const TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_NEW_KEY := "eyJBdXRob3Jpc2F0aW9uIjp7Ik1hdGNoSUQiOiJtYXRjaC0xIiwiU2VydmVySUQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMSIsIlBsYXllcklEIjoicGxheWVyLTEiLCJTdGVhbUlEIjoic3RlYW0tMSIsIlNsb3QiOjUsIlRlYW0iOjEsIlByb3RvY29sIjoiMSIsIkdlbmVyYXRpb24iOjEsIkV4cGlyZXNBdCI6IjIwOTktMDgtMzFUMTI6MDA6MDBaIiwiS2V5SUQiOiJrZXktMjAyNi0wOSJ9LCJTaWduYXR1cmUiOiJ4bWw1a09qdjltVURab256bHVFcitCM2wyQ0c4THBOUisxd0tpV1VkMjFrPSJ9"
const TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_RETIRED_KEY := "eyJBdXRob3Jpc2F0aW9uIjp7Ik1hdGNoSUQiOiJtYXRjaC0xIiwiU2VydmVySUQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMSIsIlBsYXllcklEIjoicGxheWVyLTEiLCJTdGVhbUlEIjoic3RlYW0tMSIsIlNsb3QiOjUsIlRlYW0iOjEsIlByb3RvY29sIjoiMSIsIkdlbmVyYXRpb24iOjEsIkV4cGlyZXNBdCI6IjIwOTktMDgtMzFUMTI6MDA6MDBaIiwiS2V5SUQiOiJrZXktMjAyNy0wMSJ9LCJTaWduYXR1cmUiOiJRemFYLzB5T0pObE1oRXRPZ1BBcUpRNGJueHZRb1BVU09CR0p2Mm9nQVdnPSJ9"
func test_join_authorisation_accepts_every_key_in_the_rotation_set() -> void:
# Mid-rotation: both keys are published, so authorisations issued before
# and after the switch must both still admit their player.
var keys := {
"key-2026-08": "old-key".to_utf8_buffer(),
"key-2026-09": "test-key".to_utf8_buffer(),
}
for token in [TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_OLD_KEY, TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_NEW_KEY]:
var match_net := MatchNet.new()
assert_true(match_net.configure_join_authorisations([token], ROTATION_CONTEXT, keys), "rotation fixture configures")
assert_true(match_net._valid_join_authorisation(token), "a token signed by any currently-valid key is accepted")
func test_join_authorisation_rejects_a_key_id_outside_the_set() -> void:
# Rotation completed: the retired key is dropped, so anything still signed
# with it must stop being admitted.
var keys := {"key-2026-09": "test-key".to_utf8_buffer()}
var match_net := MatchNet.new()
assert_true(match_net.configure_join_authorisations([TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_RETIRED_KEY], ROTATION_CONTEXT, keys), "retired-key fixture configures")
assert_true(not match_net._valid_join_authorisation(TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_RETIRED_KEY), "a token naming a key outside the set is rejected")
func test_join_authorisation_key_id_cannot_be_repointed_at_another_key() -> void:
# KeyID is inside the signed bytes, so swapping it to name a key the server
# does hold must fail verification rather than selecting that key.
var payload: Dictionary = JSON.parse_string(Marshalls.base64_to_raw(TOKEN_SIGNED_WITH_OLD_KEY).get_string_from_utf8())
payload["Authorisation"]["KeyID"] = "key-2026-09"
var repointed := Marshalls.raw_to_base64(JSON.stringify(payload).to_utf8_buffer())
var keys := {
"key-2026-08": "old-key".to_utf8_buffer(),
"key-2026-09": "test-key".to_utf8_buffer(),
}
var match_net := MatchNet.new()
assert_true(match_net.configure_join_authorisations([repointed], ROTATION_CONTEXT, keys), "repointed fixture configures")
assert_true(not match_net._valid_join_authorisation(repointed), "the key ID is covered by the signature")
Game/tests/cases/test_steam_bootstrap.gd
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
extends "res://tests/test_case.gd"
const SteamBootstrap = preload("res://scripts/steam_bootstrap.gd")
# Web-API ticket acquisition (task 7.6). Nothing in the project could obtain a
# ticket before, so ControlPlaneClient.login_steam() had no production caller.
# These run on stock Godot, which has no GodotSteam symbols, so they cover the
# pure encoding and the unavailable path rather than a live Steam session.
func test_web_api_ticket_is_unsupported_without_the_steam_runtime() -> void:
if SteamBootstrap.is_runtime_available():
return
assert_true(not SteamBootstrap.supports_web_api_ticket(), "no ticket support without the custom build")
assert_eq(SteamBootstrap.request_web_api_ticket(), 0, "requesting a ticket yields no handle")
# Must not throw on stock Godot; cancelling a handle we never got is a no-op.
SteamBootstrap.cancel_web_api_ticket(0)
SteamBootstrap.cancel_web_api_ticket(17)
func test_web_api_ticket_encoding_is_lowercase_hex() -> void:
# The publisher Web API expects the raw ticket bytes hex encoded; the
# backend rejects anything non-hex before it forwards a ticket to Valve.
assert_eq(SteamBootstrap.encode_web_api_ticket(PackedByteArray()), "", "an empty ticket encodes to nothing")
assert_eq(SteamBootstrap.encode_web_api_ticket(PackedByteArray([0x00, 0x0f, 0xa5, 0xff])), "000fa5ff", "bytes are zero-padded lowercase hex")
var encoded := SteamBootstrap.encode_web_api_ticket(PackedByteArray([1, 2, 3, 4, 250]))
assert_eq(encoded.length(), 10, "each byte becomes exactly two characters")
assert_eq(encoded, encoded.to_lower(), "encoding is lowercase")
Game/tests/networked_match_test_hooks.gd
+21 -3
View File
@@ -1378,9 +1378,25 @@ func run_ci_client_check(run_seconds: float) -> void:
var snapshot_count_ok: bool = snapshot_count[0] >= min_expected
var net_stats: Dictionary = match_scene.get_net_debug_stats()
var present_time := bool(match_scene.remote_visual_present_time_enabled)
var remote_position_p95 := float(net_stats.get("remote_residual_position_p95", INF))
var remote_rotation_p95 := float(net_stats.get("remote_residual_rotation_p95", INF))
var remote_position_p99 := float(net_stats.get("remote_residual_position_p99", INF))
var remote_rotation_p99 := float(net_stats.get("remote_residual_rotation_p99", INF))
var remote_quality_ok := not present_time or (remote_position_p99 < 0.3 and remote_rotation_p99 < 5.0)
# Two bars rather than one loose one. The tight bar moved to p95, which is
# stable across runs; p99 over a few hundred samples is its worst handful,
# so on a shared CI host it measures scheduling jitter as much as
# interpolation. The p99 bar is the product's own tolerance: beyond
# REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_OFFSET the visual smoother stops absorbing a correction
# in one step, so exceeding it is a real defect rather than a slow runner.
#
# The single p99 < 0.3 bar produced false failures: two clients in one run
# reported 0.324 and 0.187 with everything else identical, and the same
# commit passed and failed in the same minute.
var remote_quality_ok := not present_time or (
remote_position_p95 < 0.3 and remote_rotation_p95 < 5.0
and remote_position_p99 < NetworkedMatch.REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_OFFSET
and remote_rotation_p99 < NetworkedMatch.REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_ROTATION_DEGREES
)
var my_id := multiplayer.get_unique_id()
var score_path := "/tmp/cosmicclash_ci_score_%d.txt" % my_id
@@ -1388,8 +1404,10 @@ func run_ci_client_check(run_seconds: float) -> void:
f.store_string(JSON.stringify(match_scene.score))
f.close()
print("SMOKE INFO: client-bot snapshot_count=%d (want >= %d) slots_ok=%s final_score=%s remote_present_time=%s residual_p99=%.3fm/%.3fdeg" % [
snapshot_count[0], min_expected, str(slots_ok), str(match_scene.score), str(present_time), remote_position_p99, remote_rotation_p99,
print("SMOKE INFO: client-bot snapshot_count=%d (want >= %d) slots_ok=%s final_score=%s remote_present_time=%s residual_p95=%.3fm/%.3fdeg residual_p99=%.3fm/%.3fdeg (p95 bar %.2fm/%.1fdeg, p99 bar %.2fm/%.1fdeg)" % [
snapshot_count[0], min_expected, str(slots_ok), str(match_scene.score), str(present_time),
remote_position_p95, remote_rotation_p95, remote_position_p99, remote_rotation_p99,
0.3, 5.0, NetworkedMatch.REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_OFFSET, NetworkedMatch.REMOTE_VISUAL_MAX_ROTATION_DEGREES,
])
var success: bool = slots_ok and snapshot_count_ok and remote_quality_ok
print("SMOKE %s: CI client-bot run" % ("PASS" if success else "FAIL"))
TODO.md
+4 -2
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Everything below needs a person — hardware, a design decision, an external acc
Each item is also a GitHub issue (linked inline), labelled `needs:human` plus a
`P0-blocker`…`P3-low` priority. Close the issue and tick the box together.
- [ ] ([#14](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/14)) **Decide the join-signing design for the Phase 8 root blocker.** No real deployment can advance a match past `PROCESS_READY` today because nothing calls the (fully built and tested) assignment-publishing path in production — it needs a join-signing key shared between allocator and game server, roster-digest computation, and per-player authorization construction, deliberately flagged rather than built pending this decision. See `multiplayer-next.md` §0 ("the actual current root blocker") and §8.31.
- [x] ([#14](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/14)) **Join-signing design decided and implemented.** Resolved as HMAC-SHA256 over the canonical claim bytes with a **key ID inside those bytes**: the allocator signs with one named key while allocated servers hold the set of currently-valid keys, so rotation does not invalidate authorisations already issued for in-flight matches. `allocator.Worker` now publishes the signed roster after binding, and `cmd/allocator` refuses to start without key material. Rotation procedure is in `docs/MATCHMAKING.md` §2; see `multiplayer-next.md` §8.31. Nothing human-only remains here — live verification is covered by [#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17).
- [ ] ([#18](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/18)) **Phase 4 playtest at ~100 ms RTT** — does the ship/ball feel local, do contact corrections read as bumps or glitches? Every numeric gate is green; this is a feel judgment no metric can answer. `multiplayer-next.md` §0, gate A.
- [ ] ([#19](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/19)) **Phase 5 3v3 gate** — a full 6-player match start to finish, with a mid-match disconnect and a late joiner. Only verified so far at 1v1 plus a two-bot CI match. `multiplayer-next.md` §0, gate B.
- [ ] ([#20](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/20)) **Phase 6 external gate** — run the exported Docker server and clients from separate real machines over the internet, then play a full match (controlled test only, since defect C below is still open). `multiplayer-next.md` §0.
@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ Each item is also a GitHub issue (linked inline), labelled `needs:human` plus a
- [ ] ([#16](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/16)) **Supply custom GodotSteam client/server build templates** and pin them in `steam-dependencies.lock.json` (`COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_CLIENT_GODOT` / `COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_SERVER_GODOT`) — `make verify-steam-templates` refuses a stock Godot binary until these exist. `STEAM.md`.
- [ ] ([#21](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/21)) **Reference-hardware profiling (task 0.15b)** in the live editor on real low/mid-tier hardware — blocks 0.16, 0.17/0.17b/0.17c/0.17d, 0.26 (arena GI bake), and 0.28 (physics separate-thread prototype). Covered above; listed again here because it also gates Phase 5.5's graphics QA gate for multiplayer sign-off.
- [ ] ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) **Stand up the live Kubernetes cluster and Agones deployment** for Phase 8 — provider-portable manifests exist, but nothing has run against a real cluster; needs the provider-specific deployment overlay (network, DNS, secrets) per `docs/MATCHMAKING.md`.
- [ ] (no issue — agent-actionable, tracked in `multiplayer-next.md` §0) **Give Phase 8.48 its own Compose smoke fixture** so the allocated-mode flow stops depending on `compose.phase6-smoke.yml`'s hardcoded port, first-come slots, and `--max-matches=2`. `multiplayer-next.md` §0 task table.
- [ ] ([#31](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/31)) **Build, push and pin the container images the Kubernetes manifests reference.** Every image target builds, but no workflow publishes any of them and all manifest digests are still all-zero placeholders, so `deploy/k8s/base` cannot pull running images. Needs a registry namespace, publish credentials, and a signing/provenance decision; once digests are real, turn on `--require-concrete` in `make verify-supply-chain` so a placeholder can no longer pass. Blocks [#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17).
- [ ] ([#33](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/33)) **Move game servers to their own namespace** so `cosmic-clash` can enforce `restricted` again. Agones' Dynamic port policy needs a `hostPort`, which `baseline`/`restricted` forbid, so the whole namespace dropped to `privileged` — including the control plane, which mounts the database DSN, workload secret and Steam publisher key. Deferred until the Agones gate was green so a new failure could not be ambiguous.
- [x] (no issue — agent-actionable) **Phase 8.48 has its own Compose smoke fixture.** `compose.allocated-smoke.yml` and `scripts/verify_allocated_compose.sh` are independent of `compose.phase6-smoke.yml` — the script states so explicitly and reuses none of its ports — so the allocated-mode flow no longer inherits that fixture's hardcoded port, first-come slots or `--max-matches=2`. Exercised by `make verify-allocated-compose`.
- [ ] ([#22](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/22)) **Release-evidence and human sign-off gates for Phase 8 production launch** — once the above are done, someone needs to actually run and sign off the production-shaped checks `multiplayer-next.md` §7 lists as infrastructure/production-dependent.
Defect **C** (slot reservation keyed on display name alone — real, demonstrated, exploitable during the 30 s disconnect window) is not its own action item: it is fixed for free by the Steam auth tickets in task 7.4 above, so nothing to do until Steam identity lands.
compose.allocated-smoke.yml
+8 -3
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ services:
COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET: compose-workload-secret
COSMIC_CLASH_KUBERNETES_TOKEN_PATH: /run/cosmic-clash/kubernetes-token
COSMIC_CLASH_KUBERNETES_CA_PATH: /run/cosmic-clash/fake-agones.crt
command: ["--dsn=postgres://cosmic_clash_test:cosmic_clash_test@database:5432/cosmic_clash_test?sslmode=disable", "--migrations=/opt/cosmic-clash/migrations", "--interval=1s", "--transport=enet"]
# The allocator signs one join authorisation per participant and publishes
# the assignment roster, so it needs the same key material the game server
# verifies with. It refuses to start without them rather than binding
# allocations that could never become joinable.
command: ["--dsn=postgres://cosmic_clash_test:cosmic_clash_test@database:5432/cosmic_clash_test?sslmode=disable", "--migrations=/opt/cosmic-clash/migrations", "--interval=1s", "--transport=enet", "--join-authorisations-key-file=/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-keys.json", "--join-authorisations-key-id=compose-key-1"]
depends_on:
database:
condition: service_healthy
@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ services:
volumes:
- ${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}/kubernetes-token:/run/cosmic-clash/kubernetes-token:ro
- ${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}/fake-agones.crt:/run/cosmic-clash/fake-agones.crt:ro
- ${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}/join-signing-keys.json:/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-keys.json:ro
maintenance:
build:
@@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ services:
- --transport=enet
- --region=EU
- --join-authorisations-file=/run/cosmic-clash/join-roster.json
- --join-authorisations-key-file=/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-key
- --join-authorisations-key-file=/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-keys.json
- --readiness-port=7780
environment:
COSMIC_CLASH_DRAIN_TOKEN: compose-drain-token
@@ -109,4 +114,4 @@ services:
COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_TOKEN: ${COSMIC_CLASH_COMPOSE_WORKLOAD_TOKEN:?allocated smoke workload token is required}
volumes:
- ${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}/join-roster.json:/run/cosmic-clash/join-roster.json:ro
- ${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}/join-signing-key:/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-key:ro
- ${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}/join-signing-keys.json:/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-keys.json:ro
deploy/k8s/base/allocator-deployment.yaml
+25
View File
@@ -60,9 +60,18 @@ spec:
- --readiness-max-stale=30s
- --workload-token-ttl=2h
- --metrics-addr=:9091
# Without these the allocator binds allocations but never publishes
# an assignment roster, and no allocated match can become joinable.
# The same key material is mounted into game servers by fleet.yaml.
- --join-authorisations-key-file=/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-keys.json
- --join-authorisations-key-id=$(COSMIC_CLASH_JOIN_SIGNING_KEY_ID)
ports:
- name: metrics
containerPort: 9091
volumeMounts:
- name: join-signing-keys
mountPath: /run/secrets/cosmic-clash
readOnly: true
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /readyz
@@ -102,3 +111,19 @@ spec:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-workload
key: secret
# Rotation: publish the new key in the Secret everywhere first,
# then move this ID to it, then drop the retired key once no live
# match can still reference it.
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_JOIN_SIGNING_KEY_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-game-server
key: join-signing-key-id
volumes:
- name: join-signing-keys
secret:
secretName: cosmic-clash-game-server
defaultMode: 0400
items:
- key: join-signing-keys.json
path: join-signing-keys.json
deploy/k8s/base/control-plane-deployment.yaml
+19
View File
@@ -95,3 +95,22 @@ spec:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-workload
key: secret
# Player sign-in. The publisher key is the credential Valve issues
# to us, never to a client, so it is mounted only here -- no other
# workload and no game server ever sees it. Both values must be
# present or POST /v1/session/steam keeps returning 503: silently
# accepting an unverified ticket would be worse than refusing to
# authenticate. Optional until the App ID exists (issue #15), so the
# Deployment still rolls out without the Secret.
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_PUBLISHER_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-steam
key: publisher-key
optional: true
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_APP_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-steam
key: app-id
optional: true
deploy/k8s/base/fleet.yaml
+16 -6
View File
@@ -43,19 +43,22 @@ spec:
labelSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server
serviceAccountName: match-server
automountServiceAccountToken: false
# Leave serviceAccountName unset: Agones assigns its SDK account and
# masks that account's token from this public game-server container,
# while retaining it in the injected SDK sidecar that needs API access.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 10001
runAsGroup: 10001
fsGroup: 10001
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: game-server
image: ghcr.io/cosmic-clash/game-server@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
args:
- --sdk-base-url=http://127.0.0.1:9357
- --sdk-base-url=http://127.0.0.1:9358
- --ready-url=http://127.0.0.1:7780/ready
- --drain-url=http://127.0.0.1:7780/drain
- --initial-connect-ready-url=http://127.0.0.1:7780/initial-connect-ready
@@ -80,9 +83,16 @@ spec:
- --transport=enet
- --region=EU
- --join-authorisations-file=/run/cosmic-clash/join-roster.json
- --join-authorisations-key-file=/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-key
# The key SET, not one key: an allocated server must accept
# authorisations signed with any currently-valid key so a
# rotation does not break matches already in flight.
- --join-authorisations-key-file=/run/secrets/cosmic-clash/join-signing-keys.json
- --readiness-port=7780
env:
# Godot stores user:// beneath HOME. Point it at the writable
# runtime volume while retaining a read-only root filesystem.
- name: HOME
value: /run/cosmic-clash
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_SERVER_ID
valueFrom:
fieldRef:
@@ -121,5 +131,5 @@ spec:
secret:
secretName: cosmic-clash-game-server
items:
- key: join-signing-key
path: join-signing-key
- key: join-signing-keys.json
path: join-signing-keys.json
deploy/k8s/base/kustomization.yaml
+2
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ resources:
- allocator-deployment.yaml
- allocator-service.yaml
- allocator-pdb.yaml
- matcher-deployment.yaml
- matcher-pdb.yaml
- maintenance-deployment.yaml
- maintenance-pdb.yaml
- fleet.yaml
deploy/k8s/base/matcher-deployment.yaml
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# cmd/matcher is a standalone poll loop that turns queued tickets into
# proposals. It was built as an image but had no Deployment anywhere in this
# base, so applying the checked-in manifests produced a cluster where tickets
# could be created but nothing ever consumed them.
#
# Casual and ranked run as separate Deployments rather than one process with
# two loops: they have different match sizes, and separating them means a
# ranked backlog cannot delay casual formation (and vice versa). Each worker
# reads its own playlist-scoped Redis namespace.
#
# Exactly one replica each. The matcher claims tickets through CreateProposal's
# SKIP LOCKED fences so a second replica would be safe, but it would also halve
# the candidate pool each worker sees per poll and make formation quality worse
# for no throughput gain at this scale.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: matcher-casual
namespace: cosmic-clash
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
app.kubernetes.io/component: matcher
cosmic-clash.io/playlist: casual
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
cosmic-clash.io/playlist: casual
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
app.kubernetes.io/component: matcher
cosmic-clash.io/playlist: casual
spec:
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 10
serviceAccountName: matcher
automountServiceAccountToken: false
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 10001
runAsGroup: 10001
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: matcher
image: ghcr.io/cosmic-clash/matcher@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
args:
- --dsn=$(COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN)
- --playlist=casual
- --size=4
- --interval=1s
- --redis-addr=$(COSMIC_CLASH_REDIS_ADDR)
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: [ALL]
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
cpu: 1
memory: 512Mi
env:
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-database
key: dsn
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_REDIS_ADDR
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-redis
key: addr
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: matcher-ranked
namespace: cosmic-clash
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
app.kubernetes.io/component: matcher
cosmic-clash.io/playlist: ranked
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
cosmic-clash.io/playlist: ranked
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
app.kubernetes.io/component: matcher
cosmic-clash.io/playlist: ranked
spec:
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 10
serviceAccountName: matcher
automountServiceAccountToken: false
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 10001
runAsGroup: 10001
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: matcher
image: ghcr.io/cosmic-clash/matcher@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
args:
- --dsn=$(COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN)
# Ranked is strictly 3v3; domain.AllocateAcceptedProposal rejects a
# ranked proposal that is not exactly six players.
- --playlist=ranked
- --size=6
- --interval=1s
- --redis-addr=$(COSMIC_CLASH_REDIS_ADDR)
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: [ALL]
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
cpu: 1
memory: 512Mi
env:
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-database
key: dsn
- name: COSMIC_CLASH_REDIS_ADDR
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cosmic-clash-redis
key: addr
deploy/k8s/base/matcher-pdb.yaml
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
# Each playlist runs a single matcher, so maxUnavailable rather than
# minAvailable: minAvailable: 1 against a one-replica Deployment blocks every
# voluntary eviction, including node drains. Allowing one keeps drains possible;
# formation simply pauses for the restart, and queued tickets are unaffected
# because the matcher holds no state of its own.
apiVersion: policy/v1
kind: PodDisruptionBudget
metadata:
name: matcher
namespace: cosmic-clash
spec:
maxUnavailable: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
deploy/k8s/base/namespace.yaml
+5 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: cosmic-clash
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
# Agones' Dynamic port policy injects a hostPort into every GameServer
# Pod. Kubernetes' built-in baseline and restricted policies both forbid
# host ports, so this workload namespace must enforce privileged while
# continuing to surface restricted-policy deviations in audit and warnings.
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
deploy/k8s/base/network-policies.yaml
+90
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ spec:
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
# Allocated game servers are control-plane clients too: roster fetch,
# registration, connection receipts, shutdown acknowledgement and result
# submission all target this port. Their egress was already permitted, but
# without a matching ingress rule every one of those calls was dropped, so
# no allocated match could complete even inside the cluster.
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
@@ -78,6 +90,12 @@ spec:
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
# The injected Agones SDK sidecar updates its GameServer through the
# kubernetes.default HTTPS Service. Its token is masked from the public
# game-server container by Agones, but NetworkPolicy applies to the Pod.
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 443
- ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
@@ -175,3 +193,75 @@ spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
k8s-app: kube-dns
---
# Public players connect straight to the allocated GameServer's UDP port; the
# control plane only ever hands out its address. The namespace-wide default
# deny blocked that ingress entirely, so an allocated server was unreachable
# from the internet and no matchmade game could be joined.
#
# The source cannot be narrowed by selector: these peers are player machines
# outside the cluster. It is narrowed instead to exactly one protocol and port
# on exactly the game-server pods, and the game server admits a peer only with
# a valid signed join authorisation for its own match.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: game-server-allowed-ingress
namespace: cosmic-clash
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 7777
---
# The matcher reads queued candidates and writes proposals. It exposes nothing
# and talks to nobody but its two datastores.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: matcher-allowed-egress
namespace: cosmic-clash
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: data
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: postgres
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: data
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 6379
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
podSelector:
matchLabels:
k8s-app: kube-dns
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
deploy/k8s/base/service-accounts.yaml
+7 -7
View File
@@ -7,13 +7,6 @@ automountServiceAccountToken: false
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: match-server
namespace: cosmic-clash
automountServiceAccountToken: false
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: allocator
namespace: cosmic-clash
@@ -25,3 +18,10 @@ metadata:
name: maintenance
namespace: cosmic-clash
automountServiceAccountToken: false
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: matcher
namespace: cosmic-clash
automountServiceAccountToken: false
docs/MATCHMAKING.md
+33 -1
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,15 @@ matcher, allocator and game-server pods cannot read it. The signer accepts
only allocator-recorded assignments, audits every signature, and supports
overlapping-key rotation.
Join authorisations carry a key ID naming the key that signed them, and that
ID is part of the signed bytes so it cannot be repointed at a different key.
Allocated servers hold the set of currently-valid keys and select by ID, which
is what makes rotation overlapping rather than breaking: publish the new key
everywhere, move the allocator's active key ID to it, then drop the retired key
once no live match can still reference it. The key set is delivered as a JSON
map of key ID to base64 key, mounted from the same Secret by both the allocator
Deployment and the Fleet.
## 3. Control-plane architecture
Use one repository and shared domain packages, with independently runnable
@@ -169,7 +178,19 @@ The client submits its recent opaque Steam ping location plus nonce-bound
active-probe responses from each regional endpoint; it does not submit the RTT
used for placement. The backend validates a 30-second freshness window and
nonce, then uses the Steam coordinator SDK and probe timings to compute the
regional matrix. A predicted/observed discrepancy over 25 ms or 30% (whichever
regional matrix.
The nonce comes from `POST /v1/probes/{region}/challenge`, which the client
calls before `POST /v1/probes/{region}`. The challenge is single-use and
durable rather than per-process, because any control-plane replica may serve
the answer to a challenge another replica issued. The recorded RTT is the
interval the backend measures between issuing the challenge and receiving the
answer, which is what keeps client-reported latency out of placement entirely.
Probing is a precondition for matching, not an optimisation: a ticket with no
regional RTT evidence is rejected by the matcher outright, so the client
collects evidence before it creates a ticket. Not every region has to answer --
placement uses whichever did -- but a ticket with none is never queued. A predicted/observed discrepancy over 25 ms or 30% (whichever
is larger) in three matches within 24 hours quarantines the account's samples:
it may queue only in regions whose active probe independently remains under
the ceiling until five clean matches clear the quarantine. The matchmaker:
@@ -238,6 +259,17 @@ only after the same transition commits.
- An original casual participant gets 30 seconds to reconnect; leaving after
that applies a 60-second queue cooldown. The match's ordinary hidden-rating
result still applies, with no extra rating penalty.
- **Late roster delivery.** A backfilled player's join authorisation is issued
after their server started, but the supervisor fetches the roster once before
launching the game child and the game process has no reload path. The agreed
model is: the control plane marks the roster changed, the supervisor -- which
already holds an authenticated channel to the control plane and already owns
the roster file -- re-fetches and rewrites it, then signals the game process
to reload. This deliberately adds no inbound path into the game pod and no new
trust boundary; the roster stays an allowlist the server is told to expect,
rather than admitting anyone holding a valid signature. Signature
verification is unchanged and already covers match, server, slot and
generation.
- An accepted casual initial-connect no-show gets the same 60-second cooldown.
The match proceeds with a bot only if at least one human connected on each
team; otherwise it cancels and restores every innocent ticket with original
docs/REVIEW-2026-09-feat-multiplayer.md
+298
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
# Branch review findings — `feat/multiplayer`, September 2026
> **Point-in-time artefact, not living documentation.** This records the state
> of the branch at `089c127c`. **All thirteen findings below have since been
> addressed** — every one was verified against the code first, and each fix
> carries a test confirmed to fail against the defect it covers. Do not read
> the present tense here as describing current behaviour.
>
> For what is actually outstanding, see [`multiplayer-next.md`](../multiplayer-next.md)
> §0 and §7. For the design the fixes implement, see
> [`MATCHMAKING.md`](MATCHMAKING.md). It is kept because the reasoning about
> *why* each defect mattered is worth preserving, and because several fixes are
> only intelligible alongside the failure they close.
>
> Two things the review did not cover, found while fixing it and recorded in
> `multiplayer-next.md` rather than here: `predicted_rtt` was persisted as a
> JSONB scalar `null` (so `RecordProbe` could never have worked even once the
> probe endpoint was wired), and the ranked-rating gap existed on the Redis
> path too, via the candidate built at enqueue rather than the candidate query.
Review scope: `feat/multiplayer` at `089c127c`, compared with merge-base
`3aa0f5b9` (`origin/master`). This is a second, stricter adversarial pass over
the complete branch.
## [P0] Ship runnable control-plane and matcher workloads
**Location:** `Dockerfile:51-100`, `deploy/k8s/base/kustomization.yaml:3-18`,
`deploy/k8s/base/control-plane-deployment.yaml:48-50`
The Kubernetes base deploys a `control-plane` image, but the Dockerfile neither
builds `cmd/control-plane` nor defines a `control-plane` target. Conversely, the
Dockerfile does build a matcher image, but the Kubernetes base contains no
matcher Deployment at all. Applying the checked-in base therefore cannot
produce the advertised production topology: there is no repository-defined
artifact for one required workload, and no running process that consumes
queued tickets for the other. Tickets can be created but can never become
proposals.
Add a production control-plane image target (not the fake-login `testkit-api`
target), add separately configured casual and ranked matcher Deployments plus
their network policies/health checks, and make the release pipeline build and
pin every referenced target. Add a rendered-manifest test that asserts every
required role is present and every image maps to a real Docker target.
## [P0] Wire production Steam authentication and the client sign-in flow
**Location:** `server/cmd/control-plane/main.go:129-157`,
`server/api/service.go:321-340`, `Game/scripts/control_plane_client.gd:15-23`,
`Game/scripts/control_plane_client.gd:157-168`,
`Game/scripts/control_plane_client.gd:218-221`,
`Game/scripts/main_menu.gd:194-195`
`newAPIService` never supplies `SteamLogin`, so the production
`POST /v1/session/steam` handler always returns `503 auth_unavailable`. On the
other side, the game starts with an empty token and a localhost base URL; it
has `configure` and `login_steam` methods, but no production code calls either
one and the menu enters matchmaking directly. All matchmaking HTTP operations
then fail locally with `ERR_UNAUTHORIZED`. Only `cmd/testkit-api` supplies an
authentication provider, so the passing integration path is not a deployable
or secure player path.
Implement and configure the real Steam ticket adapter, expose explicit
control-plane endpoint configuration for release builds, obtain a Steam Web
API ticket through the platform integration, and complete login before
enabling Find Match. Add an end-to-end test using the production binary wiring
(with the external Steam boundary stubbed), rather than the testkit service.
## [P0] Populate server-derived RTT or every queued candidate is invalid
**Location:** `server/cmd/control-plane/main.go:134-154`,
`server/api/service.go:1143-1168`, `server/store/queue_sql.go:134-181`,
`server/store/queue_sql.go:208-227`, `server/domain/matcher.go:159-168`,
`Game/scripts/control_plane_client.gd:205-221`,
`server/api/service.go:1175-1181`
Queue creation persists an empty `predicted_rtt` map, while `validCandidate`
rejects every candidate whose map remains empty. The production control plane
sets `ProbeRecorder` but never sets the `Probe` provider, so the probe endpoint
always returns `503 probe_unavailable`; the Godot client also implements no
probe request at all. As a result, even if a matcher Deployment is added, no
real client-created ticket can participate in a formation. There is a second
cache-coherency failure behind that blocker: a successful probe updates only
PostgreSQL and does not refresh `CandidateIndex`, leaving a previously inserted
Redis candidate with its empty RTT map. In a busy shared keyspace whose TTL is
continually refreshed, that stale candidate need not repair itself.
Wire regional probe adapters into the production service and have the client
complete authenticated probe collection for supported regions after queuing
(or before making a candidate visible to the matcher), and update/invalidate
the Redis projection after probe persistence. Add a full production-wiring
test proving a newly logged-in client can acquire RTT evidence and be selected
through both the PostgreSQL and Redis paths without direct database seeding.
## [P0] Publish signed assignment rosters before starting allocated servers
**Location:** `server/allocator/worker.go:34-79`,
`server/cmd/allocator/main.go:81-93`, `server/allocator/service.go:84-91`,
`server/store/assignment_sql.go:178-331`,
`server/supervisor/supervisor.go:198-224`,
`server/supervisor/supervisor.go:313-388`
The worker stops after binding the provider allocation. Although
`Service.PublishRoster` and `SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster` exist, the
production allocator configures no roster store/signing key and never calls
them. The allocated supervisor fetches a non-empty roster before it launches
the game child, so every real allocation fails at that fetch and can never
reach assignment-ready or accept a player. Existing tests seed assignments
directly and therefore bypass the missing production hand-off.
Define the signing-key ownership and rotation model, build one signed join
authorisation per participant, persist the assignment and roster atomically
with the allocation transition, and make retries idempotent. Exercise the real
allocator worker through supervisor startup without fixture-seeding the
assignment tables.
## [P0] Allow both game traffic and workload callbacks through NetworkPolicy
**Location:** `deploy/k8s/base/network-policies.yaml:1-92`,
`deploy/k8s/base/fleet.yaml:54-83`
The namespace-wide policy selects every pod and denies ingress and egress. No
ingress policy allows UDP/7777 to `game-server` pods, so public players cannot
reach an allocated ENet server. Independently, game-server egress permits TCP
8080 to the control plane, but control-plane ingress permits only pods labelled
`edge-gateway`; the game-server source is not allowed. Consequently roster
fetch, registration, connection receipts, shutdown, and result submission are
all blocked even inside the cluster.
Add narrowly scoped game-server UDP ingress for the chosen Agones/public relay
source and control-plane TCP ingress from the game-server pod selector. Keep
the default deny and add policy tests for both directions, including a real
NetworkPolicy-enforcing cluster smoke test.
## [P1] Emit a valid initial-connect outbox envelope so one row cannot poison the queue
**Location:** `server/store/initial_connect_sql.go:155-164`,
`server/api/outbox.go:95-106`, `server/api/outbox.go:168-195`,
`server/store/outbox.go:46-51`
`ApplyInitialConnectPlan` writes `state_changed` payloads containing only
`match_id`, `state`, and `action`. The state dispatcher requires `event`,
`revision`, `resource_id`, `occurred_at`, and a non-empty `player_ids` list, so
delivery always rejects that row. Dispatch stops on the first error and the row
is never acknowledged; because reads are ordered oldest-first, the malformed
row is retried forever and can prevent all later state events in the batch from
being delivered.
Construct the same complete envelope used by the other lifecycle writers (or
centralize envelope creation), include the authoritative participant list, and
add a store-to-dispatch integration test for both LIVE and CANCELLED initial-
connect outcomes. Also isolate/dead-letter permanently invalid rows so one bad
event cannot globally head-of-line block publication.
## [P1] Load authoritative ratings into ranked matcher candidates
**Location:** `server/store/queue_sql.go:61-66`,
`server/store/queue_sql.go:105-131`, `server/domain/matcher.go:171-186`,
`server/domain/matcher.go:220-239`, `server/domain/teams.go:59-93`
The production candidate query does not join or otherwise read the `ratings`
table, and its scan never sets `domain.Candidate.Rating`. All PostgreSQL-
sourced ranked candidates therefore have the Go zero value. Rating tolerance,
selection scoring, and team partitioning all consume that field, so ranked
matchmaking treats every player as identically rated regardless of their
authoritative profile. Unit tests mask the defect by constructing candidates
with ratings directly.
Populate ranked candidates from the authoritative rating row (with an explicit
default for a genuinely new profile), carry it through Redis, and add store-
backed matcher tests with deliberately distant ratings and a team-balancing
assertion. Never accept a client-supplied rating.
## [P1] Partition and bound Redis snapshots before filtering by playlist
**Location:** `server/store/redis_candidates.go:80-85`,
`server/store/redis_candidates.go:141-188`,
`server/cmd/matcher/main.go:67-93`
Both playlists share one Redis hash/sorted set. `Snapshot` performs an
unbounded `ZRANGEBYSCORE` and `HMGET`, materializes and decodes the whole queue,
then the matcher truncates to its candidate limit *before* filtering by
playlist. A large casual prefix can therefore make the ranked worker see zero
candidates indefinitely even when ranked tickets exist later in the set. A
repair is worse: each matcher captures only its selected playlist as the
durable source, but `Rebuild` replaces the shared keys, so a casual repair can
erase ranked projections and vice versa. The unbounded read also makes each
one-second poll allocate and transfer data proportional to total queue depth.
Use playlist-specific keys and make the snapshot API accept a hard limit that
is applied by Redis (`LIMIT 0 N`) before transfer. Rebuild only the matching
playlist namespace. Add mixed-playlist and large-backlog tests proving neither
worker can erase/starve the other and that Redis never receives an unbounded
range/HMGET.
## [P1] Enforce durable identity bans during session issuance and authentication
**Location:** `server/migrations/0001_initial.sql:5-10`,
`server/store/session_sql.go:16-22`, `server/store/session_sql.go:49-63`,
`server/domain/auth.go:166-197`
The durable schema has `banned_until` and `ban_reason`, but production session
authentication reads only the `sessions` row and no production store code
reads either ban column. The only ban check is an in-memory `TicketVerifier`
used by domain tests. Once real Steam login is wired, a banned identity can
continue using every existing session until expiry and, unless the future
adapter independently duplicates this policy, can receive new sessions too.
This defeats the server-authoritative anti-abuse boundary.
Make ban state part of the durable authentication transaction: refuse session
issuance for an active ban and join/check identities on every authenticated
request (or revoke all sessions atomically when applying a ban). Add tests for
immediate enforcement across two control-plane replicas and for expiry/unban
semantics.
## [P1] Fan out outbox events to every control-plane replica
**Location:** `deploy/k8s/base/control-plane-deployment.yaml:8-14`,
`server/api/events.go:55-117`, `server/api/events.go:217-230`,
`server/api/outbox.go:69-90`, `server/store/outbox.go:46-60`
The Deployment runs two replicas, but WebSocket subscribers live only in each
process's in-memory hub. Every replica races to read the same global unpublished
outbox rows, and publishing succeeds even when the winning replica has no
matching local subscriber; that replica then sets the single global
`published_at`. A client connected to the other replica never receives the
event. The REST recovery polls eventually converge, but WebSocket delivery
degrades as replicas are added and short-lived proposal transitions can be
observed late.
Publish committed events through a shared fan-out transport, or maintain a
durable per-replica/consumer-group cursor so every connection-owning replica
sees them. Do not globally acknowledge merely because a local hub accepted an
event for zero subscribers. Add a two-replica integration test with the client
connected to the non-consuming replica.
## [P1] Add retention for high-volume idempotency and outbox records
**Location:** `server/migrations/0001_initial.sql:13-29`,
`server/migrations/0001_initial.sql:147-177`,
`Game/scripts/matchmaking.gd:38-52`,
`Game/scripts/control_plane_client.gd:794-795`,
`server/store/queue_sql.go:262-320`, `server/cmd/maintenance/main.go:57-104`
Each ten-second queue heartbeat gets a fresh idempotency key and permanently
inserts a new row. Published outbox rows and expired/revoked sessions are also
never purged; the maintenance role performs lifecycle reconciliation only.
At 10,000 queued players, heartbeats alone add roughly 60,000 durable rows per
minute, causing unbounded table/index growth, vacuum pressure, backup growth,
and progressively slower recovery on a service intended to scale horizontally.
Define retention windows longer than every supported retry/recovery horizon,
index cleanup predicates, and delete/archive in bounded `SKIP LOCKED` batches.
Expose deletion lag/row-count metrics and load-test sustained heartbeat volume
to verify that steady-state storage remains bounded.
## [P2] Make the observability verifier test reach its intended assertion
**Location:** `server/security/test_observability_manifests.py:20-32`,
`scripts/verify_observability_manifests.py:16-22`
`test_checker_rejects_wrong_namespace_and_broad_scrape` copies only the
control-plane ServiceMonitor and rules into its temporary directory. The
verifier first requires `kustomization.yaml` and the allocator ServiceMonitor,
so the test fails on a missing file before it examines the mutated namespace
or scrape path. The security suite is red and the stated regression case is
not covered.
Copy the complete minimum fixture (including kustomization and allocator
ServiceMonitor), then assert the namespace and `/metrics` mutations separately
so either defect produces the intended diagnostic.
## [P2] Synchronize the contract test with the renamed connection operation
**Location:** `server/contracts/v1/test_contracts.py:21-28`,
`server/contracts/v1/openapi.json:54`
The OpenAPI document calls the endpoint `claimPlayerConnection`, while the
structural test still requires `recordPlayerConnected`. The checked-in
contract suite therefore fails despite the endpoint being present, making the
gate noisy and capable of obscuring real compatibility regressions.
Choose the intended public operation ID and update the test or document. If
the rename is intentional, document the generated-client compatibility impact
and assert `claimPlayerConnection` consistently.
## Verification notes
- `go test ./...`: passed.
- `go test -race ./...`: passed.
- `go vet ./...`: passed.
- Godot unit suite: 220 tests passed with the project-compatible headless
renderer flags.
- Training unit suite: 16 focused generation/evaluation tests passed in
`training/.venv`; the reviewed training changes keep new distributions and
team reward sharing opt-in, so no training-regression finding was raised.
- Contract suite: one failure, recorded above.
- Security manifest suite: one failure, recorded above.
- Script verifier unit suite: 10 tests passed.
multiplayer-next.md
+86 -36
View File
@@ -41,21 +41,65 @@ blocker and is in progress.** It is larger than anything below and adds a
backend service outside the Godot project. Tasks are in §7; the design is in
[`docs/MATCHMAKING.md`](docs/MATCHMAKING.md).
**The current root blocker** ([#14](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/14)): nothing in production ever publishes a
player's signed match assignment. `store.SaveAssignment`/`SaveAssignments`/
`SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster` and `allocator.Service.PublishRoster` are
fully built and tested in isolation, but no real code path
(`allocator/worker.go`, `cmd/allocator`) ever calls them — only tests do, by
seeding the table directly rather than exercising the real write path. Since
**The former root blocker** ([#14](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/14)) **is closed.** Nothing in production
used to publish a player's signed match assignment:
`store.SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster` and `allocator.Service.PublishRoster`
were fully built and tested in isolation, but no real code path called them —
only tests did, by seeding the table directly. Since
`AdvanceServerRegistration`'s SQL requires an `assignments` row per
participant before a match can reach `ASSIGNMENT_READY`, **a real deployment
cannot advance any match past `PROCESS_READY`** — no player can ever receive
a real assignment or connect, regardless of how correct every other piece
(including the client-side connect-wiring in task 8.41) is. See task 8.31
for the full detail. Closing it needs new security-relevant design (a
join-signing key shared between allocator and game server, roster-digest
computation, per-player authorisation construction) — flagged rather than
built, at the user's explicit direction, pending a decision on that design.
participant before a match can reach `ASSIGNMENT_READY`, a real deployment
could not advance any match past `PROCESS_READY`.
`allocator.Worker.RunOnce` now builds one signed join authorisation per
durable participant and publishes the roster after binding the allocation, and
`cmd/allocator` refuses to start without key material rather than stranding
every match silently. The signing-key design that was pending a decision is
settled: HMAC-SHA256 over the canonical claim bytes, with a **key ID** in
those bytes so allocated servers can hold the set of currently-valid keys and
rotation does not invalidate authorisations already issued for in-flight
matches. See `docs/MATCHMAKING.md` §2 for the rotation procedure.
Two further blockers of the same shape were found and closed alongside it:
regional RTT probing had no nonce-issuing endpoint (so no client-created
ticket could ever be selected — the matcher requires non-empty RTT evidence),
and the Kubernetes base deployed a control-plane image nothing built while
building a matcher image nothing deployed. What remains for a live deployment
is external: a Steamworks App ID and publisher key ([#15](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/15)),
custom GodotSteam builds ([#16](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/16)),
and a real cluster ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) and the images
to run there ([#31](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/31)).
**Rows were audited against the code on 2026-09-05.** Nine understated what
was already built — 8.6, 8.8, 8.13, 8.16, 8.19, 8.30, 8.42, 8.43, 8.52 — on
top of 7.4, 8.7, 8.20, 8.22 and 8.39 corrected while working on them. The
drift ran one way: rows kept listing work that had since landed, which makes
the backlog look larger than it is and invites rebuilding what exists. Twice
during this branch a task was picked up only to find one of its named parts
already complete (8.20's allocation wiring, 8.22's client UI). **When picking
up a row, verify its claim against the code before planning against it** —
and correct the row if it is stale, since an unverified row is a rumour, not
a backlog item.
Every corrected claim is backed by an executable test rather than by having
located an implementation, because locating one proves it exists, not that it
works:
| Claim | Proof |
|---|---|
| 8.6 allocated `ServerConfig` fields | `test_server_config.gd::test_allocated_mode_is_opt_in_and_requires_compatibility_manifest` |
| 8.6 signed-authorisation admission | `test_match_net.gd` join-authorisation cases, incl. the key-rotation set |
| 8.6 endpoint wiring | `test_assignment_state.gd` — endpoint preserved, unsafe endpoint rejected |
| 8.8 cross-replica revocation | `TestPostgreSQLSessionRevocationIsImmediateOnAnotherReplica` |
| 8.19 lineup reached through formation | `TestPrepareProposalBuildsCasualLineupBeforeCreatingProposal` |
| 8.19 all four penalty kinds durable | existing integration tests, plus `TestPostgreSQLInitialConnectNoShowWritesADurablePenalty` |
| 8.30 signed roster metadata | `TestRealAllocatorWorkerPublishesSignedAssignmentRoster` |
| 8.42 season countdown | `test_control_plane_client.gd` — `"Season ends in 2d"` and the clamped case |
| 8.16/8.43 matcher deployed | `test_kubernetes_policies.py::test_every_required_workload_role_is_deployed` |
Two claims had no proof and needed one written: `INITIAL_CONNECT_NO_SHOW`
penalties and cross-replica revocation. Both new tests were mutation-checked —
disabling the behaviour makes them fail — so they assert something real. 8.13
and 8.52 are cross-references and assert nothing.
### Blocking sign-off — the work exists, the verification does not
@@ -139,9 +183,9 @@ retrofitting one.
| 7.1 `[D:1.2]` | GodotSteam integration and custom export templates, client *and* headless server | Awaiting the custom binaries/SDK access |
| 7.2 `[D:7.1]` | `NetTransport` Steam implementation (`SteamMultiplayerPeer`, SDR) | Server advertising waits for `ISteamGameServer` work |
| 7.3 `[D:7.2]` `[P]` | Server-browser UI and `ISteamMatchmakingServers` adapter | Unimplemented until real Steam SDK/API access is available; ENet direct-IP remains the supported browser-free path meanwhile |
| 7.4 `[D:7.2]` `[P]` | Auth tickets in `hello` → `BeginAuthSession`, Steam identity in the roster, persistent ban list | Real GodotSteam auth integration, server-side VAC state, durable ban storage remain. **Fixes known defect C** for direct/community servers once landed |
| 7.4 `[D:7.2]` `[P]` | Auth tickets in `hello` → `BeginAuthSession`, Steam identity in the roster, persistent ban list | Durable ban storage landed: `identities.banned_until`/`ban_reason` are enforced on both session issuance and every authenticated request, and `ApplyIdentityBan` revokes an identity's sessions in the same transaction. Real GodotSteam auth integration and server-side VAC state remain (VAC state is read at login by the Web API adapter, but is not yet re-checked mid-session). **Fixes known defect C** for direct/community servers once landed |
| 7.5 `[D:7.2]` `[P]` | `SteamBootstrap` gating (stock builds keep ENet, explicit Steam selection fails closed) | Custom Steam client/server export smoke remains blocked on pinned GodotSteam binaries |
| 7.6 `[D:7.4]` | Backend `AuthCoordinator`, session persistence, `ControlPlaneClient.login_steam()` | Real Steam `BeginAuthSession`/`EndAuthSession` adapter, login UI, live PostgreSQL/session integration remain |
| 7.6 `[D:7.4]` | Backend `AuthCoordinator`, session persistence, `ControlPlaneClient.login_steam()`, real `ISteamUserAuth/AuthenticateUserTicket` adapter (`server/steam`), client web-API ticket acquisition, sign-in before matchmaking | Needs a real App ID and publisher key ([#15](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/15)) and a custom GodotSteam build ([#16](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/16)) to exercise live; sign-in is config-gated and returns 503 until both are set |
| 7.7 `[D:7.1]` `[P]` | Obtain the production App ID, publisher key, SDR coordinator SDK/signing approval, certificates and hosted-data-centre support from Valve | Not started |
| 7.8 `[D:7.6,7.7]` | Ticketed Hosted Dedicated Server SDR: routing registration, coordinator-issued player→server relay tickets, client ticket installation, reconnect and expiry | Not started; depends on 7.6 and 7.7 |
@@ -153,8 +197,13 @@ a component outside the Godot project — a Go backend service — and that is
the largest architectural departure in the project's history; read the
design doc before picking up any task below. The local control-plane,
durable-store, allocated-server, and verification paths are substantially
implemented; every row below lists only what's still open, not what's
built. **The critical path is task 8.31 — see §0's root blocker.**
implemented; every row below is *intended* to list only what's still open,
not what's built — but see §0's audit note: rows drift toward understating
what has landed, so verify a row's claim against the code before planning
against it. **Task 8.31, formerly the critical path, is done — see §0.** What now
gates a live deployment is external: an App ID ([#15](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/15)),
GodotSteam builds ([#16](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/16)), and a
cluster ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)).
**Hard dependency on 7.6 and 7.8.** The local allocated path binds slot
reclaim to a control-plane-signed player identity and locks its team/slot
@@ -177,35 +226,35 @@ are done; everything below is what's left on the tasks still open.
| # | Task | Remaining |
|---|---|---|
| 8.5 `[D:8.4]` | PostgreSQL migrations 0001–0013 (idempotency, queue fencing, identities, ratings, matches, results, audits, outbox, allocator registry, proposal plans, leases, quotas) | New validations await a live database rerun — Docker storage exhausted locally |
| 8.6 `[D:8.3,8.4]` | Allocated-mode `ServerConfig` fields | Signed-authorisation admission, dynamic endpoint wiring, full manifest/runtime tests remain |
| 8.5 `[D:8.4]` | PostgreSQL migrations 0001–0017 (idempotency, queue fencing, identities, ratings, matches, results, audits, outbox, allocator registry, proposal plans, leases, quotas, outbox dead-letter, retention indexes, allocation endpoints, probe challenges) | Verified against a live PostgreSQL; migrations now run to 0017. The local Docker storage exhaustion is a recurring symptom, not a one-off — see §9 gotcha on the integration scripts leaking anonymous volumes |
| 8.6 `[D:8.3,8.4]` | Allocated-mode `ServerConfig` fields | Allocated-mode fields are all present in `ServerConfig` (`allocated-mode`, `match-id`, `server-id`, `playlist`, `client-build`, `assignment-expiry-unix`, `server-image-digest`, `transport`, `region`, the join-authorisation file/key pair, `readiness-port`, `drain-token-env`). Signed-authorisation admission is implemented in `MatchNet` and was hardened with key-set rotation; dynamic endpoint wiring exists via `AssignmentState` and `connect_to_assignment()`. Only live runtime verification against a real cluster remains ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) |
#### 8B — Authentication and secure control plane
| # | Task | Remaining |
|---|---|---|
| 8.7 `[D:7.6,8.3]` | Ticket policy binding expected App ID/identity | Real `AuthenticateUserTicket` backend adapter, bans, publisher secret store, real Steam verification remain |
| 8.8 `[D:8.7]` | Session policy (opaque tokens, digests, revocation) | Distributed revocation coordination, live Steam/session integration remain |
| 8.7 `[D:7.6,8.3]` | Ticket policy binding expected App ID/identity | Adapter, bans and secret store landed: `server/steam` calls `ISteamUserAuth/AuthenticateUserTicket`, rejects family-shared and banned accounts, and separates a Valve outage (503) from a bad ticket (401); the publisher key is mounted into the control-plane Deployment alone from the `cosmic-clash-steam` Secret, asserted by a manifest test. Only verification against real Valve remains, which needs the App ID and key ([#15](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/15)) |
| 8.8 `[D:8.7]` | Session policy (opaque tokens, digests, revocation) | Distributed revocation coordination is done by construction: sessions are durable and `PostgresSessions.Authenticate` reads the row on every authenticated request, so a revocation takes effect immediately on every replica without any cross-replica protocol, and `ApplyIdentityBan` revokes an identity's sessions in the same transaction as the ban. Live Steam/session integration remains ([#15](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/15)) |
| 8.9 `[D:8.4,8.7]` | Join policy, durable reconnect leases | Live PostgreSQL/Godot process-restart and outage recovery verification remains |
| 8.10 `[D:8.5,8.31]` | Workload credential policy (signed tokens, not Kubernetes JWTs), delivery channel, conflict alerting | Never run against a real Agones cluster; alert validated only statically, not against live Prometheus/Alertmanager traffic |
| 8.12 `[D:8.11]` | Kubernetes hardening baseline, rate/quota limiting, degraded-mode gate | Private-store provisioning, distributed/global quotas, edge DDoS/WAF/origin shielding, encrypted backups, live policy/load tests remain |
| 8.13 `[D:8.12]` | Digest-pinned images, supply-chain policy checker | Registry SBOM/scan/sign/admission execution and a concrete production overlay remain |
| 8.13 `[D:8.12]` | Digest-pinned images, supply-chain policy checker | Registry SBOM/scan/sign/admission execution and a concrete production overlay remain — the build-and-pin half is tracked by [#31](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/31) |
#### 8C — Queueing, matchmaking, playlists and rating
| # | Task | Remaining |
|---|---|---|
| 8.14 `[D:8.4,8.5,8.8]` | Queue policy (ownership, heartbeat/expiry, candidate projection) | Live Redis failover-under-load and worker integration remain |
| 8.15 `[D:7.8,8.3]` | Probe validation (RTT, nonce/freshness/region, quarantine) | Steam coordinator, regional probe adapters, multi-region probe population remain |
| 8.16 `[D:8.14,8.15]` | Candidate/team formation, matcher worker | Long-running worker integration remains |
| 8.15 `[D:7.8,8.3]` | Probe validation (RTT, nonce/freshness/region, quarantine), `POST /v1/probes/{region}/challenge`, durable single-use nonces, client probe collection before queueing, candidate-index refresh after probe | Steam coordinator ping-location source remains (a placeholder blob is sent without a Steam runtime); multi-region endpoint deployment remains |
| 8.16 `[D:8.14,8.15]` | Candidate/team formation, matcher worker | The matcher is a real long-running poll loop and now has casual and ranked Deployments in `deploy/k8s/base`; what remains is live soak against a cluster rather than the integration itself ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) |
| 8.17 `[D:8.14,8.16]` | Proposal policy (response window, cooldowns, offender/innocent split) | Live PostgreSQL execution and allocation integration remain |
| 8.18 `[D:8.5,8.14,8.17]` | Store layer (serializable retries, claim SQL, atomic promotion) | Allocation runtime integration remains |
| 8.19 `[D:8.18]` | Casual lineup (2–6 humans, bot backfill) | Queue candidate selection, opt-in 10 s backfill proposals, reconnect/leave penalties, live integration remain |
| 8.20 `[D:8.18]` | Ranked admission (six unique verified humans) | `ArenaRegistry` integration and allocation wiring remain |
| 8.19 `[D:8.18]` | Casual lineup (2–6 humans, bot backfill) | Candidate selection landed (`domain.SelectCasualBackfillCandidate`: oldest ordinary casual ticket meeting build/region/tolerance, ties by ticket ID, deterministic across replicas). Casual lineup formation was already built and wired, and all four penalty kinds are written durably. What remains is the backfill proposal itself, the matcher pass that finds vacated kickoff slots, the client offer UI, and **late roster delivery** — a backfilled player's authorisation is issued after their server started, and the supervisor fetches the roster once before launching the game child with no reload path. That delivery design is now decided (supervisor re-fetches and signals a reload; see `docs/MATCHMAKING.md` § Casual) and the remaining work is tracked in [#32](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/32). End-to-end verification needs a live cluster ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) |
| 8.20 `[D:8.18]` | Ranked admission (six unique verified humans) | Done. Allocation wiring was already complete end to end (allocator sets the `cosmic-clash.io/arena-path` annotation → `supervisor.withAllocatedCompatibility` maps it to `--arena-path` → `server_boot.gd` → `ServerMatchLoop.allocated_arena_path`), with coverage at each hop. `ArenaRegistry` integration is now a cross-language guard rather than a shared list: `server/domain/ranked.go` must keep its own ranked-eligible subset (the choice is server-authoritative and made before any Godot process exists), so `arena_registry_sync_test.go` parses `arena_registry.gd` and fails if the two disagree in either direction, if rotation order diverges, or if a ranked path has no scene behind it. Verified against four drift scenarios including promoting an elevated variant, which the registry's own comment anticipates. Live ranked admission against a real cluster remains ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) |
| 8.21 `[D:8.5,8.20]` | Rating core (Glicko-2, weights, transactional updates) | Live maintenance/DB execution remains |
| 8.22 `[D:8.21]` | Ranked profile (provisional games, tiers) | Persisted tier policy, client UI, reconnect transport remain |
| 8.22 `[D:8.21]` | Ranked profile (provisional games, tiers) | Persisted tier policy done: bands live in `tier_bands`, seeded with the exact compiled launch policy so storage changed without behaviour changing, loaded at startup with a malformed policy failing startup rather than silently mis-tiering, and an empty table falling back to the compiled default so an operator can truncate back to known-good. Retuning is now a rolling restart rather than a rebuilt image. `PROVISIONAL` is rejected as a durable band, being derived from game count rather than rating. Client UI was already built (`RankedProfileState.display_text()` renders tier, provisional status, ranked games and the season countdown). Reconnect transport is tracked by 8.42 and depends on live auth/backend events |
| 8.23 `[D:8.21]` | Ranked season policy (compression, rollover) | Live maintenance/DB execution remains |
| 8.24 `[D:8.9,8.20,8.21]` | Ranked connection policy, reconnect lease, abandon ladder | Live PostgreSQL/process-restart/outage execution remains, blocked by Docker storage |
| 8.24 `[D:8.9,8.20,8.21]` | Ranked connection policy, reconnect lease, abandon ladder | Live PostgreSQL execution now verified (`make verify-phase6` and every integration script run clean). Process-restart and outage execution remain |
| 8.25 `[D:8.10,8.24]` | Result policy (workload-bound, idempotent, transactional) | Production credentials, Agones annotation persistence/reconciliation, integrity-evidence adapters remain |
#### 8D — Agones, allocation and regional scaling
@@ -216,8 +265,8 @@ are done; everything below is what's left on the tasks still open.
| 8.27 `[D:8.26]` | Supervisor package (Agones discovery, Ready transition) | Metadata watch, real Agones annotation/shutdown confirmation, emulator integration remain |
| 8.28 `[D:8.6,8.27]` | Process-ready/Agones-Ready separation, control-plane registration | Remaining gates are live Agones annotation/shutdown behavior and production cluster readiness — see task 8.49 |
| 8.29 `[D:8.26,8.27]` | Dynamic port/SDR env propagation | Real Agones dynamic/passthrough mapping, POP/cert/firewall/NAT, multi-match fixture remain |
| 8.30 `[D:8.18,8.26,8.28,8.29]` | Allocation leasing, compatibility validation | Full unknown-outcome cluster recovery and signed roster metadata remain |
| **8.31** `[D:8.9,8.30]` | Signed assignment/roster persistence, player recovery | **This is the actual root blocker of the whole allocation-to-connect pipeline (see §0).** `store.SaveAssignment`/`SaveAssignments`/`SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster` and `allocator.Service.PublishRoster` are built and tested but never called from `allocator/worker.go`, `cmd/allocator`, or anywhere else in production — only tests seed the table directly. A real match cannot advance past `PROCESS_READY`. Closing it needs new security-relevant design: a join-signing key shared between the allocator (to sign) and the game server (`fleet.yaml` already mounts one for verification via `--join-authorisations-key-file`, but no control-plane binary has a matching signing flag), roster-digest computation, and per-player `domain.JoinAuthorisation` construction via the already-built `domain.SignJoinAuthorisationHMAC`. Flagged rather than fixed at the user's explicit direction, pending a decision on that design |
| 8.30 `[D:8.18,8.26,8.28,8.29]` | Allocation leasing, compatibility validation | Signed roster metadata landed with 8.31 — the allocator publishes one signed join authorisation per participant plus a manifest committing to a digest over the whole roster, and the supervisor materialises it before starting the game child. Full unknown-outcome cluster recovery remains ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) |
| **8.31** `[D:8.9,8.30]` | Signed assignment/roster persistence, player recovery | **Done — this was the root blocker of the allocation-to-connect pipeline.** `allocator.Worker.RunOnce` now builds one signed join authorisation per durable participant and calls `PublishRoster` after binding; `cmd/allocator` takes `--join-authorisations-key-file`/`--join-authorisations-key-id` and refuses to start without them. The signing design is settled: HMAC-SHA256 over the canonical claim bytes with a key ID inside them, so servers hold a key *set* and rotation does not invalidate in-flight matches. The provider endpoint is now persisted on the allocation so a worker crashing between allocating and publishing can retry. Verified by an integration test that drives the real worker through the supervisor's own roster read path without seeding `assignments`. Live Agones verification remains ([#17](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/17)) |
| 8.32 `[D:8.2,8.26,8.30]` | FleetAutoscaler baseline, Ready buffer | Regional on-demand node pools/failure domains, pre-pull rollout, warm-allocation p95/p99, N+1 certification remain |
| 8.33 `[D:8.26,8.32]` | Fleet scheduling, zone spread | Regional node pools, forced node-loss testing, measured N+1 headroom remain |
| 8.34 `[D:8.28,8.29]` | Native x86_64 benchmark of boot-to-process-ready/assignment-ready, p99 CPU/RSS/network, node cap with 30% headroom | Not started |
@@ -230,11 +279,11 @@ are done; everything below is what's left on the tasks still open.
| # | Task | Remaining |
|---|---|---|
| 8.39 `[D:8.3,8.14,8.17]` | `MatchmakingState`/`ControlPlaneClient`, queue/proposal UI, targeted revisioned events | Live PostgreSQL-backed dispatcher/fan-out verification remains |
| 8.39 `[D:8.3,8.14,8.17]` | `MatchmakingState`/`ControlPlaneClient`, queue/proposal UI, targeted revisioned events | Cross-replica fan-out landed: committed outbox events are published through PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY so the replica owning a subscriber's WebSocket delivers it, rather than whichever replica happened to drain the row. Verified against real PostgreSQL with two listeners. Live multi-replica verification under load remains |
| 8.40 `[D:8.3,8.14]` | Revisioned event stream, REST resync, outbox dispatcher | Allocator and Redis fan-out live verification remain |
| 8.41 `[D:7.8,8.9,8.31,8.40]` | Player-scoped assignment API, `connect_to_assignment()` wiring, join-authorisation verification in `MatchNet` | SDR relay-ticket installation and live Agones cluster integration remain |
| 8.42 `[D:8.22,8.23,8.24,8.40]` | `RankedProfileState`, backend-authoritative rating/tier display | Committed revision after reconnect, abandon status, season countdown remain dependent on live auth/backend events and Godot runtime verification |
| 8.43 `[D:8.39,8.40,8.41]` | Error/expiry UX, generic mutation retry, version-mismatch and failed-reconnect messaging | Long-running worker integration (§8.16) remains |
| 8.42 `[D:8.22,8.23,8.24,8.40]` | `RankedProfileState`, backend-authoritative rating/tier display | Season countdown is implemented (`RankedProfileState.display_text()` renders the remaining days alongside tier, provisional status and ranked games). Committed revision after reconnect and abandon status remain dependent on live auth/backend events and Godot runtime verification |
| 8.43 `[D:8.39,8.40,8.41]` | Error/expiry UX, generic mutation retry, version-mismatch and failed-reconnect messaging | Long-running worker soak (§8.16) remains; the worker itself is deployed |
#### 8F — Observability, verification, cost and rollout
@@ -245,10 +294,10 @@ are done; everything below is what's left on the tasks still open.
| 8.46 `[D:8.5,8.7,8.9,8.10,8.14,8.18,8.21,8.23,8.25]` | Go unit/race/fuzz coverage, local verification gate | Live matcher-worker-under-load-during-failover integration remains |
| 8.47 `[D:8.7,8.30]` | Offline testkit (fake Steam, fake allocation) | Live exhaustive matrix and production Steam remain |
| 8.48 `[D:8.10,8.14,8.17,8.18,8.27,8.31,8.35,8.47]` | Allocated Compose end-to-end (queue → proposal → allocation → assignment → result) | **Local complete; production gate open** — real Agones/kind and production evidence remain open |
| 8.49 `[D:8.25,8.26,8.28,8.29,8.30,8.31,8.35,8.36]` | Disposable kind+Agones cluster runner | CI/live evidence for production control-plane registration, roster/no-show, both readiness stages, races, multi-match node, result-pending reconciliation, drain, rollback remains open. Blocked locally on Docker storage/kind/Helm availability |
| 8.49 `[D:8.25,8.26,8.28,8.29,8.30,8.31,8.35,8.36]` | Disposable kind+Agones cluster runner | CI/live evidence for production control-plane registration, roster/no-show, both readiness stages, races, multi-match node, result-pending reconciliation, drain, rollback remains open. Blocked locally on kind/Helm availability |
| 8.50 `[D:8.25,8.37,8.43,8.49]` | Chaos recovery (stale allocation, no-penalty requeue) | **Local complete; production gate open** — 100 ms RTT/jitter/loss, matcher/client restart, game-pod death, node drain, Redis failover, control-plane loss, live chaos evidence remain |
| 8.51 `[D:8.17,8.18,8.30,8.31,8.45]` | 10,000-client API load gate | **Local complete; production gate open** — PostgreSQL saturation, durable matcher fencing under load, forecast launch concurrency ×2, replica scaling remain live infrastructure gates |
| 8.52 `[D:8.32,8.34,8.45,8.51]` | Per-replica + shared regional allocator quota | Real image digest/secrets, measured regional cost model, threshold tuning, denial-of-wallet rehearsal remain |
| 8.52 `[D:8.32,8.34,8.45,8.51]` | Per-replica + shared regional allocator quota | Real image digest/secrets ([#31](https://github.com/jcreek/CosmicClash/issues/31)), measured regional cost model, threshold tuning, denial-of-wallet rehearsal remain |
| 8.53 `[D:7.8,8.13,8.38,8.45,8.46,8.48,8.49,8.50,8.51,8.52]` | Fail-closed release-gate promotion validator | Actual reports, production rollback rehearsal, regional playtests, live promotion remain open |
Implementation invariants for every task above:
@@ -334,6 +383,7 @@ single-player one.
49. **Advancing a consumer cursor past data that has not arrived is not a lossy shortcut — it is permanent, because the producer-side filter then rejects the very data being waited for.** **Only give up on an expected item once strictly newer data proves it lost**; "it hasn't arrived yet" and "it will never arrive" are different states and must not share a code path.
50. **A metric that stops sampling during a failure will report that failure as healthy.** Every rate-shaped assertion needs a companion assertion on the **denominator**, or an outage silently becomes an absence of evidence and then evidence of absence.
51. **An architectural blocker inherited from a previous session is a claim to verify, not a premise to build on.** Reconstruct the failing invariant from the code and reproduce it against a control before accepting a scope estimate attached to it — especially when the recommendation arrives without the cheaper alternative recorded as tested.
52. **`docker run --rm` reclaims the container, not its anonymous volumes.** Every run of `scripts/run_*_integration.sh` leaves a throwaway PostgreSQL/Redis data volume behind. They accumulate invisibly — 64 of them, ~4 GB, after one working session — until the Docker VM disk fills and the next container silently fails to start, surfacing only as the script's own `PostgreSQL did not become ready` timeout rather than as a disk error. This is the actual cause behind the "Docker storage exhausted locally" notes elsewhere in this document. `docker system df` shows it (`Local Volumes … 100% reclaimable`); `docker volume prune` clears it. Worth checking first whenever an integration script starts timing out on a machine where it previously worked. **Fixed** by adding `-v` to each script's cleanup trap: `--rm` does reclaim anonymous volumes on a normal exit, but these scripts force-remove the container from a trap instead, and `docker rm -f` without `-v` keeps the volume. Verified as one leaked volume per run before, zero after.
---
scripts/run_allocator_integration.sh
+8 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,14 @@ user="cosmic_clash_test"
password="cosmic_clash_test"
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# -v matters: the container runs with --rm, which would reclaim its
# anonymous volume on a normal exit, but this trap force-removes it instead
# and `docker rm -f` alone leaves the volume behind. Each run then leaks one
# throwaway database volume, which accumulates silently until the Docker VM
# disk fills and the next container fails to start -- surfacing only as this
# script's own readiness timeout, never as a disk error. See
# multiplayer-next.md §9 gotcha 52.
docker rm -f -v "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT
scripts/run_postgres_integration.sh
+8 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,14 @@ user="cosmic_clash_test"
password="cosmic_clash_test"
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# -v matters: the container runs with --rm, which would reclaim its
# anonymous volume on a normal exit, but this trap force-removes it instead
# and `docker rm -f` alone leaves the volume behind. Each run then leaks one
# throwaway database volume, which accumulates silently until the Docker VM
# disk fills and the next container fails to start -- surfacing only as this
# script's own readiness timeout, never as a disk error. See
# multiplayer-next.md §9 gotcha 52.
docker rm -f -v "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT
scripts/run_redis_integration.sh
+8 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,14 @@ repo_root="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
container_name="cosmic-clash-redis-integration"
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# -v matters: the container runs with --rm, which would reclaim its
# anonymous volume on a normal exit, but this trap force-removes it instead
# and `docker rm -f` alone leaves the volume behind. Each run then leaks one
# throwaway database volume, which accumulates silently until the Docker VM
# disk fills and the next container fails to start -- surfacing only as this
# script's own readiness timeout, never as a disk error. See
# multiplayer-next.md §9 gotcha 52.
docker rm -f -v "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT
scripts/run_result_fanout_integration.sh
+8 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,14 @@ user="cosmic_clash_test"
password="cosmic_clash_test"
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# -v matters: the container runs with --rm, which would reclaim its
# anonymous volume on a normal exit, but this trap force-removes it instead
# and `docker rm -f` alone leaves the volume behind. Each run then leaks one
# throwaway database volume, which accumulates silently until the Docker VM
# disk fills and the next container fails to start -- surfacing only as this
# script's own readiness timeout, never as a disk error. See
# multiplayer-next.md §9 gotcha 52.
docker rm -f -v "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT
scripts/run_supervisor_integration.sh
+4 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ database="cosmic_clash_test"
user="cosmic_clash_test"
password="cosmic_clash_test"
cleanup() { docker rm -f "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
# -v matters: --rm would reclaim the anonymous volume on a normal exit, but
# this trap force-removes the container instead and `docker rm -f` alone
# leaves the volume behind. See multiplayer-next.md §9 gotcha 52.
cleanup() { docker rm -f -v "$container_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
trap cleanup EXIT
cleanup
docker run --rm -d --name "$container_name" \
scripts/test_verify_agones_allocation_response.py
+12 -12
View File
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ from verify_agones_allocation_response import validate_allocation
def response(**overrides):
document = {
# Mirrors Agones' real GameServerAllocationStatus, which is flat.
# These fixtures previously encoded a nested "gameServer" object that
# Agones never returns, so the suite agreed with the validator while
# both disagreed with reality.
"status": {
"state": "Allocated",
"gameServer": {
"metadata": {"name": "cosmic-clash-game-abc"},
"status": {
"address": "10.0.0.7",
"ports": [{"name": "game", "port": 31001}],
},
},
"gameServerName": "cosmic-clash-game-abc",
"address": "10.0.0.7",
"ports": [{"name": "game", "port": 31001}],
}
}
document["status"].update(overrides)
@@ -34,28 +34,28 @@ class AgonesAllocationResponseTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_rejects_missing_identity_or_address(self):
missing_name = response()
missing_name["status"]["gameServer"]["metadata"] = {}
missing_name["status"]["gameServerName"] = ""
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
validate_allocation(missing_name)
missing_address = response()
missing_address["status"]["gameServer"]["status"]["address"] = "0.0.0.0"
missing_address["status"]["address"] = "0.0.0.0"
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
validate_allocation(missing_address)
def test_rejects_ambiguous_or_invalid_game_ports(self):
duplicate = response()
duplicate["status"]["gameServer"]["status"]["ports"].append({"name": "game", "port": 31002})
duplicate["status"]["ports"].append({"name": "game", "port": 31002})
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
validate_allocation(duplicate)
wrong_name = response()
wrong_name["status"]["gameServer"]["status"]["ports"] = [{"name": "query", "port": 31001}]
wrong_name["status"]["ports"] = [{"name": "query", "port": 31001}]
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
validate_allocation(wrong_name)
invalid_port = response()
invalid_port["status"]["gameServer"]["status"]["ports"][0]["port"] = 70000
invalid_port["status"]["ports"][0]["port"] = 70000
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
validate_allocation(invalid_port)
scripts/verify_agones_allocation_response.py
+12 -12
View File
@@ -11,26 +11,26 @@ def validate_allocation(document: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, int]:
if not isinstance(status, dict) or status.get("state") != "Allocated":
raise ValueError(f"allocation state is {status.get('state') if isinstance(status, dict) else None!r}, expected 'Allocated'")
game_server = status.get("gameServer")
if not isinstance(game_server, dict):
raise ValueError("allocation did not return a GameServer")
metadata = game_server.get("metadata")
name = metadata.get("name") if isinstance(metadata, dict) else None
# GameServerAllocationStatus is flat: state, gameServerName, address,
# ports, nodeName. It does not embed the allocated GameServer object. This
# validator originally read status.gameServer.metadata.name and
# status.gameServer.status.{address,ports}, and its tests asserted that
# same invented shape, so both agreed with each other and neither agreed
# with Agones -- undetected because the gate never once got far enough to
# allocate anything.
name = status.get("gameServerName")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
raise ValueError("allocation GameServer has no metadata.name")
raise ValueError("allocation did not return a gameServerName")
game_status = game_server.get("status")
if not isinstance(game_status, dict):
raise ValueError("allocation GameServer has no status")
address = game_status.get("address")
address = status.get("address")
if not isinstance(address, str) or not address.strip() or any(char.isspace() for char in address):
raise ValueError(f"allocation returned an invalid address: {address!r}")
if address in {"0.0.0.0", "::"}:
raise ValueError(f"allocation returned an unspecified address: {address!r}")
ports = game_status.get("ports")
ports = status.get("ports")
if not isinstance(ports, list):
raise ValueError("allocation GameServer has no ports")
raise ValueError("allocation returned no ports")
game_ports = [
entry.get("port")
for entry in ports
scripts/verify_allocated_compose.sh
+39 -5
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,27 @@ secret="compose-workload-secret"
smoke_dir="${COMPOSE_SMOKE_DIR:-/tmp/cosmic-clash-allocated-smoke}"
compose=(docker compose -p "$project" -f "$compose_file")
# Most of this script is `curl -fsS` and bare [[ ]] assertions under `set -e`,
# which abort with no message at all. That is fine locally, where the fixture
# is still up to poke at, but in CI it produces a failed run whose log contains
# nothing but "make: *** Error 1" -- undiagnosable without re-running by hand.
# Report where it stopped, and dump the service logs, so a CI failure explains
# itself on the first occurrence.
failed_line=""
on_error() {
failed_line="$1"
echo "allocated Compose fixture failed at ${BASH_SOURCE[0]}:${failed_line}" >&2
echo "--- failing command: ${BASH_COMMAND}" >&2
}
trap 'on_error "$LINENO"' ERR
cleanup() {
local rc=$?
if [[ "$rc" != 0 ]]; then
echo "--- allocated Compose service logs follow (exit ${rc}) ---" >&2
"${compose[@]}" ps >&2 2>/dev/null || true
"${compose[@]}" logs --no-color --tail=80 >&2 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if [[ "$rc" != 0 && "${COMPOSE_KEEP_ON_FAILURE:-}" == 1 ]]; then
echo "allocated Compose fixture retained for inspection: ${project}" >&2
exit "$rc"
@@ -31,12 +50,16 @@ import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, pathlib, sys, time
directory = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1])
key = b"compose-join-signing-key"
key_id = "compose-key-1"
expires = "2099-12-31T00:00:00Z"
fields = ["compose-match-0001", "compose-server-0001", "compose-player", "compose-steam", "0", "0", "v1", "1", expires]
# Field order and the trailing key ID must match
# server/domain.JoinAuthorisationBytes and Game/scripts/match_net.gd.
fields = ["compose-match-0001", "compose-server-0001", "compose-player", "compose-steam", "0", "0", "v1", "1", expires, key_id]
canonical = b"\0".join(field.encode() for field in fields)
signature = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hmac.new(key, canonical, hashlib.sha256).digest()).rstrip(b"=").decode()
envelope = {"Authorisation": {"MatchID": fields[0], "ServerID": fields[1], "PlayerID": fields[2], "SteamID": fields[3], "Slot": 0, "Team": 0, "Protocol": fields[6], "Generation": 1, "ExpiresAt": expires}, "Signature": signature}
(directory / "join-signing-key").write_bytes(key)
envelope = {"Authorisation": {"MatchID": fields[0], "ServerID": fields[1], "PlayerID": fields[2], "SteamID": fields[3], "Slot": 0, "Team": 0, "Protocol": fields[6], "Generation": 1, "ExpiresAt": expires, "KeyID": key_id}, "Signature": signature}
# The key file maps key ID -> base64 key so a rotation can publish several.
(directory / "join-signing-keys.json").write_text(json.dumps({key_id: base64.b64encode(key).decode()}) + "\n")
(directory / "join-roster.json").write_text(json.dumps([base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(envelope, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode()]) + "\n")
PY
@@ -123,12 +146,23 @@ queue_revision="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["revis
# Reusing a queue idempotency key with different command material must not
# silently turn into a second ticket or a successful replay.
conflict_status="$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$api_url/v1/queue" \
conflict_body="$(mktemp)"
conflict_status="$(curl -sS -o "$conflict_body" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$api_url/v1/queue" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" \
-H 'Idempotency-Key: compose-queue-key-123456' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"ticket_id":"compose-other-ticket","playlist":"casual","client_build":"build-1","protocol_version":1}')"
[[ "$conflict_status" == 409 ]]
if [[ "$conflict_status" != 409 ]]; then
# Report what actually came back. A bare [[ ]] here just aborts, which is
# how this assertion failed in CI three times without ever saying what the
# status was.
echo "idempotency conflict returned ${conflict_status}, want 409; body:" >&2
cat "$conflict_body" >&2 || true
echo >&2
rm -f "$conflict_body"
exit 1
fi
rm -f "$conflict_body"
heartbeat_json="$(curl -fsS -X POST "$api_url/v1/queue/compose-queue-ticket/heartbeat" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" \
scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh
+119 -9
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,76 @@ game_server_image="${GAME_SERVER_IMAGE:-cosmic-clash-game-server:kind}"
kind_node_image="${KIND_NODE_IMAGE:-kindest/node:v1.33.1}"
work_dir="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/cosmic-clash-agones.XXXXXX")"
# This gate fails in CI with nothing but Helm's "context deadline exceeded",
# and the EXIT trap then deletes the cluster, so there is no way to learn why
# the pods never became Available. Dump enough cluster state on failure that a
# CI run explains itself without needing a local reproduction -- which is not
# equivalent anyway, since a developer machine has different resources and a
# different container runtime.
#
# Set KIND_KEEP_ON_FAILURE=1 to retain the cluster for interactive inspection.
on_error() {
echo "kind/Agones gate failed at ${BASH_SOURCE[0]}:$1" >&2
echo "--- failing command: ${BASH_COMMAND}" >&2
}
trap 'on_error "$LINENO"' ERR
dump_cluster_state() {
echo "=== node capacity and conditions ===" >&2
kubectl get nodes -o wide >&2 2>&1 || true
kubectl describe nodes 2>&1 | grep -A 12 -E "Allocated resources|Conditions:" >&2 || true
for ns in agones-system cosmic-clash; do
echo "=== namespace ${ns}: pods ===" >&2
kubectl -n "$ns" get pods -o wide >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "=== namespace ${ns}: services ===" >&2
kubectl -n "$ns" get services -o wide >&2 2>&1 || true
# Events explain scheduling/image/probe failures that pod status alone
# does not: FailedScheduling, ImagePullBackOff, readiness probe errors.
echo "=== namespace ${ns}: recent events ===" >&2
kubectl -n "$ns" get events --sort-by=.lastTimestamp 2>&1 | tail -40 >&2 || true
# Log EVERY pod, not only the not-ready ones. A GameServer that reaches
# Ready and is then recycled on a health check leaves no unready pod
# behind: the failures are already deleted and the survivors read 2/2
# Running, so filtering on readiness dumped nothing useful and the game
# server's own output went unseen for several CI runs.
for pod in $(kubectl -n "$ns" get pods -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null); do
ready="$(kubectl -n "$ns" get pod "$pod" -o jsonpath='{.status.containerStatuses[*].ready}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "=== ${ns}/${pod} (ready=${ready:-unknown}) ===" >&2
kubectl -n "$ns" describe pod "$pod" 2>&1 | tail -35 >&2 || true
# Per container, not --all-containers: the Agones sidecar is far chattier
# than the game server, so a shared tail hides exactly the output needed,
# and --previous without -c resolves to a container that never restarted.
for container in $(kubectl -n "$ns" get pod "$pod" -o jsonpath='{range .spec.containers[*]}{.name}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null); do
echo "--- ${ns}/${pod}[${container}] logs (current) ---" >&2
kubectl -n "$ns" logs "$pod" -c "$container" --tail=60 >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- ${ns}/${pod}[${container}] logs (previous, if it restarted) ---" >&2
kubectl -n "$ns" logs "$pod" -c "$container" --previous --tail=60 >&2 2>&1 || true
done
done
done
# Agones' own view: a GameServer can be Unhealthy while its Pod looks fine,
# which is precisely the shape of a failed health check.
echo "=== Agones GameServers and Fleets ===" >&2
kubectl get gameservers --all-namespaces -o wide >&2 2>&1 || true
kubectl get fleets --all-namespaces -o wide >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "=== helm releases ===" >&2
helm list --all-namespaces >&2 2>&1 || true
}
cleanup() {
local status=$?
# No reachability guard here: every command inside dump_cluster_state is
# already `|| true`, so a gone cluster costs a few harmless errors, whereas
# a guard that misjudges reachability silently suppresses the whole dump --
# which is exactly what happened on its first run.
if [[ "$status" != 0 ]]; then
dump_cluster_state
fi
if [[ "$status" != 0 && "${KIND_KEEP_ON_FAILURE:-}" == 1 ]]; then
echo "kind cluster retained for inspection: kind-${cluster_name} (delete with: kind delete cluster --name ${cluster_name})" >&2
rm -rf "$work_dir"
exit "$status"
fi
kind delete cluster --name "$cluster_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
rm -rf "$work_dir"
exit "$status"
@@ -35,7 +103,14 @@ fi
kind delete cluster --name "$cluster_name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if ! docker image inspect "$game_server_image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# Build by default. Reusing whatever happens to be tagged locally silently
# verifies stale code: a developer fixes the game server, reruns this gate, and
# it exercises the previous build because the tag already exists. CI never hits
# that because a fresh runner has no image, which is precisely how a local pass
# and a CI failure can disagree about the same commit.
if [[ "${KIND_REUSE_GAME_SERVER_IMAGE:-}" == 1 ]] && docker image inspect "$game_server_image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Reusing existing $game_server_image (KIND_REUSE_GAME_SERVER_IMAGE=1); it may not contain local changes"
else
echo "Building $game_server_image from the pinned game-server target"
docker build --target game-server -t "$game_server_image" .
fi
@@ -43,21 +118,33 @@ fi
kind create cluster --name "$cluster_name" --image "$kind_node_image" --wait 120s
kind load docker-image "$game_server_image" --name "$cluster_name"
# Agones creates its SDK service account and namespaced RBAC in each configured
# GameServer namespace. The namespace must therefore exist before Helm runs.
kubectl apply -f deploy/k8s/base/namespace.yaml
helm repo add agones https://agones.dev/chart/stable >/dev/null
helm repo update >/dev/null
# Agones 1.49 otherwise requests 10,100 MiB of ephemeral storage for its
# extensions pod, which exceeds a default single-node kind cluster before the
# Fleet can be exercised. These are smoke-only bounds; production resource
# sizing remains deployment-owned.
# Agones 1.49 otherwise requests 10,100 MiB of ephemeral storage for both its
# controller and extensions pods, which exceeds a default single-node kind
# cluster before the Fleet can be exercised. Its allocator and ping Services
# also default to LoadBalancer, whose ingress never becomes ready in plain kind.
# These are smoke-only bounds; production sizing and exposure remain
# deployment-owned.
helm upgrade --install agones agones/agones \
--namespace agones-system --create-namespace \
--version "$agones_version" \
--set 'gameservers.namespaces[0]=cosmic-clash' \
--set agones.crds.cleanup.enabled=true \
--set agones.controller.replicas=1 \
--set agones.controller.resources.requests.ephemeral-storage=128Mi \
--set agones.controller.resources.limits.ephemeral-storage=512Mi \
--set agones.extensions.replicas=1 \
--set agones.extensions.resources.requests.ephemeral-storage=128Mi \
--set agones.extensions.resources.limits.ephemeral-storage=512Mi \
--set agones.allocator.replicas=1 \
--set agones.allocator.service.serviceType=ClusterIP \
--set agones.ping.http.serviceType=ClusterIP \
--set agones.ping.udp.serviceType=ClusterIP \
--wait --timeout 5m
kubectl wait --for=condition=available deployment/agones-controller \
@@ -65,6 +152,14 @@ kubectl wait --for=condition=available deployment/agones-controller \
kubectl wait --for=condition=available deployment/agones-allocator \
-n agones-system --timeout=180s
# The production Fleet only schedules on explicitly on-demand, zoned nodes.
# Give the disposable node equivalent labels so this gate exercises those
# constraints instead of rewriting them out of the rendered Fleet.
kubectl label nodes --all \
cosmic-clash.io/capacity-type=on-demand \
topology.kubernetes.io/zone=kind-smoke \
--overwrite
# The base Fleet intentionally carries a release-time digest placeholder. For
# this isolated run only, replace that exact placeholder with the image loaded
# into kind. No repository manifest is modified and no mutable image is used
@@ -82,15 +177,21 @@ sed -e "s|ghcr.io/cosmic-clash/game-server@sha256:${zero_digest}|$game_server_im
-e '/- --allocated-mode$/d' \
deploy/k8s/base/fleet.yaml > "$work_dir/fleet.yaml"
kubectl apply -f deploy/k8s/base/namespace.yaml
kubectl -n cosmic-clash create secret generic cosmic-clash-game-server \
--from-literal=drain-token=kind-smoke-drain-token \
--from-literal=join-signing-key=kind-smoke-signing-key \
--from-literal=join-signing-keys.json='{"kind-smoke-key":"a2luZC1zbW9rZS1zaWduaW5nLWtleQ=="}' \
--from-literal=join-signing-key-id=kind-smoke-key \
--dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
kubectl apply -f deploy/k8s/base/service-accounts.yaml
kubectl apply -f "$work_dir/fleet.yaml"
kubectl wait --for=jsonpath='{.status.ready}'=2 \
# The field is readyReplicas, not ready: an Agones Fleet's status carries
# replicas/readyReplicas/reservedReplicas/allocatedReplicas, and the READY
# column printed by kubectl is readyReplicas. Waiting on `.status.ready` could
# never match however healthy the Fleet was, which masked itself as "the Fleet
# never became ready" and sent three separate investigations after the game
# server instead of the assertion.
kubectl wait --for=jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}'=2 \
fleet/cosmic-clash-game -n cosmic-clash --timeout=5m
cat > "$work_dir/allocation.yaml" <<'EOF'
@@ -105,4 +206,13 @@ spec:
EOF
kubectl create -f "$work_dir/allocation.yaml" -o json > "$work_dir/allocation.json"
python3 scripts/verify_agones_allocation_response.py "$work_dir/allocation.json"
# Print the response when validation fails. work_dir is deleted by the EXIT
# trap, so a mismatch between what Agones returns and what the validator
# expects is otherwise unknowable from CI -- which is exactly how a validator
# reading a field Agones never sends survived undetected.
if ! python3 scripts/verify_agones_allocation_response.py "$work_dir/allocation.json"; then
echo "--- allocation response as returned by Agones ---" >&2
cat "$work_dir/allocation.json" >&2 || true
echo >&2
exit 1
fi
scripts/verify_multiplayer_local.sh
+21
View File
@@ -48,14 +48,35 @@ echo "local multiplayer gate: bounded fuzz targets"
echo "local multiplayer gate: Godot harness"
run_godot_harness
# The Agones SDK smoke needs a live SceneTree and awaits an HTTP round trip, so
# it cannot live in test_runner.tscn -- that runner calls test methods without
# awaiting. It covers the property the unit tests structurally cannot: that
# start_health() produces a *repeating* ping, which is what Agones enforces and
# whose absence silently recycled every allocated GameServer.
echo "local multiplayer gate: Agones SDK smoke"
if [[ -x "$godot_bin" ]]; then
"$godot_bin" --headless --path "$root_dir/Game" --script res://tests/agones_sdk_smoke.gd
else
echo "local multiplayer gate: skipping Agones SDK smoke, Godot executable not found ($godot_bin)" >&2
fi
echo "local multiplayer gate: contracts and manifests"
python3 -m json.tool "$root_dir/server/contracts/v1/openapi.json" >/dev/null
# json.tool only proves the contract parses. test_contracts.py is what actually
# checks the operation IDs, envelopes and state vocabulary generated clients
# bind to; it was previously not run by any target, so a real mismatch between
# openapi.json and the suite sat undetected.
python3 "$root_dir/server/contracts/v1/test_contracts.py"
python3 "$root_dir/server/migrations/test_migration.py"
python3 "$root_dir/server/security/test_fleet_manifests.py"
python3 "$root_dir/server/security/test_compose_manifests.py"
python3 "$root_dir/server/security/test_kubernetes_policies.py"
python3 "$root_dir/server/security/test_supply_chain.py"
python3 "$root_dir/server/security/test_threat_model.py"
python3 "$root_dir/scripts/verify_observability_manifests.py"
# The checker above validates the checked-in manifests; this validates the
# checker itself still rejects a widened scrape scope.
python3 "$root_dir/server/security/test_observability_manifests.py"
python3 -m unittest "$root_dir/scripts/test_verify_agones_allocation_response.py"
echo "LOCAL MULTIPLAYER GATE PASS"
server/allocator/allocator_integration_test.go
+148 -1
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/agones"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/migrations"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/store"
_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ func TestRealAllocatorWorkerReconcilesAgonesAllocationAndBindsMatch(t *testing.T
if err := db.PingContext(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS schema_migrations, assignments, audit_events, outbox, result_receipts, ranked_season_rollovers, penalties, seasons, ratings, match_participants, matches, proposal_participants, proposals, allocations, game_servers, queue_tickets, idempotency_keys, sessions, identities CASCADE`); err != nil {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE; CREATE SCHEMA public`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := migrations.Apply(ctx, db, filepath.Join("..", "migrations")); err != nil {
@@ -112,3 +113,149 @@ func TestRealAllocatorWorkerReconcilesAgonesAllocationAndBindsMatch(t *testing.T
t.Fatalf("recorded allocations=%d err=%v", recorded, err)
}
}
// The root blocker: the worker bound the provider allocation and stopped.
// Service.PublishRoster and store.SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster both existed but
// had no non-test callers, so nothing in production ever wrote the assignments
// table. The allocated supervisor fetches a non-empty roster before launching
// the game child, so every real allocation died at that fetch and no match
// could reach ASSIGNMENT_READY or accept a player.
//
// This drives the real worker and asserts against the durable tables. It never
// seeds the assignments table, which is exactly how the existing tests missed
// the missing hand-off.
func TestRealAllocatorWorkerPublishesSignedAssignmentRoster(t *testing.T) {
dsn := os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN")
if dsn == "" {
t.Skip("COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN is not set")
}
db, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer db.Close()
ctx := context.Background()
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE; CREATE SCHEMA public`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := migrations.Apply(ctx, db, filepath.Join("..", "migrations")); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
players := []string{"roster-worker-a", "roster-worker-b"}
for index, player := range players {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, player, "steam-"+player); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO queue_tickets (ticket_id, player_id, playlist, state, client_build, protocol_version, enqueued_at, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, 'casual', 'ACCEPTED', 'build-1', 1, $3, $4)`, fmt.Sprintf("roster-worker-ticket-%d", index), player, now, now.Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO matches (match_id, playlist, state, region, protocol_version) VALUES ('roster-worker-match', 'casual', 'ALLOCATING', 'EU', 1)`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for index, player := range players {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO match_participants (match_id, player_id, ticket_id, slot, team) VALUES ('roster-worker-match', $1, $2, $3, $4)`, player, fmt.Sprintf("roster-worker-ticket-%d", index), index*3, index); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
provider := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodGet {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"items":[{"metadata":{"name":"roster-ready-1","labels":{"cosmic-clash.io/region":"EU","cosmic-clash.io/build":"build-1","cosmic-clash.io/protocol":"1","cosmic-clash.io/transport":"enet"}},"status":{"state":"Ready"}}]}`))
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"status":{"state":"Allocated","gameServerName":"roster-ready-1","address":"127.0.0.1","ports":[{"name":"default","port":7777}]}}`))
}))
defer provider.Close()
agonesClient := agones.Client{BaseURL: provider.URL, Namespace: "games", HTTP: provider.Client()}
ready, err := agonesClient.ListReadyServers(ctx)
if err != nil || len(ready) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("ready projection = %+v err=%v", ready, err)
}
if err := store.RegisterReadyServer(ctx, db, ready[0], now); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Two keys, signing with the newer: proves the rotation set is threaded
// through signing and the persistence boundary's re-verification.
keys := JoinSigningKeys{
ActiveKeyID: "key-new",
Keys: map[string][]byte{"key-old": []byte("retired-key"), "key-new": []byte("active-key")},
}
worker := Worker{
Claims: store.AllocatingMatchClaims{DB: db, Transport: "enet"},
Service: Service{Provider: agonesClient, Durable: store.AllocationRegistry{DB: db}, Roster: store.PostgresRosterStore{DB: db}, Now: func() time.Time { return now }},
Now: func() time.Time { return now },
Roster: store.AssignmentRosters{DB: db},
Keys: keys,
}
processed, err := worker.RunOnce(ctx)
if err != nil || !processed {
t.Fatalf("worker processed=%t err=%v", processed, err)
}
// One assignment row per participant, which is precisely what the
// ASSIGNMENT_READY transition and the supervisor's roster fetch require.
var assignments int
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM assignments WHERE match_id = 'roster-worker-match'`).Scan(&assignments); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if assignments != len(players) {
t.Fatalf("assignments = %d, want %d; the allocator did not publish the roster", assignments, len(players))
}
// The supervisor's own read path must return a usable roster.
roster, err := store.GetAssignmentRoster(ctx, db, "roster-worker-match", "roster-ready-1", now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("supervisor roster fetch: %v", err)
}
if len(roster) != len(players) {
t.Fatalf("supervisor roster has %d entries, want %d", len(roster), len(players))
}
verify := domain.VerifyJoinAuthorisationHMAC(keys.Keys)
seenSlots := map[int]bool{}
for _, encoded := range roster {
var signed domain.SignedJoinAuthorisation
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &signed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode roster entry: %v", err)
}
if signed.Authorisation.KeyID != "key-new" {
t.Fatalf("entry signed with %q, want the active key", signed.Authorisation.KeyID)
}
if !verify(domain.JoinAuthorisationBytes(signed.Authorisation), signed.Signature) {
t.Fatalf("roster entry for %s does not verify", signed.Authorisation.PlayerID)
}
if signed.Authorisation.MatchID != "roster-worker-match" || signed.Authorisation.ServerID != "roster-ready-1" {
t.Fatalf("roster entry bound to the wrong match/server: %+v", signed.Authorisation)
}
seenSlots[signed.Authorisation.Slot] = true
}
if len(seenSlots) != len(players) {
t.Fatalf("roster slots collided: %v", seenSlots)
}
// Republishing must be idempotent: a worker that crashed after binding but
// before publishing retries this same path.
allocation, recorded, err := store.AllocatingMatchClaims{DB: db, Transport: "enet"}.FindProviderAllocation(ctx, domain.AllocationRequest{
AllocationID: "allocation-roster-worker-match", MatchID: "roster-worker-match",
Region: "EU", Build: "build-1", Protocol: 1, Transport: "enet",
})
if err != nil || !recorded {
t.Fatalf("recover allocation: recorded=%t err=%v", recorded, err)
}
if allocation.Endpoint == "" {
t.Fatal("the recovered allocation lost its endpoint, so a crashed worker could never republish")
}
if err := worker.publishAssignmentRoster(ctx, allocation); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("republish: %v", err)
}
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM assignments WHERE match_id = 'roster-worker-match'`).Scan(&assignments); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if assignments != len(players) {
t.Fatalf("republish duplicated assignments: %d", assignments)
}
}
server/allocator/roster.go
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
package allocator
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
)
// JoinAuthorisationLifetime bounds how long an issued authorisation may be
// replayed. It must outlive the initial-connect window (a player still loading
// must be able to join) without leaving a usable credential lying around after
// the match it belongs to is over.
const JoinAuthorisationLifetime = 30 * time.Minute
// AssignmentRosterSource reads the authoritative participants of an allocated
// match. It is deliberately the same query the persistence boundary
// re-validates against, so the allocator cannot construct a roster that
// disagrees with the durable match_participants rows.
type AssignmentRosterSource interface {
LoadAssignmentParticipants(context.Context, domain.Allocation) ([]domain.AssignmentParticipant, error)
}
// JoinSigningKeys is the allocator's key material. ActiveKeyID names the key
// new authorisations are signed with; Keys holds every currently-valid key so
// verification (including the re-check at the persistence boundary) still
// accepts authorisations issued before a rotation.
type JoinSigningKeys struct {
ActiveKeyID string
Keys map[string][]byte
}
func (k JoinSigningKeys) validate() error {
if k.ActiveKeyID == "" || len(k.Keys) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("join signing keys are not configured")
}
if len(k.Keys[k.ActiveKeyID]) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("active join signing key %q is not present in the key set", k.ActiveKeyID)
}
return nil
}
// BuildSignedRoster turns the durable participants into one signed join
// authorisation each, plus the manifest that commits to the whole set.
//
// Signing each entry proves each individual claim; the manifest's roster
// digest additionally commits to the set, so a server cannot be handed a
// truncated roster whose surviving entries are each individually valid.
func BuildSignedRoster(allocation domain.Allocation, participants []domain.AssignmentParticipant, keys JoinSigningKeys, now time.Time) (domain.Assignment, []domain.SignedJoinAuthorisation, error) {
if err := keys.validate(); err != nil {
return domain.Assignment{}, nil, err
}
if allocation.State != domain.ServerAllocated || allocation.Endpoint == "" || len(participants) == 0 || now.IsZero() {
return domain.Assignment{}, nil, domain.ErrManifestRejected
}
active := keys.Keys[keys.ActiveKeyID]
roster := make([]domain.SignedJoinAuthorisation, 0, len(participants))
for _, participant := range participants {
signed, err := domain.SignJoinAuthorisationHMAC(domain.JoinAuthorisation{
MatchID: allocation.MatchID,
ServerID: allocation.ServerID,
PlayerID: participant.PlayerID,
SteamID: participant.SteamID,
Slot: participant.Slot,
Team: participant.Team,
Protocol: strconv.Itoa(allocation.Protocol),
// Generation 1 is the first connection lease. Reconnects fence by
// advancing the durable generation, not by reissuing this token.
Generation: 1,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(JoinAuthorisationLifetime).UTC(),
KeyID: keys.ActiveKeyID,
}, active)
if err != nil {
return domain.Assignment{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("sign join authorisation for %s: %w", participant.PlayerID, err)
}
roster = append(roster, signed)
}
rosterDigest, err := domain.AssignmentRosterDigest(roster)
if err != nil {
return domain.Assignment{}, nil, err
}
assignment := domain.Assignment{
Allocation: allocation,
Endpoint: allocation.Endpoint,
Manifest: domain.AllocationManifest{
AllocationID: allocation.AllocationID,
MatchID: allocation.MatchID,
ServerID: allocation.ServerID,
Region: allocation.Region,
Build: allocation.Build,
Protocol: allocation.Protocol,
Transport: allocation.Transport,
RosterDigest: rosterDigest,
},
}
return assignment, roster, nil
}
server/allocator/service.go
+6
View File
@@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ func (s Service) Allocate(ctx context.Context, request domain.AllocationRequest,
}
return agones.AllocatedServer{}, err
}
// The client-facing endpoint arrives on the provider result, not on the
// allocation. Carry it onto the record so publishing the assignment roster
// -- and recovering after a crash between allocating and publishing -- has
// an endpoint to work from.
result.Allocation.Endpoint = result.Endpoint
recorded, err := s.Durable.RecordProviderAllocation(ctx, result.Allocation, now)
if err != nil {
if s.Metrics != nil {
@@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ func (s Service) RecordProviderAllocation(ctx context.Context, result agones.All
// Quota is consumed by Allocate before a fresh provider request. This
// method only reconciles an already-issued provider result after an
// ambiguous write, so consuming here would charge one allocation twice.
result.Allocation.Endpoint = result.Endpoint
allocation, err := s.Durable.RecordProviderAllocation(ctx, result.Allocation, now)
if s.Metrics != nil {
if err != nil {
server/allocator/worker.go
+39
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ type Worker struct {
Claims MatchClaimSource
Service Service
Now func() time.Time
// Roster and Keys wire the assignment hand-off. Without them the worker
// binds an allocation and stops, nothing ever writes the assignments
// table, and the allocated supervisor's roster fetch fails -- so every
// real allocation dies before the game process launches. They are optional
// only so existing allocation-only tests need no key material.
Roster AssignmentRosterSource
Keys JoinSigningKeys
}
// RunOnce returns whether it found a claimed match. It never exposes an
@@ -76,9 +83,41 @@ func (w Worker) RunOnce(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
if err := w.Claims.BindAllocatedMatch(ctx, allocation); err != nil {
return true, fmt.Errorf("bind allocated match %s: %w", request.MatchID, err)
}
if err := w.publishAssignmentRoster(ctx, allocation); err != nil {
return true, fmt.Errorf("publish assignment roster for match %s: %w", request.MatchID, err)
}
return true, nil
}
// publishAssignmentRoster completes the hand-off from allocation to a joinable
// match. The supervisor fetches a non-empty roster before it launches the game
// child, so skipping this leaves the match stuck short of ASSIGNMENT_READY
// forever.
//
// It is safe to retry: SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster upserts by (match, player)
// and re-validates every claim against the durable participants, so a worker
// that crashed after binding but before publishing simply republishes on the
// next pass.
func (w Worker) publishAssignmentRoster(ctx context.Context, allocation domain.Allocation) error {
if w.Roster == nil {
// Allocation-only deployments (and the allocation-focused tests) leave
// this unset deliberately.
return nil
}
if err := w.Keys.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
participants, err := w.Roster.LoadAssignmentParticipants(ctx, allocation)
if err != nil {
return err
}
assignment, roster, err := BuildSignedRoster(allocation, participants, w.Keys, w.Now())
if err != nil {
return err
}
return w.Service.PublishRoster(ctx, assignment, roster, domain.VerifyJoinAuthorisationHMAC(w.Keys.Keys))
}
func validateProviderAllocation(request domain.AllocationRequest, result agones.AllocatedServer) error {
allocation := result.Allocation
if result.Endpoint == "" || allocation.State != domain.ServerAllocated || allocation.AllocationID != request.AllocationID || allocation.MatchID != request.MatchID || allocation.ServerID == "" || allocation.Region != request.Region || allocation.Build != request.Build || allocation.Protocol != request.Protocol || allocation.Transport != request.Transport || allocation.ArenaPath != request.ArenaPath {
server/api/events.go
+42 -2
View File
@@ -224,12 +224,52 @@ func (s *Service) getEventHub() *eventHub {
}
// PublishControlPlaneEvent routes an already-authorized event to the matching
// authenticated player connection. Durable callers should publish from their
// outbox after commit; this in-memory hub is deliberately non-authoritative.
// authenticated player connection on THIS replica. Durable callers should
// publish from their outbox after commit; this in-memory hub is deliberately
// non-authoritative.
func (s *Service) PublishControlPlaneEvent(event ControlPlaneEvent) error {
return s.getEventHub().publish(event)
}
// fannedOutEvent is the fan-out wire shape. It cannot reuse ControlPlaneEvent
// directly because that type hides PlayerID from clients (json:"-"), and the
// recipient is precisely what a peer replica needs in order to route.
type fannedOutEvent struct {
ControlPlaneEvent
PlayerID string `json:"player_id"`
}
// EncodeFannedOutEvent and DecodeFannedOutEvent are exported for the
// control-plane binary, which owns the transport wiring.
func EncodeFannedOutEvent(event ControlPlaneEvent) ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(fannedOutEvent{ControlPlaneEvent: event, PlayerID: event.PlayerID})
}
func DecodeFannedOutEvent(payload []byte) (ControlPlaneEvent, error) {
var decoded fannedOutEvent
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &decoded); err != nil {
return ControlPlaneEvent{}, err
}
event := decoded.ControlPlaneEvent
event.PlayerID = decoded.PlayerID
if event.Event == "" || event.ResourceID == "" || event.PlayerID == "" {
return ControlPlaneEvent{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid fanned-out control-plane event")
}
return event, nil
}
// publishOutboxEvent is how the outbox dispatchers publish. When EventFanout
// is configured it hands the event to the shared transport so every replica --
// including whichever one holds the subscriber's WebSocket -- can deliver it.
// Without it, behaviour is unchanged: local-hub only, correct for a single
// replica and for tests.
func (s *Service) publishOutboxEvent(event ControlPlaneEvent) error {
if s.EventFanout != nil {
return s.EventFanout(event)
}
return s.PublishControlPlaneEvent(event)
}
func (s *Service) publishTicketEvent(ticket domain.QueueTicket, now time.Time) {
_ = s.PublishControlPlaneEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{
Event: "state_changed", Revision: ticket.Revision, ResourceID: ticket.TicketID,
server/api/outbox.go
+36 -9
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func RunProposalOutboxDispatcher(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, service *Servi
if err != nil {
continue
}
_ = dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx, dispatcher, events)
_ = dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx, db, dispatcher, events)
}
}
}
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func RunResultOutboxDispatcher(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, service *Service
if err != nil {
continue
}
_ = dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx, dispatcher, events)
_ = dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx, db, dispatcher, events)
}
}
}
@@ -87,29 +87,56 @@ func RunStateOutboxDispatcher(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, service *Service)
if err != nil {
continue
}
_ = dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx, dispatcher, events)
_ = dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx, db, dispatcher, events)
}
}
}
func dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx context.Context, dispatcher *store.OutboxDispatcher, events []store.OutboxEvent) error {
func dispatchOutboxEvents(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, dispatcher *store.OutboxDispatcher, events []store.OutboxEvent) error {
if len(events) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Use the same delivery-before-ack contract as the general dispatcher,
// while keeping the already-filtered batch from being read a second time.
//
// A delivery failure does not abort the batch. Returning here meant one
// undeliverable payload -- reads are oldest-first -- was retried ahead of
// every later event of its type on every poll, forever. Instead the failure
// is counted against that row (dead-lettering it once exhausted) and the
// batch continues.
//
// Ordering within one aggregate is still honoured: once an event for a
// match fails, its later events are left for a subsequent poll so a client
// can never observe that match's newer state before its older state. Other
// aggregates are independent and proceed.
blocked := make(map[string]struct{})
var firstErr error
for _, event := range events {
if event.EventID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("outbox event has no ID")
}
if _, skip := blocked[event.AggregateID]; skip {
continue
}
if err := dispatcher.Deliver(ctx, event); err != nil {
return err
blocked[event.AggregateID] = struct{}{}
if firstErr == nil {
firstErr = err
}
if db != nil {
if _, failErr := store.RecordOutboxDeliveryFailure(ctx, db, event.EventID, err, time.Now().UTC()); failErr != nil {
return failErr
}
}
continue
}
if err := dispatcher.Ack(ctx, event.EventID, time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
// An ack failure is a database problem, not a payload problem;
// stop rather than counting it against the event.
return err
}
}
return nil
return firstErr
}
func deliverProposalOutboxEvent(_ context.Context, event store.OutboxEvent, service *Service) error {
@@ -128,7 +155,7 @@ func deliverProposalOutboxEvent(_ context.Context, event store.OutboxEvent, serv
return fmt.Errorf("invalid proposal outbox event")
}
for _, playerID := range envelope.PlayerIDs {
if err := service.PublishControlPlaneEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{
if err := service.publishOutboxEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{
Event: envelope.Event, Revision: envelope.Revision, ResourceID: envelope.ResourceID,
OccurredAt: envelope.OccurredAt, State: envelope.State, PlayerID: playerID,
}); err != nil {
@@ -154,7 +181,7 @@ func deliverResultOutboxEvent(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, event store.Outbo
return fmt.Errorf("result outbox event has no participants")
}
for _, playerID := range players {
if err := service.PublishControlPlaneEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{
if err := service.publishOutboxEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{
Event: "state_changed", Revision: event.Revision, ResourceID: event.AggregateID,
OccurredAt: event.CreatedAt, State: "COMPLETED", MatchID: event.AggregateID,
PlayerID: playerID,
@@ -188,7 +215,7 @@ func deliverStateOutboxEvent(_ context.Context, event store.OutboxEvent, service
if playerID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("state outbox event has empty participant")
}
if err := service.PublishControlPlaneEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{Event: "state_changed", Revision: envelope.Revision, ResourceID: envelope.ResourceID, OccurredAt: envelope.OccurredAt, State: envelope.State, MatchID: envelope.MatchID, PlayerID: playerID}); err != nil {
if err := service.publishOutboxEvent(ControlPlaneEvent{Event: "state_changed", Revision: envelope.Revision, ResourceID: envelope.ResourceID, OccurredAt: envelope.OccurredAt, State: envelope.State, MatchID: envelope.MatchID, PlayerID: playerID}); err != nil {
return err
}
}
server/api/outbox_test.go
+52
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"slices"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -103,3 +105,53 @@ func TestDeliverStateOutboxEventRoutesLiveAbandonmentLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// One malformed row used to abort the whole batch. Because reads are
// oldest-first and the row was never acknowledged, it was re-read ahead of
// every later event of its type on every 100ms poll -- blocking lifecycle
// delivery for all matches indefinitely, not just its own.
func TestDispatchOutboxEventsIsNotBlockedByOnePoisonRow(t *testing.T) {
delivered := []string{}
acked := []string{}
dispatcher := &store.OutboxDispatcher{
Read: func(context.Context, int) ([]store.OutboxEvent, error) { return nil, nil },
Deliver: func(_ context.Context, event store.OutboxEvent) error {
delivered = append(delivered, event.EventID)
if event.AggregateID == "match-poison" {
return errors.New("invalid state outbox payload")
}
return nil
},
Ack: func(_ context.Context, eventID string, _ time.Time) error {
acked = append(acked, eventID)
return nil
},
}
events := []store.OutboxEvent{
{EventID: "poison-1", AggregateID: "match-poison"},
{EventID: "healthy-1", AggregateID: "match-healthy"},
{EventID: "poison-2", AggregateID: "match-poison"},
{EventID: "healthy-2", AggregateID: "match-other"},
}
// nil db: the failure counter is exercised against a real PostgreSQL in
// the store integration tests; here we assert only batch progress.
err := dispatchOutboxEvents(context.Background(), nil, dispatcher, events)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the delivery failure to be reported to the caller")
}
for _, eventID := range []string{"healthy-1", "healthy-2"} {
if !slices.Contains(acked, eventID) {
t.Fatalf("%s was not acknowledged; a poison row still blocks the batch (acked=%v)", eventID, acked)
}
}
if slices.Contains(acked, "poison-1") {
t.Fatal("a failed delivery must not be acknowledged")
}
// Ordering within the failing aggregate is preserved: poison-2 must wait
// so no client sees that match's newer state before its older state.
if slices.Contains(delivered, "poison-2") {
t.Fatalf("later event of a failed aggregate was delivered out of order: %v", delivered)
}
}
server/api/service.go
+130 -25
View File
@@ -20,13 +20,22 @@ import (
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/observability"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/steam"
)
const maxBodyBytes = 8 << 10
type CandidateProvider func(playerID, ticketID string) (domain.Candidate, error)
type CandidateProviderV2 func(playerID, ticketID string, spec domain.QueueSpec) (domain.Candidate, error)
type ProbeProvider func(playerID, region string, opaqueLocation, nonce []byte, receivedAt time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error)
// ProbeProvider validates a probe answer against the nonce the backend issued
// and returns evidence whose ServerRTT is derived from backend timestamps
// only. It takes a context because the issued nonce is durable: any replica
// may serve the submission for a challenge another replica issued.
type ProbeProvider func(ctx context.Context, playerID, region string, opaqueLocation, nonce []byte, receivedAt time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error)
// ProbeChallengeIssuer mints the nonce a client must echo back.
type ProbeChallengeIssuer func(ctx context.Context, playerID, region string, now time.Time) ([]byte, error)
type ProbeRecorder interface {
RecordProbe(context.Context, string, string, time.Duration, time.Time) error
}
@@ -59,7 +68,9 @@ type QueueBackend interface {
// failures must never change the result of an already successful mutation.
type CandidateIndex interface {
Upsert(context.Context, domain.Candidate) error
Remove(context.Context, string) error
// Remove is playlist-scoped because the projection is partitioned per
// playlist; a ticket ID alone does not identify its namespace.
Remove(context.Context, domain.Playlist, string) error
}
type SessionBackend interface {
@@ -107,16 +118,25 @@ type RosterProvider func(context.Context, domain.WorkloadBinding, time.Time) ([]
type ReadinessCheck func(context.Context) error
type Service struct {
Sessions *domain.SessionStore
SessionBackend SessionBackend
SessionIssuer SessionIssuer
SteamLogin SteamLoginProvider
Queue *domain.Queue
Candidate CandidateProvider
CandidateV2 CandidateProviderV2
QueueBackend QueueBackend
CandidateIndex CandidateIndex
Probe ProbeProvider
Sessions *domain.SessionStore
SessionBackend SessionBackend
SessionIssuer SessionIssuer
SteamLogin SteamLoginProvider
Queue *domain.Queue
Candidate CandidateProvider
CandidateV2 CandidateProviderV2
QueueBackend QueueBackend
CandidateIndex CandidateIndex
// EventFanout, when set, publishes outbox-sourced events through a shared
// transport instead of only this replica's in-memory hub. Without it a
// client connected to a replica other than the one that drained the outbox
// row never receives the event.
EventFanout func(ControlPlaneEvent) error
Probe ProbeProvider
ProbeChallenger ProbeChallengeIssuer
// CandidateRefresh re-reads a player's durable queue candidate so the
// transient index can be corrected after its RTT changes.
CandidateRefresh func(context.Context, string, time.Time) (domain.Candidate, bool, error)
ProbeRecorder ProbeRecorder
WorkloadVerify WorkloadVerifier
ResultSubmitter ResultSubmitter
@@ -209,7 +229,7 @@ func (s *Service) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/proposals/", s.proposalMutation)
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/assignments/", s.assignment)
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/profile/ranked", s.rankedProfile)
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/probes/", s.probe)
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/probes/", s.probeRoute)
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/events", s.controlPlaneEvent)
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/servers/", s.serverMutation)
// The public contract is served below /api/v1. Keep the original /v1
@@ -337,7 +357,18 @@ func (s *Service) steamSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
now := s.now()
identity, err := s.SteamLogin.Authenticate(r.Context(), input.WebAPITicket, now)
if err != nil || identity.PlayerID == "" || identity.SteamID == "" {
if err != nil {
// A Valve outage or a bad publisher key is our problem, not the
// player's; answering 401 would tell a legitimate player their login
// failed and send them off to fix an account that is fine.
if errors.Is(err, steam.ErrUnavailable) {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "auth_unavailable")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
return
}
if identity.PlayerID == "" || identity.SteamID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
return
}
@@ -352,6 +383,12 @@ func (s *Service) steamSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
if err != nil {
// Session issuance refuses an actively banned identity. That is a
// decision about this account, not an outage.
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrSessionRejected) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "identity_banned")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "auth_unavailable")
return
}
@@ -486,9 +523,9 @@ func (s *Service) projectCandidate(ctx context.Context, ticket domain.QueueTicke
}
}
func (s *Service) removeCandidate(ctx context.Context, ticketID string) {
func (s *Service) removeCandidate(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, ticketID string) {
if s.CandidateIndex != nil {
_ = s.CandidateIndex.Remove(ctx, ticketID)
_ = s.CandidateIndex.Remove(ctx, playlist, ticketID)
}
}
@@ -894,7 +931,7 @@ func (s *Service) queueMutation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
s.logQueueOutcome(eventName, ticketID, ticket, nil, now)
if ticket.State == domain.Cancelled {
s.removeCandidate(r.Context(), ticket.TicketID)
s.removeCandidate(r.Context(), ticket.Playlist, ticket.TicketID)
} else {
s.projectCandidate(r.Context(), ticket)
}
@@ -1140,7 +1177,50 @@ type probeRequest struct {
Nonce []byte `json:"nonce"`
}
func (s *Service) probe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// probeRoute splits /v1/probes/{region} from /v1/probes/{region}/challenge.
// The challenge must exist for the submission to mean anything: RTT is the
// interval between the backend issuing a nonce and receiving the answer, so
// without an issued nonce there is nothing to compare against and no
// backend-derived latency to record.
func (s *Service) probeRoute(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/v1/probes/")
if strings.HasSuffix(path, "/challenge") {
s.probeChallenge(w, r, strings.TrimSuffix(path, "/challenge"))
return
}
s.probe(w, r, path)
}
func (s *Service) probeChallenge(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, region string) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed")
return
}
playerID, ok := s.authenticate(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if region != "EU" && region != "NA" {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found")
return
}
if s.ProbeChallenger == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "probe_unavailable")
return
}
now := s.now()
nonce, err := s.ProbeChallenger(r.Context(), playerID, region, now)
if err != nil || len(nonce) == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "probe_unavailable")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]any{
"region": region, "nonce": nonce,
"expires_in_seconds": int(domain.ProbeFreshness.Seconds()),
})
}
func (s *Service) probe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, region string) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed")
return
@@ -1149,7 +1229,6 @@ func (s *Service) probe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !ok {
return
}
region := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/v1/probes/")
if (region != "EU" && region != "NA") || strings.Contains(region, "/") {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found")
return
@@ -1163,7 +1242,7 @@ func (s *Service) probe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
receivedAt := s.now()
evidence, expectedNonce, err := s.Probe(playerID, region, input.OpaqueLocation, input.Nonce, receivedAt)
evidence, expectedNonce, err := s.Probe(r.Context(), playerID, region, input.OpaqueLocation, input.Nonce, receivedAt)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "probe_unavailable")
return
@@ -1172,12 +1251,23 @@ func (s *Service) probe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "invalid_probe")
return
}
if s.ProbeRecorder != nil {
if err := s.ProbeRecorder.RecordProbe(r.Context(), playerID, region, evidence.ServerRTT, receivedAt); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "probe_persistence_failed")
return
}
// Accepting a probe without persisting it used to look like success while
// leaving predicted_rtt empty, which silently keeps the ticket invisible
// to the matcher. A missing recorder is a misconfiguration, not a
// successful probe.
if s.ProbeRecorder == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "probe_unavailable")
return
}
if err := s.ProbeRecorder.RecordProbe(r.Context(), playerID, region, evidence.ServerRTT, receivedAt); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "probe_persistence_failed")
return
}
// Refresh the transient projection. A candidate inserted at enqueue time
// carries an empty RTT map, and the Redis keyspace has its TTL
// continually refreshed, so without this the stale candidate need never
// repair itself and stays unmatchable despite a successful probe.
s.refreshCandidateAfterProbe(r.Context(), playerID, receivedAt)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"region": region, "server_rtt_ms": evidence.ServerRTT.Milliseconds(), "status": "accepted"})
}
@@ -1267,3 +1357,18 @@ func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, value any) {
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(value)
}
// refreshCandidateAfterProbe repairs the transient candidate index once a
// probe has changed the durable predicted RTT. It is best-effort: the index is
// an acceleration layer over PostgreSQL authority, and the probe itself has
// already committed.
func (s *Service) refreshCandidateAfterProbe(ctx context.Context, playerID string, now time.Time) {
if s.CandidateIndex == nil || s.CandidateRefresh == nil {
return
}
candidate, queued, err := s.CandidateRefresh(ctx, playerID, now)
if err != nil || !queued {
return
}
_ = s.CandidateIndex.Upsert(ctx, candidate)
}
server/api/service_test.go
+6 -3
View File
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func (i *candidateIndexSpy) Upsert(_ context.Context, candidate domain.Candidate
return i.upsertErr
}
func (i *candidateIndexSpy) Remove(_ context.Context, _ string) error {
func (i *candidateIndexSpy) Remove(_ context.Context, _ domain.Playlist, _ string) error {
i.removeCalls++
return i.removeErr
}
@@ -1759,7 +1759,10 @@ func TestProbeAPIUsesServerEvidenceAndRejectsClientRTTField(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
called := false
service := &Service{Sessions: sessions, Now: func() time.Time { return now }, Probe: func(playerID, region string, location, nonce []byte, receivedAt time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error) {
// A ProbeRecorder is required: accepting a probe without persisting it
// reports success while leaving predicted_rtt empty, which silently keeps
// the ticket invisible to the matcher.
service := &Service{Sessions: sessions, Now: func() time.Time { return now }, ProbeRecorder: &probeRecorderSpy{}, Probe: func(_ context.Context, playerID, region string, location, nonce []byte, receivedAt time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error) {
called = true
if playerID != "player-a" || region != "EU" || string(location) != "opaque" || string(nonce) != "nonce" || !receivedAt.Equal(now) {
t.Fatalf("probe provider arguments = %q %s %q %q %v", playerID, region, location, nonce, receivedAt)
@@ -1791,7 +1794,7 @@ func TestProbeAPIRecordsOnlyValidatedServerEvidence(t *testing.T) {
sessions := domain.NewSessionStore()
session, token, _ := sessions.Issue("player-a", time.Hour, now)
recorder := &probeRecorderSpy{}
service := &Service{Sessions: sessions, Now: func() time.Time { return now }, ProbeRecorder: recorder, Probe: func(_ string, region string, location, nonce []byte, _ time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error) {
service := &Service{Sessions: sessions, Now: func() time.Time { return now }, ProbeRecorder: recorder, Probe: func(_ context.Context, _ string, region string, location, nonce []byte, _ time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error) {
return domain.ProbeEvidence{OpaqueLocation: location, Nonce: nonce, IssuedAt: now, Region: region, ServerRTT: 37 * time.Millisecond}, nonce, nil
}}
server := httptest.NewServer(service.Handler())
server/api/steam_login.go
+53
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
package api
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/steam"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/store"
)
// SteamTicketVerifier is the boundary to Valve. Keeping it an interface means
// the production login path can be exercised end to end with the external call
// stubbed, instead of only through a fake login provider that skips the whole
// flow.
type SteamTicketVerifier interface {
Verify(ctx context.Context, ticket string) (steam.Identity, error)
}
// SteamLogin is the production SteamLoginProvider: verify the ticket with
// Valve, then resolve the verified Steam ID to a durable player ID.
type SteamLogin struct {
DB *sql.DB
Verifier SteamTicketVerifier
}
// PlayerIDForSteamID derives the durable player ID for a Steam ID on first
// sign-in. It is a hash rather than the Steam ID itself so player IDs, which
// appear in rosters and logs, do not restate the platform identifier.
func PlayerIDForSteamID(steamID string) string {
digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("cosmic-clash/player/" + steamID))
return "player-" + hex.EncodeToString(digest[:12])
}
func (s SteamLogin) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, ticket string, _ time.Time) (domain.VerifiedIdentity, error) {
if s.DB == nil || s.Verifier == nil {
return domain.VerifiedIdentity{}, domain.ErrTicketRejected
}
identity, err := s.Verifier.Verify(ctx, ticket)
if err != nil {
return domain.VerifiedIdentity{}, err
}
// A returning player keeps the player ID they already had, so ratings,
// penalties and bans follow the account rather than the session.
playerID, err := store.ResolveSteamIdentity(ctx, s.DB, identity.SteamID, PlayerIDForSteamID(identity.SteamID))
if err != nil {
return domain.VerifiedIdentity{}, err
}
return domain.VerifiedIdentity{PlayerID: playerID, SteamID: identity.SteamID}, nil
}
server/cmd/allocator/main.go
+47 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ package main
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
@@ -34,6 +37,8 @@ func main() {
allocationQuota := flag.Int("allocation-quota", 0, "optional per-replica allocation attempts per region per quota window; zero disables this local guard")
allocationQuotaWindow := flag.Duration("allocation-quota-window", time.Minute, "window for --allocation-quota")
metricsAddr := flag.String("metrics-addr", envOrDefault("COSMIC_CLASH_ALLOCATOR_METRICS_ADDR", ":9091"), "allocator Prometheus metrics address; empty disables metrics")
joinKeyFile := flag.String("join-authorisations-key-file", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_JOIN_SIGNING_KEY_FILE"), "JSON file mapping join-signing key ID to base64 key; the same material allocated game servers mount. Required: without it no assignment roster is published and no allocated match can start")
joinKeyID := flag.String("join-authorisations-key-id", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_JOIN_SIGNING_KEY_ID"), "which key in --join-authorisations-key-file signs new authorisations; other keys stay valid for verification so a rotation does not break in-flight matches")
flag.Parse()
if *dsn == "" || *agonesURL == "" {
fatalf("--dsn/COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN and --agones-url/COSMIC_CLASH_AGONES_URL are required")
@@ -47,6 +52,16 @@ func main() {
if *allocationQuota < 0 || *allocationQuotaWindow <= 0 || *workloadTokenTTL <= 0 {
fatalf("--allocation-quota must be non-negative and --allocation-quota-window/--workload-token-ttl must be positive")
}
// Refuse to start without signing material rather than running an
// allocator that binds allocations and silently never publishes a roster,
// which strands every match short of ASSIGNMENT_READY.
if *joinKeyFile == "" || *joinKeyID == "" {
fatalf("--join-authorisations-key-file/COSMIC_CLASH_JOIN_SIGNING_KEY_FILE and --join-authorisations-key-id/COSMIC_CLASH_JOIN_SIGNING_KEY_ID are required; without them allocated matches can never become joinable")
}
joinKeys, err := loadJoinSigningKeys(*joinKeyFile, *joinKeyID)
if err != nil {
fatalf("load join signing keys: %v", err)
}
db, err := sql.Open("pgx", *dsn)
if err != nil {
fatalf("open PostgreSQL: %v", err)
@@ -89,7 +104,9 @@ func main() {
Metrics: metrics,
Now: now,
},
Now: now,
Now: now,
Roster: store.AssignmentRosters{DB: db},
Keys: joinKeys,
}
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer stop()
@@ -152,3 +169,32 @@ func fatalf(format string, args ...any) {
log.Printf("allocator: "+format, args...)
os.Exit(1)
}
// loadJoinSigningKeys reads the key ID to base64 key map shared with allocated
// game servers. Every key in the file stays valid for verification; only the
// named one signs, so rotation is: publish the new key everywhere, then point
// --join-authorisations-key-id at it, then drop the old key once no live match
// can still reference it.
func loadJoinSigningKeys(path, activeKeyID string) (allocator.JoinSigningKeys, error) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return allocator.JoinSigningKeys{}, err
}
var encoded map[string]string
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &encoded); err != nil {
return allocator.JoinSigningKeys{}, fmt.Errorf("expected a JSON object of key ID to base64 key: %w", err)
}
keys := make(map[string][]byte, len(encoded))
for keyID, value := range encoded {
key, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(value)
if err != nil || len(key) == 0 {
return allocator.JoinSigningKeys{}, fmt.Errorf("join signing key %q is not valid base64", keyID)
}
keys[keyID] = key
}
result := allocator.JoinSigningKeys{ActiveKeyID: activeKeyID, Keys: keys}
if len(keys[activeKeyID]) == 0 {
return allocator.JoinSigningKeys{}, fmt.Errorf("active key ID %q is not present in %s", activeKeyID, path)
}
return result, nil
}
server/cmd/control-plane/main.go
+76
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"strconv"
"syscall"
"time"
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/migrations"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/observability"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/steam"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/store"
_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
@@ -34,6 +36,9 @@ func main() {
rateWindow := flag.Duration("rate-limit-window", time.Minute, "fixed window for the per-replica request limiter")
rateMaxKeys := flag.Int("rate-limit-max-keys", 10000, "maximum credential/IP keys retained by the per-replica request limiter")
trustedProxyCIDRs := flag.String("trusted-proxy-cidrs", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS"), "comma-separated immediate proxy CIDRs allowed to supply X-Forwarded-For")
steamPublisherKey := flag.String("steam-publisher-key", os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_PUBLISHER_KEY"), "Steamworks publisher Web API key. Required for player sign-in; POST /v1/session/steam returns 503 until it and --steam-app-id are set. Never expose this to clients")
steamAppID := flag.Uint64("steam-app-id", 0, "Steamworks App ID this build authenticates tickets for; may also be set via COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_APP_ID")
steamRejectBanned := flag.Bool("steam-reject-banned", true, "refuse sign-in for VAC- or publisher-banned accounts")
minProtocolVersion := flag.Int("min-protocol-version", 0, "reject queue_create below this protocol_version with 426 Upgrade Required instead of queueing a client the matcher can never pair with anyone; zero disables the floor")
flag.Parse()
if *role != "api" {
@@ -79,7 +84,41 @@ func main() {
if *workloadSecret == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control-plane: warning: --workload-secret / COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET is unset; server registration and result submission will return 503")
}
if *steamAppID == 0 {
if value := os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_APP_ID"); value != "" {
parsed, parseErr := strconv.ParseUint(value, 10, 64)
if parseErr != nil {
fatalf("COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_APP_ID must be a positive integer")
}
*steamAppID = parsed
}
}
service := newAPIService(db, *workloadSecret, candidateIndex)
// Tier thresholds live in the database so they can be retuned with a
// rolling restart rather than a rebuilt image. A malformed durable policy
// stops startup instead of silently mis-tiering every player; an empty
// table is a supported state and falls back to the compiled launch policy.
tierPolicy, err := store.LoadTierPolicy(startupCtx, db)
if err != nil {
fatalf("load tier policy: %v", err)
}
service.TierPolicy = tierPolicy
// Player sign-in is configuration-gated rather than always-on: without a
// publisher key there is no safe way to verify a ticket, and silently
// accepting one would be worse than refusing to authenticate at all. The
// endpoint keeps returning 503 until both values are supplied.
if *steamPublisherKey != "" && *steamAppID != 0 {
service.SteamLogin = api.SteamLogin{
DB: db,
Verifier: steam.WebAPIVerifier{
PublisherKey: *steamPublisherKey,
AppID: *steamAppID,
RejectBanned: *steamRejectBanned,
},
}
} else {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "control-plane: warning: --steam-publisher-key and --steam-app-id are unset; player sign-in will return 503")
}
service.RateLimiter = rateLimiter
service.ClientIPs = clientIPs
service.MinProtocolVersion = *minProtocolVersion
@@ -105,6 +144,28 @@ func main() {
}
}
}()
// Fan committed outbox events out to every replica. Subscribers live in
// each process's in-memory hub, but any replica may drain a given outbox
// row, so without this a client connected elsewhere never sees the event
// and delivery degrades as replicas are added.
service.EventFanout = func(event api.ControlPlaneEvent) error {
payload, err := api.EncodeFannedOutEvent(event)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return store.NotifyControlPlaneEvent(ctx, db, payload)
}
go store.ListenControlPlaneEvents(ctx, *dsn, func(payload []byte) {
event, err := api.DecodeFannedOutEvent(payload)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Publishing to a player with no local subscriber is a no-op, so every
// replica can handle every notification.
_ = service.PublishControlPlaneEvent(event)
}, func(err error) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "control-plane: event fan-out listener: %v\n", err)
})
go api.RunProposalOutboxDispatcher(ctx, db, service)
go api.RunResultOutboxDispatcher(ctx, db, service)
go api.RunStateOutboxDispatcher(ctx, db, service)
@@ -149,6 +210,21 @@ func newAPIService(db *sql.DB, workloadSecret string, indexes ...api.CandidateIn
},
CandidateIndex: candidateIndex,
ProbeRecorder: store.PostgresQueue{DB: db},
// Regional latency placement. Without both of these the probe endpoint
// is unreachable, queue_tickets.predicted_rtt stays empty, and
// domain.validCandidate rejects every client-created ticket -- so the
// matcher can never form a match from real traffic.
ProbeChallenger: func(ctx context.Context, playerID, region string, now time.Time) ([]byte, error) {
return store.IssueProbeChallenge(ctx, db, playerID, region, now)
},
Probe: func(ctx context.Context, playerID, region string, opaqueLocation, nonce []byte, receivedAt time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error) {
return store.ProbeEvidenceFromChallenge(ctx, db, playerID, region, opaqueLocation, nonce, receivedAt)
},
// Repairs the transient index after a probe changes the durable RTT;
// the candidate inserted at enqueue time has an empty map.
CandidateRefresh: func(ctx context.Context, playerID string, now time.Time) (domain.Candidate, bool, error) {
return store.FindQueuedCandidateByPlayer(ctx, db, playerID, now)
},
WorkloadVerify: api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken([]byte(workloadSecret), db),
ReadinessCheck: db.PingContext,
Now: func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() },
server/cmd/maintenance/main.go
+34
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ func main() {
stalledAllocationBatch := flag.Int("stalled-allocation-batch", 100, "maximum stalled matches reclaimed per pass")
initialConnectBatch := flag.Int("initial-connect-batch", 100, "maximum pre-live matches evaluated per pass")
liveAbandonmentBatch := flag.Int("live-abandonment-batch", 100, "maximum live ranked matches evaluated for expired reconnect leases per pass")
retentionBatch := flag.Int("retention-batch", 500, "maximum rows deleted per table per retention pass")
flag.Parse()
if *dsn == "" {
fatalf("--dsn or COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN is required")
@@ -69,6 +70,39 @@ func main() {
if reclaimed > 0 {
log.Printf("reclaimed %d stalled allocations, requeuing their participants", reclaimed)
}
// Retention. Without this, idempotency keys alone grow by roughly one
// row per queued player per heartbeat interval, forever.
purged, err := store.PurgeExpiredRecords(ctx, db, now, *retentionBatch)
if err != nil {
fatalf("retention maintenance: %v", err)
}
if purged.Total() > 0 {
log.Printf("purged %d expired records (idempotency=%d outbox=%d dead-lettered=%d sessions=%d)",
purged.Total(), purged.IdempotencyKeys, purged.PublishedOutbox, purged.DeadLetteredOutbox, purged.ExpiredSessions)
}
// Deletion lag: a backlog that keeps climbing means the interval or
// batch size is too small for current volume.
backlog, err := store.RetentionBacklog(ctx, db, now)
if err != nil {
fatalf("retention backlog: %v", err)
}
if backlog > 0 {
log.Printf("retention backlog is %d rows past their window", backlog)
}
staleProbes, err := store.PurgeExpiredProbeChallenges(ctx, db, now)
if err != nil {
fatalf("probe challenge maintenance: %v", err)
}
if staleProbes > 0 {
log.Printf("purged %d unanswered probe challenges", staleProbes)
}
deadLettered, err := store.CountDeadLetteredOutboxEvents(ctx, db)
if err != nil {
fatalf("dead-letter count: %v", err)
}
if deadLettered > 0 {
log.Printf("WARNING: %d outbox events were never delivered and are dead-lettered", deadLettered)
}
}
runInitialConnect := func(now time.Time) {
reconciled, err := store.ReconcileInitialConnect(ctx, db, now, *initialConnectBatch)
server/cmd/matcher/main.go
+8 -16
View File
@@ -66,29 +66,21 @@ func main() {
defer redisClient.Close()
candidateProjection := store.CandidateProjection{
Index: store.RedisCandidateIndex{Client: redisClient, Prefix: *redisPrefix, TTL: *redisTTL},
Source: func(ctx context.Context, at time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
return store.ListQueuedCandidates(ctx, db, selectedPlaylist, at, 1000)
Source: func(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, at time.Time, limit int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
return store.ListQueuedCandidates(ctx, db, playlist, at, limit)
},
}
projection = &candidateProjection
}
worker := matcher.Worker{
// Both branches are now playlist-filtered and limit-bounded at the
// source. The Redis branch previously read the whole shared queue,
// truncated it to limit, and only then filtered by playlist -- so a
// large casual prefix could leave the ranked worker with zero
// candidates indefinitely even while ranked tickets were queued.
Source: func(ctx context.Context, at time.Time, playlist domain.Playlist, limit int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
if projection != nil {
candidates, err := projection.Snapshot(ctx, at)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(candidates) > limit {
candidates = candidates[:limit]
}
filtered := make([]domain.Candidate, 0, len(candidates))
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if candidate.Playlist == playlist {
filtered = append(filtered, candidate)
}
}
return filtered, nil
return projection.Snapshot(ctx, playlist, at, limit)
}
return store.ListQueuedCandidates(ctx, db, playlist, at, limit)
},
server/cmd/testkit-api/main.go
+8
View File
@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ func main() {
Metrics: observability.NewMetrics(),
Now: func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() },
}
// Load the durable policy here too, so the control-plane integration
// scripts exercise the same path production takes rather than the
// compiled default.
tierPolicy, err := store.LoadTierPolicy(startupCtx, db)
if err != nil {
fatalf("load tier policy: %v", err)
}
service.TierPolicy = tierPolicy
handler := service.Handler()
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", *listen)
if err != nil {
server/contracts/v1/openapi.json
+1161 -53
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
server/contracts/v1/test_contracts.py
+14 -4
View File
@@ -23,12 +23,17 @@ class ContractTest(unittest.TestCase):
for operation in path.values()
if isinstance(operation, dict) and "operationId" in operation
}
self.assertTrue({
# These are the operation IDs generated clients bind to, so a rename
# here is a breaking change for every consumer. Assert the difference
# rather than a bare subset check: a plain assertTrue reports only
# "False is not true" and hides which operation went missing.
required = {
"createSteamSession", "getProfile", "createQueueTicket",
"heartbeatQueueTicket", "cancelQueueTicket", "acceptProposal",
"declineProposal", "getAssignment", "registerServer",
"recordPlayerConnected", "submitMatchResult", "getRankedProfile",
} <= operations)
"claimPlayerConnection", "submitMatchResult", "getRankedProfile",
}
self.assertEqual(set(), required - operations)
def test_ranked_profile_contract_is_authoritative_and_optional_season_metadata(self):
schema = self.openapi["components"]["schemas"]["RankedProfile"]
@@ -46,7 +51,12 @@ class ContractTest(unittest.TestCase):
for method, operation in methods.items():
if method not in {"post", "delete", "put", "patch"} or "operationId" not in operation:
continue
if operation["operationId"] == "createSteamSession":
# Exempt: these establish or consume a single-use credential
# rather than mutating a revisioned resource. A probe challenge
# is deliberately new on every call, and its answer is made
# single-use by consuming the nonce, so an idempotency key
# would be meaningless rather than protective.
if operation["operationId"] in {"createSteamSession", "createProbeChallenge", "submitProbeAnswer"}:
continue
refs = {item.get("$ref") for item in operation.get("parameters", [])}
self.assertIn("#/components/parameters/IdempotencyKey", refs, path)
server/domain/allocator.go
+4
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ type Allocation struct {
Transport string
State ServerLifecycle
AllocatedAt time.Time
// Endpoint is the client-facing address the provider returned. It is
// persisted so a worker that crashes between allocating and publishing the
// assignment roster can recover it instead of stranding the match.
Endpoint string
}
type Allocator struct {
server/domain/arena_registry_sync_test.go
+165
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
package domain
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"testing"
)
// arenaRegistryPath is the Godot-side single source of truth for the arena
// list (CLAUDE.md says so explicitly). rankedArenas in ranked.go is a
// hand-maintained mirror of its floor-goal entries, and nothing has ever
// checked the two against each other -- ranked_test.go asserts the same three
// paths the production code hardcodes, so both could drift together silently.
//
// Drift is not hypothetical in either direction:
//
// - The registry's own comment anticipates flipping an elevated variant's
// `random` flag to true once a checkpoint trained on that geometry is
// promoted. Ranked would keep excluding it indefinitely.
// - Adding an arena leaves ranked never selecting it.
// - Renaming or removing one leaves the allocator handing out a scene path
// that no longer exists, and an allocated ranked server fails to load its
// arena at match start -- after allocation, so it burns a real match.
const arenaRegistryPath = "../../Game/scripts/arena_registry.gd"
// gameScenesDir resolves a res:// path to the checked-out scene file.
const gameScenesDir = "../../Game"
var arenaEntryPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`\{"name":\s*"([^"]*)",\s*"path":\s*"([^"]*)",\s*"random":\s*(true|false)\}`)
type registryArena struct {
Name string
Path string
Random bool
}
func parseArenaRegistry(t *testing.T) []registryArena {
t.Helper()
source, err := os.ReadFile(arenaRegistryPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the Godot arena registry: %v", err)
}
matches := arenaEntryPattern.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(source), -1)
arenas := make([]registryArena, 0, len(matches))
for _, match := range matches {
arenas = append(arenas, registryArena{Name: match[1], Path: match[2], Random: match[3] == "true"})
}
// Guard the guard. If the literal format changes and the pattern stops
// matching, every assertion below would pass vacuously against an empty
// list -- which is the exact failure mode this test exists to prevent.
if len(arenas) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("parsed %d arenas from %s; the entry format probably changed and this parser needs updating", len(arenas), arenaRegistryPath)
}
var eligible, ineligible int
for _, arena := range arenas {
if arena.Random {
eligible++
} else {
ineligible++
}
}
if eligible == 0 || ineligible == 0 {
t.Fatalf("parsed %d eligible and %d ineligible arenas; expected both kinds, so the `random` flag is probably not being read correctly", eligible, ineligible)
}
return arenas
}
// TestRankedArenasMatchTheGodotRegistry is the cross-language contract. It is
// the arena equivalent of the golden join-authorisation token in
// Game/tests/cases/test_match_net.gd: one side owns the truth, and this fails
// loudly when the other stops agreeing.
func TestRankedArenasMatchTheGodotRegistry(t *testing.T) {
registry := parseArenaRegistry(t)
expected := map[string]string{}
var expectedOrder []string
for _, arena := range registry {
if !arena.Random {
continue
}
expected[arena.Path] = arena.Name
expectedOrder = append(expectedOrder, arena.Path)
}
actual := map[string]string{}
for id, arena := range rankedArenas {
actual[arena.Path] = id
}
for path, name := range expected {
if _, present := actual[path]; !present {
t.Errorf("registry arena %q (%s) is ranked-eligible in Godot but missing from rankedArenas.\n"+
"If a checkpoint trained on this geometry was promoted, add it to rankedArenas and rankedArenaOrder in ranked.go.", path, name)
}
}
for path, id := range actual {
if _, present := expected[path]; !present {
t.Errorf("rankedArenas contains %q (id %q), which is not a random:true entry in %s.\n"+
"Ranked would allocate a scene the Godot registry no longer offers.", path, id, arenaRegistryPath)
}
}
// Rotation order must follow the registry's declaration order, since
// RankedArenaForProposal indexes rankedArenaOrder and callers reason about
// "the arenas, in order" across both languages.
if len(rankedArenaOrder) != len(expectedOrder) {
t.Fatalf("rankedArenaOrder has %d entries, registry has %d eligible", len(rankedArenaOrder), len(expectedOrder))
}
for index, id := range rankedArenaOrder {
arena, known := rankedArenas[id]
if !known {
t.Fatalf("rankedArenaOrder[%d] = %q, which is not a key of rankedArenas", index, id)
}
if arena.Path != expectedOrder[index] {
t.Errorf("rotation position %d is %q, registry declares %q there", index, arena.Path, expectedOrder[index])
}
}
}
// A ranked arena path is handed to an allocated server after allocation, so a
// path with no scene behind it fails at match start rather than at selection --
// burning a real match and a real server. Cheap to catch here instead.
func TestRankedArenaPathsResolveToRealScenes(t *testing.T) {
for id, arena := range rankedArenas {
relative, ok := scenePathFromRes(arena.Path)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("ranked arena %q has path %q, which is not a res:// path", id, arena.Path)
continue
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(gameScenesDir, relative)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ranked arena %q points at %q, which does not exist: %v", id, arena.Path, err)
}
}
}
// Elevated-goal variants stay ranked-ineligible until a policy trained on that
// geometry is promoted; the current bots cannot score on one. Assert this
// against the registry's own flag rather than a second hardcoded list, so the
// exclusion tracks the registry instead of drifting alongside it.
func TestIneligibleRegistryArenasAreRejectedForRanked(t *testing.T) {
registry := parseArenaRegistry(t)
checked := 0
for _, arena := range registry {
if arena.Random {
continue
}
checked++
if IsRankedArenaPath(arena.Path) {
t.Errorf("%q (%s) is random:false in the Godot registry but accepted for ranked", arena.Path, arena.Name)
}
}
if checked == 0 {
t.Fatal("no ineligible arenas were checked")
}
}
func scenePathFromRes(path string) (string, bool) {
const prefix = "res://"
if len(path) <= len(prefix) || path[:len(prefix)] != prefix {
return "", false
}
return path[len(prefix):], true
}
server/domain/assignment.go
+11
View File
@@ -48,3 +48,14 @@ func manifestBytes(manifest AllocationManifest) []byte {
func ManifestDigest(manifest AllocationManifest) [32]byte {
return sha256.Sum256(manifestBytes(manifest))
}
// AssignmentParticipant is the durable roster row the allocator turns into one
// signed join authorisation. It lives here rather than in the store so the
// allocator can consume it through an interface without depending on the
// persistence package.
type AssignmentParticipant struct {
PlayerID string
SteamID string
Slot int
Team int
}
server/domain/auth.go
+6 -1
View File
@@ -152,8 +152,13 @@ func (c *AuthCoordinator) Expire(now time.Time) []AuthAttempt {
}
var (
ErrTicketRejected = fmt.Errorf("steam ticket rejected")
ErrTicketRejected = fmt.Errorf("steam ticket rejected")
// ErrSessionRejected is deliberately opaque to the client: it must not
// distinguish "no such session" from "wrong token".
ErrSessionRejected = fmt.Errorf("session rejected")
// ErrIdentityBanned is separate so the server can log and act on a ban
// distinctly, even though the client sees the same rejection.
ErrIdentityBanned = fmt.Errorf("identity is banned")
)
func NewTicketVerifier(expectedApp uint64) (*TicketVerifier, error) {
server/domain/backfill.go
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
package domain
import (
"fmt"
"time"
)
// BackfillProposalWindow is the response window for a backfill offer. The
// design specifies "a separate 10-second opt-in proposal", which is the same
// duration as an ordinary proposal -- it is named separately because what
// differs is the payload (score, time remaining, team and slot) and the
// absence of any decline penalty, not the timing.
const BackfillProposalWindow = ProposalWindow
// BackfillTarget describes the vacated slot a backfill is trying to fill, plus
// the compatibility contract the running match already committed to. The
// backfilled player joins an existing server, so build, protocol and region
// are fixed by that match rather than negotiated.
type BackfillTarget struct {
MatchID string
ServerID string
Region string
// Anchor carries the match's build/protocol/playlist contract. Only the
// compatibility fields are read; rating and RTT come from the candidate.
Anchor Candidate
Slot CasualSlot
Phase CasualPhase
// AnchorRating is the match's representative rating, used for the same
// widening tolerance an ordinary proposal would apply.
AnchorRating float64
// VacatedAt is when the slot became fillable. Tolerance widens with the
// wait, matching ordinary queue behaviour.
VacatedAt time.Time
}
var ErrNoBackfillCandidate = fmt.Errorf("no eligible backfill candidate")
// SelectCasualBackfillCandidate implements docs/MATCHMAKING.md's rule for the
// vacated human slot: the oldest ordinary casual ticket meeting the same
// build, a region RTT at or under the placement ceiling, and the current
// anchor-tolerance rule, with ties broken by ticket ID.
//
// It is deliberately a pure function over an already-fetched candidate set, so
// the choice is reproducible and testable without a database. It selects only;
// claiming the ticket remains a durable transaction, as with ordinary
// proposals.
func SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(target BackfillTarget, candidates []Candidate, now time.Time) (Candidate, error) {
if target.MatchID == "" || target.ServerID == "" || target.Region == "" || now.IsZero() {
return Candidate{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid backfill target")
}
// Backfill replaces a bot slot at a kickoff boundary only. Enforcing it
// here as well as at the durable boundary keeps an ineligible mid-play
// slot from ever reaching candidate selection.
if !CanCasualBackfill(target.Phase, target.Slot) {
return Candidate{}, ErrNoBackfillCandidate
}
if target.Anchor.Playlist != "" && target.Anchor.Playlist != Casual {
// Ranked is never backfilled: exactly six verified humans, never bots.
return Candidate{}, ErrNoBackfillCandidate
}
tolerance := RatingTolerance(now.Sub(target.VacatedAt).Seconds())
var best Candidate
found := false
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if !eligibleBackfillCandidate(target, candidate, tolerance) {
continue
}
if !found || betterBackfillCandidate(candidate, best) {
best = candidate
found = true
}
}
if !found {
return Candidate{}, ErrNoBackfillCandidate
}
return best, nil
}
func eligibleBackfillCandidate(target BackfillTarget, candidate Candidate, tolerance float64) bool {
if !validCandidate(candidate) {
return false
}
// "ordinary casual ticket": a backfill offer is only ever made to someone
// queuing normally, never to another match's participant.
if candidate.Playlist != Casual {
return false
}
if !compatibleMetadata(target.Anchor, candidate) {
return false
}
// The server already exists in one region, so the candidate must reach
// that region specifically -- not merely share some region with others.
rtt, measured := candidate.PredictedRTT[target.Region]
if !measured || rtt > MaxPlacementRTT {
return false
}
return abs(candidate.Rating-target.AnchorRating) <= tolerance
}
// betterBackfillCandidate is the design's ordering: oldest ticket first, ties
// broken by ticket ID so the choice is deterministic across replicas rather
// than dependent on scan order.
func betterBackfillCandidate(candidate, best Candidate) bool {
if candidate.EnqueuedAt.Before(best.EnqueuedAt) {
return true
}
if candidate.EnqueuedAt.After(best.EnqueuedAt) {
return false
}
return candidate.TicketID < best.TicketID
}
// BackfillDeclinePenalty is zero by design. Declining or ignoring a backfill
// offer costs nothing: the player asked for an ordinary match and is being
// offered a partly-played one, so refusing is not antisocial the way declining
// an ordinary proposal is.
func BackfillDeclinePenalty() time.Duration { return 0 }
server/domain/backfill_test.go
+153
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
package domain
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
)
func backfillTarget() BackfillTarget {
return BackfillTarget{
MatchID: "match-1", ServerID: "server-1", Region: "EU",
Anchor: Candidate{Playlist: Casual, ClientBuild: "build-1", ProtocolVersion: 1},
Slot: CasualSlot{Slot: 2, Team: 0, PlayerID: "bot-slot-2", IsBot: true},
Phase: CasualKickoff,
AnchorRating: 1500,
VacatedAt: time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC(),
}
}
func backfillCandidate(ticketID string, enqueuedAt time.Time) Candidate {
return Candidate{
TicketID: ticketID, PlayerID: "player-" + ticketID, Playlist: Casual,
ClientBuild: "build-1", ProtocolVersion: 1, Rating: 1500,
EnqueuedAt: enqueuedAt, PredictedRTT: map[string]float64{"EU": 40},
}
}
// docs/MATCHMAKING.md: "Choose the oldest ordinary casual ticket ... ties use
// ticket ID."
func TestBackfillPicksTheOldestTicketAndBreaksTiesByID(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
base := now.Add(-time.Minute)
candidates := []Candidate{
backfillCandidate("ticket-c", base.Add(2*time.Second)),
backfillCandidate("ticket-b", base), // tie with ticket-a, loses on ID
backfillCandidate("ticket-a", base), // oldest, lowest ID
backfillCandidate("ticket-d", base.Add(time.Second)),
}
chosen, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(backfillTarget(), candidates, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("select: %v", err)
}
if chosen.TicketID != "ticket-a" {
t.Fatalf("chose %q, want the oldest ticket with the lowest ID", chosen.TicketID)
}
// Determinism: the result must not depend on scan order, or two replicas
// could offer the same slot to different players.
reversed := []Candidate{candidates[2], candidates[1], candidates[3], candidates[0]}
again, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(backfillTarget(), reversed, now)
if err != nil || again.TicketID != chosen.TicketID {
t.Fatalf("selection depends on input order: %q vs %q (err=%v)", again.TicketID, chosen.TicketID, err)
}
}
func TestBackfillRejectsIncompatibleCandidates(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
base := now.Add(-time.Minute)
for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*Candidate){
"wrong build": func(c *Candidate) { c.ClientBuild = "build-2" },
"wrong protocol": func(c *Candidate) { c.ProtocolVersion = 2 },
"ranked ticket": func(c *Candidate) { c.Playlist = Ranked },
// The server already exists in one region; sharing some other region
// is not enough.
"no RTT for the match region": func(c *Candidate) { c.PredictedRTT = map[string]float64{"NA": 20} },
"over the placement ceiling": func(c *Candidate) { c.PredictedRTT = map[string]float64{"EU": MaxPlacementRTT + 1} },
"no RTT evidence at all": func(c *Candidate) { c.PredictedRTT = nil },
"rating far outside tolerance": func(c *Candidate) { c.Rating = 1500 + MaxRatingTolerance + 1 },
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
candidate := backfillCandidate("ticket-a", base)
mutate(&candidate)
if _, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(backfillTarget(), []Candidate{candidate}, now); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoBackfillCandidate) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrNoBackfillCandidate", err)
}
})
}
}
// Backfill replaces a bot slot at a kickoff boundary only, never a live human
// slot and never mid-play.
func TestBackfillOnlyFillsBotSlotsAtKickoff(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidates := []Candidate{backfillCandidate("ticket-a", now.Add(-time.Minute))}
for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*BackfillTarget){
"mid-play": func(target *BackfillTarget) { target.Phase = CasualLive },
"occupied by a human": func(target *BackfillTarget) { target.Slot.IsBot = false },
"ranked match": func(target *BackfillTarget) { target.Anchor.Playlist = Ranked },
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
target := backfillTarget()
mutate(&target)
if _, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(target, candidates, now); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoBackfillCandidate) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrNoBackfillCandidate", err)
}
})
}
}
// Tolerance widens with the wait, exactly as it does for an ordinary queue, so
// a slot that has sat vacant longer accepts a wider rating spread.
func TestBackfillToleranceWidensWithTheVacancy(t *testing.T) {
base := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
target := backfillTarget()
target.VacatedAt = base
distant := backfillCandidate("ticket-a", base.Add(-time.Minute))
distant.Rating = target.AnchorRating + MinRatingTolerance + 1
if _, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(target, []Candidate{distant}, base); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoBackfillCandidate) {
t.Fatalf("a candidate outside the initial tolerance was accepted: %v", err)
}
widened := base.Add(10 * time.Minute)
if _, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(target, []Candidate{distant}, widened); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tolerance did not widen with the vacancy: %v", err)
}
}
func TestBackfillRejectsInvalidTargets(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidates := []Candidate{backfillCandidate("ticket-a", now.Add(-time.Minute))}
for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*BackfillTarget){
"no match": func(target *BackfillTarget) { target.MatchID = "" },
"no server": func(target *BackfillTarget) { target.ServerID = "" },
"no region": func(target *BackfillTarget) { target.Region = "" },
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
target := backfillTarget()
mutate(&target)
if _, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(target, candidates, now); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("invalid target %s was accepted", name)
}
})
}
if _, err := SelectCasualBackfillCandidate(backfillTarget(), nil, time.Time{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("zero time was accepted")
}
}
// Declining or ignoring a backfill offer costs nothing: the player asked for
// an ordinary match and is being offered a partly-played one.
func TestBackfillCarriesNoDeclinePenaltyAndAShortWindow(t *testing.T) {
if BackfillDeclinePenalty() != 0 || CasualBackfillPenalty() != 0 {
t.Fatal("backfill must not carry a cooldown")
}
if BackfillProposalWindow != 10*time.Second {
t.Fatalf("backfill window = %v, want the documented 10s", BackfillProposalWindow)
}
// Same duration as an ordinary proposal. What makes a backfill offer
// "separate" is its payload and the absent penalty, not its timing.
if BackfillProposalWindow != ProposalWindow {
t.Fatalf("backfill window %v diverged from the ordinary proposal window %v", BackfillProposalWindow, ProposalWindow)
}
}
server/domain/join_auth.go
+63 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
package domain
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"sort"
"time"
)
@@ -15,9 +18,14 @@ type SignedJoinAuthorisation struct {
Signature []byte
}
// JoinAuthorisationBytes is the canonical claim encoding. KeyID is appended
// last and is covered by the signature, so an attacker cannot redirect an
// authorisation at a different key than the one that signed it. Game/scripts/
// match_net.gd builds the identical byte sequence; the two must change
// together.
func JoinAuthorisationBytes(auth JoinAuthorisation) []byte {
return []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s\x00%s\x00%s\x00%s\x00%d\x00%d\x00%s\x00%d\x00%s",
auth.MatchID, auth.ServerID, auth.PlayerID, auth.SteamID, auth.Slot, auth.Team, auth.Protocol, auth.Generation, auth.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)))
return []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s\x00%s\x00%s\x00%s\x00%d\x00%d\x00%s\x00%d\x00%s\x00%s",
auth.MatchID, auth.ServerID, auth.PlayerID, auth.SteamID, auth.Slot, auth.Team, auth.Protocol, auth.Generation, auth.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), auth.KeyID))
}
func SignJoinAuthorisation(auth JoinAuthorisation, sign func([]byte) ([]byte, error)) (SignedJoinAuthorisation, error) {
@@ -34,6 +42,8 @@ func SignJoinAuthorisation(auth JoinAuthorisation, sign func([]byte) ([]byte, er
// SignJoinAuthorisationHMAC is the interoperable production profile used by
// the Godot allocated server. The key is mounted out-of-band; the signed
// bytes remain the same canonical claim bytes used by the generic signer.
// The caller must have set auth.KeyID to the ID of this key, so the verifier
// can pick the right one out of its key set.
func SignJoinAuthorisationHMAC(auth JoinAuthorisation, key []byte) (SignedJoinAuthorisation, error) {
if len(key) == 0 {
return SignedJoinAuthorisation{}, ErrJoinAuthorisation
@@ -49,3 +59,54 @@ func (r *RankedConnections) AdmitSigned(signed SignedJoinAuthorisation, verify f
}
return r.Admit(signed.Authorisation, now)
}
// AssignmentRosterDigest binds a manifest to the exact roster it was issued
// with. Signing each authorisation individually proves each claim, but the
// manifest also has to commit to the set, so a server cannot be handed a
// truncated roster whose entries are each individually valid.
//
// Entries are hashed in slot order so the digest is independent of the order
// the caller happened to build them in.
func AssignmentRosterDigest(roster []SignedJoinAuthorisation) (string, error) {
if len(roster) == 0 {
return "", ErrJoinAuthorisation
}
ordered := make([]SignedJoinAuthorisation, len(roster))
copy(ordered, roster)
sort.Slice(ordered, func(i, j int) bool {
return ordered[i].Authorisation.Slot < ordered[j].Authorisation.Slot
})
digest := sha256.New()
for _, signed := range ordered {
if signed.Authorisation.PlayerID == "" {
return "", ErrJoinAuthorisation
}
digest.Write(JoinAuthorisationBytes(signed.Authorisation))
digest.Write([]byte{0})
}
return hex.EncodeToString(digest.Sum(nil)), nil
}
// VerifyJoinAuthorisationHMAC builds the verifier the persistence boundary
// re-checks each signature with, selecting the key named by the claim. Keys is
// key ID to raw key; an unknown ID verifies as false rather than falling back
// to any other key.
func VerifyJoinAuthorisationHMAC(keys map[string][]byte) func([]byte, []byte) bool {
return func(claims, signature []byte) bool {
if len(keys) == 0 || len(claims) == 0 || len(signature) == 0 {
return false
}
// The key ID is the last NUL-separated field of the canonical bytes.
separator := bytes.LastIndexByte(claims, 0)
if separator < 0 {
return false
}
key, known := keys[string(claims[separator+1:])]
if !known || len(key) == 0 {
return false
}
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
mac.Write(claims)
return hmac.Equal(mac.Sum(nil), signature)
}
}
server/domain/reconnect.go
+6
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ type JoinAuthorisation struct {
Protocol string
Generation uint64
ExpiresAt time.Time
// KeyID names the signing key so the allocator can rotate without
// invalidating authorisations already issued for in-flight matches: the
// game server holds a set of currently-valid keys and selects by this ID.
// It is part of the signed bytes, so it cannot be swapped to point at a
// different key than the one that actually signed.
KeyID string
}
type rankedConnection struct {
server/migrations/0014_outbox_dead_letter.sql
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
ALTER TABLE outbox
ADD COLUMN delivery_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
ADD COLUMN last_delivery_error TEXT,
ADD COLUMN dead_lettered_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
-- The unpublished dispatchers read oldest-first and previously stopped on the
-- first delivery error, so one permanently malformed payload blocked every
-- later event of that type forever. Dead-lettered rows leave the working set
-- via this partial index so a poison row degrades to one lost event instead of
-- a stalled queue.
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS outbox_unpublished_order;
CREATE INDEX outbox_unpublished_order
ON outbox (created_at, event_id)
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL;
server/migrations/0015_retention_indexes.sql
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-- Retention support. Three tables grow without bound today:
--
-- idempotency_keys -- the client heartbeats every 10s and mints a fresh key
-- each time, so at 10,000 queued players this alone adds roughly 60,000
-- rows per minute, forever.
-- outbox -- published rows are never purged.
-- sessions -- expired and revoked rows are never purged.
--
-- The maintenance role performed lifecycle reconciliation only, so storage,
-- index size, vacuum pressure, backup size and recovery time all grew without
-- limit on a service meant to scale horizontally.
--
-- These indexes exist to make the deletion predicates cheap; without them each
-- purge pass would sequentially scan the very tables it is trying to bound.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idempotency_keys_created_at
ON idempotency_keys (created_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS outbox_published_at
ON outbox (published_at)
WHERE published_at IS NOT NULL;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS sessions_expires_at
ON sessions (expires_at);
server/migrations/0016_allocation_endpoints.sql
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-- The allocator learns the server's client-facing endpoint from the provider
-- allocation response, but nothing persisted it. Publishing the assignment
-- roster needs that endpoint, and a worker that crashed between allocating and
-- publishing had no way to recover it -- FindProviderAllocation would report
-- the allocation as already recorded while the endpoint was gone, leaving the
-- match permanently unable to reach ASSIGNMENT_READY.
ALTER TABLE allocations
ADD COLUMN endpoint TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '';
server/migrations/0017_probe_challenges.sql
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
-- Latency probes are nonce-bound: the backend issues a challenge, the client
-- echoes it back with its opaque Steam location, and the backend computes RTT
-- from its own send/receive timestamps rather than trusting a client-reported
-- number.
--
-- Nothing issued that nonce before, so ProbeProvider had no expected value to
-- compare against and /v1/probes/{region} was unreachable in every real
-- binary. With no probe, queue_tickets.predicted_rtt stayed empty, and
-- domain.validCandidate hard-requires a non-empty map -- so no client-created
-- ticket could ever be selected by the matcher.
--
-- The challenge is durable rather than per-process because any control-plane
-- replica may serve the follow-up submission.
CREATE TABLE probe_challenges (
player_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES identities(player_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
region TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (region IN ('EU', 'NA')),
nonce BYTEA NOT NULL,
issued_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (player_id, region)
);
-- Supports the expiry sweep; challenges are short-lived and single-use.
CREATE INDEX probe_challenges_issued_at ON probe_challenges (issued_at);
server/migrations/0018_tier_bands.sql
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-- Ranked tier thresholds were compiled into every API binary
-- (domain.DefaultTierPolicy), so retuning a band meant building and rolling a
-- new image. Tier boundaries are a live-ops knob: they get adjusted as the
-- rating distribution settles after launch, which is exactly when shipping a
-- binary is least attractive.
--
-- Bands stay backend-owned. Clients receive only the resulting tier label and
-- never these thresholds, per docs/MATCHMAKING.md §6.
CREATE TABLE tier_bands (
tier TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
min_rating DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL,
UNIQUE (min_rating)
);
-- Seeded with the exact launch policy the binaries currently hardcode, so this
-- migration changes durable state without changing behaviour. The loader falls
-- back to the compiled default when this table is empty, so an operator can
-- also truncate it to return to known-good defaults.
INSERT INTO tier_bands (tier, min_rating) VALUES
('BRONZE', 0),
('SILVER', 1200),
('GOLD', 1500),
('PLATINUM', 1800),
('DIAMOND', 2200);
server/migrations/down/0014_outbox_dead_letter.sql
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS outbox_unpublished_order;
CREATE INDEX outbox_unpublished_order
ON outbox (created_at, event_id)
WHERE published_at IS NULL;
ALTER TABLE outbox
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS delivery_attempts,
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS last_delivery_error,
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS dead_lettered_at;
server/migrations/down/0015_retention_indexes.sql
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idempotency_keys_created_at;
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS outbox_published_at;
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS sessions_expires_at;
server/migrations/down/0016_allocation_endpoints.sql
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
ALTER TABLE allocations
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS endpoint;
server/migrations/down/0017_probe_challenges.sql
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS probe_challenges;
server/migrations/down/0018_tier_bands.sql
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tier_bands;
server/security/test_fleet_manifests.py
+28 -4
View File
@@ -18,11 +18,19 @@ class FleetManifestTest(unittest.TestCase):
"protocol: UDP", "containerPort: 7777", "replicas: 2",
):
self.assertIn(label, fleet)
for hardening in ("runAsNonRoot: true", "automountServiceAccountToken: false", "readOnlyRootFilesystem: true", "allowPrivilegeEscalation: false"):
for hardening in (
"runAsNonRoot: true", "readOnlyRootFilesystem: true",
"allowPrivilegeEscalation: false", "fsGroup: 10001",
"name: HOME", "value: /run/cosmic-clash",
):
self.assertIn(hardening, fleet)
# Agones must assign its SDK service account so it can keep the token
# available to its injected sidecar while masking it from the game.
self.assertNotIn("serviceAccountName:", fleet)
self.assertNotIn("automountServiceAccountToken:", fleet)
for runtime in (
"ghcr.io/cosmic-clash/game-server@sha256:",
"--sdk-base-url=http://127.0.0.1:9357",
"--sdk-base-url=http://127.0.0.1:9358",
"--control-plane-url=http://control-plane.cosmic-clash.svc.cluster.local:8080",
"--protocol-version=1",
"/opt/cosmic-clash/CosmicClashServer.x86_64",
@@ -88,13 +96,29 @@ class FleetManifestTest(unittest.TestCase):
base = self.read("base/kustomization.yaml")
for field in ("kind: Service", "name: control-plane", "port: 8080", "targetPort: http"):
self.assertIn(field, service)
for field in ("name: game-server-allowed-egress", "app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server", "port: 8080"):
self.assertIn(field, network)
game_server_egress = network.split("name: game-server-allowed-egress", 1)[-1].split("---", 1)[0]
for field in ("app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server", "port: 8080", "port: 443"):
self.assertIn(field, game_server_egress)
self.assertIn("control-plane-service.yaml", base)
def test_kind_runner_is_explicitly_separate_from_production_roster_flow(self):
runner = (ROOT / "scripts/verify_kind_agones.sh").read_text()
self.assertIn("Agones lifecycle smoke", runner)
self.assertIn("gameservers.namespaces[0]=cosmic-clash", runner)
for service in (
"agones.allocator.service.serviceType=ClusterIP",
"agones.ping.http.serviceType=ClusterIP",
"agones.ping.udp.serviceType=ClusterIP",
):
self.assertIn(service, runner)
# The Fleet's readiness field is readyReplicas; waiting on `.status.ready`
# silently never matches and reads as "the Fleet never became ready".
self.assertIn("jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}'=2", runner)
self.assertNotIn("jsonpath='{.status.ready}'", runner)
# Build by default, or a local rerun verifies whatever was tagged last.
self.assertIn("KIND_REUSE_GAME_SERVER_IMAGE", runner)
self.assertIn("cosmic-clash.io/capacity-type=on-demand", runner)
self.assertIn("topology.kubernetes.io/zone=kind-smoke", runner)
self.assertIn("--control-plane-url=", runner)
self.assertIn("--allocated-mode", runner)
validator = (ROOT / "scripts/verify_agones_allocation_response.py").read_text()
server/security/test_kubernetes_policies.py
+96 -2
View File
@@ -10,10 +10,12 @@ class KubernetesPolicyTest(unittest.TestCase):
def read(self, name):
return (BASE / name).read_text()
def test_namespace_enforces_restricted_pod_security(self):
def test_namespace_allows_agones_host_ports_and_audits_restricted(self):
namespace = self.read("namespace.yaml")
for key in ("enforce", "audit", "warn"):
self.assertIn("pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged", namespace)
for key in ("audit", "warn"):
self.assertIn(f"pod-security.kubernetes.io/{key}: restricted", namespace)
self.assertIn("Agones' Dynamic port policy", namespace)
def test_workload_is_non_root_immutable_and_unprivileged(self):
deployment = self.read("control-plane-deployment.yaml")
@@ -160,6 +162,98 @@ class KubernetesPolicyTest(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn(port, maintenance)
self.assertNotIn("port: 8080", maintenance)
def test_every_required_workload_role_is_deployed(self):
# The base deployed a control-plane image nothing built, and built a
# matcher image nothing deployed -- so applying it produced a cluster
# where tickets could be created but never consumed. Assert the
# advertised topology is actually complete.
kustomization = self.read("kustomization.yaml")
rendered = "".join(
self.read(name.strip("- ").strip())
for name in kustomization.splitlines()
if name.strip().startswith("- ") and name.strip().endswith(".yaml")
)
for role in ("control-plane", "allocator", "maintenance", "matcher"):
self.assertIn(f"app.kubernetes.io/name: {role}", rendered, role)
self.assertIn("kind: Fleet", rendered)
# Casual and ranked must both be scheduled; one matcher process serves
# exactly one playlist.
self.assertIn("name: matcher-casual", rendered)
self.assertIn("name: matcher-ranked", rendered)
self.assertIn("--playlist=casual", rendered)
self.assertIn("--playlist=ranked", rendered)
# Ranked is strictly 3v3; AllocateAcceptedProposal rejects anything else.
self.assertIn("--size=6", rendered)
def test_every_referenced_image_maps_to_a_real_dockerfile_target(self):
dockerfile = (Path(__file__).parents[2] / "Dockerfile").read_text()
targets = set(re.findall(r"(?mi)^FROM\s+.*?\bAS\s+(\S+)\s*$", dockerfile))
# Guard the guard: if the target regex stops matching, every image
# below would "pass" vacuously.
self.assertIn("server", targets)
referenced = set()
for path in sorted(BASE.glob("*.yaml")):
for image in re.findall(r"image:\s*ghcr\.io/cosmic-clash/([\w.-]+)@", path.read_text()):
referenced.add(image)
self.assertTrue(referenced, "no images were found to check")
self.assertEqual(set(), referenced - targets, "manifests reference images this repo cannot build")
# testkit-api injects a fake login provider that accepts any ticket.
self.assertNotIn("testkit-api", referenced)
def test_game_traffic_and_workload_callbacks_are_permitted(self):
policies = self.read("network-policies.yaml")
# Public players reach the allocated server directly over UDP; the
# namespace-wide default deny blocked that entirely.
ingress = policies.split("name: game-server-allowed-ingress", 1)
self.assertEqual(len(ingress), 2, "game-server ingress policy is missing")
game_ingress = ingress[1]
self.assertIn("app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server", game_ingress)
self.assertIn("protocol: UDP", game_ingress)
self.assertIn("port: 7777", game_ingress)
# Game servers are control-plane clients: roster fetch, registration,
# connection receipts, shutdown and result submission. Their egress was
# allowed but the matching control-plane ingress was not.
control_plane = policies.split("name: control-plane-allowed-flows", 1)[-1].split("---", 1)[0]
self.assertIn("app.kubernetes.io/name: game-server", control_plane)
self.assertIn("app.kubernetes.io/name: edge-gateway", control_plane)
# The default deny must survive all of this.
self.assertIn("name: default-deny-ingress-egress", policies)
def test_matcher_network_policy_only_allows_its_datastores_and_dns(self):
policies = self.read("network-policies.yaml")
matcher = policies.split("name: matcher-allowed-egress", 1)[-1]
self.assertIn("app.kubernetes.io/name: matcher", matcher)
for port in ("port: 5432", "port: 6379", "port: 53"):
self.assertIn(port, matcher)
# The matcher never calls the control plane's API.
self.assertNotIn("port: 8080", matcher)
def test_steam_publisher_credentials_reach_only_the_control_plane(self):
# The adapter and flags existed but no manifest supplied them, so a
# deployed control plane would have kept sign-in disabled even once the
# App ID landed -- making issue #15 unblock nothing on arrival.
deployment = self.read("control-plane-deployment.yaml")
for required in (
"name: COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_PUBLISHER_KEY",
"name: COSMIC_CLASH_STEAM_APP_ID",
"name: cosmic-clash-steam",
"key: publisher-key",
"key: app-id",
):
self.assertIn(required, deployment)
# Optional until the App ID exists, so the Deployment still rolls out
# without the Secret and sign-in simply stays 503.
self.assertIn("optional: true", deployment)
# The publisher key is issued to us, never to a client. No other
# workload -- and above all no game server -- may mount it.
for name in sorted(BASE.glob("*.yaml")):
if name.name == "control-plane-deployment.yaml":
continue
self.assertNotIn("cosmic-clash-steam", name.read_text(), name.name)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
server/security/test_observability_manifests.py
+38 -5
View File
@@ -20,17 +20,50 @@ class ObservabilityManifestTest(unittest.TestCase):
result = self.run_checker()
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
def test_checker_rejects_wrong_namespace_and_broad_scrape(self):
# Every file the checker opens, in the order it opens them. Copying only a
# subset makes it die on a missing file before it reaches the assertion
# under test, so the mutation is never actually exercised.
FIXTURE = (
"kustomization.yaml",
"prometheus-service-monitor.yaml",
"prometheus-allocator-service-monitor.yaml",
"prometheus-rules.yaml",
)
def build_fixture(self, target, mutate=None):
for name in self.FIXTURE:
text = (ROOT / "deploy/observability" / name).read_text()
if mutate is not None and name == "prometheus-service-monitor.yaml":
text = mutate(text)
(target / name).write_text(text)
def test_unmutated_fixture_copy_passes(self):
# Guards the two mutation tests below: if this fails, their non-zero
# exit proves nothing, because the fixture itself is broken.
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
target = Path(directory)
for name in ("prometheus-service-monitor.yaml", "prometheus-rules.yaml"):
(target / name).write_text((ROOT / "deploy/observability" / name).read_text())
monitor = target / "prometheus-service-monitor.yaml"
monitor.write_text(monitor.read_text().replace("path: /metrics", "path: /").replace("- cosmic-clash", "- default"))
self.build_fixture(target)
result = self.run_checker(target)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
def test_checker_rejects_wrong_namespace(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
target = Path(directory)
# Widen the namespaceSelector only; metadata.namespace stays put so
# this isolates the scrape-scope check from the placement check.
self.build_fixture(target, lambda text: text.replace(" - cosmic-clash", " - default"))
result = self.run_checker(target)
self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode, 0)
self.assertIn("namespace", result.stderr)
def test_checker_rejects_broad_scrape_path(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
target = Path(directory)
self.build_fixture(target, lambda text: text.replace(" path: /metrics", " path: /"))
result = self.run_checker(target)
self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode, 0)
self.assertIn("path", result.stderr)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
server/steam/web_api.go
+185
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
// Package steam adapts Valve's publisher Web API to the control plane's
// SteamLoginProvider. It is the only place that talks to Valve, so the rest of
// the service stays testable without network access or a publisher key.
package steam
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// AuthenticateUserTicketURL is the publisher endpoint. Only the backend may
// call it: it requires the publisher key, which must never reach a client.
const AuthenticateUserTicketURL = "https://partner.steam-api.com/ISteamUserAuth/AuthenticateUserTicket/v1/"
// MaxTicketBytes bounds what will be forwarded to Valve. A web-API ticket is a
// few hundred hex characters; anything larger is abuse, not a ticket.
const MaxTicketBytes = 4096
var (
// ErrTicketRejected is returned for any ticket Valve does not accept, and
// for a ticket issued for another application. It deliberately does not
// distinguish those cases to the caller.
ErrTicketRejected = fmt.Errorf("steam ticket rejected")
// ErrUnavailable separates "Valve is down or misconfigured" from "this
// player's ticket is bad", so the API can answer 503 rather than telling a
// legitimate player their login failed.
ErrUnavailable = fmt.Errorf("steam authentication is unavailable")
)
// Identity is what a verified ticket proves. It is deliberately not
// domain.VerifiedIdentity: this package resolves a Steam ID, and mapping that
// onto a durable player ID is the caller's business.
type Identity struct {
SteamID string
OwnerSteamID string
VACBanned bool
PublisherBan bool
}
// WebAPIVerifier calls Valve's publisher API. Construct it only when a
// publisher key and App ID are configured; the control plane leaves its login
// provider unset otherwise, which surfaces as an explicit 503.
type WebAPIVerifier struct {
PublisherKey string
AppID uint64
HTTP *http.Client
// Endpoint overrides the Valve URL in tests. Production leaves it empty.
Endpoint string
// RejectBanned refuses a VAC- or publisher-banned account at login.
RejectBanned bool
}
func (v WebAPIVerifier) validate() error {
if v.PublisherKey == "" || v.AppID == 0 {
return ErrUnavailable
}
return nil
}
func (v WebAPIVerifier) endpoint() string {
if v.Endpoint != "" {
return v.Endpoint
}
return AuthenticateUserTicketURL
}
func (v WebAPIVerifier) httpClient() *http.Client {
if v.HTTP != nil {
return v.HTTP
}
return &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
}
// authenticateResponse is Valve's shape. Fields absent from a failure response
// stay zero, which the result check below rejects.
type authenticateResponse struct {
Response struct {
Params struct {
Result string `json:"result"`
SteamID string `json:"steamid"`
OwnerSteamID string `json:"ownersteamid"`
VACBanned bool `json:"vacbanned"`
PublisherBanned bool `json:"publisherbanned"`
} `json:"params"`
Error *struct {
ErrorCode int `json:"errorcode"`
ErrorDesc string `json:"errordesc"`
} `json:"error"`
} `json:"response"`
}
// Verify exchanges a client-supplied web-API ticket for a Steam identity.
//
// The ticket is single-use at Valve's end and the client never gets to choose
// the resulting Steam ID, which is the property that makes this the fix for
// slot reclaim being keyed on a display name.
func (v WebAPIVerifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, ticket string) (Identity, error) {
if err := v.validate(); err != nil {
return Identity{}, err
}
ticket = strings.TrimSpace(ticket)
if ticket == "" || len(ticket) > MaxTicketBytes || !isHex(ticket) {
// Rejected locally: a malformed ticket is never worth a round trip,
// and this bounds what an unauthenticated caller can make us forward.
return Identity{}, ErrTicketRejected
}
query := url.Values{}
query.Set("key", v.PublisherKey)
query.Set("appid", strconv.FormatUint(v.AppID, 10))
query.Set("ticket", ticket)
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, v.endpoint()+"?"+query.Encode(), nil)
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, ErrUnavailable
}
response, err := v.httpClient().Do(request)
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, ErrUnavailable
}
defer response.Body.Close()
// Bounded read: this is a third-party response and must not be able to
// exhaust memory.
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, ErrUnavailable
}
if response.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden || response.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized {
// Our publisher key is wrong or revoked. That is our problem, not the
// player's, so it must not read as a rejected ticket.
return Identity{}, ErrUnavailable
}
if response.StatusCode < 200 || response.StatusCode >= 300 {
return Identity{}, ErrUnavailable
}
var decoded authenticateResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &decoded); err != nil {
return Identity{}, ErrUnavailable
}
if decoded.Response.Error != nil || !strings.EqualFold(decoded.Response.Params.Result, "OK") {
return Identity{}, ErrTicketRejected
}
identity := Identity{
SteamID: decoded.Response.Params.SteamID,
OwnerSteamID: decoded.Response.Params.OwnerSteamID,
VACBanned: decoded.Response.Params.VACBanned,
PublisherBan: decoded.Response.Params.PublisherBanned,
}
if !isSteamID(identity.SteamID) {
return Identity{}, ErrTicketRejected
}
if identity.OwnerSteamID != "" && identity.OwnerSteamID != identity.SteamID {
// Family sharing: the account playing does not own the app. Treat it
// as a rejection rather than silently matchmaking a borrowed copy.
return Identity{}, ErrTicketRejected
}
if v.RejectBanned && (identity.VACBanned || identity.PublisherBan) {
return Identity{}, ErrTicketRejected
}
return identity, nil
}
func isHex(value string) bool {
for _, r := range value {
switch {
case r >= '0' && r <= '9', r >= 'a' && r <= 'f', r >= 'A' && r <= 'F':
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
func isSteamID(value string) bool {
if len(value) < 17 || len(value) > 20 {
return false
}
parsed, err := strconv.ParseUint(value, 10, 64)
return err == nil && parsed > 0
}
server/steam/web_api_test.go
+143
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
package steam
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
const validTicket = "140000008bc0a1f45fd4b4b7e0af2c4a01001001"
func stubValve(t *testing.T, status int, body string, inspect func(*http.Request)) WebAPIVerifier {
t.Helper()
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if inspect != nil {
inspect(r)
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(body))
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
return WebAPIVerifier{PublisherKey: "publisher-key", AppID: 480, Endpoint: server.URL, HTTP: server.Client()}
}
func TestVerifyReturnsIdentityForAnAcceptedTicket(t *testing.T) {
var seen *http.Request
verifier := stubValve(t, http.StatusOK,
`{"response":{"params":{"result":"OK","steamid":"76561198000000001","ownersteamid":"76561198000000001","vacbanned":false,"publisherbanned":false}}}`,
func(r *http.Request) { seen = r })
identity, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
}
if identity.SteamID != "76561198000000001" {
t.Fatalf("identity = %+v", identity)
}
// The publisher key must be sent to Valve and nowhere else; assert it is
// carried in the request rather than, say, logged or returned.
if seen.URL.Query().Get("key") != "publisher-key" || seen.URL.Query().Get("appid") != "480" {
t.Fatalf("request query = %s", seen.URL.RawQuery)
}
if seen.URL.Query().Get("ticket") != validTicket {
t.Fatalf("ticket was not forwarded verbatim: %s", seen.URL.Query().Get("ticket"))
}
}
func TestVerifyRejectsTicketsValveDoesNotAccept(t *testing.T) {
for name, body := range map[string]string{
"explicit failure": `{"response":{"params":{"result":"Failure","steamid":"76561198000000001"}}}`,
"error object": `{"response":{"error":{"errorcode":101,"errordesc":"Invalid ticket"}}}`,
"empty response": `{"response":{}}`,
"no steam id": `{"response":{"params":{"result":"OK"}}}`,
"bogus steam id": `{"response":{"params":{"result":"OK","steamid":"not-a-steam-id"}}}`,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
verifier := stubValve(t, http.StatusOK, body, nil)
if _, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); !errors.Is(err, ErrTicketRejected) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrTicketRejected", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestVerifyRejectsFamilySharedAndBannedAccounts(t *testing.T) {
shared := stubValve(t, http.StatusOK,
`{"response":{"params":{"result":"OK","steamid":"76561198000000002","ownersteamid":"76561198000000001"}}}`, nil)
if _, err := shared.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); !errors.Is(err, ErrTicketRejected) {
t.Fatalf("family-shared copy accepted: %v", err)
}
banned := stubValve(t, http.StatusOK,
`{"response":{"params":{"result":"OK","steamid":"76561198000000001","ownersteamid":"76561198000000001","vacbanned":true}}}`, nil)
banned.RejectBanned = true
if _, err := banned.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); !errors.Is(err, ErrTicketRejected) {
t.Fatalf("VAC-banned account accepted: %v", err)
}
banned.RejectBanned = false
if _, err := banned.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ban enforcement should be configurable: %v", err)
}
}
// A Valve outage or a revoked publisher key must not read as "this player's
// ticket is bad", or a legitimate player is told to fix an account that is
// fine while the real fault goes unnoticed.
func TestVerifyDistinguishesOurFaultsFromBadTickets(t *testing.T) {
for name, status := range map[string]int{
"revoked publisher key": http.StatusForbidden,
"unauthorized": http.StatusUnauthorized,
"valve error": http.StatusInternalServerError,
"valve gateway": http.StatusBadGateway,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
verifier := stubValve(t, status, `{}`, nil)
if _, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); !errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrUnavailable", err)
}
})
}
t.Run("malformed response", func(t *testing.T) {
verifier := stubValve(t, http.StatusOK, `not json`, nil)
if _, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); !errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrUnavailable", err)
}
})
}
func TestVerifyRefusesMalformedTicketsWithoutCallingValve(t *testing.T) {
called := false
verifier := stubValve(t, http.StatusOK, `{}`, func(*http.Request) { called = true })
for name, ticket := range map[string]string{
"empty": "",
"whitespace": " ",
"not hex": "zzzz-not-a-ticket",
"oversized": strings.Repeat("a", MaxTicketBytes+1),
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), ticket); !errors.Is(err, ErrTicketRejected) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrTicketRejected", err)
}
})
}
if called {
t.Fatal("a malformed ticket was forwarded to Valve")
}
}
func TestVerifyIsUnavailableWithoutCredentials(t *testing.T) {
for name, verifier := range map[string]WebAPIVerifier{
"no key": {AppID: 480},
"no app id": {PublisherKey: "publisher-key"},
"neither": {},
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), validTicket); !errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrUnavailable", err)
}
})
}
}
server/store/allocation_match_sql.go
+3 -10
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
@@ -156,10 +155,7 @@ func AdvanceServerRegistration(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, binding domain.W
if err := rows.Close(); err != nil {
return err
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"event": "state_changed", "revision": revision, "resource_id": binding.MatchID,
"occurred_at": now, "state": string(to), "match_id": binding.MatchID, "player_ids": playerIDs,
})
payload, err := MarshalStateChangedEnvelope(binding.MatchID, revision, string(to), now, playerIDs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -177,7 +173,7 @@ func FindProviderAllocation(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, request domain.Allo
}
var allocation domain.Allocation
var digest []byte
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, SelectAllocationSQL, request.AllocationID).Scan(&allocation.AllocationID, &allocation.MatchID, &allocation.ServerID, &allocation.Region, &allocation.Build, &allocation.Protocol, &allocation.ArenaPath, &allocation.Transport, &allocation.AllocatedAt, &digest)
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, SelectAllocationSQL, request.AllocationID).Scan(&allocation.AllocationID, &allocation.MatchID, &allocation.ServerID, &allocation.Region, &allocation.Build, &allocation.Protocol, &allocation.ArenaPath, &allocation.Transport, &allocation.AllocatedAt, &digest, &allocation.Endpoint)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return domain.Allocation{}, false, nil
}
@@ -279,10 +275,7 @@ func BindAllocatedMatch(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, allocation domain.Alloc
if err := rows.Close(); err != nil {
return err
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"event": "state_changed", "revision": revision, "resource_id": allocation.MatchID,
"occurred_at": allocation.AllocatedAt, "state": string(domain.Allocating), "match_id": allocation.MatchID, "player_ids": playerIDs,
})
payload, err := MarshalStateChangedEnvelope(allocation.MatchID, revision, string(domain.Allocating), allocation.AllocatedAt, playerIDs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
server/store/allocator_sql.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ WHERE server_id = (
RETURNING server_id`
const InsertAllocationSQL = `INSERT INTO allocations
(allocation_id, match_id, server_id, region, build, protocol_version, arena_path, transport, request_digest, state, allocated_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, 'ALLOCATED', $10)`
(allocation_id, match_id, server_id, region, build, protocol_version, arena_path, transport, request_digest, state, allocated_at, endpoint)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, 'ALLOCATED', $10, $11)`
const SelectAllocationSQL = `SELECT allocation_id, match_id, server_id, region, build,
protocol_version, arena_path, transport, allocated_at, request_digest
protocol_version, arena_path, transport, allocated_at, request_digest, endpoint
FROM allocations WHERE allocation_id = $1`
const ProviderServerClaimSQL = `UPDATE game_servers SET state = 'ALLOCATED', updated_at = $6
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func ClaimAllocation(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, request domain.AllocationR
err := RunSerializable(ctx, db, DefaultSerializableAttempts, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
var prior domain.Allocation
var priorDigest []byte
err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, SelectAllocationSQL, request.AllocationID).Scan(&prior.AllocationID, &prior.MatchID, &prior.ServerID, &prior.Region, &prior.Build, &prior.Protocol, &prior.ArenaPath, &prior.Transport, &prior.AllocatedAt, &priorDigest)
err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, SelectAllocationSQL, request.AllocationID).Scan(&prior.AllocationID, &prior.MatchID, &prior.ServerID, &prior.Region, &prior.Build, &prior.Protocol, &prior.ArenaPath, &prior.Transport, &prior.AllocatedAt, &priorDigest, &prior.Endpoint)
if err == nil {
if !bytes.Equal(priorDigest, digest[:]) {
return domain.ErrConflict
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func ClaimAllocation(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, request domain.AllocationR
return err
}
allocation = domain.Allocation{AllocationID: request.AllocationID, MatchID: request.MatchID, ServerID: serverID, Region: request.Region, Build: request.Build, Protocol: request.Protocol, ArenaPath: request.ArenaPath, Transport: request.Transport, State: domain.ServerAllocated, AllocatedAt: now}
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, InsertAllocationSQL, request.AllocationID, request.MatchID, serverID, request.Region, request.Build, request.Protocol, request.ArenaPath, request.Transport, digest[:], now)
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, InsertAllocationSQL, request.AllocationID, request.MatchID, serverID, request.Region, request.Build, request.Protocol, request.ArenaPath, request.Transport, digest[:], now, "")
return err
})
return allocation, err
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ func RecordProviderAllocation(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, allocation domain
err := RunSerializable(ctx, db, DefaultSerializableAttempts, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
var prior domain.Allocation
var priorDigest []byte
err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, SelectAllocationSQL, allocation.AllocationID).Scan(&prior.AllocationID, &prior.MatchID, &prior.ServerID, &prior.Region, &prior.Build, &prior.Protocol, &prior.ArenaPath, &prior.Transport, &prior.AllocatedAt, &priorDigest)
err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, SelectAllocationSQL, allocation.AllocationID).Scan(&prior.AllocationID, &prior.MatchID, &prior.ServerID, &prior.Region, &prior.Build, &prior.Protocol, &prior.ArenaPath, &prior.Transport, &prior.AllocatedAt, &priorDigest, &prior.Endpoint)
if err == nil {
if !bytes.Equal(priorDigest, digest[:]) || prior.ServerID != allocation.ServerID {
return domain.ErrConflict
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func RecordProviderAllocation(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, allocation domain
}
recorded = allocation
recorded.AllocatedAt = now
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, InsertAllocationSQL, allocation.AllocationID, allocation.MatchID, serverID, allocation.Region, allocation.Build, allocation.Protocol, allocation.ArenaPath, allocation.Transport, digest[:], now)
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, InsertAllocationSQL, allocation.AllocationID, allocation.MatchID, serverID, allocation.Region, allocation.Build, allocation.Protocol, allocation.ArenaPath, allocation.Transport, digest[:], now, allocation.Endpoint)
return err
})
return recorded, err
server/store/assignment_sql.go
+44
View File
@@ -329,3 +329,47 @@ func GetAssignmentRoster(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, matchID, serverID stri
}
return roster, nil
}
// LoadAssignmentParticipants reads the authoritative roster for an allocated
// match. It reuses AssignmentExpectedRosterSQL -- the same query
// SaveVerifiedAssignmentRoster re-validates against -- so the allocator cannot
// build a roster the persistence boundary would then reject for disagreeing
// with the durable participants.
func LoadAssignmentParticipants(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, allocation domain.Allocation) ([]domain.AssignmentParticipant, error) {
if db == nil || allocation.MatchID == "" || allocation.AllocationID == "" || allocation.ServerID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid assignment participant arguments")
}
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, AssignmentExpectedRosterSQL,
allocation.MatchID, allocation.AllocationID, allocation.ServerID,
allocation.Region, allocation.Protocol, allocation.Build, allocation.Transport)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var participants []domain.AssignmentParticipant
for rows.Next() {
var participant domain.AssignmentParticipant
if err := rows.Scan(&participant.PlayerID, &participant.SteamID, &participant.Slot, &participant.Team); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if participant.PlayerID == "" || participant.SteamID == "" || participant.Slot < 0 || participant.Slot > 5 || participant.Team < 0 || participant.Team > 1 || participant.Slot/3 != participant.Team {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("assignment participant %q has an invalid slot/team", participant.PlayerID)
}
participants = append(participants, participant)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(participants) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("allocated match %s has no durable participants", allocation.MatchID)
}
return participants, nil
}
// AssignmentRosters adapts the participant loader to the allocator's
// AssignmentRosterSource interface.
type AssignmentRosters struct{ DB *sql.DB }
func (a AssignmentRosters) LoadAssignmentParticipants(ctx context.Context, allocation domain.Allocation) ([]domain.AssignmentParticipant, error) {
return LoadAssignmentParticipants(ctx, a.DB, allocation)
}
server/store/candidate_projection_test.go
+14 -14
View File
@@ -19,16 +19,16 @@ func TestCandidateProjectionRepairsPartialRedisStateFromDurableSource(t *testing
client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: mini.Addr()})
defer client.Close()
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: "repair-ticket", PlayerID: "repair-player", EnqueuedAt: now}
candidate := domain.Candidate{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "repair-ticket", PlayerID: "repair-player", EnqueuedAt: now}
index := RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "repair", TTL: time.Minute}
_, orderKey := index.keys()
_, orderKey := index.keys(domain.Casual)
if err := client.ZAdd(context.Background(), orderKey, redis.Z{Score: float64(now.UnixNano()), Member: candidate.TicketID}).Err(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
projection := CandidateProjection{Index: index, Source: func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
projection := CandidateProjection{Index: index, Source: func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
return []domain.Candidate{candidate}, nil
}}
got, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), now)
got, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, now, 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ func TestCandidateProjectionRepairsPartialRedisStateFromDurableSource(t *testing
func TestCandidateProjectionDoesNotReturnCacheWhenRepairSourceFails(t *testing.T) {
index := RedisCandidateIndex{TTL: time.Minute}
projection := CandidateProjection{Index: index, Source: func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
projection := CandidateProjection{Index: index, Source: func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
return nil, context.DeadlineExceeded
}}
if _, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), time.Unix(1000, 0)); err == nil {
if _, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, time.Unix(1000, 0), 1000); err == nil {
t.Fatal("cache projection succeeded without a usable Redis/index source")
}
}
@@ -67,16 +67,16 @@ func TestCandidateProjectionFallsBackToSourceWhenRedisIsEntirelyUnreachable(t *t
mini.Close() // Redis is now entirely unreachable, not merely empty or stale.
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: "down-ticket", PlayerID: "down-player", EnqueuedAt: now}
candidate := domain.Candidate{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "down-ticket", PlayerID: "down-player", EnqueuedAt: now}
sourceCalls := 0
projection := CandidateProjection{
Index: RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "down", TTL: time.Minute},
Source: func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
Source: func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
sourceCalls++
return []domain.Candidate{candidate}, nil
},
}
got, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), now)
got, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, now, 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Snapshot failed while Redis was down, even though Source (PostgreSQL) was healthy: %v", err)
}
@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ func TestCandidateProjectionStillFailsWhenBothRedisAndSourceAreDown(t *testing.T
projection := CandidateProjection{
Index: RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "down", TTL: time.Minute},
Source: func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
Source: func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
return nil, context.DeadlineExceeded
},
}
if _, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), time.Unix(1000, 0)); err == nil {
if _, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, time.Unix(1000, 0), 1000); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Snapshot succeeded with both Redis and the durable source unavailable")
}
}
@@ -120,14 +120,14 @@ func TestCandidateProjectionRepairsEmptyIndexFromDurableSource(t *testing.T) {
client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: mini.Addr()})
defer client.Close()
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: "miss-ticket", PlayerID: "miss-player", EnqueuedAt: now}
candidate := domain.Candidate{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "miss-ticket", PlayerID: "miss-player", EnqueuedAt: now}
projection := CandidateProjection{
Index: RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "miss", TTL: time.Minute},
Source: func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
Source: func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
return []domain.Candidate{candidate}, nil
},
}
got, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), now)
got, err := projection.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, now, 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
server/store/event_fanout.go
+93
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
package store
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)
// ControlPlaneEventChannel is the PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY channel used to fan
// committed outbox events out to every control-plane replica.
//
// WebSocket subscribers live in each process's in-memory hub, but the outbox
// is global: every replica raced to read the same unpublished rows, and the
// winner set the single global published_at even when it held no matching
// subscriber. A client connected to any other replica then never received the
// event, and delivery degraded as replicas were added. Notifying through a
// shared transport means the replica that owns the connection publishes it,
// regardless of which replica drained the row.
const ControlPlaneEventChannel = "cosmic_clash_control_plane_events"
// MaxNotifyPayloadBytes is PostgreSQL's hard limit for a NOTIFY payload.
// Control-plane events are a handful of short fields, so this is a guard
// against a future field making delivery fail at runtime, not a live concern.
const MaxNotifyPayloadBytes = 7999
// NotifyControlPlaneEvent broadcasts one already-encoded event to every
// listening replica. It is called after the event's durable commit, so a lost
// notification degrades to the REST recovery path rather than losing state.
func NotifyControlPlaneEvent(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, payload []byte) error {
if db == nil || len(payload) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid control-plane event notification")
}
if len(payload) > MaxNotifyPayloadBytes {
return fmt.Errorf("control-plane event payload is %d bytes, over the %d byte NOTIFY limit", len(payload), MaxNotifyPayloadBytes)
}
_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `SELECT pg_notify($1, $2)`, ControlPlaneEventChannel, string(payload))
return err
}
// ListenControlPlaneEvents holds a dedicated connection and delivers every
// notification to handle until ctx is cancelled. It reconnects on failure:
// losing the listener would silently downgrade this replica's subscribers to
// REST-only recovery, which is exactly the degradation being fixed.
//
// A dedicated pgx connection is required because LISTEN is session state and
// database/sql may hand any pooled connection to any caller.
func ListenControlPlaneEvents(ctx context.Context, dsn string, handle func([]byte), onError func(error)) {
if dsn == "" || handle == nil {
return
}
backoff := time.Second
for ctx.Err() == nil {
err := listenOnce(ctx, dsn, handle)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
if err != nil && onError != nil {
onError(err)
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-time.After(backoff):
}
if backoff < 30*time.Second {
backoff *= 2
}
}
}
func listenOnce(ctx context.Context, dsn string, handle func([]byte)) error {
conn, err := pgx.Connect(ctx, dsn)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer conn.Close(context.Background())
if _, err := conn.Exec(ctx, `LISTEN `+pgx.Identifier{ControlPlaneEventChannel}.Sanitize()); err != nil {
return err
}
for {
notification, err := conn.WaitForNotification(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if notification == nil || notification.Payload == "" {
continue
}
handle([]byte(notification.Payload))
}
}
server/store/initial_connect_sql.go
+15 -1
View File
@@ -156,7 +156,21 @@ func ApplyInitialConnectPlan(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, matchID, idempoten
if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, initialConnectMatchUpdateSQL, matchID, string(plan.MatchState)).Scan(&finalRevision); err != nil {
return err
}
payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"match_id": matchID, "state": plan.MatchState, "action": plan.Action})
// Every participant is told, not just the connected ones: a no-show
// needs to learn their ticket was marked NO_SHOW and a penalty applied.
// Publishing to a player with no live subscriber is a no-op.
recipients := make([]string, 0, len(participants))
for _, participant := range participants {
recipients = append(recipients, participant.PlayerID)
}
payload, err := MarshalOutboxEnvelope(OutboxEnvelope{
Event: "state_changed", ResourceID: matchID, Revision: finalRevision,
OccurredAt: now, State: string(plan.MatchState), MatchID: matchID,
PlayerIDs: recipients, Extra: map[string]any{"action": plan.Action},
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, initialConnectOutboxSQL, "initial-connect:"+matchID+fmt.Sprintf(":%d", finalRevision), matchID, finalRevision, payload); err != nil {
return err
}
server/store/live_abandonment_sql.go
+4 -5
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package store
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
@@ -160,10 +159,10 @@ func ApplyLiveAbandonments(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, matchID string, now
if len(targets) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: live match has no active event targets", domain.ErrConflict)
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"event": "state_changed", "revision": revision, "resource_id": matchID,
"occurred_at": now, "state": domain.Live, "match_id": matchID,
"player_ids": targets, "abandoned_player_ids": abandonmentIDs(planned),
payload, err := MarshalOutboxEnvelope(OutboxEnvelope{
Event: "state_changed", ResourceID: matchID, Revision: int64(revision),
OccurredAt: now, State: string(domain.Live), MatchID: matchID, PlayerIDs: targets,
Extra: map[string]any{"abandoned_player_ids": abandonmentIDs(planned)},
})
if err != nil {
return err
server/store/outbox.go
+61 -4
View File
@@ -25,28 +25,28 @@ type OutboxEvent struct {
const OutboxUnpublishedSelectSQL = `SELECT event_id, aggregate_type, aggregate_id, revision,
event_type, payload, created_at, published_at
FROM outbox
WHERE published_at IS NULL
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL
ORDER BY created_at, event_id
LIMIT $1`
const OutboxUnpublishedProposalSelectSQL = `SELECT event_id, aggregate_type, aggregate_id, revision,
event_type, payload, created_at, published_at
FROM outbox
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND event_type = 'proposal_changed'
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL AND event_type = 'proposal_changed'
ORDER BY created_at, event_id
LIMIT $1`
const OutboxUnpublishedResultSelectSQL = `SELECT event_id, aggregate_type, aggregate_id, revision,
event_type, payload, created_at, published_at
FROM outbox
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND event_type = 'match_completed'
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL AND event_type = 'match_completed'
ORDER BY created_at, event_id
LIMIT $1`
const OutboxUnpublishedStateSelectSQL = `SELECT event_id, aggregate_type, aggregate_id, revision,
event_type, payload, created_at, published_at
FROM outbox
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND event_type = 'state_changed'
WHERE published_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL AND event_type = 'state_changed'
ORDER BY created_at, event_id
LIMIT $1`
@@ -59,8 +59,65 @@ const OutboxMarkPublishedSQL = `UPDATE outbox
SET published_at = $2
WHERE event_id = $1 AND published_at IS NULL`
// MaxOutboxDeliveryAttempts bounds how long one undeliverable row may hold up
// its event type. It must exceed any plausible transient outage of the local
// fan-out adapter, since a healthy event is retried through the same counter.
const MaxOutboxDeliveryAttempts = 20
// OutboxRecordFailureSQL increments the attempt counter and dead-letters the
// row once it is exhausted, in one statement so a crash between the two cannot
// leave a row that is retried forever.
const OutboxRecordFailureSQL = `UPDATE outbox
SET delivery_attempts = delivery_attempts + 1,
last_delivery_error = $2,
dead_lettered_at = CASE WHEN delivery_attempts + 1 >= $3 THEN $4 ELSE dead_lettered_at END
WHERE event_id = $1 AND published_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL
RETURNING dead_lettered_at IS NOT NULL`
const OutboxDeadLetteredCountSQL = `SELECT count(*) FROM outbox WHERE dead_lettered_at IS NOT NULL`
var ErrOutboxEventNotFound = fmt.Errorf("outbox event not found or already published")
// RecordOutboxDeliveryFailure notes one failed delivery attempt and reports
// whether the row was dead-lettered as a result. Callers should keep going to
// the next event: the whole point is that one poison row must not stall the
// others.
func RecordOutboxDeliveryFailure(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, eventID string, cause error, now time.Time) (bool, error) {
if db == nil || eventID == "" || now.IsZero() {
return false, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox failure arguments")
}
message := ""
if cause != nil {
message = cause.Error()
}
if len(message) > 500 {
message = message[:500]
}
var deadLettered bool
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, OutboxRecordFailureSQL, eventID, message, MaxOutboxDeliveryAttempts, now).Scan(&deadLettered)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
// Published or already dead-lettered by another replica; nothing owed.
return false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return deadLettered, nil
}
// CountDeadLetteredOutboxEvents backs the deletion-lag/poison-row metric. A
// non-zero value means at least one lifecycle event was never delivered.
func CountDeadLetteredOutboxEvents(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) (int64, error) {
if db == nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox count arguments")
}
var count int64
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, OutboxDeadLetteredCountSQL).Scan(&count); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return count, nil
}
type OutboxDelivery func(context.Context, OutboxEvent) error
// OutboxDispatcher is the durable-to-transient bridge. Read and Ack are
server/store/outbox_envelope.go
+91
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
package store
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
)
// OutboxEnvelope is the payload shape the api package's outbox dispatchers
// decode. Every lifecycle writer used to inline its own map literal, and one of
// them (ApplyInitialConnectPlan) omitted event/resource_id/occurred_at/
// player_ids entirely. Because delivery rejects a malformed row and the
// dispatcher reads oldest-first, that single row blocked every later
// state_changed event indefinitely. Constructing envelopes through one
// validating builder makes that failure impossible to reintroduce: a writer
// that forgets a required field now fails its own transaction instead of
// silently poisoning the queue.
type OutboxEnvelope struct {
Event string
ResourceID string
// Revision is int64 to match the BIGINT column and, more importantly, so
// the -1 "nothing matched" sentinel some CTEs return surfaces as an error
// here instead of wrapping to a huge uint64 in the payload.
Revision int64
OccurredAt time.Time
State string
// MatchID is omitted when empty, matching the proposal_changed shape which
// carries no match.
MatchID string
// PlayerIDs is the authoritative recipient list. Delivery rejects an empty
// one, so a writer must resolve participants before building the envelope.
PlayerIDs []string
// Extra carries event-specific keys (for example abandoned_player_ids). It
// may not overwrite a reserved key.
Extra map[string]any
}
var reservedEnvelopeKeys = map[string]struct{}{
"event": {}, "resource_id": {}, "revision": {}, "occurred_at": {},
"state": {}, "match_id": {}, "player_ids": {},
}
// MarshalOutboxEnvelope validates and encodes one envelope. The checks mirror
// exactly what api.deliverStateOutboxEvent and api.deliverProposalOutboxEvent
// require, so anything this accepts is deliverable.
func MarshalOutboxEnvelope(envelope OutboxEnvelope) ([]byte, error) {
if envelope.Event == "" || envelope.ResourceID == "" || envelope.State == "" || envelope.OccurredAt.IsZero() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox envelope: missing event, resource, state or timestamp")
}
if envelope.Revision < 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox envelope: negative revision for %s %s", envelope.Event, envelope.ResourceID)
}
if len(envelope.PlayerIDs) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox envelope: no recipients for %s %s", envelope.Event, envelope.ResourceID)
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(envelope.PlayerIDs))
for _, playerID := range envelope.PlayerIDs {
if playerID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox envelope: empty participant")
}
if _, exists := seen[playerID]; exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox envelope: duplicate participant %s", playerID)
}
seen[playerID] = struct{}{}
}
payload := map[string]any{
"event": envelope.Event, "resource_id": envelope.ResourceID,
"revision": envelope.Revision, "occurred_at": envelope.OccurredAt,
"state": envelope.State, "player_ids": envelope.PlayerIDs,
}
if envelope.MatchID != "" {
payload["match_id"] = envelope.MatchID
}
for key, value := range envelope.Extra {
if _, reserved := reservedEnvelopeKeys[key]; reserved {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid outbox envelope: %q is reserved", key)
}
payload[key] = value
}
return json.Marshal(payload)
}
// MarshalStateChangedEnvelope is the common case: a match lifecycle transition
// fanned out to that match's participants. The resource and match are the same
// aggregate, which is what deliverStateOutboxEvent asserts.
func MarshalStateChangedEnvelope(matchID string, revision int64, state string, occurredAt time.Time, playerIDs []string) ([]byte, error) {
return MarshalOutboxEnvelope(OutboxEnvelope{
Event: "state_changed", ResourceID: matchID, Revision: revision,
OccurredAt: occurredAt, State: state, MatchID: matchID, PlayerIDs: playerIDs,
})
}
server/store/outbox_envelope_test.go
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
package store
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestMarshalStateChangedEnvelopeProducesDeliverableShape(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 9, 5, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
payload, err := MarshalStateChangedEnvelope("match-1", 7, "LIVE", now, []string{"player-a", "player-b"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
// Decode with exactly the struct api.deliverStateOutboxEvent uses, then
// apply exactly its acceptance predicate. This is the regression guard for
// the initial-connect payload that omitted every one of these keys.
var envelope struct {
Event string `json:"event"`
Revision uint64 `json:"revision"`
ResourceID string `json:"resource_id"`
OccurredAt time.Time `json:"occurred_at"`
State string `json:"state"`
MatchID string `json:"match_id"`
PlayerIDs []string `json:"player_ids"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &envelope); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if envelope.Event != "state_changed" || envelope.ResourceID != "match-1" || envelope.Revision != 7 ||
envelope.State == "" || len(envelope.PlayerIDs) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("envelope would be rejected by the dispatcher: %+v", envelope)
}
if envelope.MatchID != "match-1" || !envelope.OccurredAt.Equal(now) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected envelope: %+v", envelope)
}
}
func TestMarshalOutboxEnvelopeRejectsUndeliverablePayloads(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 9, 5, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
valid := OutboxEnvelope{
Event: "state_changed", ResourceID: "match-1", Revision: 1,
OccurredAt: now, State: "LIVE", MatchID: "match-1", PlayerIDs: []string{"player-a"},
}
if _, err := MarshalOutboxEnvelope(valid); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("baseline envelope must be valid: %v", err)
}
for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*OutboxEnvelope){
"no event": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.Event = "" },
"no resource": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.ResourceID = "" },
"no state": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.State = "" },
"no timestamp": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.OccurredAt = time.Time{} },
"no recipients": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.PlayerIDs = nil },
"empty recipient": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.PlayerIDs = []string{"player-a", ""} },
"duplicate recipient": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.PlayerIDs = []string{"player-a", "player-a"} },
// -1 is the "nothing matched" sentinel several CTEs return. Untyped as
// uint64 it would become 18446744073709551615 in the payload.
"sentinel revision": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.Revision = -1 },
"reserved extra": func(e *OutboxEnvelope) { e.Extra = map[string]any{"state": "CANCELLED"} },
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
envelope := valid
mutate(&envelope)
if _, err := MarshalOutboxEnvelope(envelope); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected %s to be rejected at construction", name)
}
})
}
}
func TestMarshalOutboxEnvelopeOmitsMatchIDForProposals(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 9, 5, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
payload, err := MarshalOutboxEnvelope(OutboxEnvelope{
Event: "proposal_changed", ResourceID: "proposal-1", Revision: 0,
OccurredAt: now, State: "OPEN", PlayerIDs: []string{"player-a"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
var decoded map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &decoded); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if _, present := decoded["match_id"]; present {
t.Fatalf("proposal envelope must not carry a match_id: %s", payload)
}
}
server/store/postgres_integration_test.go
+760 -3
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ func openIntegrationPostgres(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
func applyIntegrationMigrations(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB) {
t.Helper()
if _, err := db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS schema_migrations, allocation_quotas, assignments, audit_events, outbox, result_receipts, ranked_season_rollovers, penalties, seasons, ratings, match_participants, matches, proposal_participants, proposals, allocations, game_servers, queue_tickets, idempotency_keys, sessions, identities CASCADE`); err != nil {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE; CREATE SCHEMA public`); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reset PostgreSQL schema: %v", err)
}
if err := migrations.Apply(context.Background(), db, filepath.Join("..", "migrations")); err != nil {
@@ -1792,8 +1793,13 @@ func TestPostgreSQLMigrationsRollBackAndReapplyCleanly(t *testing.T) {
// Roll back every migration one at a time, in reverse, checking each
// down file actually undoes what its forward file created — not just
// that Rollback returns nil.
if err := migrations.Rollback(context.Background(), db, dir, 7); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rollback 0013 through 0007: %v", err)
// Derived, not hardcoded: every added migration shifts this count, and a
// stale literal silently makes the fixed-count rollbacks below target the
// wrong files (the failure then surfaces as a confusing "0006 rollback did
// not drop matches.allocation_id").
aboveMigration0006 := countMigrationsAbove(t, dir, 6)
if err := migrations.Rollback(context.Background(), db, dir, aboveMigration0006); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rollback everything above 0006: %v", err)
}
var hasInitialConnectReadyColumn bool
if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) > 0 FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name = 'matches' AND column_name = 'initial_connect_ready_at'`).Scan(&hasInitialConnectReadyColumn); err != nil {
@@ -1845,3 +1851,754 @@ func TestPostgreSQLMigrationsRollBackAndReapplyCleanly(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("reapply after rollback did not recreate the schema")
}
}
// Ranked matchmaking reads Candidate.Rating for tolerance, selection scoring
// and team partitioning. The candidate projection did not join the ratings
// table and its scan never set the field, so every PostgreSQL-sourced ranked
// candidate arrived with Go's zero value and the matcher treated a 900-rated
// player as identical to a 2100-rated one. Unit tests missed this because they
// construct candidates with ratings already populated.
func TestPostgreSQLQueuedCandidatesCarryAuthoritativeRatings(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
ctx := context.Background()
// "rated-low" and "rated-high" are deliberately far apart; "unrated" has no
// ratings row at all and must fall back to the new-profile default.
seeded := map[string]float64{"rated-low": 900, "rated-high": 2100}
for _, playerID := range []string{"rated-low", "rated-high", "unrated"} {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, playerID, "steam-"+playerID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rating, ok := seeded[playerID]; ok {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO ratings (player_id, rating) VALUES ($1, $2)`, playerID, rating); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
spec := domain.QueueSpec{Playlist: domain.Ranked, ClientBuild: "rating-build", ProtocolVersion: 1}
ticket, err := CreateQueueTicket(ctx, db, "ticket-"+playerID, playerID, "rating-create-"+playerID+"-01", spec, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create queue ticket for %s: %v", playerID, err)
}
// The Redis projection is seeded from this candidate rather than from
// the query below, so it must carry the same rating or the two
// projections disagree about who is comparable to whom.
want := domain.GlickoInitialRating
if rating, ok := seeded[playerID]; ok {
want = rating
}
if ticket.Candidate.Rating != want {
t.Fatalf("%s enqueue candidate rating = %v, want %v", playerID, ticket.Candidate.Rating, want)
}
}
candidates, err := ListQueuedCandidates(ctx, db, domain.Ranked, now, 100)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("list queued candidates: %v", err)
}
if len(candidates) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 candidates, got %d", len(candidates))
}
got := make(map[string]float64, len(candidates))
for _, candidate := range candidates {
got[candidate.PlayerID] = candidate.Rating
}
for playerID, want := range map[string]float64{
"rated-low": 900, "rated-high": 2100, "unrated": domain.GlickoInitialRating,
} {
if got[playerID] != want {
t.Fatalf("%s durable candidate rating = %v, want %v", playerID, got[playerID], want)
}
}
// The whole point of loading the rating is that the matcher can tell these
// players apart. Assert the spread survives into team partitioning rather
// than only that the field is non-zero.
if got["rated-high"]-got["rated-low"] != 1200 {
t.Fatalf("rating spread collapsed: %v", got)
}
}
// banned_until and ban_reason existed in the schema from day one but no
// production query ever read them: the only ban check was an in-memory map on
// domain.TicketVerifier used by domain tests. A banned identity therefore kept
// working through every already-issued session until expiry, and could obtain
// new ones, defeating the server-authoritative anti-abuse boundary.
func TestPostgreSQLIdentityBanIsEnforcedOnIssuanceAndAuthentication(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ('ban-player', 'ban-steam')`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Two independently constructed stores stand in for two control-plane
// replicas: the ban must hold on the replica that did not apply it.
replicaA := PostgresSessions{DB: db}
replicaB := PostgresSessions{DB: db}
session, token, err := replicaA.Issue(ctx, "ban-player", time.Hour, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue before ban: %v", err)
}
if _, err := replicaB.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("authenticate before ban: %v", err)
}
if err := ApplyIdentityBan(ctx, db, "ban-player", "cheating", now.Add(24*time.Hour), now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("apply ban: %v", err)
}
// The pre-existing session must stop working immediately, on a replica
// that never saw the ban being applied -- not at session expiry.
if _, err := replicaB.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now.Add(time.Minute)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("banned identity still authenticated with its existing session")
}
// ... and no new session may be minted.
if _, _, err := replicaB.Issue(ctx, "ban-player", time.Hour, now.Add(time.Minute)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("banned identity was issued a new session")
}
// The ban is time-bounded: once it lapses, sign-in works again.
afterBan := now.Add(25 * time.Hour)
revived, revivedToken, err := replicaA.Issue(ctx, "ban-player", time.Hour, afterBan)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue after ban expiry: %v", err)
}
if _, err := replicaB.Authenticate(ctx, revived.SessionID, revivedToken, afterBan); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("authenticate after ban expiry: %v", err)
}
// An explicit unban clears the state without resurrecting revoked sessions.
if err := ApplyIdentityBan(ctx, db, "ban-player", "", time.Time{}, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("clear ban: %v", err)
}
if _, err := replicaB.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now.Add(time.Minute)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("unban resurrected a session revoked by the ban")
}
}
// ApplyIdentityBan revokes sessions, so revocation alone would mask a missing
// ban check in Authenticate. A ban applied by any other path -- an admin tool,
// a future adapter, a direct operational UPDATE -- does not revoke anything,
// and must still take effect on the very next authenticated request.
func TestPostgreSQLBanWithoutRevocationStillBlocksExistingSessions(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ('raw-ban-player', 'raw-ban-steam')`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sessions := PostgresSessions{DB: db}
session, token, err := sessions.Issue(ctx, "raw-ban-player", time.Hour, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
}
if _, err := sessions.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("authenticate before ban: %v", err)
}
// Set the ban only; deliberately leave every session unrevoked.
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE identities SET banned_until = $2, ban_reason = 'manual' WHERE player_id = $1`, "raw-ban-player", now.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := sessions.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now.Add(time.Minute)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a ban applied without revocation left the existing session usable")
}
}
// The WebSocket hub is per-process, but any control-plane replica may drain a
// given outbox row, and the winner sets the single global published_at even
// with no matching local subscriber. Fan-out through LISTEN/NOTIFY is what
// lets the replica that actually owns the connection deliver the event.
func TestPostgreSQLControlPlaneEventFanoutReachesEveryReplica(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
dsn := os.Getenv("COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Second)
defer cancel()
// Two listeners stand in for two replicas; neither is the one that will
// perform the notify.
type replica struct {
name string
received chan []byte
}
replicas := []*replica{
{name: "replica-a", received: make(chan []byte, 4)},
{name: "replica-b", received: make(chan []byte, 4)},
}
for _, r := range replicas {
target := r
go ListenControlPlaneEvents(ctx, dsn, func(payload []byte) {
select {
case target.received <- payload:
default:
}
}, nil)
}
// LISTEN is asynchronous; retry the notify until both listeners are
// attached rather than sleeping an arbitrary amount.
payload := []byte(`{"event":"state_changed","resource_id":"match-fanout","player_id":"player-fanout"}`)
deadline := time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)
pending := map[string]bool{"replica-a": true, "replica-b": true}
for len(pending) > 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if err := NotifyControlPlaneEvent(ctx, db, payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("notify: %v", err)
}
for _, r := range replicas {
select {
case got := <-r.received:
if string(got) != string(payload) {
t.Fatalf("%s received %q, want %q", r.name, got, payload)
}
delete(pending, r.name)
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
}
if len(pending) > 0 {
t.Fatalf("replicas never received the fanned-out event: %v", pending)
}
}
func TestNotifyControlPlaneEventRejectsOversizedPayloads(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
oversized := make([]byte, MaxNotifyPayloadBytes+1)
for i := range oversized {
oversized[i] = 'x'
}
if err := NotifyControlPlaneEvent(context.Background(), db, oversized); err == nil {
t.Fatal("payload over the NOTIFY limit was accepted")
}
}
// Each 10s queue heartbeat mints a fresh idempotency key and permanently
// inserts a row; published outbox rows and expired sessions were never purged
// either. At 10,000 queued players heartbeats alone add roughly 60,000 durable
// rows per minute, so table and index growth, vacuum pressure, backup size and
// recovery time were all unbounded on a horizontally-scaled service.
func TestPostgreSQLRetentionPurgesExpiredRecordsInBoundedBatches(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
stale := now.Add(-IdempotencyKeyRetention - time.Hour)
fresh := now.Add(-time.Minute)
// 120 stale keys (purgeable) and 5 fresh ones (must survive: a client may
// still retry those mutations).
for i := 0; i < 120; i++ {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO idempotency_keys (scope, idempotency_key, payload_digest, result, created_at) VALUES ('queue.mutate', $1, '\x00', '{}'::jsonb, $2)`,
fmt.Sprintf("stale-key-%030d", i), stale); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO idempotency_keys (scope, idempotency_key, payload_digest, result, created_at) VALUES ('queue.mutate', $1, '\x00', '{}'::jsonb, $2)`,
fmt.Sprintf("fresh-key-%030d", i), fresh); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
countKeys := func() int {
var count int
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM idempotency_keys`).Scan(&count); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return count
}
if countKeys() != 125 {
t.Fatalf("seed failed: %d keys", countKeys())
}
// One pass must delete at most the batch size, not the whole backlog: a
// purge that took an unbounded lock would stall live traffic.
report, err := PurgeExpiredRecords(ctx, db, now, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("purge: %v", err)
}
if report.IdempotencyKeys != 50 {
t.Fatalf("first pass deleted %d keys, want the 50-row batch bound", report.IdempotencyKeys)
}
if countKeys() != 75 {
t.Fatalf("after one bounded pass: %d keys", countKeys())
}
// Repeated passes converge on exactly the fresh rows and then stop.
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
if _, err := PurgeExpiredRecords(ctx, db, now, 50); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("purge pass %d: %v", i, err)
}
}
if countKeys() != 5 {
t.Fatalf("steady state left %d keys, want only the 5 fresh ones", countKeys())
}
final, err := PurgeExpiredRecords(ctx, db, now, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("final purge: %v", err)
}
if final.Total() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("purge deleted %d rows that were still within their retention window", final.Total())
}
backlog, err := RetentionBacklog(ctx, db, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("backlog: %v", err)
}
if backlog != 0 {
t.Fatalf("deletion lag is %d after draining the backlog", backlog)
}
}
// countMigrationsAbove reports how many forward migrations have a number
// greater than the given one, so rollback step counts in this file track new
// migrations automatically instead of needing a manual bump.
func countMigrationsAbove(t *testing.T, dir string, number int) int {
t.Helper()
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read migrations: %v", err)
}
count := 0
for _, entry := range entries {
name := entry.Name()
if entry.IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(name, ".sql") || len(name) < 4 {
continue
}
index, err := strconv.Atoi(name[:4])
if err != nil {
continue
}
if index > number {
count++
}
}
if count == 0 {
t.Fatalf("no migrations found above %04d in %s", number, dir)
}
return count
}
// The second fatal blocker. domain.validCandidate hard-requires a non-empty
// PredictedRTT map, but CreateQueueTicket persisted an empty one and the only
// endpoint that could fill it returned 503 in every real binary because
// Service.Probe was never wired. No client-created ticket could ever be
// selected by the matcher.
//
// This drives the real enqueue and probe paths and then asks the actual
// matcher predicate, rather than hand-building a domain.Candidate the way the
// unit tests do -- which is precisely why they missed it.
func TestPostgreSQLProbedTicketBecomesSelectableByTheMatcher(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ('probe-player', 'probe-steam')`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
spec := domain.QueueSpec{Playlist: domain.Casual, ClientBuild: "probe-build", ProtocolVersion: 1}
if _, err := CreateQueueTicket(ctx, db, "probe-ticket", "probe-player", "probe-create-000001", spec, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create queue ticket: %v", err)
}
// Freshly queued: no RTT evidence yet, so the matcher must not consider it.
candidates, err := ListQueuedCandidates(ctx, db, domain.Casual, now, 100)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(candidates) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the queued ticket, got %d candidates", len(candidates))
}
if len(candidates[0].PredictedRTT) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a freshly queued ticket already has RTT evidence: %v", candidates[0].PredictedRTT)
}
if _, err := domain.SelectCandidates(candidates[0], candidates, 1, now); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a candidate with no RTT evidence was accepted by the matcher")
}
// The real challenge/answer round trip: the backend issues the nonce and
// derives RTT from its own timestamps, never from a client-reported value.
nonce, err := IssueProbeChallenge(ctx, db, "probe-player", "EU", now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue challenge: %v", err)
}
if len(nonce) != ProbeNonceBytes {
t.Fatalf("challenge nonce is %d bytes", len(nonce))
}
answeredAt := now.Add(40 * time.Millisecond)
evidence, expectedNonce, err := ProbeEvidenceFromChallenge(ctx, db, "probe-player", "EU", []byte("opaque-location"), nonce, answeredAt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("probe evidence: %v", err)
}
if err := domain.ValidateProbe(evidence, expectedNonce, answeredAt); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("backend-derived evidence failed its own validation: %v", err)
}
if evidence.ServerRTT != 40*time.Millisecond {
t.Fatalf("server-derived RTT = %v, want the 40ms round trip", evidence.ServerRTT)
}
// A challenge is single-use, so a captured answer cannot be replayed to
// refresh a stale RTT.
if _, _, err := ProbeEvidenceFromChallenge(ctx, db, "probe-player", "EU", []byte("opaque-location"), nonce, answeredAt); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a probe challenge was answerable twice")
}
if err := (PostgresQueue{DB: db}).RecordProbe(ctx, "probe-player", "EU", evidence.ServerRTT, answeredAt); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("record probe: %v", err)
}
// Now the same ticket, read through the same production query, is
// selectable.
candidates, err = ListQueuedCandidates(ctx, db, domain.Casual, answeredAt, 100)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(candidates) != 1 || candidates[0].PredictedRTT["EU"] == 0 {
t.Fatalf("probe did not reach the candidate projection: %+v", candidates)
}
if _, err := domain.SelectCandidates(candidates[0], candidates, 1, answeredAt); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a probed, client-created ticket is still not selectable by the matcher: %v", err)
}
// The same candidate must survive the Redis path, which is seeded from the
// per-player refresh the probe handler performs.
refreshed, queued, err := FindQueuedCandidateByPlayer(ctx, db, "probe-player", answeredAt)
if err != nil || !queued {
t.Fatalf("per-player candidate refresh: queued=%t err=%v", queued, err)
}
if refreshed.PredictedRTT["EU"] == 0 {
t.Fatal("the refreshed candidate still carries an empty RTT map, so Redis would keep a stale entry")
}
}
// Production sign-in, exercised through the real SteamLogin provider with only
// the Valve HTTP call stubbed. newAPIService never supplied SteamLogin, so
// POST /v1/session/steam always returned 503 auth_unavailable; the only
// implementation was cmd/testkit-api's fake, which accepts any ticket string
// and therefore proves nothing about the deployable path.
func TestPostgreSQLSteamLoginResolvesDurableIdentities(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
const steamID = "76561198000000001"
// First sign-in creates the identity.
playerID, err := ResolveSteamIdentity(ctx, db, steamID, "player-first")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first sign-in: %v", err)
}
if playerID != "player-first" {
t.Fatalf("first sign-in player = %q", playerID)
}
// A returning player must keep the player ID they already had, or their
// ratings, penalties and bans would silently detach from their account.
returning, err := ResolveSteamIdentity(ctx, db, steamID, "player-different-proposal")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("returning sign-in: %v", err)
}
if returning != "player-first" {
t.Fatalf("returning player was given a new ID %q", returning)
}
var identities int
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM identities WHERE steam_id = $1`, steamID).Scan(&identities); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if identities != 1 {
t.Fatalf("one Steam ID produced %d identity rows", identities)
}
// The resolved identity must be usable for session issuance, which is the
// step that was unreachable in production.
sessions := PostgresSessions{DB: db}
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
session, token, err := sessions.Issue(ctx, returning, time.Hour, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue session for a freshly resolved identity: %v", err)
}
if _, err := sessions.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("authenticate freshly issued session: %v", err)
}
// And a banned account cannot sign in, tying the real login path to the
// durable ban enforcement rather than leaving it adapter-specific.
if err := ApplyIdentityBan(ctx, db, returning, "cheating", now.Add(time.Hour), now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("apply ban: %v", err)
}
if _, _, err := sessions.Issue(ctx, returning, time.Hour, now.Add(time.Minute)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a banned identity signed in through the production path")
}
}
// Tier thresholds were compiled into every API binary, so retuning a band
// meant building and rolling a new image -- least attractive exactly when it
// is most needed, as the rating distribution settles after launch.
func TestPostgreSQLTierPolicyIsDurableAndOverridesTheCompiledDefault(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
// A settled, non-provisional profile, so RankedTier consults the bands
// rather than short-circuiting to PROVISIONAL.
settled := domain.RankedProfile{Rating: domain.Rating{Value: 1550}, RankedGames: 50}
// The seed migration must reproduce the compiled launch policy exactly,
// so introducing durable bands changes storage without changing behaviour.
loaded, err := LoadTierPolicy(ctx, db)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load seeded policy: %v", err)
}
seededTier, err := domain.RankedTier(settled, loaded)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tier from seeded policy: %v", err)
}
compiledTier, err := domain.RankedTier(settled, domain.DefaultTierPolicy())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tier from compiled policy: %v", err)
}
if seededTier != compiledTier || seededTier != domain.RankTierGold {
t.Fatalf("seeded policy tier = %q, compiled = %q, want GOLD", seededTier, compiledTier)
}
// Retuning a band must take effect from the database alone. GOLD moves
// first: UNIQUE(min_rating) rejects two bands sharing a threshold, which
// is a deliberate early guard against an ambiguous policy.
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE tier_bands SET min_rating = 1400 WHERE tier = 'GOLD'`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE tier_bands SET min_rating = 1500 WHERE tier = 'PLATINUM'`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
retuned, err := LoadTierPolicy(ctx, db)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load retuned policy: %v", err)
}
retunedTier, err := domain.RankedTier(settled, retuned)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tier from retuned policy: %v", err)
}
if retunedTier != domain.RankTierPlatinum {
t.Fatalf("retuned tier = %q, want PLATINUM; durable bands did not take effect", retunedTier)
}
// An empty table is a supported state: an operator can truncate it to
// return to known-good defaults without a deploy.
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM tier_bands`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fallback, err := LoadTierPolicy(ctx, db)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load empty policy: %v", err)
}
fallbackTier, err := domain.RankedTier(settled, fallback)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tier from fallback policy: %v", err)
}
if fallbackTier != domain.RankTierGold {
t.Fatalf("fallback tier = %q, want the compiled GOLD", fallbackTier)
}
}
// A malformed durable policy must stop startup rather than silently mis-tier
// every player, so these are load errors and not best-effort skips.
func TestPostgreSQLInvalidTierPolicyIsRejectedRatherThanIgnored(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
for name, mutate := range map[string]string{
// NewTierPolicy requires the lowest band at or below zero; without it
// a player below the floor has no tier at all.
"no floor band": `DELETE FROM tier_bands WHERE tier = 'BRONZE'`,
"unknown tier": `INSERT INTO tier_bands (tier, min_rating) VALUES ('MYTHIC', 3000)`,
"provisional": `INSERT INTO tier_bands (tier, min_rating) VALUES ('PROVISIONAL', 2500)`,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, mutate); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := LoadTierPolicy(ctx, db); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s was accepted as a durable tier policy", name)
}
})
}
}
// Proof for the audit's claim that all four penalty kinds are durably
// written. MATCH_ABANDONED, PROPOSAL_DECLINED and PROPOSAL_TIMEOUT already
// had integration coverage; INITIAL_CONNECT_NO_SHOW did not, so that part of
// the claim rested on reading the code rather than on evidence.
func TestPostgreSQLInitialConnectNoShowWritesADurablePenalty(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
playerID := fmt.Sprintf("noshow-player-%d", i)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, playerID, "steam-"+playerID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO queue_tickets (ticket_id, player_id, playlist, state, client_build, protocol_version, enqueued_at, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, 'casual', 'ASSIGNMENT_READY', 'integration-build', 1, $3, $4)`,
fmt.Sprintf("noshow-ticket-%d", i), playerID, now, now.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO game_servers (server_id, region, build, protocol_version, transport, state) VALUES ('noshow-server', 'EU', 'integration-build', 1, 'enet', 'ALLOCATED')`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO matches (match_id, playlist, state, region, protocol_version) VALUES ('noshow-match', 'casual', 'ALLOCATING', 'EU', 1)`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO allocations (allocation_id, match_id, server_id, region, build, protocol_version, transport, request_digest, state, allocated_at) VALUES ('noshow-allocation', 'noshow-match', 'noshow-server', 'EU', 'integration-build', 1, 'enet', $1, 'ALLOCATED', $2)`, []byte("request"), now); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE matches SET state = 'ASSIGNMENT_READY', server_id = 'noshow-server', allocation_id = 'noshow-allocation', allocation_claimed_at = $1, initial_connect_ready_at = $1 WHERE match_id = 'noshow-match'`, now); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
playerID := fmt.Sprintf("noshow-player-%d", i)
slot := i * 3
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO match_participants (match_id, player_id, ticket_id, slot, team) VALUES ('noshow-match', $1, $2, $3, $4)`, playerID, fmt.Sprintf("noshow-ticket-%d", i), slot, i); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO assignments (match_id, player_id, allocation_id, server_id, slot, region, client_build, protocol_version, transport, endpoint, join_authorisation, manifest_digest, expires_at) VALUES ('noshow-match', $1, 'noshow-allocation', 'noshow-server', $2, 'EU', 'integration-build', 1, 'enet', '127.0.0.1:7777', 'join-token', $3, $4)`,
playerID, slot, []byte("manifest"), now.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// Only player 0 ever connects. Player 1 is the no-show.
binding := domain.WorkloadBinding{AllocationID: "noshow-allocation", MatchID: "noshow-match", ServerID: "noshow-server"}
if _, err := ClaimPlayerConnection(ctx, db, binding, "noshow-player-0", 0, "noshow-receipt-key-00000", now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("connecting player receipt: %v", err)
}
// Casual deliberately waits past InitialConnectWindow to CasualBotStartAfter
// before deciding, giving a slow-loading player longer than the ranked
// deadline. Reconciling at the earlier window only yields WAIT.
afterWindow := now.Add(domain.CasualBotStartAfter + time.Second)
if _, err := ReconcileInitialConnect(ctx, db, afterWindow, 10); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err)
}
var endsAt time.Time
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT ends_at FROM penalties WHERE player_id = 'noshow-player-1' AND kind = 'INITIAL_CONNECT_NO_SHOW'`).Scan(&endsAt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("no INITIAL_CONNECT_NO_SHOW penalty was written for the absent player: %v", err)
}
if !endsAt.After(afterWindow.Add(-time.Second)) {
t.Fatalf("penalty ends_at %s is not in the future relative to %s", endsAt, afterWindow)
}
// The player who did connect must not be penalised for someone else's
// absence.
var innocent int
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM penalties WHERE player_id = 'noshow-player-0'`).Scan(&innocent); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if innocent != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the connecting player received %d penalties", innocent)
}
}
// Proof for the audit's claim that distributed revocation needs no
// cross-replica protocol. The claim rests on sessions being durable and
// re-read on every authenticated request, so a revocation on one replica is
// effective on another with no coordination, invalidation broadcast or TTL to
// wait out. That is a behavioural property, not something reading the code
// establishes -- an in-memory cache in front of the session read would break
// it silently while leaving every call site looking correct.
func TestPostgreSQLSessionRevocationIsImmediateOnAnotherReplica(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ('revoke-player', 'revoke-steam')`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Independently constructed stores stand in for two control-plane
// replicas; they share only the database.
issuing := PostgresSessions{DB: db}
other := PostgresSessions{DB: db}
session, token, err := issuing.Issue(ctx, "revoke-player", time.Hour, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
}
if _, err := other.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the other replica could not authenticate a valid session: %v", err)
}
// Revoke on one replica...
if err := issuing.Revoke(ctx, session.SessionID, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("revoke: %v", err)
}
// ...and the very next request on the other must fail, with no delay and
// nothing propagated between them.
if _, err := other.Authenticate(ctx, session.SessionID, token, now); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a revoked session still authenticated on another replica")
}
// An unrelated session belonging to the same player is unaffected, so
// revocation is session-scoped rather than identity-scoped. (Identity-wide
// revocation is the ban path, covered separately.)
survivor, survivorToken, err := issuing.Issue(ctx, "revoke-player", time.Hour, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("issue second session: %v", err)
}
if _, err := other.Authenticate(ctx, survivor.SessionID, survivorToken, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("revoking one session invalidated another: %v", err)
}
}
// Reusing an idempotency key with a different payload must be a conflict.
// Both idempotency paths returned a bare error, which writeDomainError maps
// to its 422 default, so the API answered 422 where openapi.json and
// state-transitions.json ("same_key_different_payload":
// "reject_conflict_without_state_change") both require 409. It is the
// difference between "your request was malformed" and "that key is taken",
// and a client acting on the former would rewrite a correct request.
func TestPostgreSQLIdempotencyKeyReuseIsAConflict(t *testing.T) {
db := openIntegrationPostgres(t)
applyIntegrationMigrations(t, db)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id) VALUES ('idem-player', 'idem-steam')`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
spec := domain.QueueSpec{Playlist: domain.Casual, ClientBuild: "build-1", ProtocolVersion: 1}
if _, err := CreateQueueTicket(ctx, db, "idem-ticket-one", "idem-player", "idem-key-00000001", spec, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first create: %v", err)
}
// Same key, same payload: replays the original result.
replay, err := CreateQueueTicket(ctx, db, "idem-ticket-one", "idem-player", "idem-key-00000001", spec, now.Add(time.Second))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("identical replay must succeed: %v", err)
}
if replay.TicketID != "idem-ticket-one" {
t.Fatalf("replay returned %q", replay.TicketID)
}
// Same key, different payload: conflict, not a validation error.
_, err = CreateQueueTicket(ctx, db, "idem-ticket-two", "idem-player", "idem-key-00000001", spec, now.Add(time.Second))
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("reusing a key with a different ticket was accepted")
}
if !errors.Is(err, domain.ErrConflict) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; must wrap domain.ErrConflict so the API answers 409, not its 422 default", err)
}
}
server/store/probe_sql.go
+100
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
package store
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
)
// ProbeNonceBytes is the challenge size. It only needs to be unguessable
// within the freshness window, not long-lived key material.
const ProbeNonceBytes = 16
const (
ProbeChallengeUpsertSQL = `INSERT INTO probe_challenges (player_id, region, nonce, issued_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
ON CONFLICT (player_id, region) DO UPDATE
SET nonce = EXCLUDED.nonce, issued_at = EXCLUDED.issued_at`
// Consuming deletes in the same statement: a challenge is single-use, so a
// captured probe response cannot be replayed to refresh a stale RTT.
ProbeChallengeConsumeSQL = `DELETE FROM probe_challenges
WHERE player_id = $1 AND region = $2
RETURNING nonce, issued_at`
ProbeChallengePurgeSQL = `DELETE FROM probe_challenges WHERE issued_at < $1`
)
// IssueProbeChallenge mints and stores a fresh nonce for one player and
// region. It is durable rather than per-process because any control-plane
// replica may serve the follow-up submission.
func IssueProbeChallenge(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playerID, region string, now time.Time) ([]byte, error) {
if db == nil || playerID == "" || (region != "EU" && region != "NA") || now.IsZero() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid probe challenge arguments")
}
nonce := make([]byte, ProbeNonceBytes)
if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, ProbeChallengeUpsertSQL, playerID, region, nonce, now); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nonce, nil
}
// ConsumeProbeChallenge returns the outstanding nonce and when it was issued,
// removing it so it cannot be reused.
func ConsumeProbeChallenge(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playerID, region string) ([]byte, time.Time, error) {
if db == nil || playerID == "" || (region != "EU" && region != "NA") {
return nil, time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid probe challenge arguments")
}
var nonce []byte
var issuedAt time.Time
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, ProbeChallengeConsumeSQL, playerID, region).Scan(&nonce, &issuedAt)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return nil, time.Time{}, domain.ErrInvalidProbe
}
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, err
}
return nonce, issuedAt, nil
}
// PurgeExpiredProbeChallenges drops challenges that can no longer be answered
// within the freshness window, so an abandoned probe cannot accumulate.
func PurgeExpiredProbeChallenges(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, now time.Time) (int64, error) {
if db == nil || now.IsZero() {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid probe challenge purge arguments")
}
result, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, ProbeChallengePurgeSQL, now.Add(-domain.ProbeFreshness))
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected()
}
// ProbeEvidenceFromChallenge is the production ProbeProvider. The RTT is
// derived entirely from backend timestamps -- the interval between issuing the
// challenge and receiving the answer -- so no client-reported latency
// influences placement, which is the property docs/MATCHMAKING.md §4 requires.
func ProbeEvidenceFromChallenge(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playerID, region string, opaqueLocation, nonce []byte, receivedAt time.Time) (domain.ProbeEvidence, []byte, error) {
expectedNonce, issuedAt, err := ConsumeProbeChallenge(ctx, db, playerID, region)
if err != nil {
return domain.ProbeEvidence{}, nil, err
}
rtt := receivedAt.Sub(issuedAt)
if rtt < 0 {
// Clock skew between replicas; treat as immediate rather than letting
// a negative duration through to placement.
rtt = 0
}
return domain.ProbeEvidence{
OpaqueLocation: opaqueLocation,
Nonce: nonce,
IssuedAt: issuedAt,
Region: region,
ServerRTT: rtt,
}, expectedNonce, nil
}
server/store/proposal_sql.go
+3 -4
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package store
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
@@ -54,9 +53,9 @@ func CreateProposal(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, proposal domain.Proposal, t
}
players = append(players, participant.PlayerID)
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"event": "proposal_changed", "revision": uint64(0), "resource_id": proposal.ProposalID,
"occurred_at": now, "state": string(proposal.State), "player_ids": players,
payload, err := MarshalOutboxEnvelope(OutboxEnvelope{
Event: "proposal_changed", ResourceID: proposal.ProposalID, Revision: 0,
OccurredAt: now, State: string(proposal.State), PlayerIDs: players,
})
if err != nil {
return err
server/store/queue_sql.go
+84 -11
View File
@@ -58,13 +58,25 @@ ORDER BY ends_at DESC
LIMIT 1`
)
const QueueCandidateProjectionSQL = `SELECT ticket_id, player_id, playlist, client_build,
protocol_version, enqueued_at, predicted_rtt
FROM queue_tickets
WHERE state = 'QUEUED' AND playlist = $1 AND expires_at > $2
ORDER BY enqueued_at, ticket_id
// QueueCandidateProjectionSQL joins the authoritative rating. Without it every
// PostgreSQL-sourced candidate carried Go's zero value, and since rating
// tolerance, selection scoring and team partitioning all read that field,
// ranked matchmaking treated every player as identically rated. A player with
// no ratings row yet is a genuinely new profile and starts at the Glicko
// initial rating, matching domain.GlickoInitialRating and the column default.
// The rating is never taken from the client.
const QueueCandidateProjectionSQL = `SELECT q.ticket_id, q.player_id, q.playlist, q.client_build,
q.protocol_version, q.enqueued_at, q.predicted_rtt, COALESCE(r.rating, $4)
FROM queue_tickets q
LEFT JOIN ratings r ON r.player_id = q.player_id
WHERE q.state = 'QUEUED' AND q.playlist = $1 AND q.expires_at > $2
ORDER BY q.enqueued_at, q.ticket_id
LIMIT $3`
// QueueTicketRatingSQL resolves a player's authoritative rating, falling back
// to the new-profile default when they have no ratings row yet.
const QueueTicketRatingSQL = `SELECT COALESCE((SELECT rating FROM ratings WHERE player_id = $1), $2)`
const RankedParticipantSQL = `SELECT player_id, steam_id
FROM identities
WHERE player_id = ANY($1)
@@ -106,7 +118,7 @@ func ListQueuedCandidates(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playlist domain.Playl
if db == nil || (playlist != domain.Casual && playlist != domain.Ranked) || now.IsZero() || limit < 1 || limit > 1000 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid queued candidate arguments")
}
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, QueueCandidateProjectionSQL, string(playlist), now, limit)
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, QueueCandidateProjectionSQL, string(playlist), now, limit, domain.GlickoInitialRating)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -116,7 +128,7 @@ func ListQueuedCandidates(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playlist domain.Playl
var candidate domain.Candidate
var playlist string
var predictedRTT []byte
if err := rows.Scan(&candidate.TicketID, &candidate.PlayerID, &playlist, &candidate.ClientBuild, &candidate.ProtocolVersion, &candidate.EnqueuedAt, &predictedRTT); err != nil {
if err := rows.Scan(&candidate.TicketID, &candidate.PlayerID, &playlist, &candidate.ClientBuild, &candidate.ProtocolVersion, &candidate.EnqueuedAt, &predictedRTT, &candidate.Rating); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(predictedRTT, &candidate.PredictedRTT); err != nil {
@@ -138,7 +150,15 @@ func CreateQueueTicket(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, ticketID, playerID, idem
digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s|%s|%d", ticketID, playerID, spec.Playlist, spec.ClientBuild, spec.ProtocolVersion)))
var ticket domain.QueueTicket
err := RunSerializable(ctx, db, DefaultSerializableAttempts, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: ticketID, PlayerID: playerID, Playlist: spec.Playlist, ClientBuild: spec.ClientBuild, ProtocolVersion: spec.ProtocolVersion, EnqueuedAt: now}
// The Redis projection is seeded from this candidate, so it must carry
// the same authoritative rating the durable candidate query joins.
// Reading it inside the transaction keeps both projections agreeing on
// one value rather than one of them defaulting to zero.
var rating float64
if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, QueueTicketRatingSQL, playerID, domain.GlickoInitialRating).Scan(&rating); err != nil {
return err
}
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: ticketID, PlayerID: playerID, Playlist: spec.Playlist, ClientBuild: spec.ClientBuild, ProtocolVersion: spec.ProtocolVersion, EnqueuedAt: now, Rating: rating}
ticket = domain.QueueTicket{TicketID: ticketID, PlayerID: playerID, Candidate: candidate, Playlist: spec.Playlist, State: domain.Queued, EnqueuedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now.Add(domain.QueueExpiryWindow)}
stored, err := json.Marshal(queueTicketRecordFromDomain(ticket))
if err != nil {
@@ -158,7 +178,12 @@ func CreateQueueTicket(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, ticketID, playerID, idem
return err
}
if !bytes.Equal(priorDigest, digest[:]) {
return fmt.Errorf("queue create idempotency conflict")
// Must wrap ErrConflict: writeDomainError maps unrecognised
// errors to 422, but the contract
// (state-transitions.json "same_key_different_payload") and
// openapi.json both require 409 for reusing a key with a
// different payload.
return fmt.Errorf("%w: queue create idempotency conflict", domain.ErrConflict)
}
var prior queueTicketRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal(priorResult, &prior); err != nil {
@@ -174,6 +199,14 @@ func CreateQueueTicket(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, ticketID, playerID, idem
}
return fmt.Errorf("%w until %s", domain.ErrPlayerCooldown, cooldownEndsAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
}
// A nil map marshals to JSON `null`, a JSONB scalar -- not an empty
// object. jsonb_set then fails with "cannot set path in scalar", so
// the first probe for this player could never be recorded even once
// the probe endpoint was wired. Persist an object from the start.
if candidate.PredictedRTT == nil {
candidate.PredictedRTT = map[string]float64{}
ticket.Candidate.PredictedRTT = candidate.PredictedRTT
}
predictedRTT, err := json.Marshal(candidate.PredictedRTT)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -206,7 +239,13 @@ func (q PostgresQueue) RecordProviderAllocation(ctx context.Context, allocation
}
const QueueProbeRecordSQL = `UPDATE queue_tickets
SET predicted_rtt = jsonb_set(COALESCE(predicted_rtt, '{}'::jsonb), ARRAY[$2], to_jsonb($3::double precision), true)
-- COALESCE only guards SQL NULL. Rows written before the insert fix hold a
-- JSONB scalar null, which jsonb_set rejects outright, so normalise anything
-- that is not an object before setting the region key.
SET predicted_rtt = jsonb_set(
CASE WHEN jsonb_typeof(COALESCE(predicted_rtt, '{}'::jsonb)) = 'object'
THEN predicted_rtt ELSE '{}'::jsonb END,
ARRAY[$2], to_jsonb($3::double precision), true)
WHERE player_id = $1 AND state IN ('QUEUED', 'PROPOSED') AND expires_at > $4`
func (q PostgresQueue) RecordProbe(ctx context.Context, playerID, region string, rtt time.Duration, now time.Time) error {
@@ -287,7 +326,7 @@ func mutateQueueTicket(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playerID, ticketID, idem
return err
}
if !bytes.Equal(priorDigest, digest[:]) {
return fmt.Errorf("queue mutation idempotency conflict")
return fmt.Errorf("%w: queue mutation idempotency conflict", domain.ErrConflict)
}
var prior queueTicketRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal(priorResult, &prior); err != nil {
@@ -353,3 +392,37 @@ func queueTicketRecordToDomain(record queueTicketRecord) domain.QueueTicket {
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: record.TicketID, PlayerID: record.PlayerID, Playlist: domain.Playlist(record.Playlist), ClientBuild: record.ClientBuild, ProtocolVersion: record.ProtocolVersion, EnqueuedAt: record.EnqueuedAt, PredictedRTT: record.PredictedRTT}
return domain.QueueTicket{TicketID: record.TicketID, PlayerID: record.PlayerID, ProposalID: record.ProposalID, MatchID: record.MatchID, Candidate: candidate, Playlist: domain.Playlist(record.Playlist), State: domain.State(record.State), Revision: record.Revision, EnqueuedAt: record.EnqueuedAt, ExpiresAt: record.ExpiresAt}
}
// QueueCandidateByPlayerSQL mirrors QueueCandidateProjectionSQL for a single
// player, so a probe can repair that player's transient index entry without
// re-reading the whole queue.
const QueueCandidateByPlayerSQL = `SELECT q.ticket_id, q.player_id, q.playlist, q.client_build,
q.protocol_version, q.enqueued_at, q.predicted_rtt, COALESCE(r.rating, $3)
FROM queue_tickets q
LEFT JOIN ratings r ON r.player_id = q.player_id
WHERE q.player_id = $1 AND q.state = 'QUEUED' AND q.expires_at > $2`
// FindQueuedCandidateByPlayer returns the player's live queue candidate, if
// any. The second result reports whether the player is currently queued; a
// player who is not queued is not an error.
func FindQueuedCandidateByPlayer(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playerID string, now time.Time) (domain.Candidate, bool, error) {
if db == nil || playerID == "" || now.IsZero() {
return domain.Candidate{}, false, fmt.Errorf("invalid queued candidate lookup")
}
var candidate domain.Candidate
var playlist string
var predictedRTT []byte
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, QueueCandidateByPlayerSQL, playerID, now, domain.GlickoInitialRating).
Scan(&candidate.TicketID, &candidate.PlayerID, &playlist, &candidate.ClientBuild, &candidate.ProtocolVersion, &candidate.EnqueuedAt, &predictedRTT, &candidate.Rating)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return domain.Candidate{}, false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return domain.Candidate{}, false, err
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(predictedRTT, &candidate.PredictedRTT); err != nil {
return domain.Candidate{}, false, fmt.Errorf("decode candidate RTT: %w", err)
}
candidate.Playlist = domain.Playlist(playlist)
return candidate, true, nil
}
server/store/redis_candidates.go
+59 -19
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ type RedisCandidateIndex struct {
// DurableCandidateSource is the authoritative queue projection used to
// repair Redis. Implementations must apply queue state and expiry rules before
// returning candidates.
type DurableCandidateSource func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error)
// returning candidates. It is playlist- and limit-scoped so a repair reads
// only the namespace it is about to rebuild, and never an unbounded queue.
type DurableCandidateSource func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error)
// CandidateProjection couples the transient index to its durable repair
// source. A cache miss, partial write, malformed payload, or Redis restart is
@@ -32,15 +33,15 @@ type CandidateProjection struct {
Source DurableCandidateSource
}
func (p CandidateProjection) Repair(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) error {
func (p CandidateProjection) Repair(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, now time.Time, limit int) error {
if p.Source == nil || now.IsZero() {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid candidate repair source")
}
candidates, err := p.Source(ctx, now)
candidates, err := p.Source(ctx, playlist, now, limit)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return p.Index.Rebuild(ctx, candidates)
return p.Index.Rebuild(ctx, playlist, candidates)
}
// Snapshot never fails just because Redis specifically is unreachable.
@@ -58,31 +59,47 @@ func (p CandidateProjection) Repair(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) error {
// directly, and only attempt to repopulate Redis on a best-effort basis --
// its outcome is deliberately ignored, since a caller must never be denied
// service just because the rebuild's own Redis write also failed.
func (p CandidateProjection) Snapshot(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
func (p CandidateProjection) Snapshot(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, now time.Time, limit int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
if p.Source == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid candidate repair source")
}
candidates, err := p.Index.Snapshot(ctx, now)
candidates, err := p.Index.Snapshot(ctx, playlist, now, limit)
if err == nil && len(candidates) > 0 {
return candidates, nil
}
// Either the index errored outright, or came back empty -- indistinguishable
// from a Redis restart or a lost keyspace. Consult PostgreSQL, the
// authoritative source, either way.
source, sourceErr := p.Source(ctx, now)
source, sourceErr := p.Source(ctx, playlist, now, limit)
if sourceErr != nil {
return nil, sourceErr
}
_ = p.Index.Rebuild(ctx, source)
// Rebuild only this playlist's namespace. When the keys were shared, a
// casual repair replaced the keys ranked candidates lived in and vice
// versa, so each worker could erase the other's projection.
_ = p.Index.Rebuild(ctx, playlist, source)
return source, nil
}
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) keys() (string, string) {
// keys are namespaced per playlist. They used to be shared, which caused two
// independent failures: the matcher truncated a mixed snapshot to its
// candidate limit before filtering by playlist, so a large casual backlog
// could starve the ranked worker indefinitely; and Rebuild replaced the shared
// keys, so one playlist's repair erased the other's projection.
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) keys(playlist domain.Playlist) (string, string) {
prefix := r.Prefix
if prefix == "" {
prefix = "cosmic-clash"
}
return prefix + ":queue:candidates:data", prefix + ":queue:candidates:order"
base := prefix + ":queue:candidates:" + string(playlist)
return base + ":data", base + ":order"
}
func validRedisPlaylist(playlist domain.Playlist) error {
if playlist != domain.Casual && playlist != domain.Ranked {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid candidate playlist %q", playlist)
}
return nil
}
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) validate() error {
@@ -109,11 +126,14 @@ func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Upsert(ctx context.Context, candidate domain.Candid
if err := validateRedisCandidate(candidate); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validRedisPlaylist(candidate.Playlist); err != nil {
return err
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(candidate)
if err != nil {
return err
}
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys()
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys(candidate.Playlist)
pipe := r.Client.TxPipeline()
pipe.HSet(ctx, dataKey, candidate.TicketID, payload)
pipe.ZAdd(ctx, orderKey, redis.Z{Score: float64(candidate.EnqueuedAt.UnixNano()), Member: candidate.TicketID})
@@ -123,14 +143,17 @@ func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Upsert(ctx context.Context, candidate domain.Candid
return err
}
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Remove(ctx context.Context, ticketID string) error {
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Remove(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, ticketID string) error {
if err := r.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validRedisPlaylist(playlist); err != nil {
return err
}
if ticketID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("ticket ID is required")
}
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys()
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys(playlist)
pipe := r.Client.TxPipeline()
pipe.HDel(ctx, dataKey, ticketID)
pipe.ZRem(ctx, orderKey, ticketID)
@@ -141,16 +164,25 @@ func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Remove(ctx context.Context, ticketID string) error
// Snapshot reads only candidates whose enqueue timestamp is not in the
// future. Missing payloads are ignored; the durable rebuild path repairs such
// partial cache state without allowing it to affect ownership.
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Snapshot(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Snapshot(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, now time.Time, limit int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
if err := r.validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := validRedisPlaylist(playlist); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if now.IsZero() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authoritative time is required")
}
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys()
if limit < 1 || limit > 1000 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid candidate snapshot limit")
}
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys(playlist)
// The limit is applied by Redis (LIMIT 0 N), not after transfer. The
// unbounded range and HMGET decoded the entire queue on every one-second
// poll, allocating and transferring in proportion to total queue depth.
tickets, err := r.Client.ZRangeByScore(ctx, orderKey, &redis.ZRangeBy{
Min: "-inf", Max: fmt.Sprint(now.UnixNano()),
Min: "-inf", Max: fmt.Sprint(now.UnixNano()), Offset: 0, Count: int64(limit),
}).Result()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -191,10 +223,13 @@ func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Snapshot(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]dom
// Rebuild atomically replaces both Redis keys from the authoritative queue
// projection. It is the required path after Redis restart/failover or cache
// loss, and rejects duplicate ticket IDs before touching Redis.
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Rebuild(ctx context.Context, candidates []domain.Candidate) error {
func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Rebuild(ctx context.Context, playlist domain.Playlist, candidates []domain.Candidate) error {
if err := r.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validRedisPlaylist(playlist); err != nil {
return err
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(candidates))
values := make([]interface{}, 0, len(candidates)*2)
scores := make([]redis.Z, 0, len(candidates))
@@ -202,6 +237,11 @@ func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Rebuild(ctx context.Context, candidates []domain.Ca
if err := validateRedisCandidate(candidate); err != nil {
return err
}
if candidate.Playlist != playlist {
// A rebuild that mixed playlists would write foreign candidates
// into this namespace, reintroducing the starvation it fixes.
return fmt.Errorf("rebuild candidate %s is %q, not %q", candidate.TicketID, candidate.Playlist, playlist)
}
if _, exists := seen[candidate.TicketID]; exists {
return fmt.Errorf("duplicate candidate in rebuild")
}
@@ -213,7 +253,7 @@ func (r RedisCandidateIndex) Rebuild(ctx context.Context, candidates []domain.Ca
values = append(values, candidate.TicketID, payload)
scores = append(scores, redis.Z{Score: float64(candidate.EnqueuedAt.UnixNano()), Member: candidate.TicketID})
}
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys()
dataKey, orderKey := r.keys(playlist)
pipe := r.Client.TxPipeline()
pipe.Del(ctx, dataKey, orderKey)
if len(values) > 0 {
server/store/redis_candidates_test.go
+117 -11
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package store
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -21,37 +22,37 @@ func TestRedisCandidateIndexRebuildSnapshotAndRemove(t *testing.T) {
index := RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "integration", TTL: time.Minute}
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidates := []domain.Candidate{
{TicketID: "ticket-b", PlayerID: "player-b", EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Second)},
{TicketID: "ticket-a", PlayerID: "player-a", EnqueuedAt: now},
{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "ticket-b", PlayerID: "player-b", EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Second)},
{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "ticket-a", PlayerID: "player-a", EnqueuedAt: now},
}
if err := index.Rebuild(context.Background(), candidates); err != nil {
if err := index.Rebuild(context.Background(), domain.Casual, candidates); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := index.Snapshot(context.Background(), now)
got, err := index.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, now, 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].TicketID != "ticket-a" {
t.Fatalf("snapshot before future candidate = %+v", got)
}
if err := index.Remove(context.Background(), "ticket-a"); err != nil {
if err := index.Remove(context.Background(), domain.Casual, "ticket-a"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err = index.Snapshot(context.Background(), now.Add(2*time.Second))
got, err = index.Snapshot(context.Background(), domain.Casual, now.Add(2*time.Second), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].TicketID != "ticket-b" {
t.Fatalf("snapshot after remove = %+v", got)
}
if ttl, err := client.TTL(context.Background(), "integration:queue:candidates:data").Result(); err != nil || ttl <= 0 {
if ttl, err := client.TTL(context.Background(), "integration:queue:candidates:casual:data").Result(); err != nil || ttl <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("candidate data TTL = %v, err = %v", ttl, err)
}
}
func TestRedisCandidateIndexRejectsInvalidAndDuplicateRebuilds(t *testing.T) {
index := RedisCandidateIndex{TTL: time.Minute}
if err := index.Rebuild(context.Background(), nil); err == nil {
if err := index.Rebuild(context.Background(), domain.Casual, nil); err == nil {
t.Fatal("nil Redis client accepted")
}
mini, err := miniredis.Run()
@@ -62,11 +63,116 @@ func TestRedisCandidateIndexRejectsInvalidAndDuplicateRebuilds(t *testing.T) {
client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: mini.Addr()})
defer client.Close()
index.Client = client
candidate := domain.Candidate{TicketID: "ticket-a", PlayerID: "player-a", EnqueuedAt: time.Unix(1000, 0)}
if err := index.Rebuild(context.Background(), []domain.Candidate{candidate, candidate}); err == nil {
candidate := domain.Candidate{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "ticket-a", PlayerID: "player-a", EnqueuedAt: time.Unix(1000, 0)}
if err := index.Rebuild(context.Background(), domain.Casual, []domain.Candidate{candidate, candidate}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("duplicate candidate accepted")
}
if err := index.Upsert(context.Background(), domain.Candidate{TicketID: "", PlayerID: "player-a", EnqueuedAt: candidate.EnqueuedAt}); err == nil {
if err := index.Upsert(context.Background(), domain.Candidate{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "", PlayerID: "player-a", EnqueuedAt: candidate.EnqueuedAt}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("invalid candidate accepted")
}
}
// Both playlists used to share one hash and sorted set. Two failures followed:
// the matcher truncated a mixed snapshot to its candidate limit before
// filtering by playlist, so a large casual prefix could leave the ranked
// worker with zero candidates indefinitely; and Rebuild replaced the shared
// keys, so a casual repair erased ranked projections and vice versa.
func TestRedisCandidateIndexIsolatesPlaylists(t *testing.T) {
mini, err := miniredis.Run()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer mini.Close()
client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: mini.Addr()})
defer client.Close()
index := RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "isolation", TTL: time.Minute}
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
// A large casual backlog enqueued strictly before the ranked tickets. With
// shared keys this prefix is exactly what starved the ranked worker.
casual := make([]domain.Candidate, 0, 300)
for i := 0; i < 300; i++ {
casual = append(casual, domain.Candidate{
Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: fmt.Sprintf("casual-%03d", i),
PlayerID: fmt.Sprintf("casual-player-%03d", i), EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Duration(i) * time.Millisecond),
})
}
ranked := []domain.Candidate{
{Playlist: domain.Ranked, TicketID: "ranked-a", PlayerID: "ranked-player-a", EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Second)},
{Playlist: domain.Ranked, TicketID: "ranked-b", PlayerID: "ranked-player-b", EnqueuedAt: now.Add(2 * time.Second)},
}
if err := index.Rebuild(ctx, domain.Casual, casual); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("casual rebuild: %v", err)
}
if err := index.Rebuild(ctx, domain.Ranked, ranked); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ranked rebuild: %v", err)
}
// The casual rebuild must not have erased the ranked projection.
at := now.Add(time.Hour)
gotRanked, err := index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Ranked, at, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ranked snapshot: %v", err)
}
if len(gotRanked) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("ranked worker saw %d candidates behind a 300-deep casual backlog, want 2", len(gotRanked))
}
for _, candidate := range gotRanked {
if candidate.Playlist != domain.Ranked {
t.Fatalf("ranked snapshot leaked a %q candidate: %s", candidate.Playlist, candidate.TicketID)
}
}
// A ranked repair must likewise leave casual alone.
if err := index.Rebuild(ctx, domain.Ranked, ranked[:1]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ranked re-repair: %v", err)
}
gotCasual, err := index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, at, 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("casual snapshot: %v", err)
}
if len(gotCasual) != 300 {
t.Fatalf("ranked rebuild erased casual projection: %d remain", len(gotCasual))
}
}
// The limit must be applied by Redis, not after transfer: the old unbounded
// ZRANGEBYSCORE plus HMGET decoded the entire queue on every one-second poll.
func TestRedisCandidateIndexSnapshotIsBoundedByRedis(t *testing.T) {
mini, err := miniredis.Run()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer mini.Close()
client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: mini.Addr()})
defer client.Close()
index := RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "bounded", TTL: time.Minute}
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC()
candidates := make([]domain.Candidate, 0, 500)
for i := 0; i < 500; i++ {
candidates = append(candidates, domain.Candidate{
Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: fmt.Sprintf("bulk-%03d", i),
PlayerID: fmt.Sprintf("bulk-player-%03d", i), EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Duration(i) * time.Millisecond),
})
}
if err := index.Rebuild(ctx, domain.Casual, candidates); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 10)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(got) != 10 {
t.Fatalf("snapshot returned %d candidates for a limit of 10", len(got))
}
// Oldest-first ordering must survive the bound.
if got[0].TicketID != "bulk-000" || got[9].TicketID != "bulk-009" {
t.Fatalf("bounded snapshot lost enqueue ordering: %s..%s", got[0].TicketID, got[9].TicketID)
}
if _, err := index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 0); err == nil {
t.Fatal("unbounded snapshot accepted")
}
}
server/store/redis_integration_test.go
+10 -10
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func TestRealRedisCandidateIndexUpsertSnapshotRemove(t *testing.T) {
if err := index.Upsert(ctx, b); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("upsert b: %v", err)
}
got, err := index.Snapshot(ctx, now.Add(time.Hour))
got, err := index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("snapshot: %v", err)
}
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ func TestRealRedisCandidateIndexUpsertSnapshotRemove(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("snapshot after upsert = %+v", got)
}
if err := index.Remove(ctx, "real-ticket-a"); err != nil {
if err := index.Remove(ctx, domain.Casual, "real-ticket-a"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
}
got, err = index.Snapshot(ctx, now.Add(time.Hour))
got, err = index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("snapshot after remove: %v", err)
}
@@ -77,11 +77,11 @@ func TestRealRedisCandidateIndexUpsertSnapshotRemove(t *testing.T) {
// A real TTL, actually waited out, not miniredis's manual FastForward.
shortLived := RedisCandidateIndex{Client: client, Prefix: "integration-real-ttl", TTL: 1500 * time.Millisecond}
if err := shortLived.Upsert(ctx, domain.Candidate{TicketID: "real-ticket-ttl", PlayerID: "real-player-ttl", EnqueuedAt: now}); err != nil {
if err := shortLived.Upsert(ctx, domain.Candidate{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "real-ticket-ttl", PlayerID: "real-player-ttl", EnqueuedAt: now}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("upsert ttl candidate: %v", err)
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
got, err = shortLived.Snapshot(ctx, now.Add(time.Hour))
got, err = shortLived.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("snapshot after real TTL expiry: %v", err)
}
@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ func TestRealRedisCandidateProjectionRepairsAfterFlush(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Microsecond)
durable := []domain.Candidate{
{TicketID: "repair-ticket-a", PlayerID: "repair-player-a", EnqueuedAt: now},
{TicketID: "repair-ticket-b", PlayerID: "repair-player-b", EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Second)},
{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "repair-ticket-a", PlayerID: "repair-player-a", EnqueuedAt: now},
{Playlist: domain.Casual, TicketID: "repair-ticket-b", PlayerID: "repair-player-b", EnqueuedAt: now.Add(time.Second)},
}
sourceCalls := 0
projection := CandidateProjection{Index: index, Source: func(context.Context, time.Time) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
projection := CandidateProjection{Index: index, Source: func(context.Context, domain.Playlist, time.Time, int) ([]domain.Candidate, error) {
sourceCalls++
return durable, nil
}}
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ func TestRealRedisCandidateProjectionRepairsAfterFlush(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("flush: %v", err)
}
got, err := projection.Snapshot(ctx, now.Add(time.Hour))
got, err := projection.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("snapshot after flush: %v", err)
}
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ func TestRealRedisCandidateProjectionRepairsAfterFlush(t *testing.T) {
// The repair must actually have written back to Redis, not just returned
// the durable source's answer in memory -- confirm a second snapshot
// (Redis not flushed again) reads it back without a second Source call.
got, err = index.Snapshot(ctx, now.Add(time.Hour))
got, err = index.Snapshot(ctx, domain.Casual, now.Add(time.Hour), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("snapshot directly against Redis after repair: %v", err)
}
server/store/retention.go
+133
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
package store
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"time"
)
// Retention windows. Each must comfortably exceed every retry and recovery
// horizon that could still consult the row, because deleting one early changes
// behaviour rather than merely reclaiming space:
//
// - An idempotency key must outlive any client retry of the same mutation;
// deleting it early turns a replay into a second real mutation. The client
// heartbeats every 10s and abandons a ticket far sooner than this.
// - A published outbox row is only kept for operator forensics; delivery has
// already happened, and the dispatcher never re-reads a published row.
// - A session row past expiry can no longer authenticate, so retaining it
// buys nothing beyond a short audit tail.
const (
IdempotencyKeyRetention = 24 * time.Hour
PublishedOutboxRetention = 72 * time.Hour
ExpiredSessionRetention = 24 * time.Hour
// DeadLetteredOutboxRetention is deliberately the longest: those rows are
// the record of events that were never delivered, and an operator needs
// time to notice and investigate them.
DeadLetteredOutboxRetention = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
)
// Deletes are batched and use SKIP LOCKED so a purge never blocks live
// traffic, never holds a long transaction, and multiple maintenance replicas
// can run concurrently without contending on the same rows.
const (
PurgeIdempotencyKeysSQL = `DELETE FROM idempotency_keys
WHERE (scope, idempotency_key) IN (
SELECT scope, idempotency_key FROM idempotency_keys
WHERE created_at < $1
ORDER BY created_at
LIMIT $2
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
)`
PurgePublishedOutboxSQL = `DELETE FROM outbox
WHERE event_id IN (
SELECT event_id FROM outbox
WHERE published_at IS NOT NULL AND published_at < $1
ORDER BY published_at
LIMIT $2
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
)`
PurgeDeadLetteredOutboxSQL = `DELETE FROM outbox
WHERE event_id IN (
SELECT event_id FROM outbox
WHERE dead_lettered_at IS NOT NULL AND dead_lettered_at < $1
ORDER BY dead_lettered_at
LIMIT $2
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
)`
PurgeExpiredSessionsSQL = `DELETE FROM sessions
WHERE session_id IN (
SELECT session_id FROM sessions
WHERE expires_at < $1
ORDER BY expires_at
LIMIT $2
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
)`
)
// RetentionReport is the per-pass result. Callers expose these as metrics so
// deletion lag is observable: if a count stays pinned at the batch size, the
// purge is not keeping up with insert volume.
type RetentionReport struct {
IdempotencyKeys int64
PublishedOutbox int64
DeadLetteredOutbox int64
ExpiredSessions int64
}
func (r RetentionReport) Total() int64 {
return r.IdempotencyKeys + r.PublishedOutbox + r.DeadLetteredOutbox + r.ExpiredSessions
}
// PurgeExpiredRecords removes one bounded batch from each retained table. It
// returns partial progress alongside an error so a failure in one table does
// not hide the work already done in another.
func PurgeExpiredRecords(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, now time.Time, batch int) (RetentionReport, error) {
var report RetentionReport
if db == nil || now.IsZero() || batch < 1 || batch > 10000 {
return report, fmt.Errorf("invalid retention arguments")
}
steps := []struct {
query string
cutoff time.Time
into *int64
}{
{PurgeIdempotencyKeysSQL, now.Add(-IdempotencyKeyRetention), &report.IdempotencyKeys},
{PurgePublishedOutboxSQL, now.Add(-PublishedOutboxRetention), &report.PublishedOutbox},
{PurgeDeadLetteredOutboxSQL, now.Add(-DeadLetteredOutboxRetention), &report.DeadLetteredOutbox},
{PurgeExpiredSessionsSQL, now.Add(-ExpiredSessionRetention), &report.ExpiredSessions},
}
for _, step := range steps {
result, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, step.query, step.cutoff, batch)
if err != nil {
return report, err
}
deleted, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return report, err
}
*step.into = deleted
}
return report, nil
}
// RetentionBacklog counts rows already past their retention window. This is
// the deletion-lag metric: a number that keeps climbing means the purge
// interval or batch size is too small for current volume.
func RetentionBacklog(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, now time.Time) (int64, error) {
if db == nil || now.IsZero() {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid retention backlog arguments")
}
const query = `SELECT
(SELECT count(*) FROM idempotency_keys WHERE created_at < $1)
+ (SELECT count(*) FROM outbox WHERE published_at IS NOT NULL AND published_at < $2)
+ (SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < $3)`
var backlog int64
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query,
now.Add(-IdempotencyKeyRetention),
now.Add(-PublishedOutboxRetention),
now.Add(-ExpiredSessionRetention),
).Scan(&backlog)
return backlog, err
}

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