Each ten-second queue heartbeat mints a fresh idempotency key and
permanently inserts a row. Published outbox rows and expired/revoked
sessions were never purged either -- the maintenance role performed
lifecycle reconciliation only. At 10,000 queued players heartbeats alone
add roughly 60,000 durable rows per minute, so table and index growth,
vacuum pressure, backup size and recovery time were all unbounded on a
service intended to scale horizontally.
Add retention windows chosen to exceed every retry and recovery horizon
that could still consult the row -- deleting an idempotency key early
would turn a client replay into a second real mutation, so this is a
correctness bound, not just a housekeeping one. Dead-lettered outbox
rows are kept longest, being the record of events never delivered.
Deletes run in bounded SKIP LOCKED batches so a purge never blocks live
traffic, never holds a long transaction, and concurrent maintenance
replicas do not contend. Indexes back each predicate so a pass cannot
degrade into a sequential scan of the table it is bounding. The
maintenance role reports rows purged, the backlog past its window
(deletion lag), and any dead-lettered events.
Also make the migration-rollback test derive its step counts instead of
hardcoding them: adding a migration silently shifted the fixed counts so
the failure surfaced as an unrelated "0006 rollback did not drop
matches.allocation_id".
The Deployment runs two replicas, but WebSocket subscribers live only in
each process's in-memory hub. Every replica races to read the same
global unpublished outbox rows, and publishing succeeded even when the
winning replica held no matching local subscriber -- that replica then
set the single global published_at. A client connected to the other
replica never received the event, and delivery degraded further with
each replica added. REST recovery eventually converged, but short-lived
proposal transitions could be observed late or not at all.
Publish committed events through PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY so the replica
that owns the subscriber's connection delivers it, regardless of which
replica drained the row. The listener holds its own pgx connection --
LISTEN is session state, so a pooled database/sql connection cannot
carry it -- and reconnects with backoff, since losing it would silently
downgrade that replica's subscribers to REST-only recovery.
The fan-out is optional: without EventFanout configured, behaviour is
unchanged local-hub publication, which stays correct for a single
replica and for tests. Only outbox-sourced events are routed through it;
the in-request-path publishes remain local, as those are a latency
optimisation for the caller's own connection.
Fan-out needs a wire shape of its own because ControlPlaneEvent hides
PlayerID from clients, and the recipient is exactly what a peer replica
needs to route on.
Both playlists shared one hash and sorted set, causing two independent
failures.
Starvation: Snapshot performed an unbounded ZRANGEBYSCORE and HMGET,
decoded the whole queue, and the matcher then truncated to its candidate
limit *before* filtering by playlist. A large casual prefix could
therefore leave the ranked worker with zero candidates indefinitely even
while ranked tickets were queued further down the set.
Mutual erasure: each matcher captured only its own playlist as the
durable source, but Rebuild replaced the shared keys, so a casual repair
wiped ranked projections and vice versa.
Namespace the keys per playlist, push the limit into Redis (LIMIT 0 N)
so reads no longer scale with total queue depth, and scope Rebuild to
one namespace. Rebuild now rejects a candidate whose playlist does not
match the namespace, which would reintroduce the starvation. Upsert
derives the namespace from the candidate; Remove takes the playlist,
since a ticket ID alone no longer identifies its namespace.
Add tests for a 300-deep casual backlog not starving ranked, for neither
playlist's rebuild erasing the other, and for the limit being applied
without losing enqueue ordering.
Closes §8.43's 'version-mismatch-specific client messaging' gap. Per
the user's explicit go-ahead to design new server behavior for this
(rather than only wiring up something that already existed, the
pattern every other fix this session followed): before this, there
was no server-side protocol rejection at all. queue_create accepted
any protocol_version >= 1 unconditionally, so an outdated client could
only ever discover a mismatch by waiting in the queue forever
unmatched -- the matcher's own compatibility check requires every
formed player to share an identical protocol_version -- with no error
and no explanation given to the player.
Server: Service.MinProtocolVersion (opt-in, zero by default so every
existing caller keeps accepting protocol_version 1 unconditionally)
rejects a below-floor queue_create with 426 Upgrade Required /
client_outdated before the request ever reaches the candidate
provider. Wired via cmd/control-plane's new --min-protocol-version
flag (validated non-negative at startup).
Client: ControlPlaneClient recognises HTTPClient.RESPONSE_UPGRADE_REQUIRED
on queue_create specifically and sets a distinct 'Your client is out
of date -- please update to continue searching' message instead of
the server's raw generic error string, and clears _last_queue_create
so can_retry_queue_create() never offers 'Retry Search' for a failure
that retrying with the same build can never fix.
Verified: go build/vet/test -race clean across every server package.
TestQueueCreateEnforcesMinProtocolVersion covers below-floor rejection
(candidate provider never reached), exactly-at-floor acceptance, and
the error body naming client_outdated; TestQueueCreateMinProtocolVersionZeroIsDisabled
proves the opt-in default doesn't change behavior for every existing
caller. Godot: test_outdated_client_receives_a_distinct_message_and_no_retry_offer
proves the distinct message and suppressed retry offer. Full Godot
suite (217/217, 0 failed, no crash), full make verify-multiplayer-local
gate, zero new crash reports.
Closes the remaining gap the previous two commits left open: WorkloadVerify
itself worked, but nothing minted a real token at allocation time or handed
it to a running pod, so it had no real caller yet.
agones.Client gains WorkloadSecret/WorkloadTokenTTL. When set, Allocate
mints a signed workload token for the allocation (allocation_id is known at
request-construction time, before Agones has picked a server -- see the
previous commit for why that's the only identifier the token can bind) and
requests it as a third cosmic-clash.io/workload-token annotation, alongside
the existing match-id/allocation-id ones. Left unset (the default), Allocate
requests no such annotation, so a deployment not yet using this path is
unaffected. cmd/allocator wires it from a new --workload-secret /
COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET flag (must match cmd/control-plane's own), with
a startup warning if left unset.
supervisor.Supervisor.workloadToken() resolves the bearer credential for
control-plane registration: an explicitly configured --workload-token-path
always wins (kept for a future Kubernetes-projected-JWT WorkloadVerify path,
not yet wired server-side), otherwise it falls back to the
cosmic-clash.io/workload-token annotation on the allocated GameServer --
the same annotation-fallback pattern matchID already used for
cosmic-clash.io/match-id. WorkloadTokenPath is accordingly no longer
required at construction time when ControlPlaneURL is set.
Verified: new agones test proves the annotation is requested (and parses/
verifies against the same secret, naming the right allocation) when
WorkloadSecret is configured, and that it's absent when it isn't; new
supervisor tests prove the annotation-sourced token is what's actually sent
as the Authorization bearer, and that Start fails closed with neither a
configured path nor an annotation present. Full
`go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l . && go test ./... -race` and
`go test -tags integration ./... -race` both clean.
WorkloadVerify (api.Service.WorkloadVerify) was permanently unwired: both
/v1/servers/{id}/register and /v1/servers/{id}/result always 503, because
the only design considered so far was verifying a Kubernetes-projected
service-account JWT (server/workload/jwt.go), which needs a live cluster's
TokenReview/JWKS endpoint to validate against safely -- something this
sandbox cannot do without guessing at a trust boundary.
The API layer doesn't actually require that specific mechanism. serverMutation
only compares WorkloadBinding.ServerID and .MatchID (server/api/service.go);
AdvanceServerRegistration only uses .MatchID/.ServerID/.AllocationID. Nothing
downstream needs Namespace/ServiceAcct/PodUID/GameServerUID populated.
This adds a self-contained alternative: a short-lived, HMAC-signed token the
control plane mints and verifies with a secret only it holds (server/workload/
signed_token.go), the same trust model domain.SessionStore already uses for
player sessions elsewhere in this codebase. It needs no cluster to verify --
signature + expiry is fully self-contained and unit-testable.
The design's soundness rests on the delivery channel, not the crypto: the
token is meant to reach the allocated GameServer via the same Agones
GameServerAllocation annotation channel allocation.go already uses for
match-id/allocation-id, readable only by that pod's own local SDK sidecar. A
caller presenting this token has already proven, via that channel, that it is
the pod Agones allocated. (Wiring the actual annotation delivery -- extending
agones.Client.Allocate and the supervisor's token source -- is a separate,
follow-up change; this commit lands the verification core it depends on.)
store.AllocationBindingStillValid adds defense-in-depth on top of signature
and expiry: it cross-checks the token's claims against the durable
allocations table (append-only, never leaves 'ALLOCATED'), so a validly-signed
token naming an allocation that was never recorded -- or a real allocation id
paired with a mismatched match/server -- is still rejected.
api.WorkloadVerifierFromSignedToken wires the two together and is now plugged
into cmd/control-plane (new --workload-secret / COSMIC_CLASH_WORKLOAD_SECRET
flag; a startup warning is logged if it's left unset, since the route then
stays 503 exactly as before) and cmd/testkit-api (fixed test secret, since
that binary is test-only already).
Verified: new unit tests in server/workload (signature tamper, wrong secret,
expiry boundary, malformed input) and a new Postgres integration suite in
server/api (real allocation row, real signed token, acceptance / unknown-
allocation rejection / mismatched-triple rejection / the previously-503
Service.WorkloadVerify field itself) -- both run clean with -race across
multiple passes against a live postgres:17-alpine container. Full
`go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l . && go test ./... -race` and
`go test -tags integration ./... -race` both clean.
Same discovery pattern as ResultSubmitter/SessionIssuer, one level
deeper: api.Service.rankedProfile and .profile both only ever read
from an in-memory RankedProfiles map with no durable-store equivalent
at all -- not "adapter exists but unwired" this time, there was no
adapter. Every real request to GET /v1/profile/ranked or /api/v1/profile
always 404'd regardless of a player's actual rating.
Add RankedProfileProvider (an interface, not a struct-literal adapter
this time) and store.PostgresRankedProfiles reading the ratings table;
Service.rankedProfileFor prefers it when set and falls back to the
map otherwise, so every existing test/direct Service literal keeps
compiling and passing unchanged. A missing ratings row maps to the
exact same (zero value, false, nil) the map lookup already produced,
preserving existing not-found semantics rather than reinterpreting
them. LastSeasonID/SeasonHistory are deliberately left unset -- the
ratings table has no season pointer, and reconstructing history needs
its own query and display semantics, not bundled in here speculatively.
Wired into both cmd/control-plane and cmd/testkit-api. Verified
against real PostgreSQL via curl: a fresh identity's ranked profile
correctly 404s through the real adapter (same behavior as before,
now for a real reason instead of an empty map).
Every existing test of the client/control-plane boundary is either a
Go unit test with a mocked HTTP layer or a GDScript unit test with no
network at all (multiplayer-next.md 8.40's own evidence names "live
multi-process control-plane/game verification" as remaining). Nothing
before this actually ran the real compiled Go binary, a real
PostgreSQL instance, and a real headless Godot process talking real
HTTP to each other -- and it immediately found a real bug (previous
commit).
server/cmd/testkit-api is a new, deliberately separate, clearly-marked
test-only binary wired identically to cmd/control-plane except for
SteamLogin: cmd/control-plane has no way to authenticate against a
real Steam Web API from this sandbox (task 8.7's own documented
blocker), so testkit-api accepts any non-empty ticket string and
derives a deterministic identity instead. This bypass is confined to
its own binary -- never a flag on cmd/control-plane, never referenced
by any Dockerfile stage or Kubernetes manifest -- specifically so it
can't become a footgun on the real one.
Game/tests/control_plane_smoke.gd drives the real ControlPlaneClient
autoload through login -> queue_create -> heartbeat against a real
server and prints SMOKE PASS/FAIL, matching the existing net_smoke.gd
convention. scripts/verify_control_plane_integration.sh orchestrates
both sides (real postgres:17-alpine, the built testkit-api binary, the
Godot client) end to end.
Two real bugs surfaced building this, both fixed and re-verified, not
just the target bug: the smoke script's own use of `go run` left a
zombie process that survived cleanup and squatting on its port
corrupted the NEXT run with a misleading "http=401 unauthorized" (now
builds and runs a real binary directly, plus a belt-and-suspenders
port-kill in cleanup); and calling heartbeat() synchronously from
within a request_succeeded handler produced a spurious "Busy" because
ControlPlaneClient's own internal resync (see previous commit) was
still in flight -- the test now waits for ControlPlaneClient to go
idle via a real Timer (call_deferred alone floods the message queue
without ever yielding a frame for the in-flight request to complete).
Verified stable across 3 consecutive full runs: real PostgreSQL
container up, migrations applied, testkit-api built and started, real
headless Godot client round-tripping login/queue/heartbeat, clean
teardown with no leftover processes, containers, or bound ports each
time.
Same pattern and same discovery method as the ResultSubmitter fix:
store.PostgresSessions already implements SessionIssuer.Issue (used by
steamSession() to mint sessions) as well as SessionBackend.Authenticate
(used to verify them), and was already wired for the latter -- but not
the former, so /v1/session/steam always 503'd with auth_unavailable
even before considering whether SteamLogin (the real, still-correctly-
unwired Steam blocker) was available. Wire it: same struct value,
second field.
Not independently visible via a black-box HTTP test yet -- SteamLogin
still nil means the handler's first guard clause still 503s before
ever reaching SessionIssuer, so the observable symptom is unchanged
until Steam access exists. Verified by reading the handler's actual
branch order, not by a test that would currently pass for the wrong
reason.
Investigating the fleet.yaml wiring task found something more
fundamental than a manifest problem: cmd/control-plane/main.go never
wires WorkloadVerify, and store.PostgresResults (a ready-made,
already-correct ResultSubmitter adapter matching the interface
exactly) was referenced from nowhere outside its own file -- not even
a test. Both server-authenticated routes this session built
(/v1/servers/{id}/register and the pre-existing /result) are
completely unreachable in the actual running control-plane binary
today: Service.serverMutation treats a nil WorkloadVerify as fatal
for both routes regardless of ServerRegistrar/ResultSubmitter being
present, so every real request 503s.
Wire the safe, obviously-correct half: ResultSubmitter now uses
store.PostgresResults{DB: db}, same pattern as ServerRegistrar.
Deliberately NOT attempting a WorkloadVerify implementation here.
server/workload/jwt.go's ParseAndValidate needs a pre-known "expected"
WorkloadBinding to construct its policy against (itself needing a
durable per-allocation lookup that doesn't exist yet) plus a real
cryptographic SignatureVerifier -- which for a Kubernetes projected
service account token means either fetching/caching the cluster's own
JWKS or delegating to the API server's TokenReview endpoint, a
different verification model that doesn't fit ParseAndValidate's
signature-callback shape at all and would need its own domain-level
adapter. This is authentication-critical code with no existing
wiring example anywhere in the codebase to follow, and the actual
trust boundary (a live cluster's key material) can't be validated
from this sandbox regardless of how carefully the client code is
written. Building it fast under this session's already-heavy pace
risked a subtle, dangerous mistake far more costly than leaving the
gap named precisely, which is what this commit does instead.
Added TestServerRoutesRequireWorkloadVerifyToBeWired: pins the
current 503-on-every-request behavior as an explicit, visible
regression trip-wire rather than a silent gap -- it's designed to
start failing (and be updated, not deleted) the day WorkloadVerify is
actually wired.
Closes the last named item on task 8.28 (Health-reclaim): nothing
currently detects or cleans up a match stuck in
ALLOCATING/PROCESS_READY/ASSIGNMENT_READY forever because its server
crashed or was reclaimed by Agones as unhealthy before ever
registering -- players would wait indefinitely for a match that was
never coming.
The design question this was blocked on -- does an abandoned match
auto-requeue its players, or fail and make them re-queue -- isn't
actually open: task 8.50's own stated acceptance criterion already
answers it ("infrastructure-caused cases cannot penalise affected
players"). A server-side crash/reclaim is exactly that, not player
behaviour, so store.ExpireStalledAllocations fails the match but
requeues every participant's ticket to QUEUED with a fresh expiry
(matching the ordinary 30s queue window), releases their
match_participants row (participation_active = false, so they're
matchable again immediately), all inside one FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
pass so a second maintenance replica continues past whatever a
concurrent one is already reclaiming.
Wired into cmd/maintenance alongside the existing season-rollover
sweep: --stalled-allocation-deadline (default 2m) and
--stalled-allocation-batch (default 100).
Covered by a SQL-fragment test and a real PostgreSQL integration test:
two matches (one genuinely stalled, one recent), confirming the
deadline boundary is respected (recent match untouched), both
stranded participants' tickets requeue with a refreshed expiry, the
match_participants row releases, and a second pass doesn't reprocess
an already-FAILED match. Verified clean across 5 runs, plus the full
integration and unit suites.
Closes the second blocker named last commit. Re-traced the actual code
path rather than trusting the earlier assumption: server_boot.gd
verifies its mounted roster file synchronously in _ready(), before
NetworkManager.host() runs and before ServerControl.set_process_ready
is ever called -- so by the time the loopback /ready probe (and thus
Agones Ready, and thus process-ready registration) succeeds, Godot has
already verified its own roster. And the API's ASSIGNMENT_READY gate
(AdvanceServerRegistrationSQL) checks only durable `assignments` rows
server-side, nothing Godot reports. No new Godot-side state was needed
-- the earlier 'needs Godot's own roster-verification state exposed'
claim was overcautious and is corrected here.
The supervisor now calls registerControlPlane(ctx, true) right after
process-ready succeeds, with a bounded retry (default 5 attempts, 2s
apart, both configurable) rather than a single attempt: the durable
`assignments` rows the server-side gate checks may not have propagated
by the first attempt, and that is expected, not fatal. Unlike a
process-ready registration failure, a persistent assignment-ready
failure does NOT kill the child -- the process is already legitimately
listening and usable, and killing a healthy process over a lagging
control-plane read would be actively harmful; it's logged to stderr
instead.
Covered by two tests: the full process-ready-then-assignment-ready
sequence and body shapes, and a retry test that fails the assignment-
ready call twice with 409 (simulating the real gate not yet
satisfied) before succeeding on the third attempt, asserting Start()
still succeeds and the child is never killed.
Investigated the Fleet-manifest wiring task flagged last commit and
found a deeper, previously-undesigned gap: Kubernetes env vars are
fixed at pod creation, but Agones allocates a match to an already-
running Ready pod well after it starts -- so there was no channel at
all for match-specific data (match ID) to reach that pod's processes.
Close it using the Agones GameServerAllocation API's documented
spec.metadata.annotations field, which Agones applies to the allocated
GameServer's own object_meta on success: server/agones.Client.Allocate
now requests cosmic-clash.io/match-id and cosmic-clash.io/allocation-id
annotations, and the supervisor reads them back from the same
/gameserver SDK call it already makes for the assigned port/address
(GameServer.ObjectMeta.Annotations), falling back to them for its own
control-plane registration only when MatchID isn't explicitly
configured -- an explicit value always wins, and a match ID resolvable
from neither source fails Start() closed before any HTTP call.
The exact object_meta vs objectMeta JSON key from a live Agones SDK
sidecar is not independently verified from this sandbox; documented
inline, and the fallback degrades safely (empty annotations map, same
as before this change) if it turns out to be wrong.
Covered by two new tests: the annotation actually flowing through to
the registration body, and fail-closed with neither config nor
annotation supplying a match ID (registerCalled stays false, not just
that Start() errors).
Add opt-in control-plane registration to server/supervisor: once Agones
Ready succeeds, POST /v1/servers/{id}/register (assignment_ready=false)
using a workload token read fresh from disk each call -- matching how a
Kubernetes projected service account token is rotated in place by
kubelet, unlike a cached/env-var secret. ControlPlaneURL empty (the
default) is a total no-op, so direct/Compose mode and allocated-without-
control-plane mode are both byte-for-byte unaffected; New() rejects a
half-configured registration (URL set without token path/server/match/
digest) rather than silently skipping it.
ServerID/MatchID/ImageDigest are read from env vars named by CLI flags
(--server-id-env, --match-id-env, --image-digest-env), matching the
existing --drain-token-env convention in this same binary, rather than
parsed out of the Agones SDK's own GameServer JSON -- that shape isn't
independently verifiable from here, whereas the Kubernetes Downward API
(fieldRef: metadata.name) populating an env var is a standard, safe
pattern already used elsewhere in this codebase for exactly this class
of secret.
A registration failure now kills the child (matching the existing
waitReady failure path) rather than leaving Agones-Ready-but-
control-plane-unregistered process running -- a real gap the second new
test (TestControlPlaneRegistrationFailureKillsChildRatherThanRunningUnregistered)
had to be corrected to actually exercise: its first draft omitted
ReadyURL and was failing at waitReady, before ever reaching the code
path it claimed to test.
server/observability existed fully unit-tested but was imported by
nothing outside its own package -- no HTTP handler ever called it, so
its credential redaction protected zero real log output. Wire it into
Service via an optional Log field (nil-safe, so every existing Service
literal keeps compiling unchanged) and call it from the two
workload-authenticated server routes -- register and result -- at
every outcome: unauthorized, rejected, conflict and success. Wire
cmd/control-plane to actually emit those events as JSON lines on
stderr.
Add a secret canary test that drives both routes end to end with
realistic bearer-token and result-nonce values and asserts neither
literal secret appears anywhere in what Service.Log actually received
-- a stronger claim than the existing observability unit test, which
only proves redact() strips a synthetic value under a denylisted key
name. redact() is still key-name-based, not content-based: a future
call site that logs a secret under an unlisted key name would not be
caught by this test or by redact() itself, only by the same discipline
applied here of never putting raw request/token bytes into Fields.
Queue, proposal and assignment mutation routes are not wired yet.
Add migrations.Rollback(ctx, db, dir, steps): reverses the N most
recently applied migrations, newest first, each in its own committed
transaction under the same advisory lock Apply uses. Down SQL lives in
migrations/down/<version>.sql (a subdirectory, so Apply's *.sql glob
over the main directory is untouched); a missing down file for a
migration being rolled back is a hard error rather than a silent
partial reversal. Wire it into cmd/migrate as --rollback=N.
Add down files for all six existing migrations, each dropping objects
in FK-safe reverse dependency order.
Adversarial review: could not run the new integration test
(TestPostgreSQLMigrationsRollBackAndReapplyCleanly, gated behind
COSMIC_CLASH_POSTGRES_DSN / scripts/run_postgres_integration.sh)
against a real database in this sandbox - Docker Desktop's own
overlayfs ran out of space pulling postgres:17-alpine, unrelated to
this change. Verified instead by hand-tracing every DROP against its
forward migration's FK graph, confirming Apply's directory glob does
not pick up the down/ subdirectory, and a clean go build/vet/test
-tags integration. Worth an explicit real run before this is trusted
in CI.
Add POST /v1/servers/{id}/register (and its /api/v1 contract alias),
authenticated by the same workload binding as the result route. A
game server reports its protocol version and image digest and asks
to advance ALLOCATING -> PROCESS_READY -> ASSIGNMENT_READY; the store
boundary (AdvanceServerRegistration) does this as one idempotent
SERIALIZABLE transaction that also advances every participant's queue
ticket, and gates the final transition on every participant having a
live, unexpired assignment.
Adversarial review of the surrounding routing turned up a pre-existing
bug: contractServerMutation rejected any path containing '/', so the
already-documented /api/v1/servers/{id}/result route (and this new
/register route) 404'd for every real caller despite being declared
in the OpenAPI contract. Fix it to delegate shape validation to
serverMutation, matching how contractQueueMutation handles its own
two-segment paths, and add a regression test covering both contract
routes end to end.
Josh Creek