Files
Josh Creek f628ccfd35 feat(auth): wire production Steam sign-in and the client login flow
newAPIService never supplied SteamLogin, so POST /v1/session/steam
always returned 503 auth_unavailable in production. The only
implementation was cmd/testkit-api's fake, which derives an identity
from the ticket string itself and accepts anything -- so the passing
integration path was neither deployable nor secure. On the client side
the game started with an empty token and a loopback base URL, and no
production code called configure() or login_steam(); the menu entered
matchmaking directly, so every request failed ERR_UNAUTHORIZED before
reaching the network.

Add a real ISteamUserAuth/AuthenticateUserTicket adapter behind an
interface, so the production login path is testable with only the Valve
call stubbed. It rejects family-shared copies (the account playing does
not own the app) and, by default, VAC- or publisher-banned accounts, and
refuses malformed tickets locally rather than forwarding them.

Crucially it separates our faults from the player's: a Valve outage or a
revoked publisher key returns 503, not 401. Answering 401 would tell a
legitimate player their login failed and send them to fix an account
that is fine while the real fault went unnoticed. A banned identity now
returns 403 rather than a misleading 503.

Sign-in is configuration-gated on the publisher key and App ID: without
them the endpoint keeps returning 503, since silently accepting an
unverified ticket would be worse than refusing to authenticate. A
returning player keeps the player ID they already had, so ratings,
penalties and bans follow the account rather than the session.

Client side: acquire a web-API ticket through GodotSteam's async
signal -- requesting one returns a handle, not a ticket -- using the
existing dynamic-call pattern so stock Godot still parses the project.
The endpoint is configurable for release builds, and matchmaking
completes sign-in before it will queue.

Verified against real PostgreSQL; 232 Godot tests pass.
2026-09-05 10:57:50 +01:00

189 lines
7.1 KiB
Go

package store
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
"github.com/cosmic-clash/cosmic-clash/server/domain"
)
const (
// SessionInsertSQL refuses to mint a session for an actively banned
// identity. Enforcing it here rather than in the login adapter makes the
// ban part of the durable authentication transaction, so it holds for any
// present or future adapter rather than depending on each one to
// re-implement the policy.
SessionInsertSQL = `INSERT INTO sessions (session_id, player_id, token_digest, expires_at, created_at)
SELECT $1, $2, $3, $4, $5
FROM identities i
WHERE i.player_id = $2
AND (i.banned_until IS NULL OR i.banned_until <= $5)`
// SessionSelectSQL joins the identity so an existing session stops working
// the moment a ban lands. Without this a banned player kept full access
// through every already-issued session until it expired.
SessionSelectSQL = `SELECT s.session_id, s.player_id, s.token_digest, s.expires_at, s.revoked_at,
i.banned_until
FROM sessions s
JOIN identities i ON i.player_id = s.player_id
WHERE s.session_id = $1`
SessionRevokeSQL = `UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = COALESCE(revoked_at, $2)
WHERE session_id = $1`
// SessionRevokeAllForPlayerSQL is applied in the same transaction as a ban
// so there is no window in which the ban is durable but the player's
// existing sessions still authenticate on another replica.
SessionRevokeAllForPlayerSQL = `UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = COALESCE(revoked_at, $2)
WHERE player_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`
IdentityBanSQL = `UPDATE identities SET banned_until = $2, ban_reason = $3
WHERE player_id = $1`
IdentityBanClearSQL = `UPDATE identities SET banned_until = NULL, ban_reason = NULL
WHERE player_id = $1`
)
// PostgresSessions persists only a SHA-256 token digest. The plaintext token
// is returned once by Issue and is never sent to SQL or logged by this layer.
type PostgresSessions struct{ DB *sql.DB }
func (s PostgresSessions) Issue(ctx context.Context, playerID string, lifetime time.Duration, now time.Time) (domain.Session, string, error) {
if s.DB == nil || playerID == "" || lifetime <= 0 || now.IsZero() {
return domain.Session{}, "", domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
sessionID, err := opaqueSessionValue()
if err != nil {
return domain.Session{}, "", err
}
token, err := opaqueSessionValue()
if err != nil {
return domain.Session{}, "", err
}
session := domain.Session{SessionID: sessionID, PlayerID: playerID, ExpiresAt: now.Add(lifetime)}
digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
result, err := s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, SessionInsertSQL, session.SessionID, session.PlayerID, digest[:], session.ExpiresAt, now)
if err != nil {
return domain.Session{}, "", err
}
inserted, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return domain.Session{}, "", err
}
if inserted != 1 {
// Either no such identity or an active ban; both refuse issuance.
return domain.Session{}, "", domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
return session, token, nil
}
func (s PostgresSessions) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, sessionID, token string, now time.Time) (domain.Session, error) {
if s.DB == nil || sessionID == "" || token == "" || now.IsZero() {
return domain.Session{}, domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
var session domain.Session
var digestBytes []byte
var revokedAt sql.NullTime
var bannedUntil sql.NullTime
if err := s.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, SessionSelectSQL, sessionID).Scan(&session.SessionID, &session.PlayerID, &digestBytes, &session.ExpiresAt, &revokedAt, &bannedUntil); err != nil {
return domain.Session{}, domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
provided := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
if len(digestBytes) != sha256.Size || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(digestBytes, provided[:]) != 1 || (revokedAt.Valid && !revokedAt.Time.IsZero()) || !now.Before(session.ExpiresAt) {
return domain.Session{}, domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
// Checked on every authenticated request, not only at issuance, so a ban
// takes effect immediately across every replica rather than at expiry.
if bannedUntil.Valid && now.Before(bannedUntil.Time) {
return domain.Session{}, domain.ErrIdentityBanned
}
return session, nil
}
func (s PostgresSessions) Revoke(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, now time.Time) error {
if s.DB == nil || sessionID == "" || now.IsZero() {
return domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
result, err := s.DB.ExecContext(ctx, SessionRevokeSQL, sessionID, now)
if err != nil {
return err
}
changed, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil || changed != 1 {
return domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
return nil
}
func opaqueSessionValue() (string, error) {
value := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(value); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return hex.EncodeToString(value), nil
}
// ApplyIdentityBan makes a ban and the revocation of that identity's existing
// sessions one atomic change. Applying the ban alone would leave a window in
// which another control-plane replica still authenticates an already-issued
// session, which is exactly the gap that made banned_until dead schema.
//
// bannedUntil is the instant the ban lifts; a zero value clears the ban.
func ApplyIdentityBan(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, playerID, reason string, bannedUntil, now time.Time) error {
if db == nil || playerID == "" || now.IsZero() {
return domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
if !bannedUntil.IsZero() && !bannedUntil.After(now) {
return domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
return RunSerializable(ctx, db, DefaultSerializableAttempts, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
var result sql.Result
var err error
if bannedUntil.IsZero() {
result, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, IdentityBanClearSQL, playerID)
} else {
result, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, IdentityBanSQL, playerID, bannedUntil, reason)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
changed, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if changed != 1 {
return domain.ErrSessionRejected
}
if bannedUntil.IsZero() {
// Unbanning does not resurrect revoked sessions; the player signs
// in again and receives a fresh one.
return nil
}
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, SessionRevokeAllForPlayerSQL, playerID, now)
return err
})
}
// IdentityUpsertSQL resolves a verified Steam ID to a durable player ID,
// creating the identity on first sign-in. The player ID is derived by the
// backend and never supplied by the client.
const IdentityUpsertSQL = `INSERT INTO identities (player_id, steam_id)
VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT (steam_id) DO UPDATE SET steam_id = EXCLUDED.steam_id
RETURNING player_id`
// ResolveSteamIdentity returns the player ID for a verified Steam ID. The
// proposed ID is used only when this Steam ID has never signed in before; an
// existing identity keeps the player ID it already had, so a returning player
// keeps their ratings and penalties.
func ResolveSteamIdentity(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, steamID, proposedPlayerID string) (string, error) {
if db == nil || steamID == "" || proposedPlayerID == "" {
return "", domain.ErrTicketRejected
}
var playerID string
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, IdentityUpsertSQL, proposedPlayerID, steamID).Scan(&playerID); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return playerID, nil
}